Question Two: On the Object of Justice and on Its Distinction from the Other Virtues

St. Th. II-II, q. 57, a. 1; q. 58, a. 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 11; I-II, q. 60, a. 2 and 3; q. 64, a. 2.

139. The proper object of justice is the special good which consists in rendering a debt to another unto equality. - But in this one object three things can be distinguished:

1. The material object, or that which justice intends and does (the matter about which it is concerned), is external things and actions which can be owed to another. Many distinguish this into a remote and a proximate object: they say that the remote object is the things which are owed, exchanged, and distributed; and the proximate object is the actions by which things come into use, are exchanged, or are distributed, namely, the actions which must be furnished to another or omitted, by which something can be rendered to another and satisfaction made to his right.

2. The primary material object (others call it: the formal which) which justice principally, through itself and by reason of itself, intends and does in actions and things (the aspect under which the material object is considered), is the just, or the equal owed to another (passive right); in other words, it is the perfect due equality to be placed between the debt from one and the exigency of right in another, by which equality our actions are proportioned to the right which is owed to another.

3. The formal object by which, or the immediate and proximate motive on account of which we render the debt and establish equality, is the special honesty of the said equality, which is found in the fact that to each one his own is furnished: for we wish to render to another the debt and to preserve equality between ourselves and him, because this is good and owed and just.

Therefore the object of justice is the character of debt; the rendering of debt insofar as and because it is owed.

The other, insofar as there inheres in him an exigitive title to our debt, is not the object which justice immediately attains, but only the end to which that which is just is rendered; - and the exigitive faculty or title of right in another (active right) is not the proximate motive, but only the remote foundation why rendering the debt is good and obligatory.¹

¹ Against Billuart and Haine, who hold active right as the formal object. Yet this is not the proximate motive, for the reason why we render the equal thing to another is because it is owed to him; but it is owed because he himself has active right. Billuart himself, where he treats of the virtues annexed to justice, for example, of religion, speaks otherwise.

140. The proper matter about which justice is exercised through itself and immediately is external operations and things, insofar as according to these one is coordinated to another; but not the interior passions of the soul.

It is proved: For justice differs from the other moral virtues in this, that these primarily and through themselves rectify man in himself, justice in order to another. But the ordering of one to another is immediately made according to acts which are terminated at another, namely, according to exterior actions and things by which men can communicate with one another; but not according to interior affections or passions by which man is immediately well disposed in himself. Therefore.

Yet per accidens and through the mediation of other virtues it also regards passions, if its end requires this, namely, the equality to be established between exterior things, which passions can impede. In this case it commands the other virtues to moderate the passions lest they harm another (q. 58, a. 8 and 9).

141. The principal object of justice, namely, the just or equal owed to another, is the mean of the thing, while the other moral virtues have only the mean of reason.

It is explained: A moral virtue is said to be in a mean because as object it has the mean between excess and defect in its proper matter, which mean right reason dictates (for example, virtue chooses passions neither more nor less than reason dictates), and therefore it is called the mean of reason and is conformity to the measure of right reason. But in justice the mean of reason is the mean of the thing (conformity with the thing), insofar as right reason dictates to justice to give a thing equal to the person or to his thing, namely, dictates what precisely must be rendered to another, so that neither a greater nor a lesser thing is rendered than is owed.

It is proved: Justice differs from the other virtues in this, that these are principally concerned with passions, that one with exterior actions and things. But the right ordering of passions is not attended according to equality of one thing to another, but according to comparison to the very man acting in such conditions and circumstances. Therefore the mean of such virtues is only the mean of reason with respect to us, and therefore it varies according to persons, qualities, and circumstances: for example, food is different according to the disposition, capacity, and conditions of the subject; excess in food for the sick is not excess for the healthy; one brave action exceeds the powers of one person, not of another.

On the contrary, justice is concerned with things and actions according as they have a due proportion to another person. Therefore the mean of justice consists in equality of things, namely, in equality of proportion of an exterior thing to an exterior person, and therefore it is the mean of the thing.² This consequently is established independently of the conditions and circumstances of the acting persons: thus, for example, if I owe someone one hundred francs, in order that satisfaction be made to the other, I am bound to pay him, whether he himself be rich or poor, or whether I am.

² Not in this sense, says Billuart, diss. 5, a. 4, that it is not according to reason: nothing is more consonant with reason. But in this sense, that it is not established by reason according to the conditions of the subject, but reason depends on the nature of things: therefore to pay a debt is conformed to reason because it is equality of things, not conversely. - Therefore in the other virtues there is a psychological mean; in justice, an objective mean.

In summary: Justice therefore through itself immediately considers only the thing owed, and not the condition of persons, unless this redounds into the quantity and equality or inequality of the thing: thus, for example, an injury inflicted implies a proportion to the dignity of the person offended, and therefore has one proportion to a prince and another to a private person (q. 58, a. 10, ad 3).

142. The formal object or special honorable good of the virtue of justice is taken by comparison to another; in the other virtues, by comparison to the agent.

It is proved: For justice is essentially toward another, but the other virtues perfect man only in those things which are suitable to him according to himself. Therefore a) the good of justice is not taken by comparison to the agent alone, for example, from the suitability of the work with him, but also, beyond comparison to the agent, it is constituted by comparison to another, namely, from the comparison and equality of thing to thing or to an exterior person, for example, recompense of the wage owed for service rendered. Indeed b) even the work itself is just, without considering how (i.e., with what intention, disposition, motive, manner, etc.) it is done by the agent. Namely, the right is had not only according to the mean of reason, but according to the mean of the thing independently of the agent, provided what is rendered is equal to what must be rendered, for example, he who owes one hundred francs, and renders it, does what is right, although he suffers poverty from it or although he does it unwillingly³ (q. 57, a. 1).

³ Cf. Billuart, l. c.

On the contrary, there is not a work of temperance or fortitude except by comparison to the powers of the agent.

143. The proper act of justice is to render to each one his own. - It is proved:

That is the proper act which is concerned with the proper matter of the virtue. But the matter of justice is an exterior operation according as it itself, or the thing which we use through it, is proportioned to another person. But that is said to be one's own which is owed to him according to equality of proportion. Therefore the proper act of justice is to render to each one his own.

144. Justice is in the will, for its act is in the will, because as object it has a rational good. For we are not just from the fact that we rightly know something, but from the fact that we rightly act. Therefore justice is not in the intellect or in the cognitive faculty, but in the appetite. But not in the sensitive appetite, for the object of justice, namely, the proportion of one to another, exceeds the sensitive faculty, because it is not a sensible object but a rational one. Therefore it is in the rational appetite or will.

145. Corollaries. - From the foregoing it is easily concluded that justice is distinguished:

1st, from the theological virtues, which have God Himself as object, whereas justice has the honorable thing which consists in rendering to each one what is owed. Whence those are directly concerned with the last end itself; this with the means to the end, namely, our actions to be rectified so that what is owed may be given to each one, which is necessary for attaining the last end;

2nd, especially from charity, which a) by reason of its object is more excellent, as being theological; b) likewise more universal, insofar as it extends to more things; c) has as object the very person of God and of neighbor, whom it loves, while the object of justice is right owed to another. Nevertheless, justice obliges more strictly in many circumstances, because the positive obligations of charity, outside extreme spiritual necessity, admit a certain latitude;

3rd, from the other cardinal virtues, both by object and by subject:

a) by object, which in prudence is the practical true in all our actions: for it dictates in any business what seems true, i.e., truly suitable to reason and to be done, so that man may be well ordered to himself and to another; - in fortitude and temperance it is the rational good to be placed in the passions, which are to be moderated in those things which are suitable to man according to himself; - in justice it is the good and just thing owed to another in external operations;

b) by subject: prudence is in the practical intellect, which it inclines to discerning, judging, and dictating what is to be done; - fortitude is in the irascible appetite, which it moderates, strengthens, and impels according to the prescriptions of reason; - temperance in the concupiscible appetite, which it moderates, restrains, and draws back; - justice in the will, which it inclines to rendering to another his own;

4th, from the moral virtues which do not pertain to justice:

a) justice is toward another; the others, toward ourselves;

b) justice is immediately concerned with exterior actions and things; the others, with interior passions;

c) the mean of justice is the mean of the thing, or equality between a thing and a thing or the person of another; the mean of the others is only the mean of reason, or that which reason determines with respect to the one operating and the circumstances;

d) in the work of justice, the honorable and the right exist even by mere commensuration to another: that which is suitable to another; in the works of the other virtues, the right exists by mere commensuration to the agent himself: that which is suitable to the one operating.