The Virtue of Repentance

The Virtue of Repentance.—This virtue is a gift of God and a permanent habit of the soul, but there are certain acts by which man cooperates with God and prepares himself for the gift. Sometimes a sinner is converted through consideration of God’s goodness or of the rewards of heaven; but usually those who have been drawn by sinful delights are first deterred from them by the thought of God’s justice, and amendment begins from fear. Faith, hope, fear and love, at least virtually, are always found in the process of turning to God, and usually they follow one another in that process in the order here given. (a) The beginning of conversion is with God who draws the heart: “Convert us to Thee, O Lord, and we shall be converted” (Lament, v. 21). (b) Then follows the movement of faith, for he that would come to God must first believe that He is (Heb., xi. 6). (c) Next follow servile fear, which removes one from sin, and hope, which leads one to God, for faith holds out both threats of punishment and promises of mercy. (d) Then come the movements of love, which detests sin for its own sake, and of filial fear, which offers satisfaction to God out of reverence.

Repentance.—Repentance may be defined as “a moral virtue that inclines the will of one who is subject to sin to grieve over it and to make reparation to God for the injury it does to His rights.”

(a) Thus, repentance has its remote subject in one who is subject to sin, that is, in a person who has sinned or who is able to sin. Hence, it is not in Christ, who is impeccable, nor in the holy Angels, whose wills are fixed in good; but it is found in the Saints, inasmuch as their former sin is displeasing to them and their former contrition and satisfaction pleasing.

(b) The proximate subject of repentance is the will, for its acts of regret, resolution, and reparation belong to the higher appetitive faculty, Hence, repentance does not consist in emotional sorrow, and it does not need to be sensibly felt or joined with tears.

(c) The formal object or motive of repentance is reparation to Goal for the injury done Him by one’s own personal sin. Sin may be considered as opposed to the divine goodness, and in this respect it is detested by charity; or as opposed to the good of man himself, and so hope detests it; or as opposed to the moral goodness of some particular virtue, and in this respect it is hated by that virtue, as temperance shuns intemperance; or as opposed to the right which belongs to God, the Last End, that all actions be done for Him, and in this respect sin is considered by repentance. One may regret original sin or sins done by others, but one is not properly said to repent of them.

(d) The material object or subject-matter of repentance is the acts by which reparation is made to God, namely, grief over sin and its accompaniments, hatred of moral wickedness in the present, regrets for the past, and good resolutions for the future. Thus, repentance differs from religion, for religion looks upon God as Lord and Benefactor and offers Him worship, while repentance considers Him as the Last End who has been offended and offers Him satisfaction. The difference between filial fear and repentance is seen in this, that the former falls back upon its own littleness, whereas the latter throws itself at the feet of God.

The Character of Repentance.—(a) It is a virtue, since it is commanded (“Do penance,” Matt., iii. 2), and also since it moderates according to reason the sorrow felt for sin, keeping it from the extreme of despair, lest it become the remorse of a Cain or a Judas.

(b) It is a moral virtue, since its direct object is the human acts by which reparation is made to God, and its office the regulation of those acts within the bounds of moderation.

(c) It belongs to justice, being a compensation offered for injury to another’s right; but it is only a potential part of justice, as there is not perfect justice between an inferior and the superior to whose power the former is subject (2142). It is classed under commutative justice on account of the return that is offered for the offense;

The Excellence of Repentance.—(a) Its Dignity.—Repentance ranks below other virtues, for, while they are naturally advantageous to man, repentance is beneficial only hypothetically, namely, in the supposition of sin. In one respect, however, it holds a certain preeminence, for the infused virtues are bestowed only in justification, whereas the acts of repentance that prepare for justification come before those virtues.

(b) Its Necessity.—In the actual providence of God no mortal sin is remitted unless it be first repented of, and hence it is said: “Unless you do penance, you shall all likewise perish” (Luke, xiii. 5). This is reasonable, since it is fitting that he who has turned away from God by his own act, should also return to God by his own act. As to venial sin, since it consists in an inordinate cleaving to created things and must be removed by its contrary, there is need of an actual rejection of the exaggerated attachment, and hence need of repentance; moreover, since one should be restored to God’s friendship before being restored to His familiarity, penitence in regard to a venial sin does not avail, unless the penitent is in the state of grace. The act of repentance need not be formal (i.e., one in which a person expressly thinks of his sins and expressly detests them), but a virtual act suffices, that is, an act of love of God which implicitly includes repentance, though the latter is not expressly taken into consideration.

Is Repentance Necessary as a Means or as a Precept?—(a) It is necessary as a means of salvation because, if it be omitted, salvation cannot be attained. God desires that the sinner assist in and consent to his own forgiveness, and repentance, as we saw, is the most suitable way in which the sinner can do this. (b) It is also necessary as a precept. The natural law requires that those who have done an injury, make reparation; the divine law calls on sinners to repent and be converted to God (Acts, ii. 38, iii. 19, viii. 22), and the church law prescribes annual confession.

How Soon Does the Precept of Repentance Oblige?—(a) It obliges at once (i.e., without any delay), when there is immediate necessity for it. This happens per se, when one is in grave danger of death, for at that moment one is bound to prepare immediately to meet God, which supposes repentance. It happens per accidens, when by reason of some urgent precept distinct from that of repentance one is obligated here and now to rid oneself of sin (e.g., when one is called on to administer a Sacrament and must have a pure conscience, or when one is gravely tempted and will surely fall unless one repents of the past).

(b) It obliges soon (i.e., without any unreasonable delay), when there is no immediate necessity. It is not a new sin to put off repentance until tomorrow or next week in such a case; for the commandment of repentance, being affirmative, does not bind for each instant, but only for a reasonable time. But the common opinion is that a new sin is committed when repentance is delayed for a considerable time, since this exposes the sinner to further sins, impenitence, and damnation. Practically, it seems that those who comply with the church law of yearly confession commit no sin of unrepentance, though some consider it a mortal sin to delay repentance beyond a month.

Accompaniments of Repentance as to Mortal Sin.—(a) When one mortal sin is forgiven, every other mortal sin is forgiven at the same time. For no one can be truly repentant unless he grieves over his separation from God, and this means that he grieves over each individual mortal sin. But, since venial sin does not separate from God, it is possible to be sorry for one venial sin without being sorry for another.

(b) When mortal sin is forgiven, the eternal punishment is also forgiven, for forgiveness makes man a friend of God and an heir to heaven. But the temporal punishment may remain due, as is proved by the examples of Adam (Gen., iii. 23; Wisd., x. 2), of Mary, the sister of Moses (Num., xii.), of Moses (Num., xx. 12), of David (II Kings, xii. 13, 14), and of others. God is not only a merciful Father, but also a just Ruler, and it is fitting that He should exact satisfaction even for sin forgiven. But if repentance is very perfect like that of Magdalen and St. Paul, even the temporal punishment is forgiven.

The Fruits of Repentance.—(a) Every sin, no matter how grievous, is removed by repentance (Is., i. 18), and hence there is always room for forgiveness. For man is always able to repent and God is always ready to pardon the penitent (Joel, ii. 13). The unpardonable sin is refusal to repent of sin, if one continues in that refusal, but even impenitence is forgiven when laid aside (see 900).

(b) Sin once forgiven does not return, for God does not regret His gifts (Rom, xi. 29), and His pardon means that the guilt of a sin is destroyed and wiped out forever, But he who falls into the same sins after pardon increases his guilt by reason of his ingratitude.

(c) The repentant sinner recovers the infused virtues he lost by sin and also his former merits (Luke, XV. 22; Joel, ii. 25; Ezech., xxxiii. 12; Heb., vi. 10). Virginity of body and innocence of soul are not recovered as to their material elements (i.e., bodily integrity and freedom from all sin), but they are restored as to their formal part, which is the resolve to abstain from all venereal pleasure or to avoid all sin. It seems that former merits are also recovered, not necessarily in their entirety, but in a degree that corresponds with the greater or less excellence of repentance.

Forgiveness of Sin through the Use of the Sacraments.—(a) Mortal sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself (ex opere operato) and immediately; that is, the Sacraments either per se or per accidens (according as they are Sacraments of the Dead or Sacraments of the Living) produce in the soul first grace or justification, which is the opposite of mortal sin.

(b) Venial sins are forgiven by the Sacraments in virtue of the rite itself but not immediately; that is, the Sacraments produce directly either first or second grace, and indirectly through this grace they may awaken fervor, which is the opposite of venial sin. The sacramentals, on the contrary, remit venial sins, not in virtue of the rite itself but in virtue of the intercession of the Church attached to the rite (ex opere operantis Ecclesiae); for the prayers of the Church are acceptable to God and can obtain from Him a grace of repentance that will remove venial sin.

S. Th. III, q. 85, a. 1-3.

395. Penance according to the name. - According to some, penance is said from poenam tenere, to hold punishment, or to be held by the punishment of that which has been committed, because it imposes punishment for sin; according to others, from pene or penitus, because it designates something inward which greatly affects the heart.

In the more general sense it signifies:

a) in the broadest sense, weariness or displeasure at anything whatever, even that which does not depend on our will, as for example old age, and thus especially it is a passion;

b) in a less broad sense, sorrow or retraction of a past will, whether it was good or evil, and a change of counsel;

c) more strictly, sorrow and retraction concerning an evil act on account of the evil effects which have followed, for example imprisonment or dishonor.

In a similar way the Greek word metanoia, which etymologically is resipiscence, a change of mind, a retraction of a prior will.

In the strictest and theological sense it is sorrow of the soul concerning sin committed, conceived on account of God; this can be considered in act and in habit.

Penance considered in act (boete) can be defined with St. Thomas, a. 1: moderate sorrow concerning past sins, insofar as they are an offense of God, with the intention of removing them.

The sorrow is called moderate, i.e., according to right reason and not excessive, casting into despair; but it is with hope of pardon and the intention of removing sins, and therefore with a firm purpose of amendment and satisfaction.

Considered in habit, penance (boetvaardigheid) is the habit by which the penitent assumes this sorrow; it can be defined: the virtue by which a man grieves concerning sin committed insofar as it is an offense of God, or a habit inclining to repair the injury inflicted upon God through sin, as Billuart has it.¹

¹ Diss. 2, art. 1. - There is no place for distinguishing between offense and injury, as we did in sins against the neighbor (I, n. 891, in note): for every offense of God is also an injury, because God has the highest right to all our acts, and therefore every sin wounds the right of God and is an injury.

396. Penance is a virtue. - For virtue is an elective habit according to right reason. But through penance a man deliberately grieves concerning sins committed, insofar as they are an offense of God, with the purpose of amendment,1 which is according to right reason. Therefore.

"Virtue," says St. Thomas, "is an elective habit according to right reason. But it pertains to right reason that someone grieve a) concerning that about which one must grieve, b) and in that mode, and c) for the end for which one must grieve. This indeed is observed concerning penance of which we now speak; for the penitent assumes a) moderate sorrow b) concerning past sins c) with the intention of removing them. Whence it is manifest that penance of which we now speak either is a virtue or an act of virtue" (a. 1). And therefore a precept is given concerning it (Mt. IV, 17; Luke XIII, 3; XXIV, 45-47; Acts II, 38).

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object or an uprightness of special reason: the offense of God as to be repaired and moral equality with God as to be restored, or the debt of reparation toward God. For the injury of God, on account of His singular excellence, is of a special disorder; therefore there is present a special debt of reparation.

"The species of habits," says St. Thomas, "are distinguished according to the species of acts, and therefore where a special reason of a praiseworthy act occurs, there it is necessary to posit a special habit of virtue. But it is manifest that in penance there is found a special reason of a praiseworthy act, namely, to work for the destruction of past sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, which does not pertain to the reason of another virtue" (a. 2).

Likewise, there is a special virtue where a special reason of a difficult act occurs. But in penance there is present a great and special difficulty, both from the fact that man removes sin to which he voluntarily adheres, and in which he has already been delighted, and from the fact that he exercises vengeance against himself unto the punishment of himself. Whence it is necessary to posit that penance is a special virtue. Hence a special precept is given concerning penance.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: for it considers all sins and grieves concerning them under one reason, insofar as they are offenses of God to be repaired.

Although each virtue has a formal motive from which sorrow concerning the sin opposed to it can arise, for example justice the motive of preserving equality, chastity moderation in delectation, charity the divine good, from the love of which a man grieves concerning the wounding of justice, chastity, or charity; nevertheless there is a certain special virtue distinct from all these, which by one and the same act grieves concerning all sins, not insofar as each one is opposed to diverse virtues, but under the special reason insofar as they are an offense of God which demands reparation: "insofar namely as they are amendable through the act of man cooperating with God toward his justification" (a. 2, ad 2).

It is a virtue connected with justice, a certain species of commutative justice. For this is toward another with a certain exchange, and inclines to rendering to each one his own strict right unto equality: but it is strictly owed to God that an offense committed against Him be repaired by the guilty one, either unwillingly or spontaneously, which is a certain exchange. But penance impels to this, that it be repaired spontaneously. Therefore penance is a certain species of commutative justice. Whence it is said by Cajetan, in a. 4: "A virtue rendering to God His right for sin committed against Him."

Nevertheless it is not a properly so-called and strict species of justice, as Durandus used to say, but justice in a certain respect and imperfectly, or a potential part of commutative justice. For this requires strict right which is between equals. Penance is not between equals, since man is constituted under the power of God. Whence also he cannot render unto perfect equality, both because he does not render as much as he owes, since an infinite offense is not adequately compensated by finite satisfaction: indeed penance subjects the creature to God, but sin subjects God to the creature; and because he renders from the goods of God Himself, and something already owed under several other titles. And therefore penance falls short of the perfect reason of justice and is analogically reduced to commutative justice, like observance, piety, and religion (a. 3, and ad 2).

397. Observation. - All the aforesaid things are not to be understood of penance which is a passion of the sensitive appetite and does not pertain to reason; but of penance of the will, which is with election and pertains to reason: it retracts past sin, not from an intention of striving for this, that what was done had not been done, - this would be foolish, - but with the intention of removing the consequence of it, namely, the guilt of fault and the debt of punishment (q. 84, a. 9, ad 2 and 3; q. 85, a. 1, and ad 2 and 3).

1. The purpose of amendment or emendation is the intention of removing sins, whether past or future.