The Contracting Parties

655. Declaration. From the contracting parties it is required:

1. That they be in the state of grace, because they receive a sacrament of the living. Therefore particular statutes sometimes prescribe that confession be premised to matrimony; nevertheless, by universal law it is not prescribed that they procure the state of grace for themselves rather through confession than through perfect contrition. For the Council of Trent only exhorts spouses to confess before matrimony.¹

He does not sin: a. who contracts matrimony with a partner whom he knows to be in the state of mortal sin; for the notable utility which matrimony brings excuses this material cooperation.²

Nor does he sin: b. who administers the sacrament of matrimony to an unworthy partner, because he is not held to take care that the sacrament not be administered to the unworthy: for he does not act as a public person, who by force of his office must attend to the dispositions of the recipient, but he is a private person celebrating a contract, who by force of his office attends only to his own utility.³

2. That they receive the nuptial blessing. For although the Church does not prescribe it to those about to marry, nevertheless she earnestly desires that they ask for it and receive it.⁴

a. By the name of nuptial blessing are designated the three prayers which are contained in the Missal in the Mass for spouses; two of these are recited over the spouses after the Our Father, and the third after the Ite missa est or Benedicamus Domino. Since the nuptial blessing cannot be separated from the Mass for spouses, those about to marry are to be admonished to celebrate the nuptials in the morning, when Mass can be said.

b. If those about to marry have not received the nuptial blessing from whatever cause (e.g. because they celebrated the nuptials in the closed time, because at the celebration of the nuptials Mass could not be said), care must be taken that they receive it afterward at a suitable time, even if they have already lived in matrimony.⁵ But if the spouses cannot be brought to celebrate the nuptials at a time when Mass can be said, the blessing is granted to them outside Mass, yet not according to the form which is contained in the Mass for spouses, but according to the form which exists in the Roman Ritual or in the diocesan Ritual.

¹ Sess. 24, c. 1, De reform. matr.

² Cf. De Praeceptis, n. 118.

³ Cf. Lugo, De sacram. in genere, disp. 8, sect. 14, n. 230.

⁴ Cn. 1101, 1.

⁵ Cn. 1001, 1.

S. Th., Suppl. q. 44, a. 1 and 2; q. 45, a. 5.

789. Thesis. The ministers of matrimony are the contracting parties themselves, and indeed not only under the aspect of the contract, but also under the aspect of the sacrament. - It is today the common and certain opinion, against Melchior Cano and those who said that the priest is the minister of the sacrament; and it follows immediately from the doctrine of the preceding article.

It is proved: 1° Directly. If the contract of matrimony itself is the sacrament and does not really differ from it, it must be that those who make the contract are also the ministers of the sacrament; but these are the contracting parties.

2° Indirectly, from the doctrine and practice of the Church.

It is clear: a) because clandestine marriages of the faithful before the Council of Trent, and even now in certain circumstances (can. 1098-99), are held as true sacraments;

b) because for the validity of matrimony the presence of the parish priest suffices, nor is it required that he pronounce some form of words; whence documents call him a witness of matrimony, not the minister of the sacrament;

c) from the unanimous opinion of the ancient scholastics through almost five centuries, even to the times of Melchior Cano.

They object: A minister confers the sacrament in the place and name of Christ. But the contracting parties neither act nor speak in the name of Christ; he does not receive the wife as his own.

Resp. They do not speak in the name of Christ insofar as they make a contract, I concede; insofar as by making the contract they unite themselves with a sacred bond and grace, I deny. For as instruments of Christ they render the natural bond sacred and confer grace upon themselves.

790. Corollaries. - From this it follows:

1° In the sacrament of matrimony the minister confecting and the subject receiving do not differ.

2° Nevertheless the contracting parties are not ministers insofar as they are the subject; indeed, nor under every respect under which they are contracting parties. For insofar as they hand over to the co-party power over their own body, they place the matter of the sacrament and are not ministers; but only insofar as by accepting they hold ratified the donation made by the co-party do they place the form and perfect the bond of obligation. Thus they are ministers, because it belongs to the minister to join matter to form; and they are ministers of Christ, because in the matrimony of the faithful Christ principally sanctions and seals the obligation of the conjugal bond.

3° Hence, in order that they validly enter matrimony, the contracting parties must, besides the fact that they are able in law, impeded by no diriment impediment, have at least a virtual intention of contracting or of doing what others do when marrying, in which there is implicitly contained the intention of doing what the Church does; moreover, in order that matrimony be a sacrament, they must be baptized.

4° In order that the faithful also contract licitly, there is required the absence of every prohibition or impedient impediment, and the state of grace, because matrimony is a sacrament of the living. But if they knowingly contract in the state of sin, they sin by sacrilege, and indeed mortally insofar as they receive the sacrament unworthily; but insofar as they unworthily minister to themselves, although they sin, nevertheless it is not proved that they sin mortally, because they are not ministers constituted from office (n. 76-77).

791. Observation. - "The words by which matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, but not the blessing of the priest, which is a certain sacramental," says St. Thomas, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1. Whence the priest is called the minister of solemnity, not of celebration or confection; but if he says that he joins the spouses, it is to be understood of ratification, or of conjunction before the face of the Church.

The ministers of the sacrament are the contracting parties themselves who contract marriage; their contract, insofar as it is the mutual handing over of power, can be held as the proximate matter, and insofar as it is the mutual acceptance of the same, as the form of the sacrament. Moreover the contract is sacrament only, the grace which is conferred is thing of the sacrament only, and the bond which remains is both thing and sacrament.

I. The question concerning the minister and the question concerning the form and matter of this sacrament cannot be separated. Melchior Canus judged (De Locis Theologicis, L. VIII, c. 5), and sharply asserted with several arguments bearing in that age some appearance of probability, that the minister of the sacrament of marriage is the priest, and therefore that the form of the sacrament is the words uttered by him, by which he joins the spouses, while the contract is nothing except the matter of this sacrament. Once the opinion of Canus was admitted, it was easy to infer that in marriage the sacrament can be separated from the contract of Christians. But this question was being debated among Catholics. Certain others supported Canus, especially those who wished a way to lie open for them to defend the rights of secular princes over the marriages of Christians. Cf. Tournely, De Matrimonio, quaest. II, a. 11, § 3. Although formerly the opinion of Canus seemed probable to Benedict XIV, De Synodo Dioecesana, L. VIII, c. 13, nevertheless now the contrary is to be held as certain.

II. Indeed the opinion of Canus was new in the School, both because he was able to bring forward no one from the School who had certainly handed it down, and because the common doctrine of the older Scholastics resists it. For Canus appeals to three Scholastics: William of Paris, Paludanus, and St. Thomas. But the opinion of St. Thomas is wholly other, as we shall see. But what he says in IV, D. I, q. 1, a. 3 - "marriage according as it is for an office, and penance according as it is a virtue, do not have any form of words; but according as each is a sacrament consisting in the dispensation of the ministers of the Church, each has some words: just as in marriage there are words expressing consent, and again blessings instituted by the Church" - does not signify that the words of the priest pertain to the essence of the sacrament; indeed, he manifestly teaches the opposite. For the Church does not institute the forms of the sacraments; but if any words are the form of the sacrament, they are the words expressing consent. Cf. what we shall give at the end of this part. But St. Thomas does not consider the sacrament only, but the sacrament according as it is dispensed by the ministers of the Church. Marriage, however, is dispensed by the ministers of the Church, not indeed insofar as it is made by them, but insofar as it is governed by the Church, and from her ministers has a certain solemnity through blessing. He teaches the same in IV, book Contra Gentiles, c. 78, saying: "Insofar as marriage is ordered to the good of the Church, it must be subject to ecclesiastical rule; but those things which are dispensed to the people through the ministers of the Church are called sacraments." In these words it is manifest that something must be supplied, so that the determinate notion of a true sacrament may be had; for not whatever the ministers of the Church dispense to the people is a sacrament properly so called.

Nor does Paludanus favor Canus when he teaches in IV, D. V, q. 2, that a man and woman contracting, even if they are sinners and do not do penance, are not guilty of sacrilege. For he says: "It does not seem that a sinner contracting marriage sins, although the essence of marriage consists in mutual consent expressed through the words of one to the other; for this consent ministers the sacrament, not the priest blessing, who only applies a certain sacramental." What could be clearer? Why, then, are they not guilty of sacrilege? They are not guilty of sacrilege insofar as they administer, because they are not ministers specially ordained or consecrated for this (cf. St. Alphonsus, De Matrimonio, n. 884, coll. De Sacramentis in genere, n. 32).

As regards William, this sort of opinion is indeed attributed to him also by others (Roskovani, op. cit., T. 1, p. 16); but there is no certain reason why he should be thought to have asserted it. For he seems to have wished to say only this: that, in order that marriage be contracted honorably and grace actually obtained, it must be celebrated in the face of the Church and the blessing of the priest must be applied. For in the Work on the Sacraments, On Marriage, c. 6, he says: "Marriage also has (note that also; namely, it has it also of itself) no little sanctity from the blessing or priestly prayer, without which marriage must never be celebrated; whoever have contemned or declined it, unless from just fear or some other necessary cause, are not to be held as spouses, but as fornicators, nor are their children to be reckoned legitimate. For neither is food to be taken without priestly prayer and blessing," etc. But if the blessing or prayer of the priest were essential and the form of the sacrament, even if it were omitted from just fear or another necessary cause, they would not be spouses; yet William denies this. Besides, if the blessing or prayer of the priest is necessary for nuptials as it is for taking food, it is sufficiently clear that it is not required for the validity of the act, but for a certain fitting honorableness. Moreover those who contract clandestinely in this way he does not properly say are fornicators, but that they are to be held as such; for he speaks according to the norm of the law then still in force, which in the civil forum regarded conjunctions of this sort as fornications, that is, did not regard their children as legitimate and inheritable. For thus has chapter 463, book 3, of the Collection of Capitularies of Benedict the Levite, ninth century (Migne, P. L., vol. XCVII, p. 859): "A marriage does not become legitimate otherwise than if the wife is sought from those who seem to have dominion over the woman and by whom she is guarded, and is espoused by nearer parents, and is lawfully dowered, and in its own time is blessed priestly, as is the custom (a thing of custom, not of divine law), with prayers and oblations by the priest.... For in such manner they will both please the Lord and will beget children not spurious but legitimate and inheritable." But in chapter 9 of the same treatise, William, asking "whether it is a sacrament of true name and sacramental power, if it is contracted apart from the nuptial blessing and prayer which it can have," responds: "But it is certain that it is both a sacred sign and sanctifying or consecrating by essential power or by contrariety (namely, by which it is opposed to concupiscence, according to the doctrine of the Master), as we have said, and perhaps by merit, provided the nuptial blessing is not contemned" (understand: provided it is not omitted out of contempt); "but it has no sacramental power at all, nor is it a sacrament of true name except as we have said"

(namely, he had said a little before in this same chapter that sacramental power is the power of blessing and prayer which is accustomed to be made over those marrying). "Hence also marriage among the faithful and among unbelievers is said equivocally: among unbelievers, namely, only as we have said" (that is, a legitimate conjunction opposed to fornicatory prostitution and sodomitical abomination); "but as regards the faithful, both in that way and, besides, consecrating by the power of blessing, which is proper to true sacraments of full power." These words (although they display sufficiently obscure ideas of the author in this matter), when compared with the preceding things, seem able to be taken in such a way that the blessing of the priest is a certain sacramental, as it is commonly called, contempt of which deprives the contracting parties of the attainment of grace, and the use of which increases and completes the grace which the spouses obtain by marriage itself.

III. Moreover that the common opinion of the preceding School resists Canus is directly clear from this, that the others think otherwise, as Canus himself concedes, and that the Scholastics call the blessing of the priest, or the words which he utters, a certain sacramental. We have already heard this from Paludanus. St. Thomas, in IV, D. XVI, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1: "The words by which matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament, but not the blessing of the priest, which is a certain sacramental." And in D. XXVIII, q. 1, a. 3, he teaches the same more expressly. Moreover St. Bonaventure, ibid., q. 2, says: "Others say" (since no writing of these exists, for neither did Canus find them, they must be said to have been theologians of the lowest note teaching in his age, unless perhaps the holy Doctor and those who thereafter copied him looked to William of Paris, to whom they attributed this opinion) "that in the sacrament of marriage grace is given by reason of the superadded blessing.... But this position does not seem to avail, because that blessing is sacramental" (that is, a certain sacramental), "and if a sacramental effects, how much more the sacrament?" Namely, if some sacramental effects grace, how much more must the sacrament itself be said to effect it, which is marriage or the consent of man and woman. Bonaventure himself, in the immediately preceding question, teaching what that is which in the sacrament of marriage is sign only (which indeed is the essential rite itself of the sacrament), places it in the words or nods of the contracting parties expressing consent, as does St. Thomas. Dionysius the Carthusian has the same in the same place, q. 1. And the Master, in the fourth book, disputing concerning Marriage as a sacrament, and defining it first, D. XXVI, by that definition which represents the marriage of the faithful only, then in the following distinction by a definition taken from Roman law, next teaches that its efficient cause is consent expressed by words of the present; therefore the priest does not posit the sacrament, but the contracting parties do. But an opinion new in the School, opposed to the doctrine of the whole preceding School concerning a matter which can be known by revelation alone, which pertains to the dogmas of faith, cannot be true.

IV. The intrinsic demonstration of this truth is what we handed down in the preceding Thesis. For if the sacrament is the marital union itself of Christians, the contract itself, it is necessary that the minister of this sacrament be the minister of the contract, or the one who makes the contract; but this is none other than each contracting party. But the rite posited by the priest will indeed be some blessing or consecration of the marriage, but it cannot be or be called the marriage itself. Moreover from these things it is clear that both truths, both of the preceding Thesis and of this one, are bound together by a mutual bond and derive from the same principles; and therefore those things which we shall now further bring forward for this thesis, sought from the practice and sense of the Church, also avail to confirm the preceding Thesis.

V. And so, that we may more fully demonstrate the truth of each thesis, we gather these things from perpetual doctrine and practice. a) Innocent III, Tuas dudum, De Sponsa duorum, has these words: "We wish you to observe this, that after legitimate consent concerning the present has intervened between legitimate persons, which suffices in such things according to the canonical sanctions, and if it alone is lacking, the other things even celebrated together with intercourse are frustrated," etc. The obvious sense of these words is: if consent is lacking, even if the other things are present, nothing comes to be; if consent is present, even if the other things are lacking, marriage comes to be; therefore even if the act of the priest is lacking; and therefore he is not here the minister of the sacrament. You will say that, according to Innocent, consent suffices so that there be a natural contract, not so that there be a sacrament. I respond that this distinction, unknown to the ancients for the marriages of Christians (the preceding Thesis), here conflicts with the very words of Innocent, who speaks of marriage which is governed by canonical sanctions, which is nothing except a sacrament (cf. preceding Thesis, n. III, lit. c).

b) The Council of Trent, Sess. XXIV, in the Decree on the Reform of Marriage, says: "It is not to be doubted that clandestine marriages made by the free consent of the contracting parties are ratified and true marriages, as long as the Church has not made them invalid." Now according to the solemn ecclesiastical formula of speaking, the appellation of ratified marriage is made of a sacramental marriage, so that only among the faithful is marriage said to be ratified. Therefore the Tridentine Fathers signify that those marriages were sacraments. And indeed marriages of this sort the Church ruled by her laws, held subject to impediments constituted by herself, valid or invalid according as a canonical impediment stood in the way or did not, no otherwise than the other marriages, and she could invalidate them, as the Tridentine Fathers signify. But marriage as regards the bond is not subject to the power of the Church except because it is a sacrament, as we have already admonished. Now in clandestine marriages there is no action of a priest; therefore.

c) Eugene IV, in the Decree for the Armenians, handing down the doctrine of the sacraments of the New Law, says: "The seventh is the sacrament of marriage, which is the sign of the conjunction of Christ and the Church, according to the Apostle," etc. "The efficient cause of marriage regularly is mutual consent expressed by words of the present." Moreover it is inept to think that the marriage of which the efficient cause is assigned is not the sacrament, but a mere contract; because here the discussion is only about the sacraments, and Eugene had immediately before called it a sacrament, nor does he at all intimate mention of another marriage. But if mutual consent is its efficient cause, the priest is not the minister of the same, because then the action of the priest would be its efficient cause; therefore. Nor should you say that here mention of the minister is not made by Eugene; for this is simply false. For when he says that mutual consent (certainly of the contracting parties) expressed by words of the present is the efficient cause, by this very fact he says that the contracting parties are the ministers. Moreover that word regularly does not insinuate that there is another extraordinary cause; for this is wholly new in the whole tradition, that there is a twofold cause of marriage, one ordinary and the other extraordinary. Rather, it must be referred to these words: expressed by words; for consent can also be expressed by nods; indeed, in that age, with intercourse following espousals, matrimonial consent was presumed to have been signified.

d) From the Declaration of Benedict XIV concerning marriages of heretics among themselves and then mixed marriages in Holland, which declaration was afterward extended by the authority of the Apostolic See to other provinces, it is clear that there can be Christian marriages which are contracted without the presence of the priest. And from the instruction of Pius VI, extending that declaration to the Duchy of Cleves on 19 June 1793, it is clear that there can be Christian marriage when the pastor, unwilling, assists, proving it by no positive act, which is prohibited to him, or confirming it by his express consent and authority, but conducting himself merely passively and only hearing the consent of each. Thus also on 22 April 1792 the Congregation deputed for the affairs of the Gallican Church responded; for the question was asked: "Supposing that a marriage has been celebrated without the blessing of a priest, who then (in the time of the Gallican rebellion) could not be had, whether it is fitting or not that the aforesaid blessing be supplied. To this question, already proposed formerly, the response then was: the faithful are to be exhorted that, when they can have the presence of a priest, they seek a blessing from him; he, however, will declare to them that a blessing of this sort does not in the least pertain to validity." Now that the marriages of heretics have always been held by the Apostolic See as sacraments, we are made more certain from the fact that the marriages of heretics also among themselves are per se subject to canonical impediments. Benedict XIV teaches this manifestly in the cited declaration, and Gregory XVI in the Brief to the Bishops of Bavaria, dated 28 May 1832, and Pius VII in the Brief to the Archbishop of Mainz, dated 8 Oct. 1803. But Benedict XIV calls mixed marriages a sacrilegious bond. Moreover marriage is subject to the power of the Church for constituting impediments because it is a sacrament, and it cannot be held to be a sacrilege unless the sanctity of a sacrament is violated. But as regards marriages of Catholics celebrated without a priest, if the Apostolic See had not held them as sacraments, she certainly would have ordered them afterward to be celebrated before a priest, lest the faithful be deprived of the grace of the sacrament, or would have made mention of this harm in order to lead the faithful to this celebration.

e) Likewise from the history of the Council of Trent it is clear that the Fathers required the presence of the pastor not as the minister of the sacrament, but as a qualified witness. In the first formulas of the decree no mention had been made of the pastor, but only of three witnesses. Then, when there was agreement concerning the necessity of some stable witness, it was debated whether this ought to be a scribe or public notary, or the pastor; and finally the pastor was constituted. And indeed in the words of the invalidating decree mention is made only of the presence of the pastor. But by presence alone, apart from any action, no one is the minister of a sacrament. Therefore, since only the presence of the pastor, not some action of his, is essentially required, it is clear that the pastor is not required by the Council as the minister of the sacrament, but as witness.

f) Finally the Council, in the same place, speaking of the celebration of marriage, says: "The pastor, after questioning the man and woman and understanding their mutual consent, either says: I join you in marriage, in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, or uses other words according to the received rite of each province." Tournely says (q. III, c. I): "If the Synod had purposely wished to intimate that the priest is the minister of the sacrament of marriage, and that the words by which he joins the contracting parties are the form or quasi-form, it could not have used more significant words." But rather the contrary must be said. Indeed it would be foreign to the usage of the Church that a sacramental form, in which is the principal force of the sacrament, and which, when the words are changed, can easily be changed also as to sense, be permitted to the choice of each province.

You will say: the Tridentine Fathers knew the rites of the individual provinces and held them as legitimate. But 1. that is asserted altogether gratuitously; 2. the words of the Council, which have perpetual force, avail also for the future and for rites that would exist (cf. the Ritual of Paul V). Did the Tridentine Fathers know these also? Besides, although no one is ignorant that accidental changes can happen to the forms of the sacraments, nevertheless, when the Church wishes to teach the faithful the form of some sacrament, she proposes it absolutely, adding, if necessary, that the same form remains if the words are changed a little, not the sense. But here no form is proposed absolutely; even that which is expressed is proposed disjunctively with others. Therefore the Fathers most openly intimated that the form of the sacrament of marriage is not the words of the priest.

VI. But that it may be clear that this doctrine is ancient, Tertullian has these things concerning clandestine marriages in the book On Modesty: "Therefore among us hidden conjunctions also, that is, those not previously professed before the Church, run the risk of being judged next to adultery and fornication." Namely, such conjunctions were not judged to be such of themselves, but they brought in suspicion of this thing. Hence even among the Montanists the action of the priest was not held as essential. But since Tertullian says these things in praise of his own sect, which he commends for severity, much more must it be held that clandestine marriages were held valid among Catholics. Likewise in the collection of canons of their synod, which Ebedjesu, Metropolitan of Soba and Armenia, wrote at the beginning of the fourteenth century (in Angelo Mai, SS. VV. Nova Collectio, T. X, p. 44), tract. II, c. 2, it is prescribed that nuptials be made with the blessing of priests, and they are said to be consummated thereby, and thus the nuptials of Christians are distinguished from the nuptials of Jews and Gentiles. Nevertheless in c. 3 it is said that if priests are lacking, four or five witnesses are to be called, the Our Father is to be recited, the ring is to be given, and thus the espousal is to be perfected until they come to the priests: "But if the priest shall not come before the time of the bridal chamber, in like manner also let them perfect the chamber" (that is, let them consummate the marriage). From these things it is clear that the action of a priest, even among heretics anciently separated from the Church, was not held as essential for effecting the marriage of Christians.

As regards the ancient rituals, Martene reports these things generally concerning these ancient rites (On the Ancient Rites of the Church, part II, c. 9, a. 1): "Constitution for celebrating nuptials. When the day arrived, the bridegroom and bride to be blessed were presented by parents or attendants to the priest at the doors of the Church. Then, after they had given each other right hands, he required consent from each, in which the ancients placed the whole essence of the sacrament of marriage.

For unheard among them were those words of the pastor: I join you in the name, etc., in which some of the more recent Scholastics constitute the form of this sacrament. Yet these are lacking in two ancient manuscript rituals of the monastery of Bec, in the Rheims pontifical of 300 years (the work was published by Martene in the year 1709), in the ancient ritual of Bourges, and in almost all the others which will afterward be exhibited by us. To these we can add the constitutions of Richard, Bishop of Salisbury (year 1217), in which I read these things: Likewise we command that priests teach the persons contracting this form of words in French or in English: I, N., receive you, N., as mine. And similarly let the woman say: I receive you as mine. For in these words the great force consists and marriage is contracted." From these things it is clear that blessings of the priest of this sort were anciently held as a certain sacramental, as the Scholastics afterward called them; therefore.

VII. This certainly was the opinion of St. Thomas. For in IV, D. XXVIII, q. I, a. 3, speaking of marriage as a sacrament, he says: "Consent expressed by words of the present between persons legitimate for contracting makes marriage, because these two are of the essence of the sacrament; all other things, however, are of the solemnity of the sacrament, because they are applied to this end, that marriage may be made more fittingly." And ad 2: "In marriage our acts are a sufficient cause for inducing the proximate effect, which is obligation, because whoever is master of himself can bind himself to another. And therefore the blessing of the priest is not required in marriage as though of the essence of the sacrament." You see here that marriage is considered by St. Thomas not simply as it is a contract, but as it is at the same time a sacrament.

Wherefore D. XXVI, q. 11, a. 3, ad 1 says: "Just as the water of baptism has this, that it touches the body and washes the heart, from the touch of Christ's flesh, so marriage has this from the fact that Christ by his passion (in which he espoused the Church to himself) represented it, and not principally from some sanctification of the priest."

VIII. They object, however. 1. Priests according to the Apostle, 1 Cor. IV. 1, are dispensers of the mysteries of God, that is, of the sacraments; therefore. I respond, a) that by the name of mysteries the Apostle there designates not precisely the sacraments but the mysteries of faith, or evangelical doctrine. For Paul looks to this, that he may prescribe for the Corinthians the mode of rendering honor to the heralds of the Gospel, since some were extolling them too much, others depressing them too much. Therefore he says that they are to be regarded as ministers of Christ and dispensers of the mysteries of God. b) Priests, or the ruling Church, dispense marriage, insofar as she rules it and by her laws determines the manner in which it can rightly be contracted.

2. Those who confect the sacraments intend to do what the Church does; but the Church acts through her ministers, and the ministers of the Church are priests; therefore also the minister of the sacrament of marriage is the priest.

I respond that these words, what the Church does, are not to be taken in such a way that the Church is said to act insofar as the universal Church or her supreme head administers the sacraments through her ministers as through an instrumental cause; for the principal cause in the sacraments is only God. Rather they are to be taken thus: that the Church is said to act insofar as something is done in her and through her, that is, through those who in her are ministers of sacred things, and according to her doctrine and institutions. Therefore this would be the response to the argument in form. He intends to do what the Church does, that is, what is done in the Church according to the faith of the Church: I concede. What the Church does, I distinguish: what the universal Church or her visible head does as a principal cause: I deny the supposition; what the Church teaches is to be done and those do who in her are ministers either because of special consecration or by divine deputation because of baptism: I concede.

3. The words which the Council of Trent commands to be uttered by the pastor - I join you in marriage - ought to pour forth a true sense. But no true sense would be in them if the priest were not the one who makes the sacrament; therefore.

We respond that those words pertain to the solemnity of the sacrament, not to the essence. "The blessing of the priest is not required in marriage as though of the essence of the sacrament," says St. Thomas in the cited place. And indeed, since it is clear that the Church has held and holds as true marriages and sacraments also those which are made without the presence of any priest, it is altogether necessary that we say that those words of the priest do not pertain to the essence of the sacrament. Nor, however, is the sense false. For they do not signify only: I declare you joined, but I solemnly join you; or, I hold your conjunction ratified in the face of the Church. Therefore those words have a true sacramental sense: I deny. They have a true ritual sense of an authentic declaration in the face of the Church: I concede.

4. Omitting certain Roman Pontiffs' decrees, either spurious or doubtful, such as that of Evaristus (cause XXX, q. 5, c. 1), which, if it proved anything, would prove that the presence of the priest is required for the honorableness of marriage and is commanded by the Church; and omitting those decrees which prove nothing and are referred to by Gratian in the Decretum, they argue from the manner of speaking of the Fathers, who make mention of priestly blessing, derive the sanctity of marriage from it, and proclaim its necessity. I respond: from those testimonies of the Fathers we indeed have that marriage is a sacred thing, conjoined with grace; that when it is entered into it must be moderated and governed by the authority of the Church; that in order that it be contracted honorably and the effect of sacramental grace be actually obtained when it is contracted, it ought to be celebrated before the Church under the auspices of the priest; that those marriages which are entered into otherwise are dishonorable and labor even under the suspicion of concubinage. But there is nothing besides by which we are taught that the priest himself administers the sacrament, especially since the Fathers so speak as to signify that the blessing accedes to marriage already constituted, as Tertullian does; and since they speak even of that blessing which was denied to second nuptials, of which sort is that of which Ambrose speaks; and if there are any doubtful testimonies, they ought to be explained from the clearer expression of the sense of the Church in the following ages. Although in the Roman Sacerdotal published in the year 1494 these words are found after the consent of each has been understood: "Let the priest utter the words which are the form of the sacrament," nevertheless these words, which are the form of the sacrament, were deleted in its later editions, and in the Roman Ritual published by the authority of Paul V these words were substituted: "Let the priest command them to join right hands with one another, saying: I join you in marriage in the name of the Father," etc., "or let him use other words according to the received custom of each province," according to the prescription of the Council of Trent.

5. The form of a sacrament ought to signify the effect of the sacrament. But the words of the contracting parties, I receive you as mine or as my own, signify no grace. I respond that these words, which of themselves signify the natural union, were elevated by the institution of Christ to signify the holy union which comes to be through grace, when they are uttered by Christians.

6. For the words in which the form of the sacrament is contained, other signs, nods, writings, cannot be substituted; but the contract of marriage can be entered into even in these ways and indeed by procurator; therefore the form of the sacrament is not in it, and therefore it is in the words of the priest. I respond: if that most universal principle is taken so that it avails for any sacrament whatsoever and therefore also for marriage, the principle is begged, for this is what would have to be demonstrated. Moreover, since Christ elevated marriage itself to the dignity of a sacrament, with no other superadded rite, it followed that the matter and form of the contract would also become the matter and form of the sacrament, and that what is enough for marriage to exist would also be enough for it to be a sacrament. But it is proper to contracts that, besides words, they can be entered into also through other signs and through a procurator; therefore.

7. The Church permits marriages to be made between a Catholic man and a heretical woman, and conversely; but if the contracting parties were the ministers of the sacrament, they would perpetrate sacrilege, and indeed a double sacrilege; wherefore the Church ought altogether to prohibit these marriages. I respond: it is false that the Church simply permits these unions; indeed, generally she has always condemned and forbidden them, as so many Briefs and Rescripts of the Apostolic See in causes of this sort testify. Hence Benedict XIV, in a Brief given to the Primate and Archbishops of Poland in the year 1748, on 29 June, bears witness that this is the manner of acting of the Apostolic See received by constant usage: that "as often as it happens that the Apostolic See is approached either for obtaining the simple faculty of contracting marriage between persons, of whom one professes heresy, or besides for obtaining at the same time a dispensation concerning some degree or other canonical impediment which intervenes between the contracting parties, neither permission nor dispensation is granted unless this express law or condition is added, namely, heresy first having been abjured." Pius VII says in the Brief to the Archbishop of Mainz that the same unions, on account of the difficulties of places and times, are tolerated by the Church. Therefore the Church only declares that those marriages, unless some other canonical impediment stands in the way, are valid; but it is one thing not to invalidate an act, another to permit it. Cf. also the Brief of Pius VIII to the Bishops of the Rhine, dated 25 March 1830, in which it is decreed that mixed marriages contracted in those places, when the Catholic pastor is not present or when the form prescribed by Trent has not been observed, from then on, that is, from 25 March 1830, unless some other canonical diriment impediment stands in the way, are to be held as ratified and true marriages; nevertheless he says that the Church abhors those marriages and that the Apostolic See has always taken care that the canonical laws prohibiting them be religiously observed.

It is indeed true that at times the Church has permitted those marriages, as the same Pontiff Benedict testifies in the same place: "but if some examples are found of Roman Pontiffs who granted either permission for contracting marriage or even dispensation over some impediment, without the condition of first abjuring heresy being added, we say first of all that concessions of this kind have been very rare, and indeed that most of them were made for marriages to be contracted among supreme Princes, and not unless a most grave cause urged, and one pertaining to the public good; moreover that appropriate cautions were always added," etc. Moreover, when this permission has been made, the Catholic contracting party does not sin, since the act is lawful; nor does the heretic sin because he contracts with a Catholic woman, for this is rather a good, nor because he cooperates in a mixed marriage, because this, in the hypothesis, is lawful. But he can sin for other causes, just as the Catholic also can. Cf. the Opus Theologicum Morale of Ballerini, tr. V, sect. 1, n. 94.

8. Before Trent, intercourse following after espousals concerning the future, by a presumption of law and of law, against which no proof is to be admitted, perfected marriage, etc., cc. Veniens, Is qui, Adolescens, De Sponsalibus et Matrimoniis; and before the abrogating decree of Leo XIII, 15 Feb. 1892, the same was presumed in places where the decree of Trent had not been promulgated. Now marriage of this kind either was a sacrament, or it was not. If it was, therefore its form was intercourse, which is absurd; if it was not, therefore there can be Christian marriage without being a sacrament, contrary to what we affirmed in the preceding Thesis. I respond that that marriage was ratified and a sacrament; but its form and matter was consent expressed extrinsically through intercourse, which expressed consent was presumed by law and of law. Hence this marriage was called presumed, l. c.; cf. q. XLVI, a. 2, in the Supplement.

IX. Therefore it has been proved that the priest is not the minister of this sacrament, but the contracting parties themselves, and therefore that the form is not the words of the priest, but is posited by the contracting parties themselves. But the question is in what the form and matter of this sacrament must be placed. A sacrament either consists only in some passing action, such as absolution, or also in a permanent thing, as the Eucharist. But even that sacrament which consists in a permanent thing supposes a passing action by which it comes to be, which action is itself also a sacrament; hence a sacrament of this kind is a sacrament in fieri and in facto esse. Now marriage is a sacrament in fieri and in facto esse. Therefore, although marriage is a permanent sacrament, it is necessary that, when it comes to be, there be some action by which it comes to be and which is the sacrament. But concerning this the question is asked, what its form and matter are. Since the sacrament of marriage is made by the contracting parties, and the contracting parties posit no action other than the contract, it is necessary that the action in which the passing sacrament consists be the contract itself. Indeed the efficient cause of the sacrament of marriage is mutual consent expressed by words of the present, as Eugene IV teaches. This being posited, there are especially two opinions.

The first says that, since in marriage there is no other thing than the contract, its matter and form will be that which is in the other contracts; but the matter of contracts is that which is given and accepted; in marriage, however, bodies are handed over and accepted; therefore these are the matter of the sacrament. But the form is the words by which the handing over and acceptance come to be and are signified.

Lugo responds, De Sacramentis in genere, disp. 2, sect. 1, n. 15, that that which in contracts is given and accepted is the matter about which the contract is concerned, not the matter or some intrinsic element of the action which is called contract; but now such matter of the contract of marriage is sought, as it comes to be.

Therefore there is another opinion, that in the expression itself of consent, or in the contract itself, can be found the matter ex qua and the form. Some explain this thus, because the words or equivalent signs signify and make the handing over and acceptance. Now the handing over of power, of itself, by its nature, is presupposed to acceptance, and therefore of itself is determinable; but acceptance, of itself, by its nature, accedes to the handing over, and therefore itself of itself completes the contract. Therefore the words or signs, insofar as they express mutual handing over, have themselves as matter; but insofar as they express acceptance, they have themselves as form. Thus Sanchez, De Matrimonio, l. 2, disp. 5, n. 6, with Bellarmine and Suarez and others whom he cites. This does not please others, because acceptance does not seem more determined than handing over; nor, in other contracts which are perfected by words, are these customarily distinguished as matter and form. Lugo, l. c., n. 29, observes that in every contract there is a handing over of some right and an obligation assumed, which is mutual in onerous contracts; that the handing over of the thing, by which handing over dominion of the thing is obtained, follows the contract, but that sometimes by the contract alone, before the handing over of the thing, dominion is obtained (from canon and Roman law), and that the fact that it is otherwise or so in more cases depends on the determination of positive law; and certainly in marriage, before the real handing over of bodies, dominion is obtained by one over the other. Hence it follows that the very words of this contract, by which the right is given, are equivalent to the handing over of the thing itself, for they work the same effect. Therefore we have that the words of this contract are equivalent to two acts: namely to handing over and to obligation. Insofar as they are handing over, you have the proximate matter of the contract; insofar as they signify and beget a perpetual obligation of one to the other, you have the form of the contract. The difficulty in this explanation is what Lugo properly understands by the name of obligation; for in the other contracts obligation is something prior to handing over, for the contracting parties bind themselves to giving or doing something. Perhaps it is the obligation to perpetual union proceeding from mutual handing over. Let the reader choose what is more pleasing to him. But that in the very words (or signs) of the contract the matter and form are contained, St. Thomas had already taught. Moreover this is the opinion which Benedict XIV asserted in the Letter to the Bishop of Goa. And St. Thomas seems to have thought this, who in IV, D. XXVI, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1 says: "The words by which matrimonial consent is expressed are the form of this sacrament"; and ad 2 he says: "just as penance has no other matter except the very acts subjected to sense, which are in place of the material element, so it is concerning marriage." But the acts of the contracting parties are nothing except consent and the signs of the same, or expressed consent; therefore these are both form and matter under a diverse respect, insofar as they signify one thing and another.

X. In every permanent sacrament there is found that which is sacrament only, that which is thing only, and that which is thing and sacrament at the same time. Sacrament only is that which signifies and is not signified by another; thing only is that which is signified and does not signify; thing and sacrament is that which is signified and signifies. Thus in baptism the exterior rite is sacrament only; grace is thing only; the character is both thing and sacrament (St. Thomas, III, p., q. LXVI, a. 1). Likewise "in marriage," says the same Doctor, Suppl., q. XLII, a. 1, ad 5, "there are these three, because the sacrament is the obligation which arises of the man toward the woman from such acts" (the abiding bond), "but the ultimate thing contained" (namely grace, which it produces) "is the effect of this sacrament; but the thing not contained is the thing which the Master determines" (that is, the conjunction of Christ with the Church, which the sacrament does not make, but signifies). Indeed the extrinsic rite, or expression of consent, signifies and makes the holy union of the spouses and signifies the union of Christ and the Church; therefore, because this rite signifies something and is not signified by another, it is sacrament or sign only. But because through this rite grace is signified and produced, that grace is the thing of this sacrament, and because it signifies nothing else, it is thing only. But through that rite there comes to be the union or permanent bond of the spouses, which therefore is signified by that rite; moreover it itself signifies both the union of Christ with the Church and the grace or holiness which is owed to it, and by which the union of Christ and the Church is represented in a supernatural mode. For to this bond, by the institution of Christ, grace is owed, which, when that bond comes to be, is conferred and remains with it; this grace is sacramental, and although it can indeed be lost through sin, nevertheless when penance follows it is demanded by the same abiding bond. Therefore the bond is both signified and signifies; hence it is thing and sacrament at the same time.

Therefore, when marriage is called a sacrament, both the contract and the bond are understood; these are not two disparate things, but the first is the cause of the other, as Eugene says, or the first is marriage in fieri, for through the contract itself the spouses are united, and the other is marriage in facto esse. But the special reason must be observed by which the appellation of sacrament is made of permanent marriage. For the abiding bond is not some character, as in three sacraments, nor is it a sacrament as the body of Christ under the species is; but it is a sacrament because it signifies the union of Christ with the Church and demands grace, and it is an abiding sacrament because the bond remains.