St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, 2, 3, 4.

194. Thesis. For supernatural condign merit of eternal life itself, seven conditions are required:

A. On the part of the work or act, that it be:

1. voluntary and free, and indeed with liberty of election, that is, not only from coercion but also from intrinsic necessity (cf. condemned proposition 3 of Jansenius): for merit is a property of a moral act, which is the more moral the more voluntary and free it is. Moreover, retribution is not due to someone except because he himself gives from what is his own in service of the one rewarding; but no one properly gives from what is his own except that of which he is master; and man is not master of his act except that which he acts freely;

2. good or honorable (Mt. VI, 1 sq.) at least formally, for before God, infinitely holy, nothing is worthy of reward unless it is good and right; besides, if evil merits anything, it is not reward but punishment;

3. supernatural and therefore placed from grace; otherwise it would not be proportioned to the supernatural reward of eternal life (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16);

4. likewise done in service of God the supernatural end; otherwise there would be no reason why retribution should be expected from God Himself. But it is done in service of God because it is referred to and commanded by charity toward God. Cf. I Cor. II, 9; X, 31; Col. III, 17; Mt. X, 39-42; XIX, 29; Mk. IX, 40; Lk. IX, 48; Gal. V, 6, 14; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 4.

B. On the part of the one operating:

5. the state of the wayfarer: for one who has arrived at the term and end and possesses it can no longer move and tend toward it or approach it more closely; therefore he cannot merit it. The state of the way has its end with temporal life, as we know with certainty from revelation and from the faith of the universal Church (II Cor. V, 10; Heb. IX, 27; Mt. XXV, 1 sq.; Jn. IX, 4; Lk. XVI, 9, 22; Gal. VI, 10);

6. the state of grace (condemned propositions 12, 15, 17, 18 of Baius; Council of Orange II, can. 18; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16, can. 32): for the value and dignity of a work is principally from the dignity of the one operating (Gen. IV, 4); if therefore he himself is not worthy of eternal life through habitual grace making him pleasing, he is not suited for placing works worthy of eternal life (Jn. XV, 4).

C. On the part of God rewarding:

7. acceptance or preordination of the work unto a wage and a kind of promise, at least implicitly contained in the bestowal of grace. Not that the good work has intrinsic value or condignity from that acceptance, but because beyond the condignity which it has from grace, an ordination or promise concerning merits to be accepted and concerning the wage to be rendered is necessary, so that he who has operated well from grace may have a right to the wage and God may be obligated to render it to him from justice.

Among men no one is bound from justice to remunerate service, however worthy in price, unless he has accepted it and thus has at least tacitly taken on the obligation of repaying. But acceptance is much more required on the part of God, who of Himself is not obligated by any works of men to render a wage, both because our services are already owed to Him, since they are His, and because they confer no profit of utility, and because we have from God every power of operating and our very act; therefore in no way can God be our debtor. But, when an ordination or promise has been added, He is now a debtor of Himself, and He is bound not toward us but toward Himself, insofar as He owes it to His own wisdom, fidelity, and will to fulfill in creatures what by free will He has appointed to give them, and according to the proportion of works to bestow upon the works the reward established (Jas. I, 12; II, 5; Mt. XX; I Tim. IV, 8; Heb. X, 36; Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16). Therefore condignity depends upon the internal value of the work, the acceptance of God being presupposed: this does not deny the value of the work, but brings it about that to the work, which by reason of its value is worthy of reward, this reward is now actually due from God by justice (a. 1).

Hence there does not exist justice strictly so called between God and men according to absolute equality, because our works can confer nothing upon God, since their whole goodness (being, ability, and the very operating) is conferred gratuitously by His ordination in such a way that He could claim it for Himself (a. 1). Yet, this preordination having been posited, if the meritorious value of works is considered according to the power of the Holy Spirit moving us unto eternal life and according to the dignity of grace by which man is a sharer of the divine nature and an adoptive son to whom the inheritance of eternal life is due, there is present an equality of strict justice between the work and the reward promised by God, so that the work is of the same order and of equal value with the wage of eternal life and divine like it (a. 3). Whence eternal life by comparison to the proximate cause, or the works of the just, is a wage due from justice; but by comparison to the remote cause, namely, the power of operating and grace from divine ordination, it is a gift of mercy (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 16 and sess. 14, c. 8).

195. In what way meritorious works must be ordered to the service of God.

Not all declare this in the same way:

a) Some, such as Suarez, deny that a formal ordination of charity is required, saying that every act done from any supernatural motive whatever from its nature implicitly tends to the supernatural end, and therefore is equal to this in moral estimation and meritorious.

b) Better, however, with the Thomists and Bellarmine, it is said that this suffices for merit de congruo; but for merit de condigno there is required an influence from an act of charity: for through that we strictly merit the attainment of the end through which we tend to the end, the Supreme Good as such; but we do this through charity alone, by which we tend to the Supreme Good in Himself. Practically, nevertheless, this opinion does not differ so much from the preceding, because the influence of charity is always present: 1) by way of object or motive: for an act of charity, once exercised and not retracted by mortal sin, refers all the following acts of the whole life to God the supernatural end, and, if perhaps not all honorable acts, at least all which are proportioned to the supernatural end and are supernatural from motive and principle; 2) also by way of principle, because acts of the supernatural virtues do not proceed from grace except through the mediation of charity, just as they do not proceed from a power except through the command of the will, which command proceeds from charity.

c) Indeed, with very great probability several say further that by this single act of charity all honorable acts are referred to the supernatural end, and therefore are done from the motive and principle of charity and thus are supernatural and meritorious, so that in the just man exercising charity an act is either supernaturally good and meritorious, or a venial sin. This seems to be the opinion of St. Thomas, De Malo q. 2, a. 5, ad 7, and II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5.

1. Thus also outside the Order of Preachers several hold, such as the Salmanticenses, Billot, Van Noort, Van der Meersch, Raphael of St. Joseph; to whom His Eminence Cardinal Van Roey comes close.

d) Yet for this the mere presence of the habit of charity cannot suffice, as it seemed to some, such as Ballerini, Noldin, Vermeersch, but its exercise is required, because, as St. Thomas says, II Sent. d. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6, "from the fact that it is in habit no one merits, but from the fact that he actually operates."

e) Finally, some, such as St. Bonaventure and St. Alphonsus, require that the act of charity be repeated rather often, for example, daily or weekly, or even for each series of actions; and because of the probability of this opinion it is to be counseled that it be exercised more often.

196. Degrees of merit.

Salutary acts are not equally, but more or less, meritorious, according as the conditions of merit are verified more or less. Hence, other things being equal, the merit becomes greater:

1. the worthier the acting person is, according to the supernatural dignity of habitual grace making one pleasing, by which man is pleasing to God;

2. the more voluntary the work is, that is, the more it proceeds from a readier will and is performed with greater intensity; and the freer it is, that is, the more the agent gives of his own and from his proper dominion;

3. the more the work is informed by charity, namely, the more expressly, more proximately, and more actually it is referred to God; hence the practice is best of often exercising an act of charity and offering works to God in order to increase merit, and also to increase charity itself, the root of merit;

4. the better the work is according to species, excellence, and nobility of moral goodness, which nobility depends upon the object; for example, the act is better which regards a more excellent virtue, which has a higher end, which pertains to several virtues. Therefore a precept does not impede merit; indeed obedience increases merit because it adds the goodness of a new virtue;

5. and therefore the more difficult the work is in itself: namely, intrinsic difficulty, which is from the magnitude and arduousness of the work itself and from the elevation of the proper object, increases merit, because the better something is, the more it is elevated above man's powers. But extrinsic difficulty of labor, which the agent experiences in a good work and which comes from a defect of the one operating and of a ready will, does not increase but rather diminishes merit. Otherwise the more someone advanced in virtue and experienced less difficulty, the less merit he would have. Yet per accidens a special difficulty on the part of the agent can be the occasion that someone tends toward good with greater attention and with a greater effort of the will (q. 114, a. 4, ad 2), and then merit is increased not because of the difficulty but because of the intensity of the will.

197. Observation.

For congruity of merit in order to a certain supernatural retribution, the same conditions are required, excepting the state of grace, the influence of charity, and the promise of God; yet this promise, like the state of grace, is required for merit de congruo more strictly so called and infallible, which namely consists in a friendly right to some reward, without equality of the work to the reward ever being required.

Besides eternal life, which, as is evident from what has been said, is the principal object of merit, there are several other things concerning which it is disputed whether they fall under merit, which we undertake to discuss here.

But before all, that equivocation may be removed and certain contrary opinions about merit de congruo reconciled, it must be observed that we distinguish here with the Author, a. 6, c, a twofold merit de congruo, one proper and strict, the other broad and improper. Merit de congruo proper and strict we place in amicable right to reward, whereby it is distinguished from merit de condigno, which imports a debt of justice. Merit de congruo taken broadly and improperly we place in the exigency of form by way of disposition or impetration.

You will ask 1° whether man can merit for himself first grace.

I answer. No one can merit for himself habitual first grace, neither de condigno, nor de congruo proper, but only improper ¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 5, c.

I said, « first habitual grace, » because about actual grace no Catholic doubts. For so it was defined against the Pelagians, which definition the Tridentine renewed, sess. VI, chapter 5, and it is evident from what we said above that no one can by the forces of nature dispose himself even to that first actual grace ^{2 2} « God touching the heart of man through the illumination of the Holy Spirit, nor does man himself do nothing at all,

by the forces of nature he cannot indeed dispose himself to that first actual grace.

The first part is proved, which also seems of faith, 1° from Scripture. Rom., I, 24 : Being justified freely by his grace. And from the Council of Trent, sess. VI, chapter 8, where expounding the aforesaid words of the Apostle, it says: « We are said to be justified freely, because none of those things which precede justification, whether faith or works, merits the very grace of justification. »

2° The principle of merit cannot fall under merit, as we shall show below. But first grace is the principle of merit. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Merit de congruo properly taken consists, as we said, in amicable right to reward; whence there is required for it not only congruity of the work, but also of the one working, namely that he be acceptable to the rewarder, not hostile to him, nor unworthy of his benefits; such nevertheless is man in the state of sin before justification. Therefore.

The third part stands; because the good works preceding justification and the prayers of the sinner humbled and penitent exact grace by way of disposition and impetration, wherein we place merit de congruo broadly taken.

You will ask 2° whether the just man can merit first grace for another.

I answer. No one, besides Christ, can merit for another first grace de condigno, yet well de congruo.

The first part is proved. Our work has the account of merit de condigno from the force of the motion of divine grace; and thus the just man properly merits de condigno only those things to which the motion of divine grace extends. But grace conferred on the mere man is particular, and moves him to receive that inspiration, since he can both cast away and receive it; yet without the grace of God he cannot move himself by his own free will toward justice before him. » — 1. Ibid., a. 6, o. — 2. Ibid.

his own perfection and salvation, not truly that he sanctify others; for that is proper to the grace of head and universal, such as was in Christ, which according to the present providence is granted to no particular just man. Therefore.

The second part is proved; because, since man constituted in grace, acceptable and friendly to God, fulfills his will, it is congruous, according to the proportion of friendship, that God fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another, provided however no impediment of excessive obstinacy or other on the part of him whose salvation the holy one desires be present.

You will ask 3° whether the just man can merit reparation after falling for himself.

I answer. No one can merit for himself reparation after falling, neither by merit of condignity, nor by merit of congruity properly so called.

The first part is proved. Merit de condigno depends upon the motion of divine grace, and therefore does not extend beyond it. But that motion is interrupted by sin, and thus does not extend to benefits posterior to sin. Therefore.

It is confirmed 1°. All the merits which the just man acquired for himself are suspended and impeded by subsequent sin. Therefore this sin cannot be removed by the force of those merits, nor consequently can fallen man be repaired.

It is confirmed 2°. The just man could not merit that an unworthy one be rewarded. But fallen man is unworthy. Therefore.

It is confirmed 3°. If the just man merited de condigno reparation after falling, he would infallibly obtain it, and thus all just men would be predestined, seeing that they would be finally restored to grace. Therefore.

The second part is proved. Merit de congruo properly taken imports amicable right to reward, so that there be not only congruity and aptitude on the part of the work, but

^{1 1} Ibid., a. 3, c.

also of the one working. But the just man has not amicable right to reparation after falling, because through sin the friendship of God is lost, he becomes unworthy of divine benefits, and therefore every preceding merit is suspended, whether of condignity or of congruity.

What can be objected against the second part must be understood of merit of congruity improperly and broadly taken for congruity and aptitude on the part of the work, not on the part of the one working, because by sinning he lost amicable right to reparation and renders himself unworthy of divine benefits.

You will ask 4° whether the just man can merit for himself increase of grace or charity.

I answer. The just man can merit for himself de condigno increase of grace or charity ¹, according to that of Augustine, Tract. V in Epist. Joann.: « Charity deserves to be increased, that increased it may deserve to be perfected ² ». So it was defined under anathema by the Council of Trent, sess. VI, can. 32 ³. And it stands from Scripture, which so often exhorts us to obtain that increase by good works, as Ephes., IV, 15 ⁴, and elsewhere. ¹ Ibid., a. 8, o. ² Here the words are not quoted, but the sense of Augustine saying there, n. 4: « Numquid mox ut nascitur [charitas]. ». ³ « If anyone says that the good works of a justified man are so gifts of God that they are not also the good merits of the justified man himself, or that the justified man himself, by the good works which are done by him through the grace of God and the merit of Jesus Christ, of whose living member he is, does not truly merit increase of grace, eternal life, and the attainment of that eternal life itself, if however he depart in grace, and even increase of glory: let him be anathema. ». ⁴ But doing the truth in charity, let us grow in him in all things, who is the head Christ.

The reason is ⁵, because that falls under merit de condigno to which the motion of God extends; but the motion of any mover extends not only to the ultimate term of motion, but to the whole progress in motion. But the term of the motion of grace is eternal life, but progress in this motion is according to increase of grace or charity, according to that Prov., IV, 18 : The path of the just as a shining light goes forth, and grows even to the perfect day, which is the day of glory. Therefore. ⁵ Where above, a. 8, c.

You will ask 5° whether man can merit for himself the gift of final perseverance.

I answer. No one can merit for himself de condigno the gift of perseverance. So commonly with the Author ¹. ¹ Ibid., a. 9, c.

It is proved 1° from the principle of the Author received by all ². The principle of merit does not fall under the merit of the work proceeding from that very principle; for nothing can be its own merit and reward, cause and effect. But if the gift of perseverance fell under merit, the principle of merit would fall under the merit of the work proceeding from the very principle. Therefore. — Proof of minor. The gift of perseverance consists in the divine conserving motion of the first grace given. But divine motion, as conserving grace, is the principle of merit, or holds itself on the part of principle. Therefore. — Proof of minor. Divine motion, as conserving grace, is the same entitatively as the first production of grace; for conservation of a thing is continued production of the same thing; consequently the conserving action of a thing is not entitatively distinguished from its first production, the Author saying, Ia p., q. 104, a. 1, ad 4: « Conservation of things by God is not through some new action, but through continuation of the action which gives being; which action indeed is without motion and time: just as also conservation of light in the air is through continued influx from the sun. » But the first production of grace is the principle of merit, or holds itself on the part of principle. And so, just as no one can merit his conservation, because conservation is not an action distinct from creation, which does not fall under merit; so no one can merit perseverance in good, because it is nothing else than conservation of grace, which is not ² Ibid.

¹ — ^{2 1} Ibid., a. 9, c. ² Ibid.

distinguished from its first production, which does not fall under merit, as was proved above.

It is proved 2°. Whatever anyone merits de condigno, that he obtains from God infallibly, unless impeded through sin. If therefore perseverance fell under merit, since scarcely anyone is just who has not meritorious works, scarcely anyone would be who had not the gift of perseverance, against that Matth., XX, 16 : Many are called, few are chosen.

It is proved 3°. For merit de condigno is required the promise of God, or pact of rendering reward for the work. But God nowhere promised perseverance to those working well; nay rather Scripture cries out that even the just ought to work their salvation with fear and trembling, Philipp., II, 12, and that he who stands ought to be solicitous lest he fall, I Cor., X, 12. Therefore.

There remains therefore that the gift of perseverance falls under merit de congruo only ¹. Some say de congruo proper; others de congruo broadly taken for impetration from the liberality and benignity of God. ¹ Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

^{1 1} Ibid., in arg. Sed contra.

APPENDIX

ON THE DISSERTATIONS ON MIDDLE KNOWLEDGE, GRATUITOUS PREDESTINATION AND GRACE PER SE EFFICACIOUS.

Since our prescribed limits do not allow a complete treatise upon this matter, it will be permitted us to join only those things which might seem omitted by Billuart in solving the arguments of recent Molinists. We shall speak therefore 1° of certain facts pertaining to history, 2° of middle knowledge, 3° of gratuitous predestination, 4° finally of physical premotion.

I. — ON CERTAIN HISTORICAL FACTS