The Objects of Commutative Justice

Commutations of Commutative Justice.—There are various kinds of commutations or exchanges used by commutative justice, but they do not create new species of justice, since they are only accidental modes of the act of giving the equivalent of what one receives. They are classified as follows:

(a) involuntary commutations, which are those in which reparation is made for the use against the will of another of the things, persons, or works that pertain to him. Thus, the property of another is used unlawfully by secret theft and by open robbery; the person of another is injured by murder and wounds; the honor of another by secret calumny and detraction, by open false testimony and contumely; the rights of another to persons are used unlawfully by adultery with his wife, by seduction of his servant, and the like;

(b) voluntary commutations, which are those in which compensation is made for a benefit that one derived with the owner’s consent from something that was his, or in which one gives or returns to another what is his. They include the various forms of contracts, or agreements between two parties in which the consent of both to the same proposal is externally manifested and obligation is produced to abide by the terms of agreement.

Forms of Contract.—The chief forms of contract are the following:

(a) gratuitous contracts, which are those that confer advantage on only one of the contractants, or those in which no payment or compensation for his acts or goods is made to one party by the other party. They include unilateral contracts, which produce obligation on one side only (e.g., a promise, gift, testament), and bilateral contracts, which produce obligation on both sides. The bilateral contracts are also known as bailments, or understandings whereby a thing or business is transferred from one person to another in trust, on condition that a return will be made to the owner, They include the following contracts: loans, in which return must be made of the identical things borrowed (commodatum), or of a thing similar in kind (mutuum); deposit, in which a thing must be returned after safekeeping (depositum); an agency, in which one conducts the business of another with the obligation of making returns, either from express contract (mandatum) or from imputed agreement (negotiorum gestio). In commodatum and mutuum the advantage is had by the bailee, in the other three by the bailor;

(b) onerous contracts of certain event, which are those that confer an advantage on both parties, and in which the thing agreed on is certain and definite. They include contracts in which one party transfers ownership to the other (e.g., buying and selling, barter, loan at interest, contracts for annuities, stocks and bonds) or useful dominion (e.g., lease of property, contractor’s agreement, hire of labor), and contracts in which both parties transfer rights to a moral person of which they are the members (partnership);

(c) onerous contracts of uncertain event, which are those that confer advantage on both parties, but in which the thing agreed on is contingent and uncertain. Examples are insurance, wager, gaming contracts, lottery, and stock market speculation;

(d) subsidiary contracts, which are those that are made in order to give security to principal contracts to which they are annexed or for whose sake they are made. Such are guaranty and surety, pledge and pawn, and mortgage.

The Equality Sought by Commutative Justice.—The equality in quantity sought by commutative justice means that in involuntary transactions the offender must suffer a punishment equal to the injury he offered or must pay a recompense equal to the damage he caused, and that in voluntary transactions one must give the equal of what one receives. But this can be understood in two ways.

(a) Thus, equality may be taken for identity in species, in the sense that the same kind of thing must be taken or returned (e.g., a life for a life, an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth). This kind of equality will do in some instances, as in cases of exchange of goods, but as a rule it would not be fair to both parties. Thus, if a subject strikes a ruler, he is not sufficiently punished if he receives the same kind of blow, for the injury to the ruler is greater on account of his office; when a man steals a cow or a sheep, he is not sufficiently punished if he restores what he took, for he would suffer no loss and the community whose peace he had offended would go without satisfaction (Exod., xxii. 1); if one gives one’s cow for another’s cow, or if a shoemaker trades his products for the clothes made by a tailor, the exchange may be unfair, since the thing given on one side may be better than that given on the other side.

(b) Equality may be understood as identity in value, in the sense that the thing taken or returned has the same quantity of goodness or excellence as the thing received, no matter how they differ in species. This kind of equality must be observed as a rule both in involuntary and voluntary transactions. Thus, for injury done to merchandise payment is made in money, or vice versa. If equality in value is not possible, because the good for which one owes is on a higher plane than the good which one is able to give, it seems that justice requires one to approximate equality as far as possible, and hence mayhem or defamation should be compensated for by the goods of fortune (see 1802 and 2090).

St. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 1; q. 58, a. 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11; I-II, q. 60, a. 2 and 3; q. 64, a. 2.

139. The proper object of justice is the special good which consists in rendering a debt to another unto equality. - But in this one object three things can be distinguished:

1. The material object, or that which justice intends and does (the matter about which it is concerned), is external things and actions which can be owed to another. Many distinguish this into a remote and a proximate object: they say that the remote object is the things which are owed, exchanged, and distributed; and the proximate object is the actions by which things come into use, are exchanged, or are distributed, namely, the actions which must be furnished to another or omitted, by which something can be rendered to another and satisfaction made to his right.

2. The primary material object (others call it: the formal which) which justice principally, through itself and by reason of itself, intends and does in actions and things (the aspect under which the material object is considered), is the just, or the equal owed to another (passive right); in other words, it is the perfect due equality to be placed between the debt from one and the exigency of right in another, by which equality our actions are proportioned to the right which is owed to another.

3. The formal object by which, or the immediate and proximate motive on account of which we render the debt and establish equality, is the special honesty of the said equality, which is found in the fact that to each one his own is furnished: for we wish to render to another the debt and to preserve equality between ourselves and him, because this is good and owed and just.

Therefore the object of justice is the character of debt; the rendering of debt insofar as and because it is owed.

The other, insofar as there inheres in him an exigitive title to our debt, is not the object which justice immediately attains, but only the end to which that which is just is rendered; - and the exigitive faculty or title of right in another (active right) is not the proximate motive, but only the remote foundation why rendering the debt is good and obligatory.¹

¹ Against Billuart and Haine, who hold active right as the formal object. Yet this is not the proximate motive, for the reason why we render the equal thing to another is because it is owed to him; but it is owed because he himself has active right. Billuart himself, where he treats of the virtues annexed to justice, for example, of religion, speaks otherwise.

140. The proper matter about which justice is exercised through itself and immediately is external operations and things, insofar as according to these one is coordinated to another; but not the interior passions of the soul.

It is proved: For justice differs from the other moral virtues in this, that these primarily and through themselves rectify man in himself, justice in order to another. But the ordering of one to another is immediately made according to acts which are terminated at another, namely, according to exterior actions and things by which men can communicate with one another; but not according to interior affections or passions by which man is immediately well disposed in himself. Therefore.

Yet per accidens and through the mediation of other virtues it also regards passions, if its end requires this, namely, the equality to be established between exterior things, which passions can impede. In this case it commands the other virtues to moderate the passions lest they harm another (q. 58, a. 8 and 9).

141. The principal object of justice, namely, the just or equal owed to another, is the mean of the thing, while the other moral virtues have only the mean of reason.

It is explained: A moral virtue is said to be in a mean because as object it has the mean between excess and defect in its proper matter, which mean right reason dictates (for example, virtue chooses passions neither more nor less than reason dictates), and therefore it is called the mean of reason and is conformity to the measure of right reason. But in justice the mean of reason is the mean of the thing (conformity with the thing), insofar as right reason dictates to justice to give a thing equal to the person or to his thing, namely, dictates what precisely must be rendered to another, so that neither a greater nor a lesser thing is rendered than is owed.

It is proved: Justice differs from the other virtues in this, that these are principally concerned with passions, that one with exterior actions and things. But the right ordering of passions is not attended according to equality of one thing to another, but according to comparison to the very man acting in such conditions and circumstances. Therefore the mean of such virtues is only the mean of reason with respect to us, and therefore it varies according to persons, qualities, and circumstances: for example, food is different according to the disposition, capacity, and conditions of the subject; excess in food for the sick is not excess for the healthy; one brave action exceeds the powers of one person, not of another.

On the contrary, justice is concerned with things and actions according as they have a due proportion to another person. Therefore the mean of justice consists in equality of things, namely, in equality of proportion of an exterior thing to an exterior person, and therefore it is the mean of the thing.² This consequently is established independently of the conditions and circumstances of the acting persons: thus, for example, if I owe someone one hundred francs, in order that satisfaction be made to the other, I am bound to pay him, whether he himself be rich or poor, or whether I am.

² Not in this sense, says Billuart, diss. 5, a. 4, that it is not according to reason: nothing is more consonant with reason. But in this sense, that it is not established by reason according to the conditions of the subject, but reason depends on the nature of things: therefore to pay a debt is conformed to reason because it is equality of things, not conversely. - Therefore in the other virtues there is a psychological mean; in justice, an objective mean.

In summary: Justice therefore through itself immediately considers only the thing owed, and not the condition of persons, unless this redounds into the quantity and equality or inequality of the thing: thus, for example, an injury inflicted implies a proportion to the dignity of the person offended, and therefore has one proportion to a prince and another to a private person (q. 58, a. 10, ad 3).

142. The formal object or special honorable good of the virtue of justice is taken by comparison to another; in the other virtues, by comparison to the agent.

It is proved: For justice is essentially toward another, but the other virtues perfect man only in those things which are suitable to him according to himself. Therefore a) the good of justice is not taken by comparison to the agent alone, for example, from the suitability of the work with him, but also, beyond comparison to the agent, it is constituted by comparison to another, namely, from the comparison and equality of thing to thing or to an exterior person, for example, recompense of the wage owed for service rendered. Indeed b) even the work itself is just, without considering how (i.e., with what intention, disposition, motive, manner, etc.) it is done by the agent. Namely, the right is had not only according to the mean of reason, but according to the mean of the thing independently of the agent, provided what is rendered is equal to what must be rendered, for example, he who owes one hundred francs, and renders it, does what is right, although he suffers poverty from it or although he does it unwillingly³ (q. 57, a. 1).

³ Cf. Billuart, l. c.

On the contrary, there is not a work of temperance or fortitude except by comparison to the powers of the agent.

143. The proper act of justice is to render to each one his own. - It is proved:

That is the proper act which is concerned with the proper matter of the virtue. But the matter of justice is an exterior operation according as it itself, or the thing which we use through it, is proportioned to another person. But that is said to be one's own which is owed to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is to render to each one his own.

144. Justice is in the will, for its act is in the will, because as object it has a rational good. For we are not just from the fact that we rightly know something, but from the fact that we rightly act. Therefore justice is not in the intellect or in the cognitive faculty, but in the appetite. But not in the sensitive appetite, for the object of justice, namely, the proportion of one to another, exceeds the sensitive faculty, because it is not a sensible object but a rational one. Therefore it is in the rational appetite or will.

145. Corollaries. - From the foregoing it is easily concluded that justice is distinguished:

1st, from the theological virtues, which have God Himself as object, whereas justice has the honorable thing which consists in rendering to each one what is owed. Whence those are directly concerned with the last end itself; this with the means to the end, namely, our actions to be rectified so that what is owed may be given to each one, which is necessary for attaining the last end;

2nd, especially from charity, which a) by reason of its object is more excellent, as being theological; b) likewise more universal, insofar as it extends to more things; c) has as object the very person of God and of neighbor, whom it loves, while the object of justice is right owed to another. Nevertheless, justice obliges more strictly in many circumstances, because the positive obligations of charity, outside extreme spiritual necessity, admit a certain latitude;

3rd, from the other cardinal virtues, both by object and by subject:

a) by object, which in prudence is the practical true in all our actions: for it dictates in any business what seems true, i.e., truly suitable to reason and to be done, so that man may be well ordered to himself and to another; - in fortitude and temperance it is the rational good to be placed in the passions, which are to be moderated in those things which are suitable to man according to himself; - in justice it is the good and just thing owed to another in external operations;

b) by subject: prudence is in the practical intellect, which it inclines to discerning, judging, and dictating what is to be done; - fortitude is in the irascible appetite, which it moderates, strengthens, and impels according to the prescriptions of reason; - temperance in the concupiscible appetite, which it moderates, restrains, and draws back; - justice in the will, which it inclines to rendering to another his own;

4th, from the moral virtues which do not pertain to justice:

a) justice is toward another; the others, toward ourselves;

b) justice is immediately concerned with exterior actions and things; the others, with interior passions;

c) the mean of justice is the mean of the thing, or equality between a thing and a thing or the person of another; the mean of the others is only the mean of reason, or that which reason determines with respect to the one operating and the circumstances;

d) in the work of justice, the honorable and the right exist even by mere commensuration to another: that which is suitable to another; in the works of the other virtues, the right exists by mere commensuration to the agent himself: that which is suitable to the one operating.

277. Commutative justice regards commutations in which it establishes and preserves the due equality toward another. But commutations, or operations by which something is transferred from one to another, are some involuntary, others voluntary. Hence we shall speak:

1. of the act of commutative justice by which due equality is established or rendered, namely, of restitution;

2. of justice and injustice in involuntary commutations;

3. of justice and injustice in voluntary commutations.

Commutative justice, as the name implies, has to do chiefly with buying and selling and other contracts. It regulates relations which exist, or which ought to exist, between different and independent persons, whether physical or moral. It is a matter of commutative justice to observe agreements between nations as well as between individuals. It prescribes that what is due to another as his strict right should be rendered to him. Those who hold an office of any kind are bound by commutative justice to fulfil its duties. Statesmen, judges, magistrates, public, and private servants, lawyers, and doctors sin against commutative justice if they fail to do their duty. They violate an implied or expressed contract entered into when they assumed office.

• Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, i 57. St Thomas Aquinas, Summa, II–II, q. 186, a. 9.

What must be rendered to another in justice is his due or his strict right. Such rights are of various kinds, both natural and acquired. The right to life, liberty, and proper treatment at the hands of officials are instances of natural rights. A man has a natural right to make things his own, or to acquire private property. Commutative justice recognizes that such a right should be respected. Robbery and theft are against the natural law of justice. Thou shalt not steal is a precept of the natural law.

If commutative justice be violated an injury is done to another, and it is peculiar to such an act that it entails an obligation of making restitution or reparation for the injustice that has been done. This follows from the very nature of commutative justice. When commutative justice is violated, another person is deprived of what belongs to him, of his right. But justice requires that each one should have what belongs to him, and so justice is not done till what he has been deprived of, or its equivalent, is restored to him. This is what is meant by making restitution.

There are two roots of restitution: possession of what belongs to another, and unjust damage of what belongs to another.

If I find a watch I may keep it till I find the owner, but when I have found the owner, I must give him his watch. The watch is his, it belongs to him, and I sin against justice if I do not give another what belongs to him. There is a peculiar connection between the owner and his watch; that connection gives the owner the right to possess his watch; justice demands that the watch should be in the possession of its owner, the watch cries for its owner, just as the child cries for its mother.

If I unjustly destroy or damage what belongs to another, he has not what belongs to him. I must then give him an equivalent. I must put him as far as possible in the possession of the rights of which I unjustly deprived him. I must make restitution to him. Justice demands that, for justice demands that each one should have what belongs to him.

Are prices of commodities a matter of justice, or may a seller get what he can for his goods?

Until quite recent times the answer given to this question was that prices of commodities are certainly a matter of justice, and that a seller who tries to get for his goods more than they are worth is a cheat. At present the question is involved in the greatest confusion, chiefly due to political economists. Some economists merely abstract from the question of justice in prices. Justice, they say, is a matter for ethics, and political economy has nothing to do with ethics. Others assert that prices are regulated by natural forces as inexorable as those which govern the weather, and so are not subject to the law of justice. The Catholic doctrine is that justice is a moral virtue and that it should rule all men’s actions, and therefore his buying and selling, as well as the rest. Price is the money measure of value, but what is value? We must distinguish carefully between use-value and exchange-value. The use-value of a thing is the advantage which one derives from using it, and the consequent esteem in which he holds it. It is something individualistic, subjective, and variable. The use-value of a glass of water depends on the individual, on his tastes, on his variable needs. Exchange-value is what a thing will exchange for, what the owner can get for it. A glass of water has great or little use-value, according to circumstances; it has no exchange value, because nobody will give anything for it; it can be got for nothing. In order that a thing may have exchange-value, it must be capable of satisfying men’s wants, it must be of limited quantity and relatively scarce, and there must be a society of men in existence who have different goods which they are willing to exchange for others. Exchange-value can only exist in society. It is a social product; society gives goods their exchange-value; the social, or common, estimate is the measure of exchange-value. Because it is a social estimate, exchange-value is not mathematically determined. There is a certain indefiniteness about it. In a given society at a certain time those who are acquainted with the exchange-value of a horse will say on seeing a particular horse: “Oh! he’s worth about forty pounds.” You might get forty-five pounds for him, but hardly more. You might have to let him go for thirty-five pounds, if you are compelled to sell. In other words, the exchange-value of commodities and consequently their price fluctuates, and even when stable it is not determined to the last penny.

But justice requires that prices should be fair and reasonable. Nobody likes to give more for an article than it is worth, and the common estimate of people acquainted with the state of the market is the measure of its worth. Its use-value to the buyer will be greater than the price which he pays for it, or else he would not part with his money. But justice requires that exchange-values should be equal when things are exchanged in ordinary contracts of buying and selling. That is the doctrine expounded by Aristotle and faithfully adhered to as being the teaching of natural reason until the time of Hobbes and Locke.

Hobbes and Locke denied the traditional teaching without attempting to show that it was false. When the road had thus been cleared, Adam Smith, Ricardo, and other leading economists developed a doctrine of value which was to produce the most important results. They taught that labour is the source and measure of value. Commodities are exchanged according to the amount of labour which has been put into them. Karl Marx adopted this theory of value and built on it his doctrine of scientific Socialism. He argued that if labour is the source of value, then the worker produces all the wealth of the world. The capitalist pays the worker less for his labour than it is worth and takes the surplus value for himself. Thus the capitalist robs the worker, and no wrong is done by depriving him of his ill-gotten gains.

The doctrine of Karl Marx is the cause of a great deal of the social and economic troubles of our time. It shows how disastrous false teaching may become, and how important it is to keep to the truth.

Labour is, indeed, a source of value, but it is false to say that it is the only source of value or that it is the measure of value. A few examples will make this perfectly clear. There are things of great value which have been acquired without any labour at all, as, for example, a diamond found by chance on the South African veldt. The same quantity of labour often produces commodities of very different values. The faggot maker, the ordinary carpenter, and the cabinet maker may each work for eight hours a day, but the product of their labour will be of very different values. Not unfrequently a workman complains that his labour has been thrown away; he has mixed his labour with the material, but the result is worthless. The Marxian theory of value is false, and the consequences to which it leads are false and disastrous.