The Results of Sin

The Results of Sin.—There are two kinds of sins from the viewpoint of origin: (a) original sin, which is inherited from Adam by all his descendants (except Christ and the Blessed Virgin); (b) actual sin, which is committed by the personal will of each sinner.

The immediate consequences of original sin were that Adam lost for himself and his posterity the gifts of the state of original innocence. Thus: (a) the soul in subjection to God was endowed with the beauty of holiness, to which succeeded the deformity of enmity against Him; (b) the powers of the soul were in harmony, the lower subject to the higher, but to this succeeded a state of disunion and rebellion and what are called the four wounds of nature, the intellect and will becoming prone to error and sin, and the sensitive appetites tending inordinately towards delights or away from difficulties; (c) the body which had been in subjection to the soul and endowed with freedom from suffering and mortality, became burdensome to the soul and subject to pain and death.

The consequences that are common to all sin, both original and actual, are: (a) the sinner loses the spiritual beauty to which sin is opposed, and this loss is called the stain of sin, since the soul defiles itself by inordinate contact with what it loves; (b) the sinner incurs the debt of punishment, since sin is an injustice against the internal law of reason and against the external law of God and man.

The stain of sin is not: (a) a mere privation or absence of grace, for otherwise all sins would be the same; nor (b) a mere passing shadow over the soul, since the bad state of the will can remain after the act of sin.

The stain of sin differs according to the sin. (a) The stain of original sin is the privation of original justice (i.e., of the subjection of reason and will to God), as being a voluntary privation through the will of the first parent Adam; (b) the stain of mortal sin is the privation of sanctifying grace, as connoting the act of the individual will through which it was incurred; (c) the stain of venial sin is the privation of the fervor of charity resulting from the sin, inasmuch as it, to some extent, hinders the beauty of interior grace from appearing in external acts.

The stain of grave sin is the disfigurement of death, for (a) it removes the principle of supernatural existence (i.e., grace); (b) it takes away the principles of supernatural activity (i.e., the infused habits), though faith and hope may remain; (c) it deprives the soul of the rights that belong to the spiritually living (i.e., of merits already acquired).

The stain of venial sin is the disfigurement of disease, for (a) it disposes one for spiritual death (i.e., for mortal sin); (b) it lessens spiritual vitality, by setting up habits that make the practice of the virtues more difficult.

The penalty of sin is threefold according to the threefold offense of sin. (a) Inasmuch as sin is against reason, it is punished by remorse of conscience; (b) inasmuch as it is against ecclesiastical, civil or other human law, it is punished by man; (c) inasmuch as it is against divine law, it is punished by God.

The punishment of sin is twofold according to its duration. (a) Grave sin, since it deprives of spiritual life and turns man away from his Last End, introduces a radical and, of itself, irreparable disorder, and thus incurs an eternal punishment; those who die in grave sin will be sentenced to eternal punishment. (b) Venial sin does not inflict spiritual death, but is a defect or excess, not as regards the Last End, but as regards the means to the Last End. Thus, it incurs, not an eternal, but a temporal punishment.

The punishment of sin is twofold according to its quality. (a) Sin by which man turns away from his Last End is punished by the pain of loss, the deprivation of eternal happiness which was despised. This pain may be called infinite, inasmuch as it is the loss of Infinite Good. (b) Sin, in so far as it is an inordinate turning towards created things, is punished by the pain of sense, which comes through creatures. This pain is finite.

Sin may be a punishment of sin: (a) if a later sin results from a former sin (e.g., God may permit those who refuse to serve Him, to become the servants of their passions); (b) if the commission of sin is accompanied by internal or external sufferings (e.g., the jealous indulge their vice at the expense of great mental torment).

Not all the afflictions that befall mankind are chastisements. In the strict sense, only those evils are punishments which are inflicted by the lawgiver against the will of the offender as a vindication of justice violated by the personal offense of the latter. Hence we must distinguish punishment from the following: (a) from satisfaction, which is compensation willingly endured for one’s own sin, or freely offered for another’s (e.g., David after his repentance performed penance for his sins; Christ on the cross offered His satisfaction for the human race); (b) from medicinal afflictions, which are intended, not as reparations to injured justice, but as remedies to preserve men against sin or relapse, or to afford them opportunities for progress (e.g., the calamities of Job, the condition of the man born blind, the dolors of the Blessed Virgin, the physical evils Which in this world sometimes happen to subjects as a punishment on their rulers, etc.); (c) from the natural defects of fallen human nature, such as hunger, thirst, disease, etc. These are only indirectly the consequences of original sin, the direct punishment, from which they follow, being the infirmity and corruption of nature produced by original sin.

Question III LAW

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85; 109, a. 7; De Malo q. 2, a. 11 and 12.

515. The first effect of sin is the diminution or corruption of the good of nature, not indeed of the principles by which human nature is constituted and of the properties which flow from it (for example, intellect and will), but of the natural inclination to virtue.¹ For:

¹ It is natural because according to its beginning it is from nature, insofar as the intellect and will tend to good (I-II, q. 63, a. 1), and because it perfects nature in its own order.

1. On the part of privation: by mortal sin (and therefore by original sin) man is turned away from the ultimate end, whence the powers of the soul are deprived of due subordination to one another and to God, and thus are deprived of due order to the good of virtue and negatively do not attain their end. This subordination in the state of pure nature would be had imperfectly from the fact that, reason ordering, the will would convert itself to the ultimate end, God, and thus by one act would habitually subject all the powers of man to itself and refer them to God; but in the state of innocence it was perfect through the supernatural gifts of original justice. Hence through original sin, which takes away original justice, man is also said to be wounded in his natural goods, because in him all the powers of the soul remain deprived of their proper order by which they were naturally ordered to virtue. Insofar as reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is deprived of order to the good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible appetite is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of infirmity; insofar as the concupiscible appetite is deprived of its order to the delectable moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

2. On the part of conversion: by actual sin, as by every human act, there comes about an inclination to similar acts; this disposition is an obstacle by which man is impeded from being easily borne toward the contrary good of virtue. Therefore the very inclination to virtue is diminished, not indeed in itself (and consequently it cannot be totally corrupted), but insofar as a positive impediment of attaining the end is set against it. Hence from actual sin the four wounds inflicted by original sin are increased and aggravated.

516. Remark. - From this is understood the doctrine of the Scholastics, according to whom sin has as its effect the privation of mode, species, and order:

"Mode, species, and order follow every created good, insofar as it is such, and also every being. For every being and good is considered through some form, according to which the species is taken. But the form of each thing ... is according to some measure ... and from this it has a certain mode, which regards measure. From its form, moreover, each thing is ordered to another. Thus, therefore, according to diverse grades of goods there are diverse grades of mode, species, and order.

a) Therefore there is a certain good pertaining to the very substance of nature, which has its mode, species, and order; and this is neither taken away nor diminished by sin.

b) There is also a certain good of natural inclination, and this also has its mode, species, and order; and this is diminished by sin ... but is not totally taken away.

c) There is also a certain good of virtue and grace, which also has its mode, species, and order; and this is totally taken away by mortal sin.

d) There is also a certain good which is the ordered act itself, which also has its mode, species, and order; and the privation of this is essentially sin itself (as to the formal element).

And thus it is clear how sin is the privation of mode, species, and order; and takes away or diminishes mode, species, and order" q. 85, a. 4.