§ 1. On the Acts of the Holy See

419. Interpretation of the encyclical Rerum novarum.

I. The principal passage of the encyclical which pertains to our matter seems first to be proposed.

“We touch here upon a matter of sufficiently great importance, which must be rightly understood lest there be error on either side. Namely, the measure of the wage is defined by free consent; and therefore, once the employer has paid the wage agreed upon, he would seem to have discharged his pledge and to owe nothing further. It would then be done unjustly only if either the employer refused to pay the full price or the workman refused to render all the labor to which he was bound. In these cases it would be right for the political authority to intervene so that the right of each may remain intact, but in no others. An equitable judge of affairs will not readily or wholly assent to this argument, because it is not complete in every part: a certain rational consideration of the greatest weight is absent. For to labor is to exercise oneself for the sake of acquiring things which are for the various uses of life and especially necessary for one’s preservation. ‘In the sweat of your face you shall eat bread.’ Therefore, labor has as it were two notes implanted in man by nature: namely, that it is personal, because the active power adheres to the person and is altogether proper to him by whom it is exercised and for whose utility it is naturally ordered; and then that it is necessary, for this reason, that the fruit of labor is needed by man for preserving life, while nature itself, which is especially to be obeyed, commands that life be preserved. Now, if labor is regarded only from that part by which it is personal, there is no doubt that the workman remains free to set a narrower measure to the agreed wage; for just as he gives his labor voluntarily, so he can voluntarily be content with a wage for his labor which is either small or altogether nothing.

“But one must judge far otherwise if the rationale of necessity is joined to the rationale of personality, since it is separable from it in thought, indeed, but not in reality. In fact, to remain alive is the common duty of each person, which it is a crime to fail. Hence the right of finding the things by which life is sustained necessarily arises, and the wage acquired by labor supplies to every person of the lowest condition the means of these things. Granted, therefore, that the workman and the employer freely consent to the same agreement, and particularly to the measure of the wage, there is nevertheless always something underlying from natural justice, and this is greater and more ancient than the free will of the contracting parties: namely, the wage must not be inadequate for supporting a worker who is indeed frugal and well behaved. But if the worker, compelled by necessity or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts a harsher condition which, even though he is unwilling, must be accepted because it is imposed by the employer or contractor, this indeed is to undergo force, against which justice protests.”

II. To illustrate this passage, it is necessary to distinguish the things which are certain from those which can come into controversy.

1. The Supreme Pontiff clearly teaches: a) That there is some wage which is the lowest among just wages, and b) that this is rightly gathered from the very duty of preserving life. Therefore, one who wishes to respond with the Supreme Pontiff cannot entirely neglect this kind of argument. Moreover, c) no one doubts that the worker’s sustenance which is said to be procured by the wage must be understood not only as those things by which death is scarcely warded off, but as things which are fitting, so that they provide decent sustenance and culture according to one’s condition. d) Nor can we remain long in doubt concerning the justice which the Supreme Pontiff calls natural. For the justice which governs agreements is commutative justice, which is here called natural because it is prior to the agreement. It is therefore opposed to contractual justice.

But two things are less certain: one, by what force the worker himself is bound by an obligation to demand this wage; the other, whether or not the words for supporting the worker tacitly signify the necessary sustenance of his family. A few things concerning each.

2. On the binding force of the minimum wage. For there are some who, from the doctrine of the encyclical, deny to the worker himself the faculty of consenting to a wage lower than that lowest rationale of a just wage. Thus Rev. Fr. Cathrein, place cited; the distinguished Périn, Premiers principes [First Principles], p. 296, 1st ed.; Rev. Fr. Antoine, work cited, p. 559, or p. 595, 2nd ed. And they seem able to rely upon the Supreme Pontiff’s own argument, which is drawn not from some right but from a duty. For he says thus: “The fruit of labor is needed by man for preserving life; but nature itself, which is especially to be obeyed, commands that life be preserved.” What is more, does not the immediately following sentence—where it is conceded that the workman would remain free “to set a narrower measure to the agreed wage” if regard were to be had to the one note by which labor is something personal—as if of its own accord invoke the other note, by which, when it is posited, this option is denied, since account must also be taken of necessity? Indeed, is not this price called “greater and more ancient than the free will of the contracting parties”?

Nevertheless, we approve the explanation of others who see this alone confirmed in this passage: that there inheres in human labor, before every agreement, a certain minimum value, or a minimum price to be paid from justice in exchange,¹ by which a right of the worker, but not a duty per se, is defined. Thus Rev. Mr. Esbach in the cited article; Verhaegen, p. 57; Rev. Mr. Gayraud, work cited, p. 172.

¹ But if perchance less has been promised, the contract cannot therefore be called null. Rather, before execution it will be rescindable. But if the labor has been furnished, the just price must be supplied. Rev. Mr. De Gryse, work cited, p. 40, too absolutely judges null “on account of a vitiated substance” a contract by which the wage is established as inadequate for supporting the worker.

We think this can be established briefly as follows: a) The intention of the speaker is generally most apparent in the conclusion. But in this conclusion justice is introduced as protesting only “if the worker, compelled by necessity or moved by fear of a worse evil, accepts a harsher condition.” b) As is evident from the first words, the Supreme Pontiff refutes those who will every rationale of what is owed to be estimated from the agreed wage. To this end it is sufficient to vindicate a superior rule. c) Since sustenance is understood as those things which correspond to decent maintenance, it becomes manifest per se that the worker remains free to cede a great part of these things. And why would it not be licit to labor gratuitously and live upon alms obtained by begging?

Therefore, this is gathered strictly from the duty of preserving life: that there is a lowest rationale of a just price which the worker has the right to seek, indeed to demand, and of which, although perhaps he can divest himself, he must not be judged to have divested himself by consent which he gave unwillingly. And nothing other than the objective value of human labor is declared more ancient than the will of the contracting parties; nevertheless, we are not compelled per se to insist upon it in an agreement. That is, it is licit voluntarily to offer one’s labor for a lower wage to someone who then, without injury to you, will not pay you more. It remains, nevertheless, that the greater sum is just and that you were content with less than the just amount. Therefore, the Supreme Pontiff confirms our conclusions concerning a just price (Thesis XXV) and adds a criterion by which it can be discerned below what sum a just wage cannot remain.

3. The question concerns whether or not the words “for supporting the worker” in some manner contain the sustenance necessary for his family.

Many affirm this, such as the distinguished Périn, work cited, 2nd ed., p. 299 ff.; Verhaegen, Le minimum de salaire [The Minimum Wage], III; and they appeal to the words by which the Supreme Pontiff seems a little below to disclose his mind, when he writes: “If the worker receives a wage sufficiently ample that by it he can suitably maintain himself, his wife, and his children, he will readily devote himself to thrift, and so forth.”

Although these words, and others which can be drawn from other encyclicals,² suggest that regard for the family was not passed over by the Supreme Pontiff, nevertheless, we assent rather to those who, such as Rev. Fr. Antoine, work cited (2nd ed.), p. 607; Rev. Mr. De Gryse, De contractu conductionis [On the Contract of Hiring], p. 45; and many others, judge that it is formally passed over. For the words for supporting the worker of themselves admit either meaning; nor does one who says the worker exclude the family. But the Roman Pontiffs are accustomed in their encyclicals to establish correct principles, but to abstain from defining the more difficult questions which are disputed among Catholics themselves.

² Cf. von Zwiedineck, Lohnpolitik, and so forth, p. 127.

But if you ask this further question—whether the rationale offered in the encyclical is perhaps of such force that it logically leads us to the opinion of a wage in some manner familial—we by no means deny it; indeed, we shall voluntarily defend it in our conclusion.

420. On the Roman response. 1. Historical vicissitudes.³ Shortly before Catholics from various regions assembled at Mechelen in 1891, His Eminence Cardinal Goossens, Archbishop of Mechelen, in order that he might more easily remove excessive strife in disputing, asked the Holy See three questions concerning the matter of wages. The Holy See, however, as generally happens when it does not wish to interpose its own authority and nevertheless to satisfy the petitioner in some manner, sought the opinion of a certain consultor.

³ We shall relate them substantially from the work of Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, Léon XIII [Leo XIII], vol. 2, p. 107, which, because it was specially approved by the Supreme Pontiff, has the greatest weight in this matter.

He, as afterward became known, was Cardinal Zigliara, whom report holds not to have been without a part in drafting the encyclical Rerum novarum. Moreover, the opinion of the Most Eminent man was communicated through His Eminence Cardinal Rampolla, Secretary of State, to His Eminence the Archbishop of Mechelen, so that he might make whatever use of the response the matter seemed to him to require; it was called “a certain manner of opining (opinamento).”⁴ After receiving this document, His Eminence the Archbishop proposed to the Holy See that it be published under a prescribed title which would say that it contained responses obtained through the medium of the Cardinal Secretary of State.⁵ He replied that the Supreme Pontiff was rather of the opinion that it should merely be declared in the preface that, on account of the importance and difficulty of the matter, doubts had been referred to a certain consultor who was very well acquainted with the province, to be examined and that he might disclose what he thought concerning them.⁶ Thus it happened that His Eminence the Archbishop refrained from publishing the document. But about six months later, on 22 March 1892, the superior of the Seminary which France has in Rome, Rev. Mr. Esbach, made it public in the periodical La Science Catholique, and at the same time designated it by the name Document émané du Saint-Siège [Document Emanating from the Holy See].

⁴ Here are the words of His Eminence Rampolla by which he transmitted the response: “The Holy Father, having ordered that these doubts be examined, had the opinion formulated which I herewith transmit to Your Eminence, so that you may make whatever use of it you will deem most opportune.”

⁵ The literal title was: “The Cardinal Archbishop of Mechelen, having proposed to the Holy Father certain doubts raised concerning the question of the wage treated in the encyclical Rerum novarum, received through the Secretary of State, His Eminence Cardinal Rampolla, the following responses” (de T’Serclaes, work cited, vol. 2, p. 107, note).

⁶ His Holiness replied “that Your Eminence could modify the preamble prefixed to the copy which you communicated to me, in the sense of saying that, the aforesaid doubts having been proposed concerning the question of the wage treated in the encyclical Rerum novarum, in view of the gravity and delicacy of the argument, a consultor, qualified to examine the aforesaid doubts and to manifest his opinion on the matter, was charged with studying them, which he promptly carried out, giving opportune responses to the individual questions.” Opportune, that is, in Italian, supplied in its proper time; in French, qui viennent à point, à propos [which come at the right time, to the point]. Thus Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, in the same place.

2. It is of the following tenor:

“In the encyclical Rerum novarum it is said:

“Granted, therefore, that the workman and the employer freely consent to the same agreement, and particularly to the measure of the wage, there is nevertheless always something underlying from natural justice, and this is greater and more ancient than the free will of the contracting parties: namely, the wage must not be inadequate for supporting a workman who is indeed frugal and well behaved.”

Doubt I.—By the words “natural justice,” is commutative justice understood, or rather natural equity?

To doubt I.—Speaking per se, commutative justice is understood.

Explanation.—The work of a workman differs somewhat from merchandise, just as a wage differs from a price. For the work of a workman is work proceeding from human liberty, and for that reason it induces the rationale of merit and the right to a wage or reward; and therefore it is far nobler than merchandise and a price, which are completed by exchange alone. Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, the work of a workman is considered as a certain merchandise, and his reward or wage as its price. Nor without reason: for although the work of a workman is nobler than merchandise, it nevertheless retains the whole rationale of merchandise from the part by which it orders the wage to itself as its price. The teaching of St. Thomas, I–II, q. 114, art. 1, is very correct: “For that is called a wage which is recompensed to someone for the retribution of his work or labor, as though it were a certain price for it. Hence, just as to return a just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the wage of work or labor is an act of justice.” An act, he says, of justice, namely, commutative justice. For just as purchase and sale, so also labor and wage are for the common utility of the contracting parties, since each needs the thing of the other. But that which is brought into another’s utility must not be a greater burden to one than to the other, and therefore a contract of justice between the employer and the workman must be established according to equality of the thing, which is proper to commutative justice. (Cf. II–II, q. 57, art. 1.)

“But if the criterion is sought according to which that equality of the thing between manual labor and wage must be established by an employer, we reply: that criterion is said in the encyclical to be sought from the immediate end of the workman, which imposes upon him the natural office or necessity of laboring, and by the force of which he is clothed and fed for the suitable sustenance of life, and to which manual labor is first and principally ordered (in the same work, q. 187, art. 3). Therefore, whenever the work is such that the workman by his labor satisfies the aforesaid natural office of attaining the immediate end of his labor, but the wage for attaining this end—namely, for suitable food and clothing—is unequal, speaking per se and considering the nature of things, there is an objective inequality between work and wage, and consequently an injury to commutative justice.

“Two things, however, must be considered generally in this matter. One is that, just as the price of salable things is not punctually determined by a law of nature, but rather consists in a certain common estimation, so also one must speak concerning wages generally.

Hence, while the requirement arising from the rationale of the end—namely, suitable food and clothing—remains firm, either a moderate addition or a diminution is made or at least can be made to the workman’s wage from the common estimation, without injury to the equality of justice, just as in the price of merchandise a moderate addition or diminution from the public estimation is not regarded as removing the equality of justice (II–II, q. 77, art. 1, ad 1). The other point is that, in assigning the equality of justice between the wage and manual labor, one must attend not only to the common estimation, then to the quality and quantity of the work, but also to the duration of it, and likewise to the prices of the things which must be purchased by the workman for suitable food and clothing; but these prices are not the same everywhere.

“But if, finally, without injury to justice toward the workman according to what has been said, the employer is greatly aided by his labor, the employer can indeed, of his own accord and praiseworthily, give something to the workman beyond what is due; but this pertains to his honorable conduct, not to the fact that he is bound from justice. Namely, in our matter the principles which are given concerning a just purchase and sale have force (in the body of the article).”

Doubt II.—Does an employer sin who indeed pays a wage sufficient for the workman’s sustenance, but inadequate for supporting his family, whether this consists of a wife and numerous offspring or is not so numerous? If in the affirmative, against what virtue?

To doubt II.—He does not sin against justice; he can nevertheless sometimes sin either against charity or against natural honorable conduct.

Explanation.—From the very fact that, according to what was declared in the response to the first doubt, equality of wage and work is observed, the requirement of commutative justice is fully satisfied. But the work is the personal work of the workman, and not of his family; nor is it referred first and per se to the family itself, but secondarily and per accidens, insofar as the workman distributes the accepted wage among his own. Therefore, just as in this case the family does not increase the work, so justice does not require that the wage due for the work itself be increased.

“He can sometimes sin against charity, and so forth, yet not generally and per se, but per accidens and in certain cases. Hence the response said ‘sometimes.’

“Against charity, not only in all those ways in which a man can sin concerning charity toward his neighbor, but also in a peculiar way. For the work of the workman yields an advantage to the employer. Therefore, whenever in particular cases he is compelled by the precept of charity to exercise the offices of charity, he is also bound to observe the order of charity. This order indeed makes workmen who perform prolonged labor for his benefit closer to the employer than other poor persons doing nothing for him by that very fact. Therefore, an employer capable of exercising the offices of charity must prefer his workmen, bestowing on them from charity what justice by no means requires, so that the wage thus increased from charity may become less insufficient for supporting even the workman’s family. These things, moreover, are said generally and as it were theoretically; for in practice one must not judge rashly whether the employer sins or does not sin against charity.

“Against honorable conduct, whose proper office is to recompense spontaneously, namely, and not from justice. We do not wish honorable conduct here to be understood as gratitude induced by a benefit received, for the work of a workman is not a benefit, since it is compensated according to the equality of the thing by a wage; but when the employer derives, in fact, a great benefit and advantage from the work of the workman, and according to the nature of the matter this is so, then he is in some manner bound from a certain natural honorable conduct to recompense by way of supererogation, as in the response to doubt I, § ‘But if, finally,’ while no right to that supererogation exists in the workman.

Doubt III.—Whether and by what rationale do employers sin who, using no force or fraud, give a wage lower than the labor furnished merits and than suffices for honorable sustenance, for the reason that many workmen offer themselves who are content with that small wage and freely consent to it?

To doubt III.—Speaking per se, against commutative justice.

Explanation.—It has been said that the work of a workman, although it is not merchandise properly speaking, can nevertheless, for the sake of clarity, be compared with merchandise, since in the order to equality of wage it has the whole of that which merchandise has in order to price, and something even more. Hence an argument from the less to the greater is rightly instituted. But in a purchase, speaking per se, it is not licit to buy a thing for less than what it is worth from the common estimation, with due regard for circumstances of time and place. Therefore, a fortiori, it is neither licit, but is against justice, to give a wage lower than the labor furnished merits, that is, than suffices for honorable sustenance. Concerning this doubt, let the encyclical, pp. 38 and 39, be consulted.

“I said ‘speaking per se’; per accidens particular cases can be given in which employers can licitly hire workmen who are content with an inadequate wage. Suppose an employer would receive either no advantage at all or one insufficient for the suitable sustenance of his own life if he were to bestow an adequate wage, indeed he would even incur harm if he were to do so. In this and similar cases, even if at first sight the question is one of justice, it is in truth rather a question of the charity by which an employer provides both for himself and for others. (Cf. the explanation to the first doubt, § ‘But if, finally.’)”⁷

⁷ Thus in Science Catholique. Rev. Fr. Fristot (Études, May 1894, vol. 62, p. 147 ff., and Jan. 1901, pp. 76–77, note) nevertheless warns that a certain note must be taken into consideration, which was described thus in the official copy: “N.B. The Most Learned Cardinal de Lugo, in the disputation cited, contains nothing that contradicts what has been explained thus far; indeed, he openly favors it.” The citation was, in the supplicatory booklet, disp. 29, no. 62, which passage we cite below, no. 440, difficulty 4.

3. We must now speak concerning the authority of that document, about which we previously said that doubt was not absent and after which we shall explain why we remain in doubt. For from the historical circumstances these things are easily perceived: it is not a response of the Holy See; but the person of the writer, from his dignity, learning, and the role which he took in composing the encyclical Rerum novarum, gives the document the authority of a grave and prudent man; finally, its communication made through the Holy See certainly shows that the opinion then appeared probable, so that it is indeed licit to attack and refute it with reason, but not to despise or reject it altogether. Thus, approximately, Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, in the places cited, with whom Rev. Mr. Esbach already agreed;⁸ and likewise Rev. Mr. Nicotra, in the little work Le minimum de salaire [The Minimum Wage], art. 1.

⁸ Letter to the periodical Le Monde, 24 Jan. 1895.

4. Its correct interpretation is less agreed upon.

a) There are those who think that this response is opposed to those who judge that the wage which is per se the minimum from justice is the absolute family wage. The distinguished Turinaz,⁹ and Rev. Fr. Antoine,¹⁰ hold this; Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes, himself nevertheless a patron of the family wage, rather favors them.

⁹ Le salaire familial et le C. Zigliara [The Family Wage and Cardinal Zigliara].

¹⁰ Cours d’économie sociale [Course of Social Economics], 1st ed., p. 570.

b) Others think that that doctrine is not touched by the response. Thus Rev. Mr. Esbach, cited and approved by Mr. Verhaegen, place cited, and Mr. Périn, work cited, 2nd ed., p. 304, note. And indeed, it cannot be denied that doubt II was proposed in such a manner that inquiry was made concerning the necessity of varying the wage according to the number of persons of whom the family was composed: “Whether this consists of a wife and numerous offspring, or is not so numerous.” But this, as we shall see, is the rationale of the relative family wage, which no Catholic contends is owed per se from justice. Therefore, it can happen that the mind of Cardinal Zigliara was averse to the obligation of an absolute family wage; this, nevertheless, is not shown formally by this response.

However the matter stands, it nevertheless must not be omitted that Rev. Mr. Esbach was able, at almost the same time, to profess that, having been instructed by most eminent authorities, by the words for supporting the worker in the encyclical was designated a frugal and honorable workman, not infirm in strength and situated in the ordinary circumstances of family.¹¹

¹¹ “I agree to answer your question, not at all because I flatter myself that I shall bring to it from my own resources any new light, but because, having been informed in a high place concerning the exact sense of this passage of the pontifical document, I have confidence that I shall say nothing to you that is not in conformity with the pure truth.

And Rev. Mr. de T’Serclaes himself testified that this same doctrine was by no means unwelcome to the Holy See.¹²

¹² “Other facts testify sufficiently that the Holy See is very far from being hostile to the aforesaid doctrine (concerning the family wage).” Letter to Bien Public, 20 Jan. 1895.

421. Conclusion concerning the mind of the Holy See. From what has been said, the following is sufficiently apparent, unless something deceives us:

a) According to the doctrine of the encyclical, there is some just recompense of human labor which is the minimum, and it is defined by the suitable sustenance of at least the workman himself who hires out his labor.

b) But the question concerning the family wage is still left undecided, so that here one must appeal to that well-known saying: “In doubtful things, liberty; in all things, charity.”

This, I say, is what must be answered insofar as authority is concerned. For, to say plainly what I think, the matter itself does not seem very involved, nor of such a kind that Catholics would not easily have thought the same, if notions wrongly understood or a harsher manner of speaking had not cast darkness over it or estranged the minds of some from it.

Therefore, this is what we now desire most: that the weight of the reasons be weighed with the same equity with which they will be proposed.

“According to the encyclical, the rule of the just wage is found in the needs of the workman.”—I distinguish: the remote and fundamental rule, though not adequate;—I subdistinguish: and the encyclical means the sober and honorable workman, finding himself in normal conditions of health and family,—I concede it. Cf. Science Catholique, 1892, p. 385.