The Simulated Administration of a Sacrament

Authors do not agree in explaining the nature and morality of simulated or fictitious administration of a sacrament. It seems to us that the following must be said:

I. Notion. 1. Simulated administration of a sacrament, taken in the full sense, consists in this: that someone uses the matter and form of a sacrament, and this in such a way that he signifies the will of confecting a sacrament, which nevertheless he does not actually have (St. Alphonsus, VI, 60 and 61, where he denies simulation because matter and form are lacking).

2. Simulated administration, accepted in a less full sense, is had when someone uses the matter or form of a sacrament, and this again in such a way that he signifies the will of confecting a sacrament, which in reality he does not have (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.).

Each simulated administration is called formal or material, according as deception of one's neighbor is intended as an end, or is chosen as a means.

3. Simulated administration of a sacrament, taken improperly, consists in this: that someone applies something which bears the appearance of the matter and form of a sacrament, or of either one, and this for the end that he may be judged to confect a sacrament.

From every simulated administration there differs the dissimulation of a denied sacrament, which has place when someone applies something which bears the appearance of the matter and form, or of either one, for the end that he may hide the denial of the sacrament; for example, if someone gives a blessing instead of absolution to one who is indisposed, lest the denial of absolution be disclosed to others (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59).

II. Morality. 1. Simulation of a sacrament, accepted in the full sense, is gravely evil, because it contains a sacrilegious lie, that is, a lie which, as having been committed through a sacramental rite, redounds upon the sacrament itself and inflicts grave injury upon it. Add that the said lie will often be gravely harmful. There is added proposition 29 condemned by Innocent XI: "Urgent grave fear is a cause for simulating the administration of the sacraments";¹ concerning which note: 1. by that proposition at least the simulation of a sacrament accepted in the full sense is condemned; 2. the authors of the said proposition understood it of material simulation (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59); hence formal simulation is to be rejected a fortiori.

2. Simulation of a sacrament accepted in the less full sense likewise seems gravely illicit, because the argument just brought forward also has force if the lie is committed through the partial rite of a sacrament.²

3. Simulation of a sacrament taken improperly of itself is quite probably not gravely illicit; for since the rite of the sacrament is applied neither wholly nor partially, the injury inflicted on the sacrament seems to be lacking, so that only a lie remains. I said of itself, because grave sin can be committed from another source, for example against charity or even against justice with respect to the subject to whom the sacrament, owed by charity or by justice, is thus denied.

4. The dissimulation of a denied sacrament, when there is a just cause, is of itself licit. For in the case neither is injury inflicted on the sacrament, nor is a lie committed, but only the truth is hidden (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59). I said of itself, because again grave sin can be had from another source, for example with respect to the subject, who can have a grave right that the truth not be hidden from him.

And these things which we have said concerning simulated administration of a sacrament, with the necessary adjustments, should also be applied to simulated reception.

Corollary I. It is neither simulation of a sacrament nor sin:

1. To place the matter and form for the sake of practice, because it is not signified that the sacrament is being confected, and therefore a lie is lacking; nor does the placing of the rite for the sake of practice inflict any injury upon the sacrament.

2. For the sake of avoiding infamy, to pronounce the customary words before one pretending to receive Communion, while not handing over the host but replacing it in the ciborium (St. Alphonsus, VI, 61). Nevertheless the case is little practical.

3. To enter the confessional and there speak to the confessor about some business. "For since matter and form are lacking there, I do not know how to understand where there is simulation of a sacrament" (St. Alphonsus, VI, 60). Nor is there a lie, unless someone "approached with the intention that bystanders believe that he is confessing" (St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.); otherwise if he did it in order to hide from others the fact that he was not confessing.

4. In contracting Matrimony, to which someone is compelled, to simulate consent; since consent of this kind is invalid, so that the matter and form of the sacrament are lacking. Nor is there sin because consent is simulated, since, on account of the opposing impediment, the words of consent can be uttered with a restriction that is not purely mental, so that a lie also is lacking (St. Alphonsus, VI, 62).

Corollary II. It is simulation of a sacrament, or at least grave sin:

1. To pronounce without intention the words of absolution over one who is indisposed, or the words of consecration over bread, or in the celebration of Mass to omit the words of consecration; indeed, also from chapter De homine, 7, de celebratione missarum, the priest who in Mass did not consecrate would sin more gravely than one who consecrated and communicated sacrilegiously (St. Alphonsus, VI, 59, 61).

2. To hand over a non-consecrated host as consecrated; here indeed there is not simulation of a sacrament, but cooperation in idolatry, at least material idolatry (St. Thomas, III, q. 80, a. 6, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, VI, 61).

¹ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1179.

² Cf. Holy Office, 6 September 1625 (Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1489).

“29. Urgent fear is a just cause for simulating the administration of the Sacraments.” Proposition condemned by Innocent XI.

221. • QUESTION 5º. In what precisely does the simulation of a Sacrament consist?

Resp. Theologians do not agree. Some say that it consists generally in that which can lead those receiving or others into error. More probably, according to the common opinion, it consists in the fictive application of the form to the matter, or in the fictive pronouncing of the form; or only then does simulation seem to be present when that which essentially pertains to the thing which is simulated is fictively placed ³, so that neighbor is necessarily deceived. - Mazzotta, on the Minister, at the end.

³ ** You will say more clearly: when something fictively is placed which pertains to the essence of the sacrament. But this definition differs from the preceding one, which extends much more broadly; for by some fiction an opinion of a conferred sacrament can be induced, even when no form or matter has been applied.

81. Notion of simulation. Simulation or fiction of the sacraments is an illicit change of the matter, form, or necessary intention, secretly made by the minister, such that the sacrament is null and the recipient is led into error.

Although all theologians agree that the fiction of a sacrament is never lawful, nevertheless they labor greatly in defining it. The definition adduced seems to be good and complete. For just as that act is called fictitious which is outwardly posited as though all things required for validity were present, while in reality it is null on account of an essential internal and hidden defect, so also the administration of a sacrament is fictitious if outwardly all things necessary for the validity of the sacrament are posited in appearance, but secretly the minister introduces an essential defect, such that the sacrament is null and the recipient is led into error. In the definition adduced, however, it is called an illicit change because of the sacrament of matrimony, in which it is sometimes lawful to change the matter, form, or intention. For if someone is compelled by grave and unjust fear to contract matrimony, he can lawfully express consent outwardly while withholding it inwardly. For although from such fictitious consent the spouse, who thinks that he is entering a true contract of matrimony, is led into error, nevertheless there is not present a fiction of the sacrament properly so called, but a fiction of the matrimonial contract. This manner of fictitiously consenting is lawful in the case, both because it primarily concerns the contract and not the sacrament, and because it is a legitimate defense against the atrocious injury of fear unjustly inflicted, as will be said more broadly below in the tract on matrimony.

82. Modes. Simulation or fiction can be performed by the minister in three ways: a) if he secretly employs matter unfit for the sacrament, for example, if in place of the wine to be consecrated he were to place in the chalice another liquid altogether similar to it; b) if he secretly changes the form essentially, for example, if a confessor, in pronouncing the form of sacramental absolution, were to say in an intelligible voice, "I absolve you from your sins," but in a very low voice were to insert the little word "not";³¹¹ c) if he inwardly withholds the intention of administering the sacrament.

³¹¹ St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 59) thinks this mode not altogether illicit, but Gury, Bucceroni, and others call this case chimerical.

83. Principle. Simulation or fiction of a sacrament is never lawful.

This is evident:

1. From proposition 29 condemned by Innocent XI: "Urgent grave fear is a just cause for simulating the administration of the sacraments."³¹²

2. The fiction or simulation of a sacrament is a very harmful lie and a detestable sacrilege. It is a lie because it leads into error one who justly thinks that he is receiving a sacrament; it is a sacrilege because it is an abuse of a sacred thing, for the minister abuses the sacrament in order to lie, if not by words, nevertheless by deeds.

³¹² Denz., n. 1179.

84. Notion of dissimulation. The fiction or simulation of a sacrament differs as heaven from earth from the dissimulation of a sacrament, or rather from the dissimulation of a denied sacrament. Such dissimulation is the positing of a non-sacramental action from which others, not the recipient, erroneously judge that a sacrament has been conferred; for example, a confessor gives a blessing to a penitent to whom he was obliged to deny absolution, and recites certain prayers for the purpose that those standing about may not perceive that absolution was denied; or a priest, according to an arrangement made beforehand, might make the sign of the cross before the mouth of a man kneeling at the Communion rail, who for a grave reason can neither receive Communion nor withdraw from the public Communion table, and would then replace the sacred host in the ciborium.³¹³

In this latter case, however, a very grave cause is required, because the Most Holy Eucharist itself is employed for an end that is indeed good but also for the deception of others; and this seems to include some irreverence. But it would be plainly illicit in this case to give that man, although knowing and consenting, an unconsecrated host, since such a manner of acting would be at least material idolatry, because then this man would at least outwardly adore something which is a vile creature. "For just as he would sin by outwardly adoring an idol, even from fear of death, so also he would always sin by outwardly adoring an unconsecrated host. And he would sin more gravely than if he were to communicate unworthily; as is evident from chapter De homine 7, de celebr. miss., where it is said that the priest who did not consecrate in the Mass would sin more gravely than one who sacrilegiously consecrated and communicated."³¹⁴ St. Thomas³¹⁵ teaches concerning this matter: "An unconsecrated host must in no way be given in place of a consecrated one, because the priest doing this, insofar as it lies in him, causes those who believe it to be a consecrated host to commit idolatry, whether others present or even the one receiving it; because, as Augustine³¹⁶ says: 'Let no one eat the flesh of Christ unless he first adores it.'"

Principle. The dissimulation of a denied sacrament is lawful for a reasonable cause. For it is nothing other than permitting others, who in the case have no right to know the objective truth, to fall into a harmless error.³¹⁷

³¹³ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor., l. 6, n. 59.

³¹⁴ St. Alphonsus, ibid., n. 61.

³¹⁵ S. theol. 3, q. 80, a. 6 ad 2; cf. Quodlibet V, a. 12.

³¹⁶ In Ps. 158, circa med.

³¹⁷ Cf. St. Alphonsus, l.c., n. 59.

St. Thomas III, q. 64, a. 8 and 10.

80. Principle I. For the validity of a sacrament, in the minister, besides power, there is required the intention or deliberate will of confecting a sacrament. - This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 7, can. 11, and can. 4 on Baptism, defined against the Protestants.

It is proved:

1. From Tradition, whose witnesses are Innocent III, the profession of faith for the Waldensians; the Council of Constance, last session, constitution against Wicleff, a. 22; Florence, decree for the Armenians; and Trent already cited.

2. From the Scriptures, in which it is implicitly asserted, I Cor. IV, 1: A priest, in the ministration of the sacraments, is a minister of Christ; but in order that a man be a minister of Christ, he must will to act in the name of Christ and intend what Christ instituted; therefore. The minor is proved:

a) A minister differs from a blind instrument in this, that he is a voluntary agent; whence he must will to use his ministerial power, and thus through his will subject himself to the principal agent: for a human act does not operate beyond the intention of the agent.

b) Similarly, there was given to ministers not a mere deputation but a power (Mt. XXVIII, 18-19; John XX, 21; Luke XXII, 19); but one who has a power can use it or not use it; and therefore there is required in ministers an intention of using their power or of acting in the name of Christ.

Therefore intention is required on the part of the minister.

3. By reason: The placing of matter and form is an indifferent action which can signify various things and be done for various ends: washing, for example, for bodily cleanliness, for health, for play, for mere exercise, for representation alone; therefore it must be determined to one sacramental signification, which will not be done except by the intention of the minister. Therefore intention is also required on the part of the work.

Nor should you say: the external rite is determined by the words of the form; therefore intention is superfluous. - Reply: supposing that the words are pronounced in the name of Christ, in the person of Christ; otherwise they would not have their sacramental signification.

81. Principle II. The required intention is the will, at least virtual and implicit, absolute or equivalent to this, determined to a certain matter and person, of performing the sacramental rite. - It is said:

1. Will; hence one deprived of reason, perfectly drunk, or dreaming, does not confect a sacrament, even if he previously intended this, because he does not act in a human mode, from intention.

2. On the part of the subject: at least virtual and implicit: for an interpretative intention does not suffice, which someone would have had if he had adverted to this or that; nor a merely habitual intention, i.e., one once had and not retracted, for these do not make a human act (I, n. 55) nor influence the constitution of a sacrament. Nor is an actual intention required, which someone here and now has, because this is not always in man's moral power; but a virtual intention is required, by which someone, from the force or influx of a past actual intention, places or continues to place the sacrament.¹ Likewise an explicit intention is not required, by which someone says: I intend to make a sacrament; but an implicit one suffices, contained in another act, as if someone, having been called, goes to the church and, distracted, performs all things required for Baptism.

¹ Among the older authors, virtual intention is sometimes called habitual, as in St. Thomas, a. 8, ad 3; but he understands virtual, for he adds: "from the power of the first intention the sacrament is perfected." Yet to avoid equivocations, the terminology received today must be preserved.

In practice, one who places the actions according to custom and does not exclude intention has an implicit intention; a fortiori one who fears whether he has sufficient intention, by this very fact has more than sufficient intention.

3. On the part of the mode by which the will is borne toward the object:

a) Absolute or equivalent to this, i.e., conditioned concerning the past or present: for if, at the moment at which the sacrament is made, this condition is verified, the intention passes into an absolute one and the sacrament is valid; otherwise it is not perfected from defect of intention. But a condition concerning a future contingent thing (for example, if you restore), and also concerning a necessary future thing (for example, if the sun rises), with the mind of suspending the sacrament, renders it invalid: for it impedes the union between the intention of the minister and the application of matter and form, since it suspends the present intention and makes it so that the minister does not have the will of confecting the sacrament in the present; moreover, when the condition has been verified, there also is not then a sacrament, because then matter and form no longer exist.

Matrimony is excepted, which follows the nature of a contract; whence, when the condition has been verified, if consent has persevered, the matter and form of matrimony are present, for they coincide with the persevering intention.

b) Determined to a certain matter, because otherwise it would be indifferent, for example, if someone, knowing there are eleven hosts, wished to consecrate ten without indicating which ones; and to a certain person, because otherwise no application would be made, for example, if someone said: I absolve thee, to two persons.

But it suffices that it be determined to the present person, whoever that person may be; whence a man who is thought to be a woman is validly absolved, and Peter who seems to be Paul. Error concerning the person does not invalidate, unless the minister were to bind his intention to a determinate person; in matrimony, however, error of person is substantial, because the person is the very object of the contract.

4. On the part of the object: of performing the sacramental rite. For the rite of itself is indifferent and can be posited for a diverse end: as sacred or as profane, indeed by playing, or by pretending, without, namely, the will of confecting a sacrament; therefore in order that it be a sacrament it must be determined by the intention of doing the rite as sacramental, or of doing what the Church does,² as the Councils say, or what is done in the Church. This must be explained further.

² The first who used the formula was William of Auxerre, on IV Sentences, On Baptism.

82. Principle III. For the validity of a sacrament, external intention does not suffice, i.e., the intention only of doing the external act; but there is required, at least implicitly, an internal intention of doing what Christ instituted, or at least what the Church does. - Therefore the intention of positing the external act, even seriously and in the habit of a minister, but merely materially (although inwardly someone wills to simulate), does not suffice; this intention they call external, namely from the part of the object, and some have said that it suffices;³ for:

³ It is attributed to Alan of Lille; it was formally proposed by Catharinus, Salmeron, Contenson, Juenin, Natalis Alexander, Serry, Drouin, and others.

a) One who has only external intention, but internally does not have the intention of doing what the Church does, implicitly intends to simulate a sacrament, although not openly; but one who simulates a sacrament, whether openly or secretly, cannot be said to act in the name of Christ.

b) The external act, even one posited in a sacred place by a minister clothed in sacred vestments, can be done for a diverse end: it can be a serious or simulated action, done in the name of Christ or in one's own name, a profane representation or exercise, or a sacred action. Therefore it will not be determined to the being of a sacrament except through an internal intention, consonant with the external act, namely of doing the act formally as sacred, as instituted by Christ and intended by the Church.

This opinion in practice must be altogether held, because the sacraments are to be ministered in the safer way (n. 23); indeed the contrary seems not safe even speculatively, because proposition 28 was condemned by Alexander VIII: "Baptism conferred by a minister who observes every external rite and the form of baptizing is valid, while inwardly in his heart he resolves within himself: I do not intend what the Church does." For although the one who only negatively does not say: I intend what the Church does, but positively does not add: I do not intend what the Church does, has not been explicitly condemned; nevertheless, because he implicitly says this, therefore with Benedict XIV⁴ it is rightly judged that, from the condemnation of the proposition, a grave wound has been inflicted on the opinion which asserts that this suffices.

⁴ On the Diocesan Synod, book VII, 4, 8.

83. Corollaries. - Since implicit intention suffices, hence:

1. There is not required an explicit intention of that which the Church intends, namely, of confecting something sacred, or a sacrament, or of producing its effect.

2. Nor is faith in Christ, the Church, or the sacrament required; but whatever the minister's opinion may be concerning Christ, concerning the sacrament and its efficacy, he ministers validly provided that he wills to perform the rite which the Church performs, and which by her is held as sacred, even if he himself thinks it to be nothing: "for because the Church does something, therefore consequently and implicitly he intends to do something, although not explicitly," says St. Thomas, on IV Sentences, d. 6, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2, ad 1.

3. Nor is an explicit intention required of doing what the Roman Church does, but a general intention of doing what the true Church does, whatever the minister may think of that Church; whence a heretic, by willing what his own Church does, which he falsely thinks to be true, implicitly wills what the Church of Christ and the Roman Church does.

4. Nor is an express thought about the Church required, but the intention of doing something which identically the Church does suffices, for example, what is commanded in the Gospel, what Christians do, what is asked by the one requesting: thus baptized persons minister the sacrament of matrimony which they are ignorant to be a sacrament of the Church.

5. Indeed even if the minister has two contrary intentions, for example, of doing what Christ instituted but not what the Church does, what the Church does but not what the Roman Church does, of celebrating matrimony but dissoluble or not a sacrament, of making a sacrament but not of giving grace; the sacrament is valid, provided that the general intention of doing what the Church in fact does is predominant and prevails over the intention proceeding from error, i.e., provided that this is the intention which, according to his actual disposition, the minister would choose if he knew that both could not stand together at the same time.

But if each were equal, nothing would be operated, for one would destroy the other; but if there were doubt about this, the sacrament would be doubtful.

84. He sins gravely from defect of due intention:

1. Who ministers a sacrament without intention, or under a future condition suspending the intention, because it is not a valid sacrament, but a simulation and mockery of it.

2. Who ministers under a hidden condition extrinsic to the sacrament, whether it is unknowable in a human way, for example, if you are predestined, if God sees that you will die this year; or whether it is knowable, for example, if you are fasting, if you have recited the Rosary; because from the very placing of the condition there arises doubt concerning the validity of the sacrament, and hence he exposes himself to the danger of doing nothing and of frustrating his neighbor of the sacramental effect; and on the other hand there can be no reason for such ministration. Indeed to some, among whom is St. Alphonsus, Theologia Moralis, book VI, n. 28, it seems more probable that a sacrament confected under a hidden condition unknowable in a human way is invalid, because "since God has committed the administration of the sacraments to the cognition and will of men, a condition cannot be placed which cannot fall under human cognition."

3. Who without grave cause ministers under a hidden condition concerning the present or the past and intrinsic to the sacrament, or from its nature required for its value, so that doubt concerning the value does not arise from the very placing of the condition: for he plays in a most grave and most holy matter, because he incurs the danger of making the sacrament null, and thus inflicts irreverence upon Christ and exposes his neighbor to great harm.

On the contrary:

A. It is licit if a sufficient cause is present, such as is generally had when the sacrament here and now is necessary or very useful and cannot be had as certainly valid:

a) if a serious doubt arises whether a sacrament which cannot be repeated was conferred or validly conferred, or whether the confessor absolved the penitent; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if you are not yet baptized, absolved, etc.;

b) if there is doubt whether a capable subject is had, for example, whether a child confessing matter of mortal sin is possessed of reason, whether one deprived of the senses wishes to receive the sacrament or is still alive, whether the one to be absolved repents, whether the fetus is a man; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if you are capable;

c) if there is doubt concerning the validity of the matter or form, for example, whether this is water, or concerning the power of the minister: for doubt concerning the power of the minister, or concerning his jurisdiction for the sacrament of Penance, renders the matters and forms doubtful; then let the sacrament be ministered under the condition: if I can.

Question 2. Is it licit to simulate, or at least to dissimulate, a sacrament, lest it be conferred upon the unworthy?

Before an answer is given, it must be noted beforehand what the simulation of a sacrament is and in what it differs from its dissimulation. Now since simulation in general is, as St. Thomas says, "a lie of deed," or the placing of some sign expressing something contrary to that which is had in the mind, it follows that simulation of a sacrament is nothing other than a fictitious placing of a sacramental action, so that outwardly there does not appear the defect on account of which no sacrament is rendered. But it is called a fictitious placing of a sacramental action when matter and form are placed with the intention of not confecting the sacrament. But if the Minister, in acting thus, directly intends to deceive, then the simulation of the sacrament is called formal; if, however, he is induced to simulate from another motive, for example from grave fear, then it will be only material. But to dissimulate a sacrament is to omit some essential part of it, namely matter or form, whether another thing is substituted in its place or nothing is substituted; yet in such a way that this omission or substitution can be known outwardly, and this alone is sought, namely to hide the truth. These things having been noted, now to the question:

Resp. Certainly it is never licit to simulate a sacrament, whether there is question of formal simulation or only of material simulation. The reason is both because to simulate a sacrament is properly to lie, and because to act thus is to abuse sacred things and to mock God Himself; and since an abuse of this kind contains grave irreverence toward the sacrament, he who simulates some sacrament can never be excused from mortal sin. Besides, it is clear from proposition 29 condemned by Innocent XI, which is thus stated: "Urgent grave fear is a cause for simulating the administration of the sacraments." But in this condemnation even material simulation is reproved, since it is treated specially in the proposition. - Nevertheless, contempt being set aside and a just cause being added, it is licit to dissimulate a sacrament. The reason is that in dissimulation no injury is done to the sacrament, because no sacramental action is placed, nor is a lie committed, but only the truth is hidden. - Cf. Viva, on the cited proposition. - Scavini, lib. 3, n. 31. - Ballerini, note (a) p. 145. - Haine, vol. 2, p. 331.

II. Fr. Matthew de Moya in his Select Questions, Vol. I, tract 4, Miscellany, question 2, § 3, nos. 13 and 14: “There is no reason why, on account of fear, at least of death, it should not be lawful to use simulation of this kind in all the sacraments. Hence if a heretic (not out of hatred of the faith) should threaten death to a priest unless he consecrated all the bread present in the market, he could utter the words of consecration without the intention of consecrating, without any sin against religion or justice, and without any stain of lying.”

XXII. QUESTION XIII. Is it lawful to simulate the administration of the sacraments? ANSWER. Simulation is twofold. One express and formal, by which another's deception is directly intended; the other material, which is made for a just cause, by permitting another's deception. Formal simulation all condemn. Concerning material simulation some formerly disputed, whose opinion Innocent XI condemned, who condemned this thesis 29: Urgent grave fear is a just cause of simulating the administration of the sacraments.