Reading another's letters

671. The secret of letters. To open the letters of others, or to read them when opened and secretly kept, is of itself a sin from its kind grave against justice: for anyone has a strict right to his own secret. But smallness of matter is given in this thing; therefore if someone were to read letters which he prudently supposes contain only matters of light moment, he would not sin gravely.

To collect letters torn into tiny pieces and thrown into a public place, and to read them after putting together the fragments, is probably not against justice; yet if the letters contain anything whose revelation would turn to the detriment of the owner, that must be kept hidden from charity, under grave or light obligation according to the measure of the damage.

St. Alphonsus indeed (n. 70) judges it more probable that one who reads the fragments after putting them together sins against justice, because letters are torn up so that they cannot be read, and therefore the tearing is a sign that the owner wishes to reserve to himself the right over the secret which is contained in the letters. Lugo, on the contrary (disp. 14, n. 151), judges that the reader does not sin against justice, because casting into a public place is a sign that the owner yields his right over the letters cast out, whose reading he cannot impede; but they are torn up in order that the reading may be made more difficult.

672. Permission to open the letters of others. It is lawful to open another's letters or to read them when opened:

a. From tacit consent or consent rightly and deservedly presumed (for example, by reason of friendship) either of him who writes the letters or of him to whom they are written: for each can yield his right over the secret, and therefore thus injury is done to no one.

b. From a rule to which one has freely subjected himself. Therefore regular superiors can licitly open and read the letters of their subjects where either this right is granted them from the rule or has been introduced through legitimate custom. Nevertheless letters which are directed to mediate superiors are excepted, and letters which contain secrets of conscience. If the superior rightly doubts whether the letters truly contain secrets of conscience, he can licitly inspect them; but if they truly contain secrets, he must abstain from reading.

c. From the necessity of averting grave damage from the republic, from subjects, or from oneself. Therefore a. it is lawful for public authority (princes, military leaders) to open letters if sufficient indications are present that this is necessary for consulting the public good. b. It is lawful for a father of a family to read the letters of children who are still under paternal power, and for a superior to read the letters of pupils committed to his care, unless they treat of matters of conscience or contain secrets of the family, because this is judged necessary for consulting the good of the son or subject. c. It is lawful for a private man in particular cases to read another's letters when he rightly and deservedly judges that something is contained in them which would turn to his grave damage (n. 666).

It is not lawful for masters to read the letters of servants, nor for husbands the letters of wives, by reason of servitude or marriage; yet if they judge with moral certitude that something evil is contained in them, this is lawful to them from what has been said above.

The doctrine with regard to secrets is applicable to the opening and reading of letters, unless it is known that they contain no secrets and the writer is not aggrieved. It is, however, a general rule of Religious Orders that letters written by and to religious may be opened by the superior, except such as contain matters of conscience, and communications between higher superiors and their subjects.

852. A secret, subjectively taken, is knowledge of a thing hidden from others and to be hidden, or the knowledge and obligation of not manifesting some hidden thing; objectively, it is the hidden thing itself and to be hidden, which can be very diverse: an invention of art or science, or some fact, for example that an office is vacant, or an unknown crime. In the present matter, secret is chiefly taken subjectively. It is threefold:

a) Natural, whose obligation arises without contract from the very nature of the thing, because it cannot be manifested without harm or displeasure of the neighbor, and accordingly without his being reasonably unwilling. Thus if by chance or by effort you know another's money laid away, an invention, or a hidden crime, it is not licit to manifest it.

b) Promised, whose obligation arises from a gratuitous promise following upon knowledge of the matter, or because someone has promised to keep it, even if the matter from its nature does not induce an obligation of secrecy; for example, if someone concerning a thing previously known or now already received, spontaneously or at a friend's request, promises silence.

c) Committed or rigorous, whose obligation arises from an onerous promise antecedent to the reception of the secret, or because it is committed under an express or tacit pact of keeping it and is thus accepted by another.

Namely, first, expressly or tacitly, it is promised that it is not to be revealed: expressly indeed if someone says that he will not manifest the matter except under the express condition that the other keep silence about it (a private secret, which is required on account of a private good); tacitly when from some fact it is clear that the matter is committed under secrecy and that the other accepts it thus, as if it is committed to someone who by office, by force of the duty he bears, or by the special title of kinship or friendship, is bound not to manifest it (an officious or professional secret, which is required on account of the public good), for example, to a counselor, physician, midwife, advocate, theologian, confessor, visitor, parents, friends, etc., to whom a matter is manifested only because it is supposed to be faithfully guarded by them.

Consequently a committed secret obliges in varying degree: less when it was committed wholly freely, more if to a private person for the sake of counsel, still more if to one established in office, most of all when it is committed to a counselor in a public cause.

853. Principles. - Everyone has a strict right to his own secret. That right is proximately founded partly in dominion over one's own thoughts and the fruits of one's own genius or labor, partly in the right to reputation and external goods, insofar as, namely, from a violated secret there can be harm to reputation or fortune, or ceasing gain; ultimately it is founded in the common good. Hence the right of secrecy is relative and limited. Therefore of itself it is illicit, and indeed gravely, 1. to explore a secret; 2. to manifest a secret; 3. to use knowledge of a secret.

I. To explore a secret is illicit without legitimate authority or a just cause. For a secret is another's thing; therefore one who illegitimately explores it, for example by force, deceit, or fraud, usurps another's thing and takes it away from its owner. The gravity of this sin depends on the gravity of the thing which is extorted.

Hence a) of itself and generally it is illicit to listen at a wall or door, or to open letters, or to break open a chest, or to corrupt servants or workers in order to know another's secret, even an invention of art or science.¹

¹ An invention of art or science can licitly be detected by art or study; but this properly is not directly to explore another's secret, but to devise a similar invention by one's own ingenuity, whereby another's secret indirectly becomes known.

b) From legitimate authority, superiors (bishops, magistrates, judges) sometimes can and ought to explore secrets on account of the common good, for example, for detecting crimes committed or to be committed; and parents can do so on account of the good of children and of the family.

c) From a just cause, for example to avoid unjust harm, whether proper, common, or of an innocent third party, it is licit to explore the secret of him from whom harm threatens, for example, a crime committed or probably to be committed against oneself or against an innocent third party, the forces and positions of enemies in a just war.

II. To manifest a secret of itself is illicit, as being against charity and at the same time against fidelity or justice, because it is apt to be done with harm or displeasure of another, or also violates a promise or pact.

III. To use knowledge of a secret for one's own advantage or that of a third party, against the owner's will, is illicit, especially if it is done with his harm; a fortiori it is illicit if someone has detected the secret unjustly, because it would be to continue injustice.

Unless, however, it is in those circumstances in which there is a sufficient just cause for exploring a secret. But one who by unjustly using another's secret, as by revealing it, has brought harm upon another, is bound to restitution.

854. What the obligation of secrecy is. - I. A natural secret obliges from justice, by reason of harm; and one who violates it without just cause commits a grave sin from its genus.

II. A merely promised secret of itself obliges from fidelity alone, by reason of a simple promise; and one who violates it without just cause commits a venial sin, unless he intended to bind himself from justice, or the secret is at the same time natural.

III. A committed secret obliges from justice, by reason of a special contract; and one who violates it without just cause therefore sins gravely, and indeed more gravely, other things being equal, than for a natural secret. Especially if the secret is officious, because the common good regularly demands that it be preserved inviolate: for it pertains to the common good that all may safely seek counsel or help from those who by office or special title are able to furnish it. Hence such a secret ought not to be manifested to a judge or superior interrogating, and it also obliges if otherwise it would have had to be manifested; so that it is never to be revealed unless the common good demands it and by the law of nature it must altogether be revealed.²

² St. Thomas, II-II, q. 70, a. 1, ad 2.

855. There is a threefold just cause for manifesting a secret, on account of which the obligation of secrecy ceases:

1. The consent of him whose secret it is, at least reasonably presumed; for example, if a subject is denounced under secrecy, the superior can manifest, not indeed the denouncer, but the offense, in order to correct the delinquent.

2. Divulgation of the matter made from elsewhere; hence it is licit for him who had otherwise known a committed secret to speak about the secret, or to speak with a man who has knowledge of it.

3. The necessity of averting harm: generally it is licit to reveal a secret whenever this revelation is necessary for averting proportionately grave harm, public or private, proper or another's; indeed charity and legal justice sometimes require this manifestation. But a greater necessity is required the stricter and graver the obligation of keeping the secret is, which depends both on the nature of the secret and on the harm to be brought by manifestation.

But a fourfold necessity is given on account of which it is licit to manifest a secret as much as is sufficient for averting harm:

a) Grave common harm of civil society or of the Church: for the obligation of secrecy, which is principally introduced on account of the public good, ceases where the public good requires the manifestation of the secret, according to the adage: the safety of the republic is the supreme law. Therefore not just any harm to be avoided suffices, for example from the fact that otherwise some guilty man remains unpunished, but urgent necessity from a most grave impending harm.

Thus if someone under secrecy, even committed secrecy, has known another's purpose of greatly harming the city or the Church, from which he cannot otherwise be recalled, he can and ought to reveal the secret to authority. So also a physician is bound to denounce a sick person who could easily infect others gravely.

b) Grave harm of the very person committing the secret: for then he cannot be reasonably unwilling.

Thus, to prevent a marriage from being invalid, a hidden impediment which someone has known under secrecy must be revealed to the proper priest.

c) Grave harm of an innocent third party to be averted by revelation of the secret of the harmful person: for charity demands that we prevent grave harm of an innocent person, even with harm of the guilty person.

Yet if the matter concerns a committed secret, especially an officious one, it will not be able to be manifested unless the harm is still to be inflicted and by the very person who committed the secret about the harm to be inflicted. For the common good regularly requires that such a secret be kept, except in the case in which the one committing it is himself an unjust aggressor, against whom the innocent person can be defended. Thus if someone from a committed secret should know Peter to be a murderer, he could not reveal the matter to free Paul unjustly accused; yet he could do so if the accusation had been made by Peter himself. Likewise a physician, knowing by professional secrecy that a bridegroom is infected with venereal disease, could manifest the matter to the deceived bride, indeed he ought to do so, if the bridegroom, having been warned, would not desist from marriage.

d) Grave proper harm, for example danger of death, even if similar grave harm threatened another: for no one is judged to have bound himself with so great an inconvenience, unless he has expressly promised it and the promise was valid.

Yet if the matter concerns a committed secret, it will not be able to be manifested with great harm (for example, of life) to the one committing it, unless the danger comes from him, because then he is an unjust aggressor; otherwise, however, it is illicit. But in practice, the one committing it can first be warned about taking precautions against the harm which threatens him from the revelation to be made. Thus one who is falsely accused of homicide, whose author he knows from a committed secret, if it is necessary, can reveal the name of the guilty person after he has warned him to protect himself by flight.

Let it be noted that a secret can never be manifested, even for averting a most grave harm of death, proper or another's, if the common good demands that the hidden matter be wholly kept, as if the custody of the secret is altogether necessary for the security of society or of an army. Thus the secret of the seal of the sacrament of Penance can never be violated, because the greater good of religion and the salvation of the faithful always demands that it be preserved inviolate.

856. Corollary: on the secrecy of letters. - To open another's letters, or to read those already opened and kept in a closed place, for example in a desk, or lost by chance, of itself is a sin grave from its genus against justice: for everyone has a strict right to his own secret; and one who explores it without the owner's consent acts after the manner of a thief.

1. Hence they sin gravely who intend to know in this way secrets of great importance (matters regarding family, business, or conscience), or expose themselves to the danger of knowing them.

2. Nevertheless the sin will be only slight: a) of itself, if it is morally certain or can reasonably be presumed that nothing is found in these letters except matters of lesser importance, such as greetings, narrations of lesser events, commercial notes, and that grave infamy or grave harm cannot arise therefrom; b) accidentally, if letters are read from levity of mind or without full advertence, for example, to know news, to laugh at a barbarous manner of writing, and the reading is interrupted as soon as it appears that the matter is grave.

3. There will be no sin: a) if the consent of the sender or recipient is present, express or tacit, which nevertheless is not easily presumed: thus if spouses or friends are accustomed to hand over to each other letters received from a common friend to be read; b) in communities, institutes, or colleges in which it has been established by law, rule, or custom that superiors can read the letters of inferiors; in which case, however, letters sent to higher superiors are exempted, and in other letters those parts which it is clear deal solely with secrets of conscience; c) if on account of entirely grave motives someone judges that the letters contain injury, and the reading is necessary for averting harm threatening himself or others or the republic: nevertheless he will not be able to read more than the end requires. Thus in time of war it is licit for combatants to intercept the letters of enemies; likewise parents can read the letters of children, the rector of a college those of students, the rector of a prison those of the justly detained, a religious superior those of subjects; but not a master the letters of servants, nor a husband the letters of his wife, unless they judge with moral certainty that something harmful is contained in them.

4. Letters thrown away by the owner or knowingly left in a public place can be read without injustice, because he is deservedly judged not to vindicate his strict right; yet if something is contained there which, if revealed, would turn to the detriment of the owner, by reason of harm it must be kept hidden. But to read torn letters whose fragments are thrown away is not licit, at least if they are torn into pieces so small that the parts cannot be compared and the letter read except by an exquisite diligence which men are not accustomed to employ. For such tearing, by common estimation, is as it were destruction.

5. One who has acquired knowledge of a secret by unjustly opening letters nevertheless seems able to use it when circumstances have so changed that he now has the right of procuring for himself knowledge of that secret.

Question 4. Does he sin gravely who opens or reads another's letters?

Response. Affirmatively, because by natural right and the right of nations there is present a grave obligation of preserving the secrets of letters inviolate; otherwise human commerce would be overthrown. Except, however, the following cases: 1st. if there is tacit or presumed consent of him who writes, or of him to whom the letters are sent; 2nd. if the letters are known or presumed to contain matters of slight moment; 3rd. if it is done from a just cause, e.g., for averting public or private harm, provided no more is read than is necessary for this end; 4th. if the letters are opened from levity or from some inadvertence. Cf. St. Alphonsus, de Peccatis, n. 70; and Hom. Ap., nn. 5 and 6.

Caia, a Catholic, often reproaches Caius, her Protestant husband, concerning his excessive familiarity with Bertha, who instructs their children in the first elements (governess). At length, after some time, by her just complaints Caia brings it about that Bertha is dismissed from the house and employment. A little afterward Caia observes a letter written in Bertha’s hand brought to Caius in the morning with others. She secretly takes it, opens and reads it, and throws it into the fire. Afterward, however, in order to quiet her conscience, she asks a confessor whether she sinned or not by acting thus. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a secret, and how is it divided?

2. Is it lawful to open and read the letters of another?

3. What is to be said of the case?

1. This question is answered on p. 337.

2. Is it lawful to open and read another's letters?

As a general rule it is not, and it will be more or less against justice if the letters contain secrets which the owner of the letters is rightly unwilling that others should know. The gravity of the sin will depend on the seriousness of the injury or offence done by opening the letters. They may, however, be opened for good reason by the authority of the State, and by private persons to protect their own rights if they have a well-grounded suspicion that those rights are imperiled.¹

1 St. Alphonsus, book v, no. 70.

3. The case. Caia had good grounds for objecting to secret communications between the late governess and her husband. She did not therefore commit a sin when she opened Bertha’s letter; she was justified in protecting her rights. It must be presumed that there was something objectionable in the letter to cause Caia to throw it into the fire. She need have no scruples of conscience now on what she had done.