The Obligation Of Tending To The Ultimate End

37. On the obligation itself. The primary and principal moral duty which is incumbent upon man living in this life is the obligation of tending to the ultimate end and of attaining it by the means ordained by God.

1. Man has been destined by God to the end of eternal life; but in this destination there is manifestly contained the will of God, by which man is obligated to attain the end through the means ordained by Him.

This argument can be set forth in this way: God constituted Himself the ultimate end of man; but by the very fact that He constituted Himself the ultimate end, He imposed upon man the obligation of tending to the ultimate end.

2. Man by a natural weight is borne toward his perfection and beatitude, which he cannot attain except in God, the supernatural end. But in a rational being the tendencies of nature are governed by law and moral obligation. Therefore he is bound by moral obligation to strive toward the end of eternal life by freely choosing the end and those things which have been ordained by God for attaining the end. The same obligation is also imposed upon man by the express words of Sacred Scripture: "Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect";¹ "with fear and trembling work out your salvation."²

3. The relation of the present life to eternal life, according to Sacred Scripture, is the state of the way to the terminus, the state of tendency toward perfect beatitude: for the present way is exhibited as a time of combat, labor, and probation; eternal life as crown, wages, and reward.³ Therefore, according to the will of God, we must freely strive toward the ultimate end through the means ordained by God.⁴ Whoever has not done this will fall away from the end of beatitude and will be condemned to eternal punishment: "And these shall go into eternal punishment; but the just into eternal life."⁵

¹ Matt. 5:48.

² Phil. 2:12.

³ Matt. 5:12; 16:27; 19:17, 29; 25:9, 30, 46; 1 Cor. 9:24; 2 Tim. 4:8; Jas. 1:12; 3:4.

⁴ Matt. 19:17.

⁵ Matt. 25:46. Cf. Matt. 7:19; John 5:29.

38. What this obligation involves. In order that man may come to the end of eternal life:

1. He is bound by faith to acknowledge God, the supernatural end, and to constitute Him the end of his moral life. Hence he ought to be so disposed that he wills to love nothing, to desire nothing, which simply impedes the ultimate end and is simply opposed to attaining it, of which sort is mortal sin.

a. Since venial sin is not simply opposed to the attainment of the ultimate end, the will and intention of committing venial sin is not against the prescribed obligation of tending to the ultimate end. Venial sin is indeed an action through which man does not tend to his end, but it does not remove the end and the attainment of it.

b. From these things it is gathered that the first and fundamental precept of the whole moral life is this: that man adhere to God by faith, hope to attain Him as his supreme good, and order himself and all that is his to God, his ultimate end. And since ordering to God in this order of salvation is done through the charity of God, it is understood why an act of divine charity is necessary and prescribed at the beginning of the spiritual life.

2. He is bound to acquire for himself the state of grace and of divine sonship through the sacrament of baptism: for the kingdom of heaven is promised only to the sons of God, just as only sons have a right to the inheritance of the father: "Unless one has been reborn of water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God."¹ "But if sons, then heirs."²

3. He is bound to lead a life worthy of a son of God through the supernatural observance of the commandments of God, so that through good works he may merit for himself the reward of eternal life: "If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments."³ "He who does the will of My Father who is in heaven, he shall enter into the kingdom of heaven."⁴

4. If he has deserted the ultimate end and lost the state of grace through mortal sin, he is bound to return to the end of his life and to recover the lost state of grace through penance. For in the state of mortal sin an efficacious tendency to the ultimate end is impossible. Moreover, for one existing in the state of mortal sin, since his will, turned away from God, adheres to earthly things, because of lack of strength it is too arduous to overcome the difficulties which occur in observing the precepts for a long time, unless he withdraws his will from sins and efficaciously sets God before created things.⁵

Discussion will return elsewhere concerning the difficulty which is found in assigning the time within which this obligation must be fulfilled.⁶

¹ John 3:5.

² Rom. 8:17.

³ Matt. 19:17.

⁴ Matt. 7:21.

⁵ Cf. St. Thomas I-II, q. 109, a. 8; II-II, q. 14, a. 2. Lugo, De poenitentia, disp. 7, n. 234 ff.

⁶ Cf. De sacramentis^3, n. 217.

39. To what extent the world is to be fled. The Christian religion, which constitutes the ultimate end of man not in the goods of this life but in the goods of another life, and obligates him, earthly things being put after, to strive toward supernatural and eternal goods, is therefore gravely blamed, as though by directing man to supernatural and future things it turns him away from the goods of this life, teaches him to despise them, and to neglect temporal prosperity and progress.

a. It rightly and deservedly teaches that man attains his end not in this life, but only in the other, since in this life man cannot obtain either the moral perfection fitting to human nature or the happiness which he naturally desires. For progress, even the greatest, whether material or intellectual, cannot raise man either to moral perfection or to happiness.

b. It teaches that the world is to be contemned and fled insofar as worldly cares impede the tendency toward eternal goods and bring true human happiness into danger. Hence is understood the frequent admonition of Sacred Scripture and of the holy Fathers, not of loving but rather of abandoning the world, namely insofar as it brings the danger of losing more excellent goods. But it is wholly false that the Christian religion impedes temporal progress or renders man unfit to collaborate in perfecting and promoting temporal life and its culture. For it requires only this: that in the works by which he tries to promote temporal prosperity, he observe the norms of morality and not neglect Christian duties. With this condition posited, Christians are admonished to apply themselves seriously and diligently to temporal and worldly labors.¹

c. Nor from the fact that the Christian religion teaches that virginity is to be preferred in itself to marriage, and the religious state to the secular state, does it despise or condemn marriage or the secular state, but it prefers the greater and better good to the lesser good. Nevertheless, when the character of human nature is considered, it is not to be feared that so great a multitude of men will abandon the world that material prosperity and progress will ever be neglected.² Indeed the Christian religion effectively increases and promotes in every way the true culture both of the individual man and of society, in that it cultivates individual and social virtues in individuals, protects and perfects the family and the state, and commends and promotes that progress to which alone true and solid stability belongs.

¹ Cf. 1 Thess. 4:10 f.

² On this matter the following discuss aptly: Schneider, Die gottliche Weltordnung (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1900): "Weltflucht und Kulturscheu," p. 528 ff. Mausbach, Die katholische Moral^2 (Cologne: Bachem, 1901): "Kulturarbeit und Weltflucht," p. 113 ff. H. Pesch, Die soziale Befahigung der Kirche^2 (Freiburg: Herder, 1897); Kneib, Die Jenseitsmoral (Freiburg: Herder, 1906).

153. 1. Concerning the relation of the act to God. Baius, the Jansenists, and certain Louvain doctors, thinking that human nature had been wholly vitiated by original sin, taught that for the moral goodness of an act it is required that it be referred to God as ultimate end, and indeed not only implicitly, but also explicitly.¹ Now the relation of an act to the ultimate end is explicit when the agent thinks about it and intends it; implicit, when the ultimate end is not intended in itself, but in another, for example in the objective goodness of the act.

¹ According to Baius and Jansenius, he sins who acts without charity or heavenly delight, because no middle is given between charity and vicious cupidity; the Louvain doctors embraced the doctrine of Baius, although they tried to soften it somewhat. Cf. Vacant-Mangenot, Dict. de théol., t. II, under the word Baius.

154. Thesis: For the moral goodness of an act an explicit relation to God is not required, but an implicit relation suffices. Thus the common and true opinion.

(A) For here there is question of a work good in itself and performed on account of an honorable motive. But he who does good from an honorable end by that very fact acts in a manner consonant with right reason, and consequently with divine reason itself. Therefore such a work of itself, by its own weight, tends to the glory of God, and consequently is truly done on account of God, although implicitly.

155. (B) Nor does the argument taken by the adversaries from the words of St. Paul² avail to the contrary: "Whether you eat, or drink, or whatsoever else you do, do all things unto the glory of God." Whether those words are to be understood of a precept or of a counsel is controverted among theologians. But even those who, with St. Thomas, hear them as concerning a precept, require nothing else than that all works be referred implicitly and objectively to God, as has already been explained. - Augustine³ declares this excellently thus: "I suggest a remedy, whence all day long you praise God, if you wish: whatever you do, do it well, and you have praised God... Have you ceased from singing a hymn, do you depart so that you may refresh yourself? Do not become drunk, and you have praised God... Do you carry on business? do not commit fraud, and you have praised God."

² I Cor., X, 31.

³ St. Augustine, on Psalm 34, serm. II, n. 16, Migne, P. L., XXXVI, 341.

And indeed, if the aforesaid words signified a universal precept of referring all acts explicitly to God, it would follow that all the works of unbelievers are sins, since these do not explicitly refer them to the true God; yet this has deservedly been reprobated by the Church.⁴ - But if it is said that here there is question of a particular precept binding only the faithful, an intolerable yoke is imposed on them: for most very often act without thinking about the ordination of their works to God; indeed they are persuaded that they act well when, for example, they give alms to relieve a poor man, without thinking about the ultimate end. Therefore such an interpretation is opposed to the common sense and practice of the faithful.

⁴ Indeed by Pius V, 1 October 1567, this proposition 25 of Baius was condemned at least as scandalous: "All works of unbelievers are sins, and the virtues of philosophers are vices." (Denzinger, Enchiridion, n. 905).

N. B. Although we are not bound to refer all our acts to God, nevertheless there is given a precept of turning oneself to Him several times in the course of life, as will be explained below, where we treat concerning the virtue of charity. - Besides, it is certainly expedient not only in the morning, but also more often during the day, to offer all one's acts to God, that they may become more perfect.

156. 2. Concerning the relation of the act to an end positively honorable. As we noted above, n. 5, honorable good is distinguished from delightful or useful good. Wherefore the question arises whether we ought to act on account of an honorable end, or whether it is lawful to act on account of delightful or useful good. Among theologians themselves the matter is controverted.

(A) For some teach that it is by no means required that the will positively intend an honorable end, but that it suffices that it not exclude it, or apprehend that it is doing nothing contrary to an honorable end; for, they say, for an honorable action it is not required that an honorable end always be intended, but it suffices that it be good from the circumstances, provided the end is not evil; thus he acts well who plays in order to recreate himself, without thinking about the honorable character of this action.¹

¹ Thus Ballerini-Palmieri, t. I, n. 112-129; Genicot, I, n. 39; Noldin, n. 69.

157. (B) But others, more commonly and more truly, teach that delightful or useful good ought not to be sought except on account of an honorable end, positively willed at least implicitly. For delight is ordered by God, the author of nature, primarily to alluring men to necessary or useful operations to which it is annexed; thus a certain delight is annexed to the use of foods, so that man may thereby be allured to eating and may preserve his life; therefore he acts inordinately who, at least implicitly, does not refer this delight to self-preservation, but eats solely on account of pleasure.² The same must be said concerning useful good, which from its own nature ought to be referred to a further end. - But he implicitly intends on account of an honorable end who acts moderately; for moderation proceeds from right reason.

² To this belongs proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI, 2 March 1679, as scandalous and pernicious in practice: "To eat and drink even to satiety, for pleasure alone, is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its own acts." For, according to Viva (on this proposition, n. 7), the proposition was condemned not only because here there is question of immoderate pleasure, but also because it supposes that it is lawful to enjoy pleasure by intending it uniquely and ultimately. Cf. Denzing., n. 1025.

Nevertheless we can intend useful or delightful good not only insofar as it is honorable, but also insofar as it is useful or delightful, provided the reason of the honorable is not neglected, nor the due order inverted. For the delightful and the useful are something good, although subordinated to honorable good; therefore it is lawful to intend each, not indeed primarily, but secondarily, as an intermediate end to honorable good.

Hence the intention of one's own good, even delightful good, does not render an action evil, provided the will does not rest in it as in the ultimate end; nevertheless he acts more perfectly who, affectively renouncing delights, intends nothing except the properly universal good and that which is consonant with right reason, namely honorable good.

21. Thesis II. By our intellect and will we must tend to God as our last end.

Proof. God is the absolute ultimate end (Thesis I.), the Supreme Good to which man is bound to tend. This tendency must be through faculties or activities by which he can apprehend the Supreme Good. He cannot do so by any organic faculty, because God is a pure spirit, and, consequently, not the object of organic perception. It must, therefore, be through his immaterial faculties, the spiritual activities of his soul, his intellect and will. Man's intellect, by its nature, is able to know God, and his will is able to love what the intellect knows and proposes as worthy of love. Therefore, by our intellect and will we must tend to God as our last end.

22. Thesis III. God created all things for His own extrinsic glory.

Explanation. Honor is the recognition of worth; when expressed in words, it is called praise. Glory is the praise of exalted merit, and in its full acceptance implies love as well as knowledge, together with the manifestation of the same by many persons as a tribute of homage that is due to the person glorified. The knowledge and love which God possesses with regard to Himself is His intrinsic glory; the homage of praise and love that creation renders to God is His extrinsic glory.

Proof 1. We have seen that God is the absolute ultimate end of all things; or, in other words, that all things must tend to Him as to their last end. Since this tendency is something willed by God, it is something good. Yet no good can be added to God intrinsically, because He is Himself the Infinite Good: it can, therefore, be added to God only extrinsically. God has no need of any extrinsic good; yet, if He creates at all, He must necessarily require that creatures shall proclaim Him as their Creator, and thus render Him the glory which is His due. Hence, the end God had in creating all things was His own extrinsic glory.

Proof 2. Man in particular, we know from thesis II., is bound to tend to the Supreme Good, his last end, by his intellect and will — that is, by knowing and loving God; but in these very acts of man consists the extrinsic glory of God. Therefore, man in particular was created for the extrinsic glory of God.

1. Irrational creatures cannot praise and love God. Answer. They cannot love God, it is true; nor can they praise Him directly: nevertheless, they praise Him indirectly, by displaying God's power, goodness, wisdom, beauty, etc., to the intelligent creation, thereby serving to inspire and increase the praise and love of God on the part of man.

2. God cannot fail of His purpose, but He fails to receive the praise and love of the wicked. Therefore, He did not create them for that end. Answer. Though the wicked refuse God the homage of their love and voluntary praise in this life, they still serve to proclaim His praise. For in the next life they glorify His justice by their punishment, and even in the present life they make manifest His mercy and longanimity.

3. It would be unworthy of God to promote His glory by the misery of His creatures. Answer. To create man for misery would be unworthy of God, yes; we are maintaining that God, on the contrary, created all men for happiness, but on the condition that they shall render Him due service. When the wicked voluntarily turn away from their destined bliss by refusing to do their duty, they must necessarily incur a just punishment. The solution of this and similar difficulties will be better understood after we have treated of the sanction of the natural law (No. 107 et seq.).