Simulation

III. Opposed Vices. To truth is opposed every act of manifestation not agreeing with the internal concept; this act is called a lie if it is done by words, signs, or writings; simulation, if it consists in deeds.

Note. With truth coincides internal simplicity. "Simplicity," says the Angelic Doctor, "is said by opposition to duplicity, namely by which someone has one thing in his heart and shows another outwardly; and thus simplicity pertains to this virtue, that is, to truth" (II-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 4).¹

¹ External simplicity in clothing, etc., according to St. Thomas, II-II, q. 169, a. 1, corpus, pertains to the virtue which is called modesty of attire, concerning which below; cf. St. Peter Damian, Opusculum 45 (M.P.L. 145, cols. 695-794 inclusive); Benedict XIV, De canonizatione et beatificatione Sanctorum, book 3, c. 24, nn. 11-12 (Padua edition, 1743, t. 3, pp. 211-213 inclusive).

Divisions of Lies.—(a) Intrinsically, or in respect to its nature as a departure from the speaker’s mind, every lie is either an exaggeration, which tells more than the truth, or a suppression, which tells less than the whole truth. He who affirms what he does not believe, or who states as certain what he thinks is uncertain, exaggerates; he who denies what he believes, or who states as doubtful what he holds as certain, is guilty of suppression.

(b) Extrinsically, or in respect to purpose, mode, and result, lies are of many kinds. As to mode, a lie is either spoken or acted, the former being a falsehood and the latter a simulation or hypocrisy. As to its immediate purpose, a lie is meant either to express falsehood only or to deceive, the former being misrepresentation and the latter deceit (e.g., if Claudius knows that he calumniated and that Sempronius heard the calumny, and yet brazenly denies the calumny to Sempronius, there is misrepresentation); if Claudius tries to mislead others who only suspect him and gives false alibis, there is deceit. As to its ulterior purpose, a lie is meant for good (an officious or jocose lie) or for evil (a pernicious lie), or is directed to both good and evil. As to its result, a lie sometimes produces and sometimes does not produce a statement at variance with fact; it sometimes deceives and sometimes does not deceive the auditors.

Simulation or Pretence.—A special form of untruthfulness is simulation or pretence, which uses external deeds or things to signify the contrary of what one thinks or intends internally.

(a) Simulation uses external deeds or things, and thus there is an accidental difference between lying and simulation, the one being untruthfulness in word and the other untruthfulness in deed (see 1678 sqq.).

(b) It employs deeds or things to signify. Unlike words, deeds and things were not meant principally to signify, and hence not all conduct at variance with one’s ideas is simulation. One may act without any thought of the impression the act makes on others (e.g., when one keeps sober, not from wish, but from necessity). And even when an act is done with the intention to influence others by it, the purpose may be, not to signify, but to conceal something (e.g., Josue fled from the troops of Hai to keep them from a knowledge of his plans, Jos., viii. 1 sqq.; David feigned insanity to conceal his identity, I Kings, xxi. 11. sqq.). Thus, simulation teaches error, and dissimulation hides truth from those who have no right to it. That dissimulation is generally recognized as lawful is seen from such examples as stratagems, ambushes, camouflage in war, disguises in detective work, and concealment of marriage by couples not ready for housekeeping.

(c) It signifies the contrary of what one has in mind, as when one who is sad laughs and jokes to make others think he is happy, or one who is well apes the actions of a sick man so as to appear unwell, or when one who hates his neighbor treats him as a friend in public. A special form of simulation is hypocrisy, which makes a show of virtue that one does not possess at all or in the degree pretended. There is no simulation if the exterior corresponds with what one has is mind, for example, at Emmaus Christ made as though He would go farther (Luke, xxiv. 28), but He meant not to stop without an invitation.

The Sinfulness of Simulation.—(a) In general, simulation is a sin, since it is nothing else than an acted lie. But deeds, with the few exceptions of bows, nods, gestures and the like, are not from their nature signs of thoughts, and those employed to serve as signs are more indeterminate and equivocal than words; hence, it is not always as easy to decide that an act is simulatory as to decide that a word is a lie. Thus, it is not simulation to make use of false hair, false teeth, or false jewelry as means of protection or of adornment, there being no intention to mislead; neither is it simulation for a wicked cleric to wear the clerical garb, for the dress signifies primarily his state, and not necessarily his personal moral character.

(b) In particular, simulation by hypocrisy and treachery is detestable; for hypocrisy prostitutes works of virtue to the ignoble ends of applause or lucre or worse, while treachery uses the intimacy or marks of friendship as means for betrayal. The most stinging rebukes of Our Lord were given the hypocritical Pharisees (“Blind guides, whited sepulchres, serpents, generation of vipers,” Matt., xxiii. 23 sqq.), and among the saddest words of Christ are those addressed to Judas (“Dost thou betray the Son of man with a kiss?” Luke, xxii. 48). Against the former he pronounced woes, and He declared that it were better if the latter had never been born (Matt., xxvi. 24).

Whether simulation is licit? "Formal simulation, namely when someone intends through an external deed to signify something other than he has in mind, is never licit, because it is a true lie of deed; but material simulation, that is, when someone does something, not intending the deception of another, but some end of his own, is licit with a just cause, always and when from the circumstances others can conjecture that it is done for another end; as was said about restriction not purely mental. Thus Christ the Lord, Luke 24, at Emmaus feigned that he would go farther, not intending that the Disciples believe this, but wishing to signify that he truly would have gone farther unless he were invited by them." L. 171. - St. Thomas, 2. 2, q. 111, a. 1. Dissimulation is had when, by not speaking, not acting, something is covered and someone is deceived from it. Of itself it is licit, for there is no obligation of always manifesting the truth.

If one of the spouses is publicly unworthy, can the other enter into marriage with that one, and consequently minister the sacrament to him or her? - Resp. In the negative, if the person is unworthy because he or she is an excommunicate to be avoided, as is clear. - In the affirmative, if the person is unworthy because excommunicated, but tolerated; for the Council of Constance granted indistinctly that the faithful can communicate with tolerated excommunicates. In the affirmative, if the person is unworthy because of some sin, and the other spouse could not recede from the marriage without grave inconvenience. Thus more probably and more commonly. The reason is that the aforesaid administration is by them as ministers not consecrated for this. L. 55; H. A. tr. 14, n. 6. Hence one who contracts with an unworthy person is excused from mortal sin; for he does not sin insofar as he ministers to the unworthy person, because charity alone forbids this, and grave inconvenience excuses, which is scarcely absent, or not even scarcely; nor insofar as he asks from an unworthy person, because that person is a minister not consecrated for this. - Lugo d. 8, n. 226, 230; L. l. 2, n. 60.

S. Th. II-II, q. 109, a. 4; q. 111, 112 and 113.

864. Diverse species of lying. - On the part of the act by which it is committed, lying is divided into lying strictly so called, which is made by spoken or written words, or equivalent signs, and simulation, which is made by deeds, of which hypocrisy is a species. - On the part of the very account of lying, it is divided into boasting, or a lie which transcends truth toward the greater and is opposed by excess on the part of the object, and irony, or a lie which falls short of truth toward the lesser and is opposed to truth by defect. Of these we must now speak specifically.

865. Simulation (veinzerij) properly so called or formal, is lying by deeds, by which someone through external actions intends to signify something other than what he has in mind, for example if someone displays signs of friendship from a hostile mind, as Judas did; from it is distinguished simulation improperly so called and material: it is dissimulation, or an ambiguous action for concealing the truth, which is licit from a just cause, whenever others can gather the mind of the one dissimulating from the circumstances. Thus Christ (Luke XXIV, 28) feigned that He was going farther, in order to excite the disciples to exercising hospitality.

Therefore not every fiction is simulation, but conversely every simulation is fiction.

866. Hypocrisy (huichelarij) is the simulation of another person, especially if a sinner simulates the person of a just man, and thus it is taken in the New Testament (Luke XIII, 15) and in theological speech, as the simulation of holiness which someone does not have (schijnheiligheid); from which differs the hiding of sin (or silence about it) by which someone, for example, is silent about it lest scandal be generated therefrom.

Hypocrisy is a mortal sin 1) when holiness is contemned, as in the Pharisees: for thus "that man is called a hypocrite whose intention is borne toward both, namely, that he does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy" (q. 111, a. 4); therefore he contemns holiness, not wishing to acquire it but wishing to persevere in sin, and yet at the same time he strives to please men by simulating it; 2) also when it proceeds from a mortally evil end, for example, to dissemble or spread heresy, to acquire a benefice unjustly, to obtain seduction and fornication, etc.

But if the intended end is light, not repugnant to charity, it will be a venial sin, for example, when someone delights in the fiction itself, or if he simulates greater holiness.

Of itself hypocrisy is directly opposed to truth, yet indirectly and accidentally it can be contrary to many virtues according to the remote end, or according to the instrument or means of the act, or something else of this sort.

867. Boasting (snoeverij, grootspraak) is a lie by excess, by which someone through words extols himself above that which he really is. It is mortal if it is done with injury to God (Ezek. XXVIII, 2) or great injury or contumely of the neighbor (Luke XVIII, 11); hence 1. boasting about a good work is a sin of itself venial (IV Kings XVIII; Ezek. XXVIII, 15); 2. about an evil work (Prov. II), if it includes approval of it (which often happens if the deed was done), it is mortal or venial according as the approved work is; hence there is a twofold sin: one of boasting (Jer. XLVIII), another of delight in evil, to which a third, scandal, is often added; 3. but if it includes only approval of a circumstance, for example dexterity, which often happens if the matter concerns a fictitious work, of itself it does not exceed venial sin.

868. Irony (zelfkleinering) is not taken here for the figurative speech by which something is said mockingly by the contrary, but is a lie by defect, by which someone asserts about himself some vile thing which he does not acknowledge in himself, or by which he denies about himself something great which nevertheless he perceives in himself. Although by reason of the matter they are equal, because they are concerned with the same thing, namely, with the condition of the person, nevertheless irony ordinarily is a lesser evil than boasting, which is accustomed to proceed from a baser motive, namely, from appetite for gain or honor; yet it is graver if it is done to deceive craftily with notable detriment.