Stolidity and Impatience

The Vices Opposed to Patience.—(a) The sin of deficiency in sorrow is stolidity, which is a brutal insensibility that is moved neither by one’s own nor by others’ misfortunes. This is not a virtue, but an inhuman and unnatural way of life, which takes no account of man as a feeling as well as a reasoning being.

(b) The sin of excess in sorrow is impatience, which mourns excessively under afflictions, or in looks, words or deeds expresses a complaining and rebellious spirit (Prov. xiv. 17; Judith, viii. 24, 25). Stolidity and impatience are per se venial sins, but they become mortal per accidens on account of some circumstance, as when the unfeeling man gives great scandal by his hardhearted acts, or the impatient man blasphemes (see 2450, 2451).

S. Th. II-II, q. 136.

923. Patience (geduld) is a virtue which so moderates sadness, arisen from present evils, that on account of it the will is not moved away from the good, but rather is strengthened in it. Thus someone bears himself well in suffering things which presently harm him, especially things inflicted by others, namely, so that he is not inordinately saddened in them. It is in the concupiscible appetite, because it is concerned with sadness, but it imitates the mode of fortitude, because it restrains sadness which holds one back from the good of reason, in the same way in which fortitude restrains fear of death (a. 4, ad 2).

Hence 1) it is not insensibility or apathy, of which the Stoics boasted, and which in reality is a vice. For just as fortitude is not fearlessness, but the brave man feels fear of death and restrains it within the limits of reason, so the patient man feels pain in the body and sadness in the soul, but restrains both and does not allow them to proceed beyond the limits of reason, recalling the words of Paul (Rom. V, 3-5): "Tribulation works patience..."

2. This he does from an affection for honesty which is found in the restraining of sadness, and therefore it is a special virtue.

3. It is necessary (Hebr. X, 32-36; Rom. V, 3; Lk. XXI, 19), because inordinate sadness is a great evil and an impediment of many goods (Eccli. XIV, 2; XXX, 25; Prov. XXV, 20); on the contrary, through patience man radically roots out the passions of adversities by which the soul is disquieted (a. 2, ad 2), as will be shown more in the following number.

4. This can be done in various degrees, whence various degrees are distinguished in patience:¹ a) to tolerate without murmuring, or with an equal soul to bear the loss of riches, reputation, health, parents, and friends; b) to tolerate without lamentation and complaint before others, or to bear those things which happen to us without our fault; c) to tolerate with joy, or to sustain all those things not only patiently but with a joyful soul, as the Apostles did (Acts V, 41).

¹ Thus from the part of the mode. For from the part of the evils which someone suffers, the first degree is patiently to bear damages of fortune; the second, detriments of reputation; the third, detriments of body and life. From the part of the cause, the first degree is to tolerate things inflicted as punishment for fault; the second, those things which happen without fault; the third, those things which are inflicted by the ungrateful.

924. Patience is not the greatest of the virtues. - For "those virtues which are constitutive of good order more directly to good than those which are impeditive of things which lead away from good. And just as among those which are constitutive of good some virtue is more powerful to the extent that it establishes man in a greater good (such as faith, hope, and charity, than prudence and justice); so also among those which are impeditive of things withdrawing from good, some virtue is more powerful when that which is impeded by it withdraws more from good. But dangers of death, concerning which there is fortitude, or pleasures of touch, concerning which there is temperance, withdraw more from good than any adversities whatsoever, concerning which there is patience. And therefore patience is not the greatest of the virtues; but it falls short not only of the theological virtues, and prudence, and justice, which directly establish man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance, which draw back from greater impediments" (a. 2).

Nevertheless 1) in some respect it is more perfect according to a certain aspect. For "it is said to have a perfect work (Jas. I, 4) in tolerating adversities; from which first proceeds sadness, which patience moderates; secondly anger, which meekness moderates; thirdly hatred, which charity takes away; fourthly unjust harm, which justice prohibits" (ad 1). But patience "not only excludes unjust vengeance which justice also excludes; nor only hatred, which charity does; nor only anger, which meekness does; but it also excludes inordinate sadness, which is the root of all the aforesaid. And therefore in this it is more perfect and greater, because in this matter it extirpates the root" (I-II, q. 66, a. 4, ad 2). "But to remove the principle of each thing is more perfect. Nor yet does it follow, if in this patience is more perfect, that it is more perfect simply" (a. 2, ad 1).

2. Hence also, because "possession imports quiet dominion, therefore through patience man is said to possess his soul (Lk. XXI, 19), insofar as he radically roots out the passions by which the soul is disquieted" (ad 2).

3. Indeed "patience is said to be the root and guardian of all virtues, not as though directly causing and conserving them, but only by removing what prohibits," namely, the impeding causes or passions (ad 3).

925. Means for obtaining patience, which is very necessary to the Christian man, are enumerated by Billuart, diss. 2, a. 5: "It helps to consider 1. the patience of God tolerating sinners; 2. the patience of Christ dying for us; 3. the patience of the saints; 4. the fruits of patience in both lives: satisfaction for sins in the present life, eternal glory in the future; 5. redemption from the pains of hell and of purgatory; 6. the evils of impatience: for by this the merit of patience is lost, the evil is not diminished, but rather is increased; indeed impatience itself is an evil tormenting more than the original evil whence it is caused; finally it impels to many sins."

926. Two vices are opposed to patience:

a) By excess, hardness, when someone is in no way touched or saddened by any evils, whether his own or another's; which is consonant neither with human nature nor with social life.

b) By defect, impatience, by which someone grieves too much, and from grief withdraws from the good, for example, bitterly complaining about God and men, and on that account seeking consolation in pleasures or in idleness.

Of themselves they are venial, but mortal by reason of the effect or by reason of scandal, for example, if someone deliberately murmurs gravely against God and the divine ordinations, or from this commits lethal sins such as blasphemies, woundings, etc.

927. Longanimity (lankmoedigheid), by which someone tends toward some good to be obtained after a long time, partly differs from patience, partly agrees with it. It differs because the object of patience is evil, the object of longanimity is good; it agrees because from the delay of the good hoped for there is caused sadness, which longanimity restrains, and sadness is the object of patience. And therefore longanimity is comprehended under patience (a. 5).

{ Bl. Thom. quaest. 137 and 138.

To Patience by defect is opposed Impatience, whereby one struggles in vain against adversities, or grieves immoderately over them. But the magnitude of the sin of impatience is to be estimated from its effects, which arise from it, from which the very sin of impatience does not seem to be distinguished. The holy Doctor calls this vice Ira (Wrath).

Yet no vice opposed to patience by defect is commonly assigned, because the more lightly adversities are borne, the more it is held worthy of praise.