Article I: On the Virtue of Penance Itself

S. Th. III, q. 85, a. 1-3.

395. Penance according to the name. - According to some, penance is said from poenam tenere, to hold punishment, or to be held by the punishment of that which has been committed, because it imposes punishment for sin; according to others, from pene or penitus, because it designates something inward which greatly affects the heart.

In the more general sense it signifies:

a) in the broadest sense, weariness or displeasure at anything whatever, even that which does not depend on our will, as for example old age, and thus especially it is a passion;

b) in a less broad sense, sorrow or retraction of a past will, whether it was good or evil, and a change of counsel;

c) more strictly, sorrow and retraction concerning an evil act on account of the evil effects which have followed, for example imprisonment or dishonor.

In a similar way the Greek word metanoia, which etymologically is resipiscence, a change of mind, a retraction of a prior will.

In the strictest and theological sense it is sorrow of the soul concerning sin committed, conceived on account of God; this can be considered in act and in habit.

Penance considered in act (boete) can be defined with St. Thomas, a. 1: moderate sorrow concerning past sins, insofar as they are an offense of God, with the intention of removing them.

The sorrow is called moderate, i.e., according to right reason and not excessive, casting into despair; but it is with hope of pardon and the intention of removing sins, and therefore with a firm purpose of amendment and satisfaction.

Considered in habit, penance (boetvaardigheid) is the habit by which the penitent assumes this sorrow; it can be defined: the virtue by which a man grieves concerning sin committed insofar as it is an offense of God, or a habit inclining to repair the injury inflicted upon God through sin, as Billuart has it.¹

¹ Diss. 2, art. 1. - There is no place for distinguishing between offense and injury, as we did in sins against the neighbor (I, n. 891, in note): for every offense of God is also an injury, because God has the highest right to all our acts, and therefore every sin wounds the right of God and is an injury.

396. Penance is a virtue. - For virtue is an elective habit according to right reason. But through penance a man deliberately grieves concerning sins committed, insofar as they are an offense of God, with the purpose of amendment,1 which is according to right reason. Therefore.

"Virtue," says St. Thomas, "is an elective habit according to right reason. But it pertains to right reason that someone grieve a) concerning that about which one must grieve, b) and in that mode, and c) for the end for which one must grieve. This indeed is observed concerning penance of which we now speak; for the penitent assumes a) moderate sorrow b) concerning past sins c) with the intention of removing them. Whence it is manifest that penance of which we now speak either is a virtue or an act of virtue" (a. 1). And therefore a precept is given concerning it (Mt. IV, 17; Luke XIII, 3; XXIV, 45-47; Acts II, 38).

It is a special virtue, because it has a special object or an uprightness of special reason: the offense of God as to be repaired and moral equality with God as to be restored, or the debt of reparation toward God. For the injury of God, on account of His singular excellence, is of a special disorder; therefore there is present a special debt of reparation.

"The species of habits," says St. Thomas, "are distinguished according to the species of acts, and therefore where a special reason of a praiseworthy act occurs, there it is necessary to posit a special habit of virtue. But it is manifest that in penance there is found a special reason of a praiseworthy act, namely, to work for the destruction of past sin, insofar as it is an offense of God, which does not pertain to the reason of another virtue" (a. 2).

Likewise, there is a special virtue where a special reason of a difficult act occurs. But in penance there is present a great and special difficulty, both from the fact that man removes sin to which he voluntarily adheres, and in which he has already been delighted, and from the fact that he exercises vengeance against himself unto the punishment of himself. Whence it is necessary to posit that penance is a special virtue. Hence a special precept is given concerning penance.

It is one virtue, because it has one object: for it considers all sins and grieves concerning them under one reason, insofar as they are offenses of God to be repaired.

Although each virtue has a formal motive from which sorrow concerning the sin opposed to it can arise, for example justice the motive of preserving equality, chastity moderation in delectation, charity the divine good, from the love of which a man grieves concerning the wounding of justice, chastity, or charity; nevertheless there is a certain special virtue distinct from all these, which by one and the same act grieves concerning all sins, not insofar as each one is opposed to diverse virtues, but under the special reason insofar as they are an offense of God which demands reparation: "insofar namely as they are amendable through the act of man cooperating with God toward his justification" (a. 2, ad 2).

It is a virtue connected with justice, a certain species of commutative justice. For this is toward another with a certain exchange, and inclines to rendering to each one his own strict right unto equality: but it is strictly owed to God that an offense committed against Him be repaired by the guilty one, either unwillingly or spontaneously, which is a certain exchange. But penance impels to this, that it be repaired spontaneously. Therefore penance is a certain species of commutative justice. Whence it is said by Cajetan, in a. 4: "A virtue rendering to God His right for sin committed against Him."

Nevertheless it is not a properly so-called and strict species of justice, as Durandus used to say, but justice in a certain respect and imperfectly, or a potential part of commutative justice. For this requires strict right which is between equals. Penance is not between equals, since man is constituted under the power of God. Whence also he cannot render unto perfect equality, both because he does not render as much as he owes, since an infinite offense is not adequately compensated by finite satisfaction: indeed penance subjects the creature to God, but sin subjects God to the creature; and because he renders from the goods of God Himself, and something already owed under several other titles. And therefore penance falls short of the perfect reason of justice and is analogically reduced to commutative justice, like observance, piety, and religion (a. 3, and ad 2).

397. Observation. - All the aforesaid things are not to be understood of penance which is a passion of the sensitive appetite and does not pertain to reason; but of penance of the will, which is with election and pertains to reason: it retracts past sin, not from an intention of striving for this, that what was done had not been done, - this would be foolish, - but with the intention of removing the consequence of it, namely, the guilt of fault and the debt of punishment (q. 84, a. 9, ad 2 and 3; q. 85, a. 1, and ad 2 and 3).

1. The purpose of amendment or emendation is the intention of removing sins, whether past or future.