The Sinfulness of Pollution

The Theological Malice of Sinful Pollution.—(a) From its nature pollution is a mortal sin, because it is an act of impurity (2494^†) and a perversion of nature (2534). Moreover, its consequences are most injurious to society (it tends to self-indulgence and the avoidance of the burdens of marriage) and to the individual (when habitual, it weakens mental and will power and often brings on a breakdown of bodily vigor especially among young people), In Scripture it is represented as gravely illicit (I Cor., vi. 10; Gal., v. 19; Eph., v. 3). Hence, pollution is always a mortal sin when directly willed (e.g., when practised deliberately in order to be rid of a temptation or of bodily irritation or itch certainly due to superfluity of semen or to passion), and also when indirectly willed if there is proximate danger of consent to sin (e.g., when one who has always committed formal pollution in certain company goes into that company without necessity, or without use of means to prevent a fall) or grave danger of pollution and no sufficient reason for permitting it (e.g., undue familiarities from which nocturnal pollution is foreseen as most probable).

(b) From the imperfection of the internal act, pollution is sometimes only a venial sin. This happens in case of invincible ignorance (e.g., young children who do not understand the evil of masturbation, students who have been taught by instructors or physical directors that it is necessary for health or that it is unsanitary but not sinful), or of incomplete consent (e.g., when the person is only half awake and does not ordinarily desire pollution, when he is a psychopathic and not fully responsible for his acts).

(c) From the lightness of the matter pollution is venial when willed indirectly and permitted without sufficient reason, if there is only slight danger of it from the nature of the action performed (see 2496). Examples are the reading for pastime of love stories before falling asleep with the prevision that this may possibly bring on pollution during sleep.

If the action productive of pollution is gravely illicit, as being seriously opposed to chastity (e.g., lewdness) or to some other virtue (e.g., extreme intemperance in drugs or alcohol), is one thereby guilty of the grave sin of pollution?

(a) If the case be considered in the abstract, the answer is in the negative. For if the action in question is only remotely dangerous as regards pollution (e.g., an action of a non-venereal kind such as intemperance does not necessarily tend to impurity, an act of a venereal kind that is momentary, such as a desire, does not strongly affect the passions), the sin is only venial in so far as pollution is concerned (see 2517, 2518).

(b) If the case be considered in the concrete, the answer is in the affirmative as a rule when there is question of a habit. For generally those who act habitually in this way yield consent to the pollution as well as to the sin that precedes. Authorities note, however, that he who repents of the cause of pollution before the pollution results is not guilty of the actual pollution.

The Moral Species of Sinful Pollution.—(a) The general species of pollution is distinct from other consummated sins of impurity, since it is unnatural, and this in a special way (see 2534, and Denzinger, n. 1124), But some authors regard equivalent pollution (see 2493, 2535) as not a consummated sin, since it is without true semination, and hence according to them it may be confessed simply as impure pleasure (see 2519 b).

(b) The particular species of pollution is derived from circumstances that give it a new essential malice. If it is solitary, and committed by one who is under no bond of marriage or vow, and accompanied by no thought or desire except in reference to self or self-gratification (autoerotism, narcissism), there is the single sin of pollution. But there are other sins if it is committed by one under special obligation (i.e., adultery or sacrilege), or if committed with another person (e.g., seduction, cooperation, rape), or if committed with impure thoughts or desires about others (e.g., mental adultery, fornication, sodomy, bestiality). The manner in which pollution is performed (e.g., whether cooperative pollution is active or passive, by irrumation or concubitus or touch, with or without an instrument) is per se an accidental circumstance. According to some authors, cooperative pollution brought on by touch alone is not diversified in species, if there is no special affection for the other person, but only the desire of carnal gratification, and hence it may be declared simply as pollution from touch.

33. You will resolve from all that has been said about the voluntary in the cause: 1.º “If the cause of pollution is gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed unto sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was foreseen at least confusedly. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which per se are grave faults in the genus of luxury, namely touches or looks upon the shameful parts of another’s or one’s own body with base and deliberate pleasure; the sight of human intercourse and lingering thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions coming from these causes certainly are mortal sins. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act, which is the cause of pollution, has special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45. n. 23, and all consent.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 482. Special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in the pleasure excited from a base object. Cf. Salmant., Theol. Schol., Tr. 13, D. 10, n. 274.

Gravely influencing: wherefore if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow; since then it follows outside the intention and per accidens. Salmant., Theol. Mor., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.

Per se they are grave faults: “the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of luxury... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — In the genus of luxury: whence “it is inferred that pollution is not mortal which happens outside the intention from causes illicit still mortally in another genus than luxury, for example from drunkenness, or from eating, excessively immoderate or on a forbidden day.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.

94. Corollaries. 1. The special malice of pollution consists, as is clear from what has been said, in the vain effusion of semen against the order of nature. Therefore this sin differs in species from every impure touch, which indeed is followed by venereal pleasure, but not by any effusion of semen.

2. Voluntary pollution, for the sake of escaping any disease whatever, or the danger of death, is always a mortal sin. This is the most common doctrine of the doctors. It is entirely lawful, for the preservation of life and of the whole supposit, to cut off from a man some member, a hand or a foot. For no inconveniences ever lawfully follow from that cutting off; since the natural appetite vehemently abhors it as a most troublesome thing, men will not easily abuse that means and extend it beyond the case of extreme necessity. On the contrary, since pollution is a thing bringing great pleasure, to which nature itself inclines, the greatest danger is present lest, if it is ever lawful, men abuse it to the detriment of the species itself. And thus, for example, it is never lawful, not even in the case of extreme necessity, to violate the sacramental seal; because if this were lawful even in a most rare case, the sacrament of penance would be rendered hateful to the faithful, and they would be removed from it, to the greatest detriment of souls; just as, in fact, men are often deprived of the good of seeking counsel because they know that in some cases such a secret can be manifested. Sporer 640. 641.

"But if you object that it is sometimes expelled by nature, nothing is thereby concluded; for what is done by nature is not against nature, but by the author of nature; nor for that reason can it be lawfully done by us. Thus it is not against nature that one die from defect of strength; but it would be, if one for that reason wished to take away his strength from himself." Scavini. Cf. Gury, de Matr. et iur. n. 1315.

Lessius, De Iust. et iure, l. 4. c. 3. d. 14. n. 96., rightly says: Pollution "is a deadly sin, even if it is procured not for pleasure, but only for the sake of health or of mitigating temptation; both because temptation is not thus conquered, but yielded to and succumbed to; and because, if this is lawful, why did the saints undergo so much fasting and other austerities for taming the flesh? why was this combat held by the holy fathers to be the hardest and principal combat of the Christian man? finally, because, if one does not wish to use other aids, this work has indeed been granted as a remedy for concupiscence, but in legitimate marriage, not outside it; for a natural institution must not be perverted for an extrinsic and accidental end. Hence if anyone wishes to use this work for this end, he must enter marriage. It is confirmed, because the primary end of that work is offspring, and therefore it requires that state from which offspring can be received and rightly educated, which is marriage."

"For the same reason it is not even lawful for the sake of health, except in legitimate marriage. Nor is it an objection that it is lawful to draw blood for this end, and even to cut off a member, because these are instituted only for the good of the individual: for parts are for the good of the whole; hence we can dispose of them according as it is expedient for the health of the individual. But generation is only for the propagation of nature; hence we cannot use it except in that mode in which generation can follow."

3. To the simple malice of pollution other malices can be added by reason of circumstances, and this generally holds also for other species of lust, "for example, if a priest is polluted, sacrilege is added; if a married person, adultery; if with the desire of sinning with another person, a malice is added according to the quality of the person desired; likewise another malice is added if someone is polluted by delighting in an imaginary intercourse with some person, male or female, married or unmarried. Likewise another malice is added if he is polluted by the touches of another." L. 476.

95. Proposition 2. If the discussion is about pollution indirectly willed in its cause, he who without sufficient cause places an action from which he is going to suffer shameful motions, which nevertheless, although he foresees them, he does not intend, sins gravely, if that action is of itself mortal in the genus of lust and of itself gravely influences the pollution; he sins lightly, if that action is of itself venial in the genus of lust and of itself lightly influences the pollution; he does not sin in any way, if that action is of itself simply honorable and of itself has no influence on pollution. The reason is that, since the pollution is not willed in itself, but only in its cause, and therefore happens apart from every intention, it will be evil in the degree in which the cause itself is evil. Struggl, Tr. 7. q. 7. art. 1. n. 5.; L. 481. and following.

But a cause as such is evil according to the measure of the greater or lesser efficacy which of itself it has for the depraved effect. Moreover, pollution indirectly willed is also in itself, directly in the cause at least implicitly, truly willed, if without some other sufficient reason one wills a cause gravely influencing it of itself. For this shows a depraved affection of the will toward that pollution. But it is only permitted, if one wills its cause which of itself either in no way, or only lightly, influences it. For the cause then by its nature is not necessarily ordered to an effect of this kind, nor is the affection contained in that cause by necessary connection.

To the point are the things which Billuart has, Diss. V. art. 2. par. Confirmatur Conclusio. "If a man," he says, "were bound under mortal sin to avoid every action from which ordinarily a light venereal commotion follows, it would follow that one must condemn as mortal sin for the most part the non-necessary conversations of men with women, especially of young men with girls, familiar conversations, various recreations honest in themselves, in which flattering glances, soothing words, touches, kisses, embraces in honorable parts from friendship, play, lightness, very easily occur, since from these for the most part light venereal motions arise. But although these are to be avoided, nevertheless there are few, if any, who condemn them as mortal sin, where there is absent the danger of consent to venereal pleasure itself, nor is this the practice of confessors in the tribunal. Therefore."

Here also belong the things which Cajetan has apud Ithur., Cas. 18. n. 6., and apud Billuart, Diss. 6. art. 12. par. Confirm. Conc. He speaks of pollution arising from hearing confessions and says: "The voluntary indirectly, that is, because it is in the power of the will, is not imputed to the will except from the fact that it can and ought to act and does not act. In the proposed case this pollution does not fall under the voluntary except indirectly, namely because the will does not turn away from the hearing which is its cause. And although the will can, nevertheless it is not bound to turn away from such an act of hearing, thinking, and the like. Therefore this is not imputed to the will. The minor is declared. Because no artisan ought to omit the beginning and prosecution of his work because of defects consequent from the necessity of the matter; for someone would foolishly omit the construction of a saw or sword because they contract rust, on the ground that they are made of iron, and so with other things. But pollutions and stings of the flesh in the proposed case happen from the necessity of the matter, from the fact that the venereal matter is material to be purged, washed, disputed, preached, thought about; thence by a natural consequence follows commotion of the flesh, etc. Therefore a man ought not, on account of defects occurring from the necessity of venereal matter, to omit not only necessary, but useful thoughts, speeches, hearings, etc. For otherwise it would be necessary that either angels or very privileged men only should dispute, hear, etc., about such matters; the contrary of which ecclesiastical custom has, and reason teaches." Cf. also Elbel, de act. hum. n. 16.; Lessius l. 4. c. 3. dub. 14. n. 97-102.

429. Principles. - I. Pollution directly and perfectly voluntary is always a mortal sin, so that it is never lawful to procure it. The reason is, 1. because pollution has intrinsic repugnance with nature, which has ordered the effusion of semen solely to generation ¹; 2. because if it were ever permitted, or prohibited only under venial sin, a habit of pollution would most easily be contracted because of the great proclivity of corrupted nature into lust, and therefore the order of nature would shortly be subverted; 3. it is clear from various texts of Sacred Scripture, for example 1 Cor. 6. 10: "Nor the effeminate... shall possess the kingdom of God"; 4. it is also clear from proposition 49 condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature; hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good..." - See St. Lig., n. 476.

¹ ** It is certainly important to know accurately in what the special malice of this sin resides, so that from this the Confessor may take some norm by which, concerning the questioning of penitents, he may more easily free himself from troublesome scruples. Therefore the proper notion of this sin ought to be sought from the character of a sin against nature. Concerning this, Filliuccius says generally thus (tr. 30, n. 137): "This sin is called against nature, because it is not only repugnant to the rational order - for this is common to any sin of lust, which is against reason and is repugnant to the rational order - but also because it is repugnant to the natural order of the venereal act in the human species; for the natural order of such an act ought to be of such a kind that from it the generation of a human being can follow; for this is its end. Therefore if it cannot follow, such an act will be against the natural order, and therefore will be called a sin against nature." But more briefly and more distinctly Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 254) says of the special malice of this sin: "The reason is that human seed is ordered by nature to generation; therefore to pour it forth for another end (pleasure) is repugnant to the order of nature." Therefore, since this special malice consists in the vain effusion of semen against the order of nature, now it is clear why this sin differs in species from any immodest act which venereal pleasure indeed follows, but no effusion of semen; and therefore why the Confessor (with those cautions indeed which all the Doctors deservedly require) not imprudently asks about this as an object of a peculiar species.

But again, since this special disorder is placed in the vain effusion of semen, which was instituted by nature solely for conjugal copula so that offspring might be received from it, now the reason is clear why the Doctors judge differently about this baseness as regards those who either can emit no semen, or certainly not true semen. Hence what Sporer has (Theol. Sacr., p. 4, c. 2, n. 39) concerning the prepubescent: "If boys or girls, who cannot yet sow seed, touch themselves basely..., it is indeed a mortal sin; ... yet it seems to differ in species from true pollution, through which seed is sown, and in proper species it must be reduced to the immodesty of touch." Likewise Holzmann (part 2, tr. 2, n. 686): "If the prepubescent, whether boys or girls, try by immodest motion to elicit seed, when they cannot yet do so, they commit a sin diverse in species from true pollution, in reality pertaining to the immodesty of touch.... The reason is that... since they do not pour forth semen, they do not commit the sin of true pollution, but another diverse in species." Think the same thing of eunuchs deprived of seed apt for generation. Nor otherwise Babenstuber (tr. 5, disp. 7, art. 2, n. 71): "The prepubescent..., who try by immodest motion to pour forth seed, when they cannot yet do so, do indeed sin mortally...; nevertheless that sin of theirs differs in species from true and properly so-called pollution. The reason is that it belongs to the nature of true pollution to pour forth seed against the end of human generation; but in persons of this sort there is no effusion of seed. Therefore this sin in reality and properly pertains to the immodesty of touch.... What has been said of the prepubescent must also be understood of eunuchs. For in these there is no seed useful for generation." And Tamburini had gone before (De 2. Eccl. Praec., c. 17, n. 13), saying: "Those who from defect of age, or from another cause (such as the prepubescent, as also eunuchs), cannot by immodest motion pour forth seed, or pour forth useless seed, sin mortally...; but certainly this species of sin differs from true pollution, to which it belongs to throw forth seed against the end of generation; this throwing forth is not in the aforesaid persons of this sort; therefore the sin in the prepubescent is reduced in reality to immodest touch." From this, moreover, to the reasons which Doctors are accustomed wisely to bring forward why the Confessor must be most cautious in questioning penitents of this sort about this argument, this peremptory reason accedes: that as soon as they shall prudently have searched sufficiently whether these things were maliciously carried out, no place remains for further questions.

But from these things arises an occasion of almost the same question concerning the same sin, if there is question of women. For however theologians may introduce speech concerning female seed, and indeed for many causes, nevertheless when they then ask about its nature, they commonly have nothing except what is altogether uncertain. Let Bonacina stand for all (De Matr., q. 4, p. 6, n. 13), who writes: "According to the most probable opinion the seed of a woman concurs neither actively nor passively toward generation." And Sanchez (lib. 9, disp. 17, n. 9): "That female seed is not necessary, nor concurs actively toward generation, Galen, contrary to himself, Aristotle, Avicenna, Albertus M., Hugo Senensis, and many others teach, and the whole school of theologians with St. Thomas, 3, q. 31, art. 4, ad 3. This is clear from this, that, experience testifying, women wholly unwilling... conceive when receiving male seed; but then they by no means emit seed. Therefore since without that seed... generation follows," etc. But although the old followers of Scotus, as Sanchez suggests (l. c.), and then Elbel (part 4, conf. 9, n. 252), after Hippocrates thought that the seed of a woman concurs actively toward generation, nevertheless Elbel himself (ibid., n. 253) then confesses that today it is commonly denied by learned Physicians that true seed, or true testicles, are given in women, but rather ovaries filled with certain little things (by others they are called vesicles). Thus Georgius Francus in Paulus Zacchia, Quaest. medic. legal. From this, as from a hypothesis, the same one (l. c.) rightly concludes from the premised principles: "Whatever nevertheless may be about this matter, among theologians it remains certain and undoubted that it is as little permitted to women as to the prepubescent or eunuchs to provoke themselves to venery by their own touch or that of another." Now since the matter is now no longer uncertain or hypothetical, but certain and most thoroughly investigated among Physicians or those skilled in physiology, namely that what has been customarily called female seed is wholly diverse from the nature of true seed, and that no other end has been established by nature for humors of this sort than that they may make the work of marriage easier; from the principles posited before, a reason is supplied for gravely doubting whether as regards this matter one must now judge otherwise about women than we have already seen to be judged about the prepubescent or eunuchs. Whence it would follow that, since the Doctors have already been accustomed to bring forward other causes on account of which questions about any such female pollution are to be spared, much more now it would seem that they are to be spared, while it is now sufficiently clear that in women, however gravely they may sin, nevertheless there is not present the reason of that special malice which is proper to true and strictly so-called pollution. But concerning this whole matter let the more skilled judge.

II. Pollution indirectly, or voluntary only in the cause, is a grave sin whenever the proximate cause, that is, one per se directly and by its nature tending to pollution, for example lingering thoughts concerning very libidinous things, etc., is placed without just reason (Scav. - St. Lig., n. 482); but it is venial whenever the cause which is placed is only remote, or such that danger is joined to it per accidens or rarely. - Thus commonly. - The reason of each is evident. - St. Lig., n. 484.

III. Pollution indirectly voluntary lacks every sin whenever there is sufficient reason for placing its cause, consent or affection of the will into the consequent pleasure being removed. The reason is that where two effects follow from the same cause indifferent in itself, one evil and the other good or equivalent, it is lawful to place the cause by intending the good and permitting the evil ². But a greater reason is required for a greater danger. - Recall the things said concerning Human Acts, n. 9. - See St. Lig., n. 483.

² In these adjuncts neither ought the evil effect in reality to be called voluntary, nor will the agent properly be called its cause. For when there is question merely of the obligation of abstaining from some action by reason of an effect which follows besides the intention, the reason of causality is taken not from physical influence, but from moral influence, and therefore there is question of causality which induces the moral imputation of the effect that followed, so that causality sounds almost the same as something culpable. Therefore then someone will properly be said to be in the cause, when for this reason he was bound to abstain from the action, lest that effect should follow; but he will not be judged to be in the cause when he was not bound for this reason to abstain from the work, but exercised it licitly and according to his right. And in altogether this sense the effect is said to follow per accidens, not as if namely the effect itself does not spontaneously follow from some action, but because it cannot be imputed to the agent as to a moral cause; and by this very fact, when we say that the effect follows besides the intention, we already say that the effect is not voluntary, namely by that will to which it ought morally to be imputed.

431. • 3. Pollution which follows from touch, look, or gravely base reading is a mortal sin even when actual consent is removed, unless a just cause excuses. The reason is that then pollution is voluntary at least in the cause, since these things per se induce grave danger of pollution. But it will be only a venial sin if these things are lightly base, provided the pollution follows besides the intention of the agent and against his at least direct will; because then in these things there is not given a proximate danger of consent either into pollution or into venereal delight. Yet danger remote in itself can become proximate per accidens for someone by reason of his own weakness. - St. Lig., n. 482-485.

4. Every deliberate effusion of seed, however small, is pollution and therefore a mortal sin. - Lacroix, de Poenit., n. 1034. - Likewise it is mortal to acquiesce in the delight of pollution even for the briefest time, and even if it happens besides the intention and spontaneously from whatever cause. - St. Lig., n. 477. A fortiori if pollution begun is promoted by some effort.

5. He who caused pollution in another must explain in confession whether this person is sacred, related by blood, etc.; because he contracted the malice of sacrilege, or incest, etc. - St. Lig., n. 476.

6. It is not a sin per se to ride a horse for the sake of reasonable recreation, to lie in bed in a certain position, to take heating foods temperately, to speak with the other sex from an honorable cause, to serve the sick, to help them in baths, to exercise the surgical art, and similar things, although it is foreseen that pollution is going to follow per accidens, provided it is not intended, and there is a firm purpose of not assenting to it if it happens, and proximate danger of consent is absent. - St. Lig., n. 483.

48. (C) Pollution in itself, or directly voluntary, is a grave sin. For St. Paul numbers effeminacy, that is, pollution, among the sins which exclude from the kingdom of God.² In reality the effusion of human seed is ordered solely to the generation of offspring, and the pleasure annexed to it is for attaining this end more efficaciously; but in pollution directly willed, seed is emitted for the sake of pleasure alone, against the order of nature, and therefore it is sin;³ but if it were lightly unlawful, the end intended by nature would be frustrated: for many men, content with this pleasure, would bid farewell to the burdens of matrimony, or would contract nuptials only after lust had been fulfilled, when they have become impotent for generating. - Therefore this proposition 49 was rightly reproved by Innocent XI: "Effeminacy is not prohibited by natural law. Hence if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory under mortal sin."

² 1 Cor. 6:10.

³ The pagans themselves admitted this, the poet Martial testifying (Epigram., l. IX, 42): "Believe nature herself to say of things: That which with your fingers, Ponticus, you destroy, is a man."

49. Moreover, the physical and moral effects which follow from voluntary pollution clearly show how much it is contrary to nature. For young persons addicted to this vice easily contract a wholly tyrannical habit, which greatly weakens their strength: frequency of immodest acts disturbs the whole nervous system and the brain; hence weakness and general weariness, pains of the head, diminution of appetite, convulsions of the limbs, weakening of sight and hearing; then involuntary, or passive, pollutions accede, vehement palpitations of the heart; sometimes also incurable diseases: phthisis, dropsy, epilepsy, tabes dorsalis, and, among women, inflammation of the uterus, hysteria. Often also by frequent masturbation the power of coition and generating is lost. - To these effects must be added others, moral, namely depression of soul, enervation of the will, inability for labors, especially intellectual ones: for the mind, infected with obscene images, can scarcely think about other things; soon noble ideas and pure affections vanish, insane egoism prevails; sometimes madness succeeds. - Not all these effects indeed are always produced, nor in the same degree in all: for this depends on bodily constitution, frequency and duration of acts, and other circumstances; but the danger is certainly present that an inveterate and almost incurable habit be contracted, from which the aforesaid effects will follow more or less.⁴

⁴ Many physicians have described these effects, among whom: Tissot, De l'onanisme, 1760; Garnier, Onanisme; Fournier, L'onanisme, Paris, 1892; Ribbing, L'hygiene sexuelle, Paris, Alcan, 1901, p. 156; Surbled, La Morale, t. II, ch. 3-8; idem, Le vice solitaire, Paris, 1905; Vigouroux, Traite de Medecine, t. IV, pp. 304-317; Stall, What a young boy ought to know, Philadelphia, 1897, pp. 97-118.

Nor are those physicians to be heard who, in order to deter young men from pollution, advise fornication to them, falsely asserting that seed must sometimes be poured forth for the sake of health. - For part of the seed is reabsorbed in the body, to which it adds new strength;⁵ the other part is poured forth naturally during sleep, without any disturbance of the nerves; while fornication, which is morally evil, can induce syphilis.

⁵ Surbled, Vie de jeune homme, ch. 6-7.

323. - The grave question concerning the malice of voluntary or admitted pollution must now be undertaken. This question contains three parts. For these three things are asked concerning voluntary pollution: is its malice intrinsic; is it grave; is it specifically distinct from the malice of a lustful touch?

I. Opinions. That the malice of the sin of pollution, at least in the man, was not unknown to the pagans is already demonstrated by Martial in these verses:

"Do you think this is nothing? It is a crime, believe me, and a great one, Such as you yourself can scarcely conceive in your mind....

Believe me, the very nature of things says: That which you waste with your fingers, Ponticus, is a man ¹."

¹ Epigram 42, book 9, Against Ponticus.

But Caramuel ² again denied that this uncleanness is condemned by nature itself; and from two of his assertions was taken proposition 49, which Innocent XI condemned as at least scandalous and dangerous in practice: "Effeminacy is not prohibited by the law of nature. Wherefore, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good and sometimes obligatory under mortal sin."

² Cf. Theologia intentionalis, book 4, nos. 1960 and 1965.

Therefore, the common doctrine of Catholics affirms that it is intrinsically and gravely evil. Yet in the accurate demonstration of the doctrine they again experience no slight difficulty and have attempted various ways.

II. Various arguments. Several indicate this rationale, that pollution signifies a futile emission of semen, the exclusive destination of which is the good of the human species. Ballerini ³ still adduces this rationale; and Lehmkuhl himself ⁴ seems to us to have attended excessively to this effusion. You would indeed say that St. Thomas himself ⁵ used an argument from the pouring forth of semen. But in this way he responds rather ad hominem. To one objecting that semen is a superfluity of nourishment, the Holy Doctor replies that "it is a superfluity which is needed." But in the direct demonstration in the body of the article, he places the formal malice of lust in the vicious use of venereal things.

³ Opus theologicum morale, vol. 2, treatise 6, no. 1026.

⁴ Theologia moralis, I, 1036 and 1039.

⁵ II-II, question 153, article 3, reply to objection 1.

Moreover, the rationale deduced from the prodigal effusion of semen is subject to a twofold difficulty. Nature itself, even against the will of the man, lavishes this semen. Why would the same not be lawful for me for a just cause, for example for the sake of health ⁶? Especially since the quantity of this liquid is so great that it can never be said: "this portion of the semen poured forth is necessary for generation." Indeed, a useless outpouring is permitted even to men themselves. For no less than in pollution, in the copulations of sterile persons the semen is lavished.

⁶ Thus already Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 17, no. 16.

Again, the end for which nature prepares semen is not the generation of offspring alone.

For it destines semen for an operation, copulation, which has other immediate utilities; but nature impels to so many copulations that several must necessarily be futile.

And so you will never establish from the outpouring as such why it is not lawful to lavish by pollution this semen which can be lavished in other ways, but rather from another rationale which, if found, will manifest to us the formal malice of pollution.

b) Wherefore others have placed the malice of pollution not in the loss of semen, but in perfect venereal pleasure; and at least principally in it, as they say; indeed exclusively in it, if they wish to speak consistently. Thus Rev. Fr. Eschbach, Disputationes, disputation 4, chapter 4, or the Nouvelle Revue Theologique, vols. 3 and 5, which Palmieri favors, Opus theologicum, note to II, no. 1028.

But they incur this grave criticism, that pleasure follows the nature of the conjoined operation, so that it cannot be the first rationale of dishonesty. Nor can the force of this principle be evaded by a certain arbitrary distinction between venereal pleasure and other pleasures ⁷. At most this can be conceded: that, if it is connected with an operation evil of itself, the pleasure can create such allurements and such a danger of delusion that the disorder must consequently be judged grave and every accidental exception must be rejected. Wherefore Sanchez and other scholastic doctors gathered merely from the pleasure the necessity of a perpetual and grave prohibition ⁸.

⁷ Cf. Eschbach, Disputationes physiologico-theologicae, disputation 4, chapter 4, p. 483.

⁸ Cf. Sanchez, De matrimonio, book 9, disputation 17, no. 16; and Lessius, book 4, chapter 3, nos. 108, 119, 122.

And furthermore, if the disorder is present in the pleasure itself, since the pleasure of the consummated act and that of the non-consummated act seem to differ only in intensity ⁹, one could scarcely distinguish imperfect lust specifically from perfect lust, so that in matrimony you would be compelled to confess either that all solitary lust is gravely evil or that none is gravely evil ¹⁰.

⁹ Cf. II-II, question 154, article 4.

¹⁰ Cf. those things which the Most Illustrious Dr. Waffelaert most excellently objects, no. 63, De virtutibus cardinalibus.

Yet we do not therefore hold as improbable the opinion of those who, once the intrinsic malice of the action is admitted, contend that, because of carnal pleasure wrongly sought, it is opposed to temperance, so that unless this pleasure were joined to it, a diverse species of malice would have to be sought. Cf. the appendix at the end of the book.

c) But if, with not a few, you appeal to the disadvantages of pollution once permitted, and affirm that if the licitness of pollution were conceded in some case, men, content with this pleasure, would no longer be sufficiently solicitous about entering matrimony, there will be those, such as Lecomte ¹¹, and after him Berardi ¹², who altogether deny the truth of this effect. But it is already evident that this rationale is sought extrinsically.

¹¹ De l'ovulation spontanée, part 2, section 1, chapter 3, § 2.

¹² Praxis confessariorum, no. 849.

d) There are not lacking those who think that the malice of pollution must be derived from the fact that it is an act against nature, but its gravity from the conjoined vehement pleasure and the consequent danger of frequent abuse which would be gravely opposed to the good of the species. Thus, for example, Rev. Dr. Van Roey. This opinion seems to approach the truth more closely. Yet it has this inconvenience: that pleasure follows the nature of the operation, which here would not in itself be gravely evil; and that the vehement pleasure and the very danger of abuse can be absent in various cases in which at least grave guilt would logically have to be denied. Rev. Dr. Van Roey solves this latter difficulty thus, in the cited place: "From the common danger such a law is made, and reasonably must be made, which permits no exception. Otherwise, with the psychological constitution of men again considered, the law would be weakened in itself and the intended end would not be obtained" ¹³. By these words he transfers to the natural law those things which are customarily said of positive law. To the first difficulty he responds that pleasure belongs essentially to the work of pollution itself. (Quaestio specialis, p. 28.)

¹³ Quaestio specialis, pp. 23-24.

Hence Palmieri ¹⁴ again: "It must be confessed that there are certain practical truths necessary for human society, which men perceive and sense by a certain rational instinct, but the altogether demonstrative rationale of which those same men, when they seek it analytically, find only with difficulty.... Among truths of this kind is perhaps also found this one with which we are dealing."

¹⁴ Opus theologicum, vol. 2, no. 1036.

Nevertheless, after those things which we discussed in no. 305 concerning the formal cause of grave sin, when we spoke of fornication, the proof does not seem so difficult; and the difficulty is seen to arise from the manner in which they wished to derive the gravity of the disorder directly from the gravity of the harm.

The question concerning the intrinsic malice of pollution and its gravity is followed by the question concerning its specific distinction from imperfect acts. All Catholic authors affirm this distinction, if you except a few who, after the true organic rationale of female pollution was discovered, began to doubt whether or not there existed in women a true distinction between the perfect and imperfect solitary act. With this distinction destroyed, the burden of sacramental accusation would be lightened. Indeed, there was even one among them who inclined to this consequence ¹⁵: that the rationale of mortal sin seemed consequently to be absent from the solitary acts of a married woman.

¹⁵ Observe that this was in no way defended or admitted by Ballerini, but rather by Lecomte, De l'ovulation spontanée. Cf. Van Roey, Quaestio specialis, who on p. 6 and in note 6 explicitly averts a suspicion of this kind from Ballerini.

324. - III. Therefore, we comprehend both the gravity of pollution in either sex and its distinction from the imperfect act in a conclusion which we can state briefly thus:

Every voluntary pollution, indeed every full consent to casual pollution, whether of the man or of the woman, is infected with intrinsic and grave malice and is specifically distinguished from imperfect lust.

To explain some words: we here call pollution voluntary when it is sought directly or by intention.

Consent to pollution signifies the deliberate enjoyment of the pleasure which accompanies even casual pollution, or, as Lehmkuhl says ¹⁶, the accepted pleasure of a pollution which has arisen.

¹⁶ Theologia moralis, I, 1039.

But casual is any pollution which occurs apart from intention, whether some action of ours or no action has given occasion to it.

With these things posited, we establish the first assertion by this brief argument: Every voluntary pollution is infected with intrinsic and grave malice.

Both the man and the woman who pollute themselves exercise individually an act which was to be exercised by common operation as an act of the species. Therefore, by violating its essential subordination to the species, for the sake of their individual pleasure, they deprive the act of its essential relation to the species. Thus there recurs again, but with greater force, since the very order of animal nature is overthrown here, that twofold grave malice which was demonstrated in fornication, no. 306.

The second assertion, Every full consent to casual pollution is infected with intrinsic and grave malice, is proved briefly thus.

Consent of this kind is not a mere intellectual approval of a physiological fact, but introduces the participation of the mind and furnishes a concurrence which, by increasing it, influences the pleasurable commotion itself and physically changes it, so that in place of corporeal or partial pollution you now have complete pollution. By this active participation, reason is again carried away by sense toward enjoying individually an operation which can be loved only as pertaining to the species. Wherefore this active participation contains a malice of the will lesser indeed in degree, but similar in kind to the production itself. Therefore, the same malice by which the will to pollution is vitiated generically infects consent to casual pollution. Since this malice signifies an inversion of the essential order, it necessarily remains grave.

The third assertion, concerning the specific distinction of pollution from imperfect lust, is established by this rationale:

The non-consummated acts of lust, as is easily evident from the anthropological part, express in themselves a prepara- tion for the consummated act, and immediately derive their morality from the order toward the consummated act, so that they are good or evil according to the act to which they are referred; while the consummated act is judged good or evil immediately from the order toward generation which it possesses or of which it is deprived. And this is common to either sex.

Therefore, although we concede that these acts are referred to the same complete species, nevertheless, specifically, just as the begun and the completed, the beginning and the terminus, the means and the end - yet of the same generic rationale - differ from one another in species.

We rely upon the doctrine which St. Thomas ¹⁷ renders in these words: "Certain things are found to differ in species in two ways: in one way, from the fact that each has a complete species ¹⁸, as a horse and an ox differ in species; in another way, insofar as, according to diverse degrees in some generation or motion, diverse species are taken, as the building is the complete generation of a house, while the placing of the foundation and the erection of the wall are incomplete species, as is evident through the Philosopher (Ethics, book 10, chapter 4)." And below: "The sin of the heart and of the mouth are not distinguished from the sin of deed when they are joined with it at the same time, but insofar as any one of these is found by itself; just as a part of a motion is not distinguished from the whole motion when the motion is continuous, but only when the motion stops in the middle."

¹⁷ I-II, question 72, article 7, body and reply to objection 3.

¹⁸ That is, one individual being which is distinguished from many of the same species by individual notes alone.

421. To no. 327. - Concerning the essential malice of pollution, these things are furthermore to be observed.

Those who place the essential malice of pollution in the complete use of the venereal powers deprived of a relation to the species, and those who place it in pleasure wrongly sought, do not seem to differ so greatly from one another as regards the matter.

For both profess that the order whose privation is principally to be attended to is the order toward the species.

But the former contend that, according to the principles of St. Thomas, pleasure follows the nature of the operation, so that the operation is not evil because of the pleasure, but the pleasure is evil because of the operation, and consequently the rationale of malice cannot be found in the pleasure itself as such; that pleasure, as a subjective affection of the subject, can have no immediate order toward the species: that the subject is pleased is always some good of man; but pleasure is regulated by the operation, which here is regulated by the good of the species; that the abuse of pleasure is not the sole malice of pollution, because that abuse would place merely a disorder in the subject himself, whose reason would be conquered by passion.

But these things do not seem capable of being denied.

The latter, however, assume the principle of St. Thomas: sins are morally specified from the mutable good toward which the sinner turns himself. But here the good is pleasure. Nor does this seem capable of being doubtful to anyone.

Wherefore, the two opinions seem capable of being reconciled in this manner, by distinguishing the gravity of the sin and its specification. Because the sinner seeks pleasure, the sin is against chastity and is referred to Temperance. But there is a privation of the order toward the species which the operation to which the pleasure is joined ought to have. And from this privation pollution has its principal malice. If it were principally an abuse of pleasure as such, it would destroy only the order of man within himself.

But if you judge the controversy to concern this, whether pollution is evil because the pleasure sought is deprived of a relation to the good of the species, or because the operation from which the pleasure is taken is deprived of this relation, we judge that the latter must be held.

I say 1st. Pollution directly and perfectly voluntary is always a mortal sin, so that it is never licit to procure it. The reason is 1st. because this is drawn from the words of the Apostle, I Cor. vi, 10: "Nor the effeminate ... shall possess the kingdom of God"; 2nd. because pollution has intrinsic repugnance with nature, which has ordered the emission of semen solely to generation; 3rd. because if it were ever permitted, or prohibited only under venial matter, most easily, on account of so great a proclivity of corrupt nature toward lust, the habit of pollution would be contracted, and therefore the order of nature would shortly be subverted; 4th. because prop. 49 was condemned by Innocent XI, which has itself thus: "Mollities is not prohibited by the law of nature; whence, if God had not forbidden it, it would often be good. ..." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476. - Viva, on this proposition.

I say 2nd. Pollution indirectly or only in the cause voluntary is a grave sin whenever the proximate cause, and one tending by its own nature to pollution, e.g., lingering thoughts about very lustful things, is posited without just reason; but it is venial whenever the cause which is posited is only remote, or such that danger is joined to it by accident or rarely. The reason for each is easily gathered from those things which were said elsewhere concerning the indirectly voluntary. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 483 and 484.

You Will Resolve. - 1st. Every deliberate emission of semen, however small, is pollution and therefore a mortal sin. Likewise it is mortal to acquiesce in the pleasure of pollution, even for a very brief time, and although it happens beyond intention and spontaneously. A fortiori if pollution spontaneously begun is promoted by some effort. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 477. - Lacroix, de Paenit., n. 1034.

2nd. Pollution which follows from touch, gaze, or reading gravely base and posited without just cause, is a mortal sin even with actual consent excluded. The reason is that then the pollution is voluntary in the cause, since these things of themselves introduce grave danger of pollution. But the sin will be only venial if these things are lightly base, and the pollution follows beyond the intention of the agent. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 482 and following.

3rd. Nocturnal pollution lacks fault, because it does not arise from the free will, nor is any assent given to it, as is supposed; but neither does it indeed always denote a lustful mind, since it can come from many natural causes, e.g., from superfluity of nature, from weakness of the organs, or from disposition of the nerves. But it will be mortal or venial if before sleep it was caused and foreseen, according to the greater or lesser advertence and influence of the cause. Thus voluntary wicked thoughts, wicked conversations, and other things of this kind preceding sleep will easily render it mortal. But ordinarily intemperance in food or drink, etc., will make it only venial. Likewise nocturnal pollution which happens with imperfect will and liberty, as sometimes occurs in the half-asleep, ought not to be judged mortal; but it must be judged that no consent was present, or at most very imperfect consent, when ordinarily in the state of wakefulness it displeases; because judgment must be made according to ordinary contingencies. The same also must be held concerning nocturnal touches.

4th. Voluntary distillation, even only indirectly voluntary, if it is notable or occurs with notable stirring of the genital spirits, can be a mortal sin; because it is a grave disordering, and introduces proximate danger of pollution. But if it is small and without notable stirring, a distinction must be made: 1st. If it is directly voluntary, it cannot be excused from mortal sin; because any distillation whatsoever always, or for the most part, carries with itself stirring and some emission of semen. 2nd. But if it is only indirectly voluntary, it will easily be excused from every sin; because no more care is to be taken concerning such a flux than concerning the emission of any other excrement by which nature is accustomed to unload itself. - Thus expressly St. Alphonsus, n. 477.

5th. It is licit for someone suffering severe itching in the private parts to remove it by touch, even if pollution follows, provided that the itching arises from acrimony of the blood, as ordinarily happens, but not from ardor of lust. For if pollution then happens, with the danger of consent excluded, it happens by accident and therefore inculpably. For the rest, penitents are to be exhorted that, insofar as it can be done without grave trouble, they restrain themselves from touches of this kind. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 483.