The Minimum Wage and the Family Wage

817. (C) Catholic doctrine. Between these two extremes the Catholic doctrine which Leo XIII set forth in the Encyclical Rerum Novarum proceeds by a middle way. There he especially declares two things: (a) "that the wage ought not be unequal for nourishing a worker, frugal indeed and well behaved," and indeed from justice, as we explained above, n. 814; (b) that it is to be desired that the wage be sufficiently ample for the honorable support not only of the worker himself, but also of wife and children: "If the worker receives a wage sufficiently ample that by it he can conveniently protect himself, his wife, and his children, he will easily study thrift, if he is wise, and will bring it about, as nature herself seems to admonish, that, expenses having been deducted, something also remains, by which it may be permitted to him to arrive at a modest property... Wherefore laws must favor this right, and, insofar as possible, provide that as many as possible from the multitude prefer to have property." He afterward describes the utility of this manner of acting, namely a more equitable partition of goods, greater eagerness for laboring, and also the diminution of emigration to foreign nations.

818. From this, however, controversies arose among Catholics, some saying that from this declaration of the Pontiff a family wage is owed from justice, but others asserting that it is fittingly given only from charity, as often as the condition of industrial affairs permits this. Wherefore three doubts were proposed to the Holy See by Cardinal Goossens, to which Card. Zigliara, by order of the Holy Pontiff, responded. Now from this response three things are likewise established: (a) that from commutative justice there is owed to a worker, otherwise capable and laboring well, of itself, a wage which suffices for suitable food and clothing, not indeed to be determined punctually and mathematically, but from common estimation, with attention to the quality, quantity, and duration of the work, and also to the price of things which must be bought by the worker for suitable food and clothing in such and such a region;¹ (b) that a master who pays a wage sufficient for the support of the worker, but unequal to the feeding of his family, indeed does not sin against justice, whose demands are fully satisfied when equality of wage and work is observed; - but sometimes can sin against charity, which demands that the master prefer his workers in lavishing alms; or against natural honesty, insofar as the master, who receives great benefit and advantage from the work of the worker, is in some way held from a certain natural equity to recompense this by supererogation; (c) that, speaking of itself, masters sin against commutative justice who, "using no force or fraud, give less wage than the work furnished deserves and than suffices for honorable support, for this reason that several workers offer themselves, who are content with that small stipend, or freely consent to it"; he says, speaking of itself; for "accidentally particular cases can be given in which masters can hire workers content with an inadequate wage: for example, if the master would draw either no advantage, or one altogether insufficient for the suitable support of his own life, if he lavished an adequate wage, indeed, if he would even suffer damage thereby"; this indeed can happen when, because of an industrial crisis, manufacturers are compelled to sell merchandise at the lowest price.

¹ "Therefore as often as the work is such that the worker through himself satisfies the aforesaid natural office of obtaining the immediate end of his labor, and the wage is unequal for obtaining this end, namely suitable food and clothing, speaking of itself and considering the nature of things, there is an objective inequality between work and wage, and therefore a wound of commutative justice. - Yet two things are generally to be considered in this matter: one is that, just as the price of saleable things is not punctually determined by the law of nature, but rather consists in common estimation, so also this must generally be said concerning wage;... the other is that in assigning the equality of justice between wage and manual work, common estimation attends not only to the quality and quantity of the work, but also to the time of its duration, likewise to the prices of things which must be bought by the worker for suitable food and clothing; which prices are not the same everywhere." (Card. Zigliara, Letter to Card. Goossens, 1891.)

Yet this letter did not impose an end to the dispute; for Father Eschbach, superior of the French seminary in Rome, contended that, according to the style of the school and of the Roman Rota, under the name of sustenance come all foods, clothing, habitation, medicines, etc., with attention to the quality of the one to be sustained; wherefore, if the one to be sustained is married, he has a right to honorable support for himself, wife, and children.¹ - But on the contrary Bishop Turinaz, bishop of Nancy, responded that the labor of the worker is a personal work, and not of the family, nor does it have anything except a secondary and accidental relation with the family, and therefore from justice merits nothing except personal support.²

¹ Eschbach, letter of Aug. 19, 1893 and Jan. 24, 1895.

² Turinaz, Le salaire familial et le Card. Zigliara, Nancy, 1895, where the two letters of Father Eschbach are also found.

819. (D) Practical conclusions. (a) In every case, masters are held from justice to pay a wage which corresponds to the economic value of the work furnished, according to the common estimation of prudent persons, that is, of masters and workers who can bring a fair judgment concerning this matter.

This rule indeed flows from the general principle admitted for all contracts, namely that equality is required between the work furnished and the price paid, according to the common estimation of skilled and honest persons.

But we said that account must be had of the estimation of masters and workers, and not only of one order; for since the matter concerns a thing which pertains to each order, and besides each naturally seeks its own proper good, it is not fair to stand by the judgment of one rather than the other; but skilled and honest persons of each order must come together so that, all things carefully weighed, the just price can be determined. This in practice is done through mixed councils composed of masters and workers (Conseils des prud'hommes, Conseils d'usine).

820. Corollaries. 1. Accordingly it is permitted to stand by the current price which is in force in a region, unless there is moral certainty that it has been determined by an unjust conspiracy.

2. That price cannot be the same in all regions or times, but must be increased or diminished according to the greater or lesser prosperity of industrial affairs: thus, if from various circumstances profit is increased, that increase must be divided between masters and workers in fair proportion, and not accrue to masters alone, especially since it can rightly be attributed to the efforts of each; but on the contrary, if profit is diminished, it is fair that the wage be proportionately less, lest otherwise masters slip into ruin, not without detriment to workers.

3. Masters would act unjustly who, abusing the ignorance or necessity of some worker, furnished to him a wage below the current price, e.g., gave only three coins for work which, according to common estimation, is worth four coins.

821. (b) In the normal state of industry and commerce, from justice there is owed at least that wage which is necessary to the worker himself for his honorable support, provided he labors with common and ordinary skill and activity.

Leo XIII expressly declared this, above, n. 817; and rightly. For the right and office of protecting their own life is incumbent upon workers; but, from things commonly happening, they have nothing else from which they may live except the wage received for labor; therefore they have the right and office of demanding the payment necessary for decent support; otherwise it would have to be said that a worker fit for laboring, and besides laboring with common diligence, cannot provide for himself even in ordinary circumstances without asking alms; this indeed no one of sound mind will say; for if it pertains to charity to relieve the poor and to furnish help to workers in certain extraordinary cases, it certainly pertains to justice to provide for the ordinary necessities of workers, by furnishing to them a sufficient wage; otherwise, it is all over with their dignity, and they must be numbered among beggars.

Now under the name of honorable support are rightly enumerated: foods necessary for repairing strength, clothing suitable to one's state, a healthy dwelling, - those things which are required for observing feast days and indulging some honorable and necessary recreation, and for meeting the customary cases of sicknesses and dangers, and also for preparing for oneself a tranquil old age; for all these things, according to common estimation, must be called morally necessary. - But if extraordinary misfortunes occur, long-lasting diseases, strength broken before the customary time, etc., it is not necessary that the wage suffice for relieving all these things, but recourse must be had to charity, unless the worker has provided for fortuitous cases by insurance.

822. It was said "in the normal state of industry," because if the conditions of things are such that, for some time, owners cannot pay so great a wage unless they fall from their own state, the stipend can be diminished, and it is fair that workers and masters suffer something until the abundance of fruits permits a return to the former wage; nevertheless, it is expedient that this be done by common counsel, by which lawsuits and dissensions may more easily be removed.

Likewise, if some worker, because of old age or weak health, or lack of common skill, cannot furnish integral labor, the master is held from justice only to compensate the work furnished. The same can be said if out of mercy alone he has hired a worker whose work he did not need.

823. (c) In the normal state of industry, the wage furnished to a suitable worker ought to be such that, increased by the wage which wife and children gain by labor proportionate to their powers, it suffices for the honorable support of the family; and this indeed from commutative justice according to many, from legal and distributive justice according to several, but from charity and equity according to others.

It is declared. So that this may be better understood, it must be declared in a few words. Here the matter does not concern a relative family wage, by which namely the wage ought to be increased proportionately to the number of children; nor is it contended that more is owed to married men and fathers of families than to those who remain celibate; for if the matter were so, married men would scarcely find masters who wished to hire them, and thus they would often be compelled to be free from all work, with great detriment to themselves and their family.

But the matter concerns a collective family wage; namely, such a stipend must be furnished to any worker that, when he marries and is made the head of a family, he can support his family, provided however that the wife takes up that kind of work which can stand with her offices, and likewise the children, at an opportune time, begin to labor in a manner proportionate to their powers. It is likewise supposed that the number of children is ordinary; but if the offspring is very numerous, the social good demands that either the Republic or private societies furnish some help to this family; for since numerous offspring well educated contributes greatly to the good of the whole society, it is fair that society itself contribute something to the education of this offspring; nor from justice is the master held to increase the wage of those who have many children, although from charity he can be held to give something, according to the things said above, n. 803-805.

We also suppose that the condition of industry is prosperous, so that the owner, by paying such a wage, not only does not incur danger of ruin, but he himself can make a proportionate profit; for he is not held to suffer some damage so that he may provide for the necessities of workers; but he satisfies justice by furnishing payment equal to the value of the work furnished.

824. It is proved. These things being posited, one can argue thus. The common law of nature is that workers, like other men, enter marriage, and, insofar as they are fathers of families, perform their offices toward wife and children; but one of these primary offices is to provide for the necessities of the wife, when she, because of the duties of mother which are incumbent upon her, cannot provide for herself, and also to feed and educate the offspring whom he has begotten: "It is a most holy law of nature," says Leo XIII, "that the father of a family protect with sustenance and every cultivation those whom he himself has begotten: and this likewise is deduced from nature itself, that he wishes to acquire and prepare for his children, who refer back and in some way produce the paternal person, that by which they may honestly defend themselves from miserable fortune in the uncertain course of life."

Whence thus: in the normal state of industry, a suitable worker ought to have an efficacious means of providing for an ordinary family. But such a means cannot be except labor in which there is a value equivalent to an absolute and collective family wage. - Therefore there is in the labor of the worker a value equivalent to an absolute and collective family wage.

825. From this it follows, according to many, that this wage is owed from justice, as often as the condition of industry permits it;¹ for otherwise the right which workers have of furnishing necessities to their family would be violated. Nor does this opinion, understood thus, contradict the opinion of Cardinal Zigliara; for he was speaking of a father of a family who alone was working for the support of the whole family, while in our case it is supposed that other members of the family contribute something to the domestic matter by some labor proportionate to their powers. In other words, the family itself can be regarded as a moral body, which has a right to honorable support when it labors according to its powers.

¹ Thus Card. Manning, La Question ouvriere et sociale, Paris, 1892; Liberatore, Econ. Polit., p. 246-252; Nicotra, Le minimum de salaire, art. 2; Verhaegen, Le minimum de salaire, Ghent, 1892; C. Perin, Note sur le juste salaire, Mons, 1892; Pottier, op. cit., n. 195; Gayraud, Questions du jour, Paris, 1897, p. 171-176; Waffelaert, in Collationes Brugenses, VI, Jan. 1901; Vermeersch, op. cit., n. 430-440; Lehmk., n. 1127a; Noldin, n. 600-601.

826. Yet we do not deny that there are certain persons, among modern Catholics, who still contend that from justice only the payment necessary for personal support is owed; for, they say, the work furnished is something personal, and has no relation to the family; whence the family wage, in whatever way it is understood, is not owed except from a certain charity or equity; if the wife labors, she indeed will receive from justice payment proportionate to her labor; the same must be said concerning children; but if the collective wage does not suffice for the support of the whole family, this cannot be turned into a fault for masters, who furnished a stipend corresponding to the value of the work. - To these it is responded that there is in the labor of workers, although merely personal, an intrinsic value sufficient that from it provision can be made for the family in ordinary circumstances.

Several, on the contrary, have recourse only to legal and distributive justice. For the common good demands that workers be able to marry and provide for a family, and it cannot be admitted that the support of families is to be expected from charity alone. Hence patrons are held from legal justice to furnish an absolute family wage, and presidents of the state from distributive justice to favor families, especially numerous ones.

Whatever may be the case concerning the speculative question, now a few things must be said concerning practical means by which, gradually and without harm to anyone, the wages of workers can be increased.

2. On The Means By Which The Wage Can Be Increased.

417. With what intention and with what hope of fruit we write concerning these matters. 1. First of all, it is useful to bring forward here the golden counsels which Leo XIII sent to the Bishops of Belgium in the letter of 3 August 1881: “This, moreover, must be guarded against in conducting controversies: that the measure which the laws of equity and charity prescribe not be transgressed”; and afterward: “But in those things which are freely permitted to the disputations of wise men, let minds be exercised, with you persuading and admonishing them, in such a manner that diversity of opinions does not rupture unity of minds and concord of wills.” Cf. D’Hulst, 6th conference at Notre-Dame de Paris, 1896, I.

2. Therefore, with a mind in no way agitated and with zeal for proposing the truth, we shall disclose what we judge to be preferred in this matter. And if one cannot dispute without censure of diverse opinions, we shall nevertheless endeavor to explain and judge these opinions with an equitable mind, so that every excessive contention and every contempt may be absent from our argument.

Indeed, even that very censure of another opinion will not always be able to advance so far that we deny a legitimate use of tenets which we disapprove, until the truth has been made more manifest.

Nor, while we define what justice demands concerning the lowest recompense of labor, do we intend to inquire whether and how great a sin there is in this matter. We do not deny that this matter will be arduous if it is necessary to come to particular conclusions.

3. But if the matter stands thus, someone could ask: to what purpose is this doctrine which does not produce definite obligations? To what purpose are the pontifical documents themselves, which have not removed the doubts?

But in truth, the matters concerning which, after these letters, a consensus of good men is now had are neither few nor slight. Moreover, even if these are set aside, we judge that the fruit of the letters of the Supreme Pontiff was and is great, and we do not regard the disputation itself as fruitless. For, to pass over both the tenets of liberal economic doctrine which were overthrown and the minds of all which were aroused and induced to understand both present questions and to discover arts for consulting at once the good of the proletarians and the welfare of the state—from which zeal and care how many excellent institutions and most useful laws have arisen—to pass over all these things, the very suspicion of an office or debt is accustomed to make pious or honorable men attentive lest they incur reproaches of conscience in any respect. Therefore, with consideration of the past perhaps left aside as uncertain, they will then apply themselves to arranging the present and future in the best manner they can.¹ Then the disputation itself, if it is conducted without obstinacy, will without great difficulty make those things which are true in this matter manifest to many. And this persuasion of many will not only be the cause why a few private men now act rightly, but will prepare a better and happier condition of the state itself.

¹ The distinguished Périn seems to have perceived these things excellently when, work cited (2nd ed.), p. 387, he wrote: “For me, the true import of the decisions of the encyclical concerning the wage is first of all to proscribe every speculation upon the worker’s necessities. It is next to determine the employer, through fear of commutative justice, to do everything which the state of his industry permits in order to assure the worker a sufficient wage; to take every measure which can directly or indirectly improve his condition and assure him the necessities.” Cf. also pp. 403–407, 414, 417.

418. Order of discussion. In order that the discourse may proceed according to reason and method, in the first part we shall view the present cause as if from without, so that, with the mind not yet preoccupied by opinions, we may attain the force and intention both of the encyclical Rerum novarum of 16 May 1891 and of a certain Roman response whose celebrity is unknown to no one. Then will follow the three parts by which we are accustomed to treat arguments.

419. Interpretation of the encyclical Rerum novarum.

I. The principal passage of the encyclical which pertains to our matter seems first to be proposed.

“We touch here upon a matter of sufficiently great importance, which must be rightly understood lest there be error on either side. Namely, the measure of the wage is defined by free consent; and therefore, once the employer has paid the wage agreed upon, he would seem to have discharged his pledge and to owe nothing further. It would then be done unjustly only if either the employer refused to pay the full price or the workman refused to render all the labor to which he was bound. In these cases it would be right for the political authority to intervene so that the right of each may remain intact, but in no others. An equitable judge of affairs will not readily or wholly assent to this argument, because it is not complete in every part: a certain rational consideration of the greatest weight is absent. For to labor is to exercise oneself for the sake of acquiring things which are for the various uses of life and especially necessary for one’s preservation. ‘In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread.’ Therefore, labor has as it were two notes implanted in man by nature: namely, that it is personal, because the active power adheres to the person and is altogether proper to him by whom it is exercised and for whose utility it is naturally ordered; and then that it is necessary, for this reason, that the fruit of labor is needed by man for preserving life, while nature itself, which is especially to be obeyed, commands that life be preserved. Now, if labor is regarded only from that part by which it is personal, there is no doubt that the workman remains free to set a narrower measure to the agreed wage; for just as he gives his labor voluntarily, so he can voluntarily be content with a wage for his labor which is either small or altogether nothing.

“But one must judge far otherwise if the rationale of necessity is joined to the rationale of personality, since it is separable from it in thought, indeed, but not in reality. In fact, to remain alive is the common duty of each person, which it is a crime to fail. Hence the right of finding the things by which life is sustained necessarily arises, and the wage acquired by labor supplies to every person of the lowest condition the means of these things. Granted, therefore, that the workman and the employer freely consent to the same agreement, and particularly to the measure of the wage, there is nevertheless always something underlying from natural justice, and this is greater and more ancient than the free will of the contracting parties: namely, the wage must not be inadequate for supporting a worker who is indeed frugal and well behaved. But if the worker, compelled by necessity or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts a harsher condition which, even though he is unwilling, must be accepted because it is imposed by the employer or contractor, this indeed is to undergo force, against which justice protests.”

II. To illustrate this passage, it is necessary to distinguish the things which are certain from those which can come into controversy.

1. The Supreme Pontiff clearly teaches: a) That there is some wage which is the lowest among just wages, and b) that this is rightly gathered from the very duty of preserving life. Therefore, one who wishes to respond with the Supreme Pontiff cannot entirely neglect this kind of argument. Moreover, c) no one doubts that the worker’s sustenance which is said to be procured by the wage must be understood not only as those things by which death is scarcely warded off, but as things which are fitting, so that they provide decent sustenance and culture according to one’s condition. d) Nor can we remain long in doubt concerning the justice which the Supreme Pontiff calls natural. For the justice which governs agreements is commutative justice, which is here called natural because it is prior to the agreement. It is therefore opposed to contractual justice.

But two things are less certain: one, by what force the worker himself is bound by an obligation to demand this wage; the other, whether or not the words for supporting the worker tacitly signify the necessary sustenance of his family. A few things concerning each.

2. On the binding force of the minimum wage. For there are some who, from the doctrine of the encyclical, deny to the worker himself the faculty of consenting to a wage lower than that lowest rationale of a just wage. Thus Rev. Fr. Cathrein, place cited; the distinguished Périn, Premiers principes [First Principles], p. 296, 1st ed.; Rev. Fr. Antoine, work cited, p. 559, or p. 595, 2nd ed. And they seem able to rely upon the Supreme Pontiff’s own argument, which is drawn not from some right but from a duty. For he says thus: “The fruit of labor is needed by man for preserving life; but nature itself, which is especially to be obeyed, commands that life be preserved.” What is more, does not the immediately following sentence—where it is conceded that the workman would remain free “to set a narrower measure to the agreed wage” if regard were to be had to the one note by which labor is something personal—as if of its own accord invoke the other note, by which, when it is posited, this option is denied, since account must also be taken of necessity? Indeed, is not this price called “greater and more ancient than the free will of the contracting parties”?

Nevertheless, we approve the explanation of others who see this alone confirmed in this passage: that there inheres in human labor, before every agreement, a certain minimum value, or a minimum price to be paid from justice in exchange,¹ by which a right of the worker, but not a duty per se, is defined. Thus Rev. Mr. Esbach in the cited article; Verhaegen, p. 57; Rev. Mr. Gayraud, work cited, p. 172.

¹ But if perchance less has been promised, the contract cannot therefore be called null. Rather, before execution it will be rescindable. But if the labor has been furnished, the just price must be supplied. Rev. Mr. De Gryse, work cited, p. 40, too absolutely judges null “on account of a vitiated substance” a contract by which the wage is established as inadequate for supporting the worker.

We think this can be established briefly as follows: a) The intention of the speaker is generally most apparent in the conclusion. But in this conclusion justice is introduced as protesting only “if the worker, compelled by necessity or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts a harsher condition.” b) As is evident from the first words, the Supreme Pontiff refutes those who will every rationale of what is owed to be estimated from the agreed wage. To this end it is sufficient to vindicate a superior rule. c) Since sustenance is understood as those things which correspond to decent maintenance, it becomes manifest per se that the worker remains free to cede a great part of these things. And why would it not be licit to labor gratuitously and live upon alms obtained by begging?

Therefore, this is gathered strictly from the duty of preserving life: that there is a lowest rationale of a just price which the worker has the right to seek, indeed to demand, and of which, although perhaps he can divest himself, he must not be judged to have divested himself by consent which he gave unwillingly. And nothing other than the objective value of human labor is declared more ancient than the will of the contracting parties; nevertheless, we are not compelled per se to insist upon it in an agreement. That is, it is licit voluntarily to offer one’s labor for a lower wage to someone who then, without injury to you, will not pay you more. It remains, nevertheless, that the greater sum is just and that you were content with less than the just amount. Therefore, the Supreme Pontiff confirms our conclusions concerning a just price (Thesis XXV) and adds a criterion by which it can be discerned below what sum a just wage cannot remain.

3. The question concerns whether or not the words “for supporting the worker” in some manner contain the sustenance necessary for his family.

Many affirm this, such as the distinguished Périn, work cited, 2nd ed., p. 299 ff.; Verhaegen, Le minimum de salaire [The Minimum Wage], III; and they appeal to the words by which the Supreme Pontiff seems a little below to disclose his mind, when he writes: “If the worker receives a wage sufficiently ample that by it he can suitably maintain himself, his wife, and his children, he will readily devote himself to thrift, and so forth.”

Although these words, and others which can be drawn from other encyclicals,² suggest that regard for the family was not passed over by the Supreme Pontiff, nevertheless, we assent rather to those who, such as Rev. Fr. Antoine, work cited (2nd ed.), p. 607; Rev. Mr. De Gryse, De contractu conductionis [On the Contract of Hiring], p. 45; and many others, judge that it is formally passed over. For the words for supporting the worker of themselves admit either meaning; nor does one who says the worker exclude the family. But the Roman Pontiffs are accustomed in their encyclicals to establish correct principles, but to abstain from defining the more difficult questions which are disputed among Catholics themselves.

² Cf. von Zwiedineck, Lohnpolitik, and so forth, p. 127.

But if you ask this further question—whether the rationale offered in the encyclical is perhaps of such force that it logically leads us to the opinion of a wage in some manner familial—we by no means deny it; indeed, we shall voluntarily defend it in our conclusion.

420. On the Roman response. 1. Historical vicissitudes.³ Shortly before Catholics from various regions assembled at Mechelen in 1891, His Eminence Cardinal Goossens, Archbishop of Mechelen, in order that he might more easily remove excessive strife in disputing, asked the Holy See three questions concerning the matter of wages. The Holy See, however, as generally happens when it does not wish to interpose its own authority and nevertheless to satisfy the petitioner in some manner, sought the opinion of a certain consultor.

³ We shall relate them substantially from the work of Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, Léon XIII [Leo XIII], vol. 2, p. 107, which, because it was specially approved by the Supreme Pontiff, has the greatest weight in this matter.

He, as afterward became known, was Cardinal Zigliara, whom report holds not to have been without a part in drafting the encyclical Rerum novarum. Moreover, the opinion of the Most Eminent man was communicated through His Eminence Cardinal Rampolla, Secretary of State, to His Eminence the Archbishop of Mechelen, so that he might make whatever use of the response the matter seemed to him to require; it was called “a certain manner of opining (opinamento).”⁴ After receiving this document, His Eminence the Archbishop proposed to the Holy See that it be published under a prescribed title which would say that it contained responses obtained through the medium of the Cardinal Secretary of State.⁵ He replied that the Supreme Pontiff was rather of the opinion that it should merely be declared in the preface that, on account of the importance and difficulty of the matter, doubts had been referred to a certain consultor who was very well acquainted with the province, to be examined and that he might disclose what he thought concerning them.⁶ Thus it happened that His Eminence the Archbishop refrained from publishing the document. But about six months later, on 22 March 1892, the superior of the Seminary which France has in Rome, Rev. Mr. Esbach, made it public in the periodical La Science Catholique, and at the same time designated it by the name Document émané du Saint-Siège [Document Emanating from the Holy See].

⁴ Here are the words of His Eminence Rampolla by which he transmitted the response: “The Holy Father, having ordered that these doubts be examined, had the opinion formulated which I herewith transmit to Your Eminence, so that you may make whatever use of it you will deem most opportune.”

⁵ The literal title was: “The Cardinal Archbishop of Mechelen, having proposed to the Holy Father certain doubts raised concerning the question of the wage treated in the encyclical Rerum novarum, received through the Secretary of State, His Eminence Cardinal Rampolla, the following responses” (de T’Serclaes, work cited, vol. 2, p. 107, note).

⁶ His Holiness replied “that Your Eminence could modify the preamble prefixed to the copy which you communicated to me, in the sense of saying that, the aforesaid doubts having been proposed concerning the question of the wage treated in the encyclical Rerum novarum, in view of the gravity and delicacy of the argument, a consultor, qualified to examine the aforesaid doubts and to manifest his opinion on the matter, was charged with studying them, which he promptly carried out, giving opportune responses to the individual questions.” Opportune, that is, in Italian, supplied in its proper time; in French, qui viennent à point, à propos [which come at the right time, to the point]. Thus Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, in the same place.

2. It is of the following tenor:

“In the encyclical Rerum novarum it is said:

“Granted, therefore, that the workman and the employer freely consent to the same agreement, and particularly to the measure of the wage, there is nevertheless always something underlying from natural justice, and this is greater and more ancient than the free will of the contracting parties: namely, the wage must not be inadequate for supporting a workman who is indeed frugal and well behaved.”

Doubt I.—By the words “natural justice,” is commutative justice understood, or rather natural equity?

To doubt I.—Speaking per se, commutative justice is understood.

Explanation.—The work of a workman differs somewhat from merchandise, just as a wage differs from a price. For the work of a workman is work proceeding from human liberty, and for that reason it induces the rationale of merit and the right to a wage or reward; and therefore it is far nobler than merchandise and a price, which are completed by exchange alone. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the work of a workman is considered as a certain merchandise, and his reward or wage as its price. Nor without reason: for although the work of a workman is nobler than merchandise, it nevertheless retains the whole rationale of merchandise from the part by which it orders the wage to itself as its price. The teaching of St. Thomas, I–II, q. 114, art. 1, is very correct: “For that is called a wage which is recompensed to someone for the retribution of his work or labor, as though it were a certain price for it. Hence, just as to return a just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the wage of work or labor is an act of justice.” An act, he says, of justice, namely, commutative justice. For just as purchase and sale, so also labor and wage are for the common utility of the contracting parties, since each needs the thing of the other. But that which is brought into another’s utility must not be a greater burden to one than to the other, and therefore a contract of justice between the employer and the workman must be established according to equality of the thing, which is proper to commutative justice. (Cf. II–II, q. 57, art. 1.)

“But if the criterion is sought according to which that equality of the thing between manual labor and wage must be established by an employer, we reply: that criterion is said in the encyclical to be sought from the immediate end of the workman, which imposes upon him the natural office or necessity of laboring, and by the force of which he is clothed and fed for the suitable sustenance of life, and to which manual labor is first and principally ordered (in the same work, q. 187, art. 3). Therefore, whenever the work is such that the workman by his labor satisfies the aforesaid natural office of attaining the immediate end of his labor, but the wage for attaining this end—namely, for suitable food and clothing—is unequal, speaking per se and considering the nature of things, there is an objective inequality between work and wage, and consequently an injury to commutative justice.

“Two things, however, must be considered generally in this matter. One is that, just as the price of salable things is not punctually determined by a law of nature, but rather consists in a certain common estimation, so also one must speak concerning wages generally.

Hence, while the requirement arising from the rationale of the end—namely, suitable food and clothing—remains firm, either a moderate addition or a diminution is made or at least can be made to the workman’s wage from the common estimation, without injury to the equality of justice, just as in the price of merchandise a moderate addition or diminution from the public estimation is not regarded as removing the equality of justice (II–II, q. 77, art. 1, ad 1). The other point is that, in assigning the equality of justice between the wage and manual labor, one must attend not only to the common estimation, then to the quality and quantity of the work, but also to the duration of it, and likewise to the prices of the things which must be purchased by the workman for suitable food and clothing; but these prices are not the same everywhere.

“But if, finally, without injury to justice toward the workman according to what has been said, the employer is greatly aided by his labor, the employer can indeed, of his own accord and praiseworthily, give something to the workman beyond what is due; but this pertains to his honorable conduct, not to the fact that he is bound from justice. Namely, in our matter the principles which are given concerning a just purchase and sale have force (in the body of the article).”

Doubt II.—Does an employer sin who indeed pays a wage sufficient for the workman’s sustenance, but inadequate for supporting his family, whether this consists of a wife and numerous offspring or is not so numerous? If in the affirmative, against what virtue?

To doubt II.—He does not sin against justice; he can nevertheless sometimes sin either against charity or against natural honorable conduct.

Explanation.—From the very fact that, according to what was declared in the response to the first doubt, equality of wage and work is observed, the requirement of commutative justice is fully satisfied. But the work is the personal work of the workman, and not of his family; nor is it referred first and per se to the family itself, but secondarily and per accidens, insofar as the workman distributes the accepted wage among his own. Therefore, just as in this case the family does not increase the work, so justice does not require that the wage due for the work itself be increased.

“He can sometimes sin against charity, and so forth, yet not generally and per se, but per accidens and in certain cases. Hence the response said ‘sometimes.’

“Against charity, not only in all those ways in which a man can sin concerning charity toward his neighbor, but also in a peculiar way. For the work of the workman yields an advantage to the employer. Therefore, whenever in particular cases he is compelled by the precept of charity to exercise the offices of charity, he is also bound to observe the order of charity. This order indeed makes workmen who perform prolonged labor for his benefit closer to the employer than other poor persons doing nothing for him by that very fact. Therefore, an employer capable of exercising the offices of charity must prefer his workmen, bestowing on them from charity what justice by no means requires, so that the wage thus increased from charity may become less insufficient for supporting even the workman’s family. These things, moreover, are said generally and as it were theoretically; for in practice one must not judge rashly whether the employer sins or does not sin against charity.

“Against honorable conduct, whose proper office is to recompense spontaneously, namely, and not from justice. We do not wish honorable conduct here to be understood as gratitude induced by a benefit received, for the work of a workman is not a benefit, since it is compensated according to the equality of the thing by a wage; but when the employer derives, in fact, a great benefit and advantage from the work of the workman, and according to the nature of the matter this is so, then he is in some manner bound from a certain natural honorable conduct to recompense by way of supererogation, as in the response to doubt I, § ‘But if, finally,’ while no right to that supererogation exists in the workman.

Doubt III.—Whether and by what rationale do employers sin who, using no force or fraud, give a wage lower than the labor furnished merits and than suffices for honorable sustenance, for the reason that many workmen offer themselves who are content with that small wage and freely consent to it?

To doubt III.—Speaking per se, against commutative justice.

Explanation.—It has been said that the work of a workman, although it is not merchandise properly speaking, can nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, be compared with merchandise, since in the order to equality of wage it has the whole of that which merchandise has in order to price, and something even more. Hence an argument from the less to the greater is rightly instituted. But in a purchase, speaking per se, it is not licit to buy a thing for less than what it is worth from the common estimation, with due regard for circumstances of time and place. Therefore, a fortiori, it is neither licit, but is against justice, to give a wage lower than the labor furnished merits, that is, than suffices for honorable sustenance. Concerning this doubt, let the encyclical, pp. 38 and 39, be consulted.

“I said ‘speaking per se’; per accidens particular cases can be given in which employers can licitly hire workmen who are content with an inadequate wage. Suppose an employer would receive either no advantage at all or one insufficient for the suitable sustenance of his own life if he were to bestow an adequate wage, indeed he would even incur harm if he were to do so. In this and similar cases, even if at first sight the question is one of justice, it is in truth rather a question of the charity by which an employer provides both for himself and for others. (Cf. the explanation to the first doubt, § ‘But if, finally.’)”⁷

⁷ Thus in Science Catholique. Rev. Fr. Fristot (Études, May 1894, vol. 62, p. 147 ff., and Jan. 1901, pp. 76–77, note) nevertheless warns that a certain note must be taken into consideration, which was described thus in the official copy: “N.B. The Most Learned Cardinal de Lugo, in the disputation cited, contains nothing that contradicts what has been explained thus far; indeed, he openly favors it.” The citation was, in the supplicatory booklet, disp. 29, no. 62, which passage we cite below, no. 440, difficulty 4.

3. We must now speak concerning the authority of that document, about which we previously said that doubt was not absent and after which we shall explain why we remain in doubt. For from the historical circumstances these things are easily perceived: it is not a response of the Holy See; but the person of the writer, from his dignity, learning, and the role which he took in composing the encyclical Rerum novarum, gives the document the authority of a grave and prudent man; finally, its communication made through the Holy See certainly shows that the opinion then appeared probable, so that it is indeed licit to attack and refute it with reason, but not to despise or reject it altogether. Thus, approximately, Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, in the places cited, with whom Rev. Mr. Esbach already agreed;⁸ and likewise Rev. Mr. Nicotra, in the little work Le minimum de salaire [The Minimum Wage], art. 1.

⁸ Letter to the periodical Le Monde, 24 Jan. 1895.

4. Its correct interpretation is less agreed upon.

a) There are those who think that this response is opposed to those who judge that the wage which is per se the minimum from justice is the absolute family wage. The distinguished Turinaz,⁹ and Rev. Fr. Antoine,¹⁰ hold this; Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, himself nevertheless a patron of the family wage, rather favors them.

⁹ Le salaire familial et le C. Zigliara [The Family Wage and Cardinal Zigliara].

¹⁰ Cours d’économie sociale [Course of Social Economics], 1st ed., p. 570.

b) Others think that that doctrine is not touched by the response. Thus Rev. Mr. Esbach, cited and approved by Mr. Verhaegen, place cited, and Mr. Périn, work cited, 2nd ed., p. 304, note. And indeed, it cannot be denied that doubt II was proposed in such a manner that inquiry was made concerning the necessity of varying the wage according to the number of persons of whom the family was composed: “Whether this consists of a wife and numerous offspring, or is not so numerous.” But this, as we shall see, is the rationale of the relative family wage, which no Catholic contends is owed per se from justice. Therefore, it can happen that the mind of Cardinal Zigliara was averse to the obligation of an absolute family wage; this, nevertheless, is not shown formally by this response.

However the matter stands, it nevertheless must not be omitted that Rev. Mr. Esbach was able, at almost the same time, to profess that, having been instructed by most eminent authorities, by the words for supporting the worker in the encyclical was designated a frugal and honorable workman, not infirm in strength and situated in the ordinary circumstances of family.¹¹

¹¹ “I agree to answer your question, not at all because I flatter myself that I shall bring to it from my own resources any new light, but because, having been informed in a high place concerning the exact sense of this passage of the pontifical document, I have confidence that I shall say nothing to you that is not in conformity with the pure truth.

And Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes himself testified that this same doctrine was by no means unwelcome to the Holy See.¹²

¹² “Other facts testify sufficiently that the Holy See is very far from being hostile to the aforesaid doctrine (concerning the family wage).” Letter to Bien Public, 20 Jan. 1895.

421. Conclusion concerning the mind of the Holy See. From what has been said, the following is sufficiently apparent, unless something deceives us:

a) According to the doctrine of the encyclical, there is some just recompense of human labor which is the minimum, and it is defined by the suitable sustenance of at least the workman himself who hires out his labor.

b) But the question concerning the family wage is still left undecided, so that here one must appeal to that well-known saying: “In doubtful things, liberty; in all things, charity.”

This, I say, is what must be answered insofar as authority is concerned. For, to say plainly what I think, the matter itself does not seem very involved, nor of such a kind that Catholics would not easily have thought the same, if notions wrongly understood or a harsher manner of speaking had not cast darkness over it or estranged the minds of some from it.

Therefore, this is what we now desire most: that the weight of the reasons be weighed with the same equity with which they will be proposed.

“According to the encyclical, the rule of the just wage is found in the needs of the workman.”—I distinguish: the remote and fundamental rule, though not adequate;—I subdistinguish: and the encyclical means the sober and honorable workman, finding himself in normal conditions of health and family,—I concede it. Cf. Science Catholique, 1892, p. 385.

552. On the just wage. To determine the norm of a just wage, a threefold system is chiefly distinguished: that of the liberal economists, that of the socialists, and that of Catholics.

A. The system of the liberal economists is ruled wholly by a twofold economic law: the law of what is offered and what is sought, and the law of free contest or, as they say, competition, by which the price of all merchandise is determined. They deny objective value, and say that the wage depends upon the sole and free subjective agreement between worker and master, and therefore that that must be held just which the master freely offers and the worker freely accepts.

Hence in practice it is regulated by the law of competition, by force of which wages are increased or diminished according as owners more or less need the labor of workers. On the one hand, the master estimates the utility which comes to him from the use of the operative faculty of the workers, and the rarity or frequency of this; on the other hand, the worker estimates those things which are required for his honorable sustenance, and if he is truly free, he does not promise his work except to him who pays what is necessary for honorable sustenance. And this is in fact verified almost everywhere, that the wage in use is that which suffices for restoring and recreating the powers of workers.

But now the outcome has proved that individual liberty, left to itself under the law of unlimited competition, is incapable of furnishing to workers the security of congruous sustenance, and that it, even necessarily, cannot always define the just wage; therefore the question must be ruled by higher principles. In particular:

a) The foundation of the system of the liberals is false: that labor is nothing but merchandise.

b) The theory opens the door to tyranny, for it not rarely happens that workers in accepting a stipend are by no means truly free: for since they cannot labor fruitfully without machines or instruments which are in the possession of owners, and otherwise wholly need daily labor for daily sustenance, they are often compelled to accept the conditions imposed upon them, unless they wish to waste away with hunger. In these circumstances the price is not accepted freely, but is extorted from the worker; nor therefore can it be held as just.

c) Even granted that workers freely yielded from their right and accepted a wage insufficient for honorable sustenance, the contract would not be just, because in ordinary circumstances they cannot validly renounce those things which are necessary to them for living honorably.

Wherefore Leo XIII reproved economic liberalism: "Let it be granted, therefore, that worker and master freely consent to the same agreement, and expressly to the measure of the wage; nevertheless there is always underlying something from natural justice, and this greater and older than the free will of those making agreement, namely, that the wage ought not be inadequate for sustaining the worker, frugal indeed and of good morals. But if the worker, compelled by necessity, or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts a harder condition, which, even unwillingly, must be accepted, because it is imposed by the owner or contractor of works, this indeed is to suffer force, against which justice cries out."

B. The system of the socialists arises from the absurd and unjust principles of Marxism according to which all capital is stolen, and therefore nothing is owed to it in the division of profit. Namely, the Socialists contend that to workers from justice there is owed the whole fruit of labor, with only those things taken away which are sufficient for restoring and recreating capital: namely, after deducting expenses made for the price of materials, the use of workshops and instruments, and their renewal. They cannot sanely deny some part to the intellectual labor of those who preside over the production of things and direct the works; nevertheless they judge that this should not be esteemed more than the work of hands.

But now, they say, it is manifest that the matter does not so stand. Owners retain for themselves the greater part of the profit under the pretext of interest to be received for money, of price for the utility procured from material and instruments, and of a premium for risk of capital; indeed capital is stolen riches reserved from thrift for producing new wealth. Thus workers are deprived of the greater part of the fruits, and, by force of the iron law of wages, they fall into misery, scarcely having the foods necessary for their own sustenance. Therefore workers must be cooperators with masters by a contract of partnership, and thus obtain a greater part of the profit, as is owed to labor, which is the sole cause of riches.

This system a) has a false foundation, namely, that capital of itself is stolen, and that labor is the only source of value (n. 401, 2).

b) Capital is not only a condition but a true cause of economic production. Namely, three causes concur in it: the principal efficient cause, which is labor, both the intellectual labor of those who direct the works and the manual labor of those who execute them; the instrumental efficient cause is capital, or the complex of machines and instruments; the material cause is matter with its powers, from which things are made. To these three causes, taken singly, part of the profit is to be attributed from justice. But now those who hold capital and furnish instruments to workers also usually contribute materials; indeed they furnish a positive subsidy through their money, by which they pay wages to workers before the things produced are sold. Therefore it is not strange if, on account of the manifold utilities conferred, they obtain a rather large part of the profit.

c) Besides, capitalists take upon themselves the risk of capital. This risk, although in prosperous years it is not always very great, during an industrial crisis often happens to be enormous: in truth not a few obtain an unhappy outcome in business and not rarely lose a great part of the money committed to undertakings. Moreover, since no one exposes himself to danger unless he hopes for great profit from it, on account of the risk of capital which masters undertake, they can, when profit has been given, increase that part of it owed to themselves, while workers, instead of uncertain profit, receive less but receive what is certain.

d) Capitalists, in the present-day circumstances of industry, also usually furnish, by themselves or through mandataries, intellectual labor directive of industries. But intellectual labor surpasses manual labor, and has the first parts in economic production, as being the first cause moving all the others. Certainly the happy or unhappy outcome depends especially upon the skill and unwearied labor of those who preside over industrial affairs, and upon whom the whole solicitude rests. Therefore to these a part of the profit, proportioned to their labor, must be attributed.

These circumstances being supposed, such as now generally exist, the system of letting of services, as it prevails today, or the wage system, cannot of itself be accused of injustice, as Pius XI explicitly pronounced in the encyclical Quadragesimo anno; although it is permissible to desire and to strive that, when circumstances have already changed, another contract, namely of partnership, at least mitigated, could be entered into between workers and masters, as more fitting to the human dignity of workers.

C. Catholic doctrine. Between the extreme systems of liberalism and socialism proceeds the Catholic doctrine set forth by Leo XIII, according to which from justice there is owed to workers at least that wage which is necessary to an honorable worker for integral sustenance,¹⁵ to which, namely, labor is first and principally ordered,¹⁶ and this is owed even if such were not the common estimation.¹⁷ Moreover, the practical norm of this wage is the common estimation of prudent men. It is said:

¹⁵ Which seems to include insurance against the dangers of labor, ordinary illnesses, and old age.

¹⁶ St. Thomas, II-II, q. 187, a. 3.

¹⁷ Common estimation is the proximate criterion determining the price of labor; nevertheless, that it not be vitiated but right, it must be founded on other remote criteria, of which the ultimate is necessity, the right and duty of the worker to sustenance.

1. It is owed from justice, which by Leo XIII is called natural justice, that is, a right of nature founded in the very nature of things antecedently to private and free contract. For it is opposed to the justice which arises from the contract itself. Therefore it is a justice independent of the positive will of men, and is derived from the intrinsic constitution of things.

However, it is not expressly declared from what virtue that obligation arises, whether from commutative justice, or from legal justice, or from a virtue annexed to justice; yet of itself commutative justice is to be understood:

a) at least if workers are compelled from necessity to undergo a lesser wage, and cannot validly renounce a just wage, possessing nothing besides it; and thus it would be ordinarily and regularly if a lesser wage were paid;

b) indeed always and from the very nature of things: for labor has as its intrinsic value that which is necessary for repairing lost powers; hence he who gives whole labor must receive what is necessary for integral sustenance.

2. At least a wage sufficient for the worker himself is owed; wherefore, on the one hand, abstraction is made here from the disputed question whether from justice an individual or family wage is owed (which controversy is set forth in the following number); on the other hand, it is affirmed that that wage is owed, even if the worker has from nature or art no special skill worthy of a larger price. But if the worker furnishes something more, a greater wage is owed to him, namely, one equivalent to the economic price of the work furnished.

3. Of itself there is owed a wage necessary for the worker's sustenance, provided that, on the one hand, the worker can labor with common skill and activity, and, on the other hand, the normal state of industry and commerce is had.

For in time of a general crisis, exceptionally, with at least the consent of the workers, the wage could be less than just; and in that case it is not imposed unjustly by the owners, but rather results from extrinsic circumstances, which the owners do not impose but rather undergo, so, for example, that by giving a greater wage they would have to fall from their own state.

553. Disputation among Catholics concerning the family wage. They dispute whether an individual wage, or also a family wage, is owed from justice. Against the family wage as owed from justice, these arguments are proposed:

a) Commutative justice intends equality, here namely equality between the wage and the work furnished. But labor, or the work furnished, is the personal labor of one man, not of a family. Therefore from commutative justice the wage must suffice for the sustenance of the man, not of the family.

b) The duty of feeding oneself, to which corresponds the obligation of giving a sufficient individual wage, is a certain necessity intrinsic and essential to the labor itself, namely, the necessity of repairing the powers handed over to work and lost by labor, and therefore, in estimating the wage of labor, it must of itself be attended to; on the contrary, the duty of feeding wife and children is a certain necessity extrinsic to labor, and therefore in estimating labor it must not of itself be attended to.

c) The duty of feeding a family is hypothetical, namely, if the worker is a father of a family; it is a duty freely undertaken, since the law of entering matrimony obliges no determined man; finally, it is a duty varying according to various families: he must sustain offspring more or less numerous, and sometimes father, mother, brothers. But if such a duty had to be attended to in estimating the price of labor, from justice there would be required a relative wage, varying according to the free choice of the worker and the number of persons whom he sustains.

The arguments for the family wage as owed from justice can be proposed thus:¹⁸

¹⁸ It is not our mode of proposing the arguments, but we have taken them from an excellent and most learned man who, at the same time answering the sayings of the adversaries, defended the family wage with great dexterity in this way.

a) Commutative justice indeed intends equality between the wage and the work furnished, but with attention to the personality and necessity of the one working. But the work or labor furnished is not the labor of one man abstractly and strictly taken individually, but is the labor of man as he in fact exists in the concrete and as he ought to exist according to the general ordering of nature and the moral law; in one word, it is the labor of the worker who is father of a family. Therefore the wage must suffice for assisting the condition of a father of a family.

b) The obligation of giving a sufficient wage is founded not so much in the necessity of providing for the physical labor itself, as in the moral necessity and personal dignity of the agent, for whom the wage obtained by labor generally is the only means of sustaining a family. But this dignity of the person, this moral necessity, is not something extrinsic to the one working, but is intrinsic to the worker and to personal work. Therefore in estimating the price of a just wage it cannot be neglected. Besides, from the very necessity of providing for physical labor and for the physical powers of the one working there already arises the necessity of a family wage; for the procreation of children is necessary for pursuing industrial affairs, and the valid worker himself needed the sustenance and cares of a family for a long time. Hence, just as masters lay aside part of the profit for procuring new machines at an opportune time, so a fortiori they must furnish to workers some part of the profit under the name of wage, so that at an opportune time there may be arms and hands by which machines can be moved and directed.

c) The duty of feeding a family is indeed hypothetical, but that hypothesis is verified commonly and of itself according to the motion of nature and the moral law; but justice regards those things which happen of themselves commonly, not those which happen rarely and by accident, namely, that adult workers remain unmarried. Besides, the duty of feeding a family is indeed freely undertaken, yet according to the motion of nature itself and often according to a moral obligation; it also arises from the use of a primary natural right, which cannot legitimately be impeded by any human law or by any contract. But if workers have a right to matrimony and family, by that very fact they have a right to the only means of sustaining a family. Finally, the family wage must not therefore vary according to the various necessities of each family, just as neither is the individual wage varied according to the various necessities of each individual; but, as has already been said, the price of labor must be estimated according to those things which happen commonly; moreover, to provide for special necessities pertains to natural equity and charity.

Therefore the family wage is not understood as relative, which would have to be increased proportionately to the number of children: namely, that which is required for the sustenance of a family in extraordinary circumstances, for example, if the wife is sick and in no way can contribute to increasing the income of the family, if the offspring is very numerous or oppressed by illnesses, if extraordinary expenses are necessary. But it must be understood as absolute: namely, such a stipend is to be furnished to any worker, so that when he marries and thus constitutes a family, he can sustain his family, provided however 1. that the wife undertakes that kind of work which can stand together with her duties; 2. and likewise that the children, at the opportune time, begin to labor in a way proportioned to their powers; 3. and that the number of children is not extraordinary. In those extraordinary cases, especially of very numerous offspring, the social good demands that societies of beneficence, or even the republic itself, furnish special assistance to such families.

554. Conclusion of the disputation. 1. It does not seem that it can be sufficiently proved that the immediate end of labor (to which it is first, of itself, and principally ordered), and its intrinsic value, or "its equivalent," is the family wage, and accordingly that this is always and of itself owed from justice; for the wage is not immediately founded on the necessities of the worker, but on the value of the labor.

2. Nevertheless the family wage is owed of itself not only from charity, but at least from natural equity or honesty, which demands both that workers be able to feed their family by their labor from the one means of labor which they have, and that the owner, if he receives a great benefit from the workers, compensate this by supererogations; indeed also from legal justice, because the common good requires it.

3. Also from commutative justice, in ordinary circumstances and in the normal condition of industry. For common estimation, in determining the price of labor, must attend to this: namely, that workers generally, in order to fulfill their duty toward their family, have no other means besides labor, which they do not intend to let except for a family wage; hence, in the normal state of the economic order, workers generally do not have the intention of renouncing this wage, indeed they cannot even renounce it, and owners cannot impede workers from using that sole means for fulfilling their duty toward their family.¹⁹ And therefore common estimation will have the family wage as a minimum. But if owners by unjust means compel workers, or abuse their necessity or the abundance of workers, so that they impose a lesser wage, they sin against commutative justice, because they impede workers from exercising their right.

¹⁹ Therefore there is a twofold different mode of establishing the family wage: 1. so that it rests immediately upon the intrinsic value of human labor; although we have heard this mode proposed by the most illustrious Pottier, it is not established for us that it has been sufficiently proved; 2. so that it rests immediately upon the general condition of workers, who, in the normal circumstances of industry, neither intend nor freely can intend to let their work except for a family wage; which mode seems to be proposed by the Illustrious Waffelaert, Em. Van Roey, and others.

We have said: a) in ordinary circumstances, because if in a certain region a sufficient number of workers had another means of sustenance, for example, from the cultivation of a small field or garden, or from some animals: hens, goats, a cow, etc., they could freely renounce a wage in part;

b) in the normal condition of industry, because if the general condition is unhappy, the owners would not impose it upon the workers, but equally with the workers would unwillingly suffer it. Therefore these could prefer an insufficient wage rather than have none.

4. Sometimes from commutative justice a wage greater than the family wage is owed, namely, when the labor furnished is commonly estimated as having greater value, and indeed from a threefold cause, according as production will be more abundant or more perfect, the supply of workers smaller, or the prosperity of industry greater.

5. But if from the theoretical controversy of this question one comes to practice, Catholics now in practice all agree that the family wage is most greatly to be desired for the good of the whole society and to be procured in every honorable way, in which sense Pius XI himself also recently spoke; likewise, that in every Christian society obeying the laws of justice and not laboring under universal poverty, there in fact exists a family wage through common estimation by the spontaneous consent of masters and workers; and when this comes into common use, according to all, the family wage must also be attributed from commutative justice, unless someone is excused from this obligation for particular reasons.

Excuses can be: a) if he hires from mere charity or without proportionate utility: for then he does not hire for profit;

We now approach a subject of very great importance, and one on which, if extremes are to be avoided, right ideas are absolutely necessary. Wages, we are told, are fixed by free consent; and therefore the employer, when he pays what was agreed upon, has done his part, and is not called upon for anything further. The only way, it is said, in which injustice could happen would be if the master refused to pay the whole of the wages, or the workman would not complete the work undertaken; when this happens the State should intervene, to see that each obtains his own—but not under any other circumstances.

This mode of reasoning is by no means convincing to a fair-minded man, for there are important considerations which it leaves out of view altogether. To labor is to exert one’s self for the sake of procuring what is necessary for the purposes of life, and most of all for self-preservation. In the sweat of thy brow thou shalt eat bread.^* Therefore a man’s labor has two notes or characters. First of all, it is personal, for the exertion of individual power belongs to the individual who puts it forth, employing this power for that personal profit for which it was given. Secondly, man’s labor is necessary; for without the results of labor a man cannot live; and self-conservation is a law of nature which it is wrong to disobey. Now if we were to consider labor merely so far as it is personal, doubtless it would be within the workman's right to accept any rate of wages whatever; for in the same way as he is free to work or not, so he is free to accept a small remuneration or even none at all. But this is a mere abstract supposition; the labor of the working man is not only his personal attribute, but it is necessary; and this makes all the difference. The preservation of life is the bounden duty of each and all, and to fail therein is a crime. It follows that each one has a right to procure what is required in order to live; and the poor can procure it in no other way than by work and wages.

^* Genesis iii. 19.

Let it be granted, then, that as a rule, workman and employer should make free agreements, and in particular should freely agree as to wages; nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage-earner in reasonable and frugal comfort. If through necessity or fear of a worse evil, the workman accepts harder conditions because an employer or a contractor will give him no better, he is the victim of force and injustice. In these and similar questions, however— such as, for example, the hours of labor in different trades, the sanitary precautions to be observed in factories and workshops, etc.—in order to supersede undue interference on the part of the State, especially as circumstances, times, and localities differ so widely, it is advisable that recourse be had to Societies or Boards such as We shall mention presently, or to some other method of safe-guarding the interests of wage-earners ; the State to be asked for approval and protection.

If a workman's wages be sufficient to enable him to maintain himself, his wife, and his children in reasonable comfort, he will not find it difficult, if he is a sensible man, to study economy; and he will not fail, by cutting down expenses, to put by a little property; nature and reason would urge him to this. We have seen that this great Labor question cannot be solved except by assuming as a principle that private ownership must be held sacred and inviolable. The law, therefore, should favor ownership, and its policy should be to induce as many of the people as possible to become owners.