Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness

Sins of Ignorance, Blindness, Dullness.—After the sins against faith itself come the sins against the Gifts of the Holy Ghost that serve faith (see 808): (a) against the Gift of Knowledge is the sin of ignorance; (b) against the Gift of Understanding are the sins of blindness of heart and dullness of understanding.

Ignorance (as explained in 28 and 249) is a cause of sin—of material sin, if the ignorance is antecedent, of formal sin, if the ignorance is consequent. But ignorance is also a sin itself, in the sense now to be explained.

(a) Ignorance may be considered in itself (i.e., precisely as it is the absence of knowledge), and in this sense it is not called a sin, since under this aspect it is not opposed to moral virtue, but to knowledge, the perfection of the intellect.

(b) Ignorance may be considered in relation to the will (i.e., precisely as it is a voluntary defect), and in this sense it is a sin, since under this aspect it is opposed to the moral virtue of studiosity (i.e., the part of temperance which moderates the desire of learning and keeps the golden mean between curiosity and negligence). This sin of ignorance pertains to neglect, and is twofold; it is called affected ignorance, if the will is strongly desirous of the lack of due knowledge, and is called careless ignorance, if the will is remiss in desiring due knowledge. Affected ignorance is a sin of commission, careless ignorance a sin of omission.

(c) Ignorance may be considered in relation to obligatory acts (i.e., precisely as it makes one voluntarily incapable of fulfilling one’s duties), and in this sense it partakes of various kinds of sinfulness, inasmuch as he who is voluntarily ignorant of his duty is responsible for the mistakes he will make. Thus, he who is sinfully ignorant in matters of faith, will fail against the precepts of that virtue; he who does not know what his state of life as judge, lawyer, physician, etc., requires, will fail against justice; he who does not know what charity demands of him, will sin against charity.

The malice of the sin of ignorance in matters of faith is as follows: (a) Vincible ignorance of the truths one is obliged to know, whether the obligation be of means or of precept (see 360, 786 sqq.), is a grave sin, for faith in these truths is commanded under pain of losing salvation (Mark, xvi. 15, 16). (b) The sin committed is but one sin, regardless of length of time, and is incurred at the time one omits due diligence in acquiring knowledge, as is the case with other sins of omission. Hence, he who remains in culpable ignorance of Christian doctrine for a year commits one sin, but the length of time is an aggravating circumstance.

Culpable ignorance regarding truths of faith, as a distinct sin, is as follows:

(a) It is not distinct from its cause (i.e., negligence), for ignorance is not a sin at all, except in so far as it proceeds from negligence. Hence, one would not be obliged to accuse oneself of the sins of omission in regard to instruction in Christian doctrine and of ignorance in Christian doctrine, for these are but one sin.

(b) Culpable ignorance is not distinct from its effect (i.e., from a sin committed on account of the ignorance), if the truth one is ignorant of has to be known only on account of some passing duty that must be performed here and now; for in such a case the knowledge is required, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the duty. Hence, ignorance of fact or of a particular law is not distinct as a sin from the sin that results from it. Examples: Titus knows that he should not take money that belongs to another; but through his own carelessness he is ignorant of the fact that the money before him belongs to another, and takes the money. Balbus knows that the precept of the Church on fasting is obligatory; but through his own negligence he is unaware that today is a fast day, and does not fast. Titus and Balbus committed one sin apiece.

(c) Culpable ignorance is distinct from its effect, if the truth one is ignorant of has to be known for its own sake; for in such a case one sins against the virtue of studiosity (see 905) by not knowing something which one should know habitually, and also against some other virtue by violating its precepts as a result of one’s sinful ignorance. Truths one is obliged to know for their own sake are the mysteries of faith, the Commandments of the Decalogue, the Precepts of the Church, and the duties of one’s own state. Examples: Sempronius through his own carelessness does not know the mystery of the Incarnation, and as a result blasphemes Christ. Titus does not know that stealing is a sin, and therefore he steals. In both cases two sins are committed, the sin of ignorance and the sin that resulted from ignorance.

Cases in which ignorance in matters of faith is not culpable are the following: (a) if one has used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not responsible for one’s ignorance; (b) if one has not used sufficient diligence to acquire knowledge, one is not responsible for one’s ignorance, if the lack of diligence is not one’s fault.

Sufficient diligence is a broad term and has to be understood with relation to the mental ability of the person and the importance and difficulty of the truth in question. What is sufficient diligence in an illiterate person, or with regard to a matter of minor importance, would be insufficient in a learned person, or in a matter of greater importance. However, the following general rules can be given:

(a) To be sufficient, diligence need not be as a rule supreme (i.e., it is not necessary that one employ every possible means to acquire instruction), for even the most conscientious persons feel they have used sufficient diligence when they have employed the usual means for obtaining religious instruction;

(b) To be sufficient, diligence should equal that which is employed by good people in similar circumstances. Thus, the unlearned who consult the learned or frequent the instructions provided for them, the learned who devote themselves to study as ordered and who seek assistance in doubts, are sufficiently diligent.

One who has not used sufficient diligence is sometimes responsible, sometimes not responsible.

(a) A person is not responsible for his ignorance and lack of sufficient diligence, if he conscientiously desires to have the proper amount of instruction, and has not even a suspicion that his studies and knowledge are not sufficient. Example: Titus, having gone through a very small catechism, thought that he understood Christian doctrine sufficiently and had done all that was required. But some years later he discovered, when examined, that he was ignorant of many important matters, and had entirely misunderstood others.

(b) A person is responsible for his lack of diligence and knowledge, if at heart he does not care to know, even though no fears or doubts about his ignorance disturb him. Examples: Balbus always felt religion a bore. At Sunday school he was daydreaming; now during sermons on Sunday he falls asleep. The result is that he has many infidel ideas, but doesn’t know it, and is not much concerned. Caius secured for himself an office, for which he is unfitted on account of his ignorance. But he enjoys his position so much, and cares so little about its responsibilities, that he does not even dream of his incompetence, and would not try to change things if he did.

Similar to negligence about the truths of faith itself is negligence about truths connected with faith. (a) An unbeliever is guilty of negligence when against conscience he fails to pray for light and to inquire or inform himself about the credentials of religion, revelation, and the Church; (b) a believer is guilty of negligence if he fails to seek answers to objections against faith, when thrown much in the company of objectors.

Like to sins of ignorance are the two sins opposed to the Gift of Understanding. (a) Dullness of understanding is a weakness of mind as regards spiritual things which makes it very difficult for one to consider or understand them. It is sinful inasmuch as it arises from over-affection for carnal things, especially the delights of eating and drinking. (b) Blindness of mind is a complete lack of knowledge of divine things due to the fact that one refuses to consider them lest one feel obligated to do good, or to the fact that one is so wedded to passion that one gives it all one’s attention (Ps. xxv. 4). Blindness is sometimes a punishment (Is., vi. 10; Wis., ii. 21); it is a sin when it is voluntary—that is, when carnal delights, especially lust, make one disgusted or negligent as to the things of faith. Abstinence and chastity are two means that greatly aid spiritual understanding, as is seen in the example of Daniel and his companions (Dan. i. 17).

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 76; De Malo q. 3, a. 6, 7, 8.

464. On the part of reason, the cause of sin is ignorance and inconsideration of the intellect, not any whatever, but that which removes knowledge (whether universal knowledge of right, or particular knowledge of fact or circumstance) by which, if it were present or present more fully, sin would not occur. Whence it is not the cause of sin per se, but per accidens, insofar as it removes that which would impede sin. But if someone is so disposed that without ignorance he would nevertheless sin, ignorance would not be the cause of sin: such a one does not sin from ignorance or on account of ignorance, but sins with ignorance or while ignorant. Thus if ignorance is concomitant, or even if it is affected but precisely for sinning more freely.

For every sin, even one done from malice, ignorance or error is required in the ultimate practical judgment, by which reason erroneously judges such an illicit act to be good for itself here and now; but sins of ignorance are called those which proceed also from a culpably erroneous speculative judgment.

1. It is called ignorance of bad election. Cf. Ethics III, lect. 3; I-II, q. 6, a. 8; II Sent. d. 39, q. 1, a. 1, ad 4.

2. "Ignorance sometimes excludes the knowledge by which someone simply knows that this which is done is evil, and then he is said to sin from ignorance; sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which man knows that this now is evil, as when one sins from passion; sometimes it excludes the knowledge by which someone knows that this evil is not to be sustained on account of the attainment of that good, although he simply knows that this is evil, and thus he who sins from malice is said to be ignorant." I-II, q. 78, a. 1, ad 1. Cf. De Malo q. 2, a. 3, ad 9.

465. Ignorance can be sin (the contrary was condemned in Coelestius and Abelard), not indeed according to itself, for it is an intellectual evil, not a moral one, but by reason of preceding negligence in learning or actual negligence in considering (Luke XII, 48; I Tim. I, 13). Nevertheless not every ignorance is sin: for invincible ignorance, which someone could not repel, is not sin, as is clear from propositions 68 of Baius and 2 of Alexander VIII, condemned; but vincible ignorance is only sin if it concerns those things which someone is bound to know, or which are necessary for directing his own acts and without which he cannot rightly exercise the due act.

1. "Negative infidelity is sin." "Invincible ignorance of the right of nature in the state of fallen nature does not excuse from formal sin."

Whence for sin it does not suffice that ignorance be voluntary, but in addition it must be culpable. For this three things are required: in order that it be voluntary, 1) that someone could have removed it, that is, had the means for that, and 2) that he adverted to it in some way; but in order that it be culpable, in addition 3) that someone was obligated to impede the ignorance, that is, to apply means lest ignorance follow. Thus ignorance of medical science is not culpable for a farmer and advocate, but for a physician.

Moreover all are bound to know a) the articles or fundamental truths of faith, b) the universal precepts of right, namely, of the Decalogue and of the Church; c) but individuals are bound to know those things which regard their state or office, at least those things which are common and occur often.

Indeed ignorance can be a special sin. Vincible ignorance 1) of a thing which we are bound to know habitually or by reason of itself (ignorance of right) is a special sin of omission, diverse from the sins which follow from it, because ignorance itself is morally evil in itself, and because one sinning thus violates two diverse precepts.

Thus, for example, if someone voluntarily were ignorant of the Incarnation or the malice of adultery or the five precepts of the Church, and therefore blasphemed Christ, or committed adultery, or ate meats, he would be guilty of a double sin.

On the contrary, 2) ignorance of a thing which someone is bound to know, not indeed permanently and by reason of itself, but transiently and on account of the work here and now to be placed (ignorance of a particular fact, for example, of a circumstance of the act), is not a sin distinct from the sin which follows from it or to which it exposes, because it is not evil except by reason of the evil effect, and therefore one sinning does not act except against one precept and one virtue.

Thus negligence of inquiring whether the present day is a day of fast (even if it were not a day of fast), because from the same precept one is bound to fast and to inquire.

466. Principles. I. Invincible and antecedent ignorance per se totally excuses from the whole sin the work which is done from it, because it renders it involuntary (Gen. IX, 21); per accidens it does not entirely excuse if it is not total but partial, because only the circumstance is unknown which, if known, would prevent the sin, and nevertheless the sin is done knowingly, for example, the killing of a man by one who does not know that he is his father (Gen. XXXVIII). Whence it excuses insofar as it is ignorance.

II. Invincible and concomitant ignorance does not entirely excuse: it excuses from sin the external work which is done with it, because it renders that work non-voluntary; but it does not totally excuse the one operating, because it does not take away every will of sinning or internal affection toward sin, since the work would nevertheless be done if ignorance were not given, for example, one who kills an enemy, thinking him to be a beast, when nevertheless he would kill if he knew. Such ignorance neither excuses entirely, nor accuses.

III. Vincible and consequent ignorance concerning these things which someone is bound to know, if it is the cause of sin which otherwise would not occur, does not totally excuse from sin the work which is done from it, because it remains voluntary (since the ignorance itself is voluntary), but it diminishes it because it renders it involuntary in a certain respect. Whence it accuses, as voluntary, and does not excuse from the whole but from so much, for example, wounding from drunkenness.

IV. Vincible but affected ignorance, and excited precisely for sinning more freely, in no way excuses from sin but rather increases it, because it proceeds from a greater will of sinning. Whence it simply accuses.