First Question: On the Diminution of the Good of Nature

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85; 109, a. 7; De Malo q. 2, a. 11 and 12.

515. The first effect of sin is the diminution or corruption of the good of nature, not indeed of the principles by which human nature is constituted and of the properties which flow from it (for example, intellect and will), but of the natural inclination to virtue.¹ For:

¹ It is natural because according to its beginning it is from nature, insofar as the intellect and will tend to good (I-II, q. 63, a. 1), and because it perfects nature in its own order.

1. On the part of privation: by mortal sin (and therefore by original sin) man is turned away from the ultimate end, whence the powers of the soul are deprived of due subordination to one another and to God, and thus are deprived of due order to the good of virtue and negatively do not attain their end. This subordination in the state of pure nature would be had imperfectly from the fact that, reason ordering, the will would convert itself to the ultimate end, God, and thus by one act would habitually subject all the powers of man to itself and refer them to God; but in the state of innocence it was perfect through the supernatural gifts of original justice. Hence through original sin, which takes away original justice, man is also said to be wounded in his natural goods, because in him all the powers of the soul remain deprived of their proper order by which they were naturally ordered to virtue. Insofar as reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is deprived of order to the good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible appetite is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of infirmity; insofar as the concupiscible appetite is deprived of its order to the delectable moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

2. On the part of conversion: by actual sin, as by every human act, there comes about an inclination to similar acts; this disposition is an obstacle by which man is impeded from being easily borne toward the contrary good of virtue. Therefore the very inclination to virtue is diminished, not indeed in itself (and consequently it cannot be totally corrupted), but insofar as a positive impediment of attaining the end is set against it. Hence from actual sin the four wounds inflicted by original sin are increased and aggravated.

516. Remark. - From this is understood the doctrine of the Scholastics, according to whom sin has as its effect the privation of mode, species, and order:

"Mode, species, and order follow every created good, insofar as it is such, and also every being. For every being and good is considered through some form, according to which the species is taken. But the form of each thing ... is according to some measure ... and from this it has a certain mode, which regards measure. From its form, moreover, each thing is ordered to another. Thus, therefore, according to diverse grades of goods there are diverse grades of mode, species, and order.

a) Therefore there is a certain good pertaining to the very substance of nature, which has its mode, species, and order; and this is neither taken away nor diminished by sin.

b) There is also a certain good of natural inclination, and this also has its mode, species, and order; and this is diminished by sin ... but is not totally taken away.

c) There is also a certain good of virtue and grace, which also has its mode, species, and order; and this is totally taken away by mortal sin.

d) There is also a certain good which is the ordered act itself, which also has its mode, species, and order; and the privation of this is essentially sin itself (as to the formal element).

And thus it is clear how sin is the privation of mode, species, and order; and takes away or diminishes mode, species, and order" q. 85, a. 4.