Commentary I: On the Voluntary

1. Human acts considered relatively to man can be looked at in two ways: first, according as they proceed from human faculties, which is to consider them in their intrinsic nature; for an act, generally in created things, is nothing other than the determination of some faculty from potency to act. secondly, according as they fall short from this nature proper to them, on account of accidental impediments which do not allow the human faculties to act rightly. Therefore first we set out to speak of the intrinsic nature of a human act; but afterward we shall speak of those accidental impediments.

2. Moreover usage has prevailed, and not without reason, that a distinction should be made between an act of man and a human act. Since man is a substantive name, and directly signifies a supposit or person, an act of man is taken merely materially for any act whatever proceeding from a man, or from a human supposit and person: for actions belong to supposits. But since human is an adjective name, and directly denotes a form, a human act is an act proceeding from man not in just any way, but according to the form or nature proper to him, namely with advertence of the intellect and deliberate will. “Of actions,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1., “which are done by man, those alone are properly called human which are proper to man insofar as he is man (namely adequately, and as to the substance of the work, and as to the mode of operating). But man differs from other irrational creatures in this, that he is master of his acts. Hence those actions alone are called properly human of which man is master. But man is master of his acts through reason and will: hence free choice also is said to be the faculty of will and reason. Therefore those actions are called properly human which proceed from deliberate will. But if any other actions belong to man, they can indeed be called actions of man, but not properly human actions, since they are not of man insofar as he is man.” And in the same place, a. 3: “Acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberating will.” Therefore, since a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, in order that we may know its intrinsic nature more deeply, it is necessary to explain briefly: 1. the nature of the voluntary; 2. the nature of the free; 3. finally, in how many ways any act whatever can proceed from deliberate will. Hence in this first Commentary on human acts we have proposed first to explain the nature of the voluntary.

3. Moreover, before we proceed further, it must be noted that human acts are called acts rather than actions, because this name action is accustomed to designate more the exterior operation, although it is also used for an interior act; while, on the contrary, the name act is used rather for an interior act, or for an act considered in its intrinsic principle, than for an exterior operation, namely for an act considered with respect to its exterior object or extrinsic effect; although it is also taken for an exterior action, as when one says: an act of religious profession, an act of matrimony, an act of contract, etc. But a human act, as is clear from the very determination of the adjective added to it, properly designates an act according as it proceeds from its intrinsic principles and is considered according to them; which from what has been said is now sufficiently drawn out.

Moreover, since a human act proceeds from the will and from the free will, and in it alone, as in its proper subject, morality is found, concerning which there will be discussion hereafter, human acts are also called voluntary acts, free acts, moral acts, and one name is used for another indiscriminately, as may be seen in the Angelic Doctor in 1. 2. And thus q. 18. a. 5: “some acts are called human or moral, according as they are from reason.” And q. 1. a. 3: “moral acts and human acts are the same.” And q. 20. a. 6. ad 2: “it must be said that action and passion pertain to the genus of morals, insofar as they have the nature of the voluntary. And therefore according as by a diverse will they are called voluntary, according to this they are two morally, and there can be good on one side, and evil on the other.”

4. If a human act is an act proceeding from deliberate will, it is essentially a voluntary act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 6. For the voluntary, cognition is essentially prerequired: nothing is willed unless foreknown. This prior cognition is, in a human act, the prerequired condition; but voluntariness is properly the form constitutive of it. - From defect of the aforesaid condition, the acts of infants, of the insane, of those sleeping, of the intoxicated, are not human acts, but acts of man. Hence, if someone in a state of insanity, sleep, or intoxication baptizes, consecrates, contracts, or is present at Mass, recites the canonical hours, these acts are of no moral value and have no moral effect, because they are not human acts. And this holds even if someone, while still master of himself before he falls into that state, foresees it, indeed wills and intends it. For when, being master of himself, he wills and intends to do it, nevertheless he does not do it; but when, no longer master of himself, he does it, he does not will to do it by a human act; and since those things are of the moral order and of moral value, they can be done only by a human act. In sleep the imagination prevails, or at least “the intellect does not prevail; whence man follows the imaginative apprehension as if true.” St. Thomas, On Dreams, sect. 6. Namely, “the use of reason is indeed more or less impeded in sleeping; nevertheless it is always impeded as to something, so that one cannot have an altogether free judgment.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 154. a. 2. ad 2. - Cf. Lugo, On the Sacraments, D. 8. n. 106; Suarez, On Religion, tr. 6, On Vow, l. 1. c. 10; Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 1. D. 8. n. 20; Laymann, l. 4. tr. 4, On Vow, c. 1. n. 4.

5. But if the prior cognition of the intellect is not indeed lacking, but is not perfect, the act, so far under this head, is human insofar as it is directed and ordered by that prior cognition. Therefore, one who is ignorant of what he does materially, or as to the fact, or is ignorant of what he does formally, that is, as to the morality of his action, because namely he is ignorant of the law, sins in no way; for example, if someone on a day of abstinence is ignorant that he is eating meat, or, eating it, is ignorant of the law of abstinence. - But it is not required that someone have perfect cognition of the thing, that namely, that the thing be known in itself and in the individual, or with every certainty; for it is sufficient that it be apprehended at least confusedly, and with doubt. For, with prior cognition of the thing standing, although confused, now the will is borne into it, whatever it may be; with doubt of thing and thing standing, the will is borne into each. And thus an adult is validly baptized, although he has not yet fully explored all the obligations of a Christian, and afterward he is bound by them. One receiving the subdiaconate, at least confusedly, apprehends and consequently wills all the obligations annexed to that state; wherefore, although he is ignorant of the chastity to be preserved which is annexed to it, nevertheless he is bound to it. A hunter striking a beast, concerning which he doubts whether it is a man, in truth wills both: to kill the beast and the man.

6. From defect of voluntariness or of deliberate will, the first intuition of evident truth and the first love of good in common, or of happiness, are not human acts. Beatitude itself, since it is not an act of deliberate will, but a necessary act, although it is a perfect act of the intellect and of the will, nevertheless is not a human act; and by the Angelic Doctor himself in 1. 2. it is not considered as a human act, but as the end of human acts. And thus in the prologue to q. 6 St. Thomas says: “Therefore, because it is necessary to arrive at beatitude through certain acts, it is consequently necessary to consider human acts, that we may know by which acts one may arrive at beatitude, or the way of beatitude may be impeded.” Therefore to the question which is commonly discussed, whether beatitude is a human act, one must answer that it is not a human act, but the term and end of all human acts. Cf. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 1. D. 2. S. 2.

7. From defect of both elements, intellective cognition and deliberate will, those sudden passions of desire, fear, and anger, which are stirred up in the sensitive appetite, are not human acts, but acts of man. The same must be said of those actions which man does from a certain natural instinct, thinking nothing about them, as when someone moves a foot or hand while intent on other things, or strokes his beard, etc. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3, “that actions of this sort are not properly human, because they do not proceed from deliberation of reason, which is the proper principle of human acts; and therefore they have, as it were, an imagined end, but not an end pre-established by reason.”

8. These things having been established, the question is at once resolved concerning that cognition prerequired for a human act: namely, whether merely sensitive cognition suffices for a human act, the apprehension of a thing through sensitive imagination. - Since a human act, as has already been said, is an essentially voluntary act, the proposed question falls back into another more general question.

Since the will is borne toward an apprehended good, it is asked: whether it can be borne toward an object apprehended by sensitive cognition alone, or through phantasy and imagination alone, and not at the same time through the intellect.

It must be denied altogether; and the reason is that, as the natural appetite follows the natural form, and the sensitive appetite follows sensitive cognition, so the spiritual appetite follows spiritual cognition. Therefore spiritual cognition alone is its foundation, and is consonant with it, so that it may be moved into act. Moreover, the cognoscitive power moving the will, which is an intrinsically inorganic and spiritual faculty, illuminates and directs it. But this cannot belong to a sensitive power of an inferior order, which is an intrinsically organic faculty. Aptly Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Libertas, 20 June 1888: “The will is in no way moved unless cognition of the mind has shone before it like a certain torch: namely, the good desired by the will is necessarily a good insofar as it is known by reason.”

And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 3: “It must be said that... the goodness of the will properly depends upon the object. But the object of the will is proposed to it through reason. For the understood good is the object of the will proportioned to it. But the sensible or imaginary good is not proportioned to the will, but to the sensitive appetite; because the will can tend toward universal good, which reason apprehends. But the sensitive appetite tends only toward a particular good, which the sensitive power apprehends. And therefore the goodness of the will depends on reason in the way in which it depends on the object... The appetite of the will cannot be concerning the good unless it is first apprehended by reason.” And Cajetan, on q. 10. a. 3: “If sense alone could move the will, then man could will without the use of reason, and consequently could sin and do well, which is not intelligible; for it implies the existence of an act of free choice without the use of reason.” For liberty is founded in reason. Wherefore a human act, both insofar as it is an act proceeding from the will and insofar as it is proceeding from deliberate will, altogether requires prior cognition of reason. Cf. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. ad 3; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2; D. 6. S. 4. 5; Lessius on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. a. 2.

9. And thus much concerning the first element of the human act. The remaining matters which must be treated concerning it will more conveniently be explained presently when the discussion is about the other element, or about voluntariness. This element includes two things: the voluntary and the free. We pause now in explaining the voluntary. The voluntary, so called from the will, is that which proceeds or is caused by the will. “Voluntary,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2. ad 1, “is said denominatively from the will... which names the rational appetite.” And in the same place, a. 3: “The voluntary is said to be that which is from the will,” namely, as the same Holy Doctor explains in the same article, that which proceeds from the will. Wherefore the voluntary is nothing except either an act of the will or the effect of that act. And thus, q. 20. a. 2. ad 3, the Angelic Doctor says, “it must be said that voluntary is said not only of an act of the will, but also of exterior acts, according as they proceed from will and reason, and therefore there can be a difference of good and evil concerning both.” Just as some motion is from the sole instinct and impulse of nature, so some act is elicited from the vital appetite and arises from prior cognition. Just as the former motion has its proper name and is called natural, so also this act has its proper name and is called voluntary. And therefore this name is never attributed to those things which happen without cognition, and it is not used except to signify those things which are done by one's own will alone, without any exterior impeller. Thus 1 Peter 5:2: Not for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily; and sometimes those things which are done without obligation are also called voluntary, and those things which are done with a ready mind are especially called voluntary. Wherefore by this name voluntary is signified that motion which arises from one's own intrinsic appetite eliciting the act, with prior cognition. For since in every motion there is both to act and to act on account of an end, and since the end, the first cause of all things, does not exercise its causality except by means of cognition of it, the voluntary consequently will be that whose principle is simply intrinsic with cognition of the end. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 10.

10. The voluntary differs from the willed. For the willed neither proceeds from the will, nor consequently is it an act of the will or the effect of that act; but it designates only the object of the act of the will. Suaresius gives the example, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1. n. 2, “of a death effected by another,” while I indeed desire it, consent to it, and rejoice in it, but “do not cooperate.” That depraved desire, consent, and joy are voluntary, because they proceed from the will; but that death of the enemy, effected by another, with me in no way cooperating, is not voluntary for me, but only willed; for it does not proceed from my will, or depend upon it in any way, but is only the object of the act of my will. If, on the contrary, either I myself were to inflict that death, or at least were to cooperate so that it would be inflicted by another, then it would proceed from my will, and for me it would be at once voluntary and willed. Yet the willed object is not altogether excluded from the voluntary, insofar as the voluntary, that is, the very act of the will, is terminated at that object, and the will embraces that object by its act, and the act itself, according as it exists in the concrete, concerning such an object, proceeds from the will. But although not everything willed is also voluntary, nevertheless the voluntary is always in some way willed. For nothing can proceed from the will unless in some way it is the object of the will. Suaresius, l. c. S. 1.

11. Since the voluntary proceeds from the will, which is a principle intrinsic to the agent, the voluntary agrees with any natural motion whatever, but differs from the violent. For the former proceeds from an intrinsic principle, the latter from an extrinsic principle. “But this,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. c. and ad 3, “the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination..... Yet it is commonly of the nature of natural and voluntary motion that they are from an intrinsic principle.” And in the same place, a. 4:

“The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition. But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” And thus in 1 Peter, loc. cit., it is said: “Feed the flock which is among you: overseeing not by constraint, but spontaneously according to God, neither for the sake of base gain, but voluntarily.”

12. The voluntary can be taken in three ways: first, in an improper sense, for the spontaneous; secondly, in a proper and strict sense, for the free; thirdly, in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will. The spontaneous, according as it is distinguished from the voluntary properly so called, is said to be that which proceeds from the sensitive appetite from a prior sensitive cognition of the object into which the appetite tends. For as the appetite of nature follows from the natural form, so the vital appetite, elicited, follows from the apprehended form, actually representing the object. The form apprehended intellectually is followed by the rational appetite or will; the form apprehended sensibly is followed by the animal, or sensitive, appetite, common to brute and man. That which proceeds from the sensitive appetite indeed proceeds necessarily, but flows forth of its own accord, and therefore it is called necessary and spontaneous. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2., q. 8. a. 1., q. 30. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and strict sense, for the free, is that which proceeds from the will determining itself to act, with the active power of the same will of eliciting or not eliciting the act, of eliciting this act or another act. Wherefore the free essentially includes the notion of the simply voluntary. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3. 6.; Lessius on q. 6. St. Thomas a. 1., on q. 9. a. 1. D. 4. The voluntary, taken in a proper and enlarged sense, for any act whatever of the will, is generally that which proceeds from the spiritual or rational appetite, namely from the will, with prior intellective cognition of the object.

13. St. Thomas in 1. 2. seems to acknowledge no other voluntary than in the first and second sense, which voluntary he calls according to an imperfect and perfect notion. Hence the Angelic Doctor requires three things for the perfectly and properly voluntary. The first is that it be from an intrinsic principle, from an intrinsic inclination; for the will, whence voluntary, like every appetite, is nothing but a certain inclination intrinsic to the agent. “Appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing toward something.” 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. The second is that not only the motion itself of the will be from within, but also the motion of the will unto the end, since “it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end”; 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2.; and therefore prior cognition of the end is required. The third, finally, is that the very application of the faculty to act be from within, namely that the faculty itself move itself to the end and not be moved by another. Therefore, according to the Angelic Doctor, the voluntary is then had perfectly or properly, when from within the will there is motion, motion unto the end, determination of motion unto the end. And this last thing, according to the Angelic Doctor, is to move oneself, which in no way is to be confused, from the doctrine of St. Thomas, with motion simply from an intrinsic principle.

14. It is worth the effort to bring forward the very words of the Holy Doctor, so that it may be clear whether the interpretation set forth of his doctrine is genuine. “Of those things which are moved by an intrinsic principle, some move themselves, but some do not. For since every agent, or moved thing, whether it acts or is moved, acts or is moved on account of an end, those are moved perfectly by an intrinsic principle in which there is some intrinsic principle, not only so that they are moved, but so that they are moved unto an end. But for something to be done on account of an end, some cognition of the end is required. Therefore whatever thus acts, or is moved by an intrinsic principle, which has some knowledge of the end, has in itself the principle of its act, not only so that it acts, but also so that it acts on account of an end. But that which has no knowledge of the end, although there is in it a principle of action or motion, nevertheless the principle of that which is to act or to be moved on account of an end is not in it, but in another, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed upon it. Hence things of this kind are not said to move themselves, but to be moved by others. But those things which have knowledge of the end are said to move themselves, because in them there is a principle not only so that they act, but also so that they act on account of an end. And therefore, since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary. But this the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination. And from this it is that the voluntary is said to be, according to the definition of Aristotle and Gregory of Nyssa and Damascene, not only that whose principle is within, but with the addition of knowledge. Hence, since man most of all knows the end of his work and moves himself, in his acts the voluntary is found most of all.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. And then a. 2: “As has been said, for the notion of the voluntary it is required that the principle of the act be within, with some cognition of the end. But cognition of the end is twofold, namely perfect and imperfect. Perfect cognition of the end indeed is when not only the thing which is the end is apprehended, but also the notion of the end is known, and the proportion of that which is ordered to the end itself. And such cognition of the end belongs to rational nature alone. But imperfect cognition of the end is that which consists in the apprehension of the end alone, without this, that the notion of the end and the proportion of the act to the end be known. And such cognition of the end is found in brute animals through sense and natural estimation. Therefore perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, once the end has been apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end, or not be moved. But imperfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the imperfect notion; according as, namely, one apprehending the end does not deliberate, but suddenly is moved into it. Hence to rational nato rational nature belongs the voluntary according to the perfect notion, but according to the imperfect notion it belongs also to brutes... Will names the rational appetite; and therefore it cannot be in those things which lack reason. But voluntary is said denominatively from will, and can be extended to those things in which there is some participation of will according to some agreement with will. And in this way voluntary is attributed to brute animals, insofar namely as through some cognition they are moved unto an end... It must be said that from this it happens that man is master of his act: that he has deliberation concerning his acts. For from the fact that deliberating reason is related to opposites, the will is able toward either. But according to this, the voluntary is not in brute animals, as has been said.” And a. 3. §. Sed contra: “That of which we are masters is said to be voluntary.” And likewise q. 21. a. 2, the Holy Doctor affirms that in all voluntary acts there is present in the will dominion over its act.

15. But when it is said by the Angelic Doctor that the voluntary according to the perfect notion requires that the notion of the end be foreknown, the sense is not that it is necessary to know what an end is; but the sense is that the thing which is the end is known as an end, that is, as a term to be obtained through other things, so that the proportion of these as means to that thing is foreknown. Thus, for example, a woman about to prepare a banquet foreknows the banquet as the term of her preparation. This preparation must be directed to that. Wherefore, by reasoning from the banquet, she is moved to the preparation of these meats, of this wine, at this hour, in this place, as things corresponding to the obtaining of that banquet, and therefore she foreknows the proportion of these things, and therefore chooses and prepares these foods before others, these drinks before others.

16. But properly and strictly such a voluntary is so not only materially, because the voluntary is narrowed to the free, but also formally, since then the act, as has also been said, is from an intrinsic principle simply, not only insofar as the will simply acts and acts on account of an end, but also insofar as from itself it is determined to acting on account of an end, since it can be toward either, as St. Thomas says; or, as the same Angelic Doctor says, it itself is what moves itself unto the end. Since, on the contrary, toward an act of which it itself is not mistress, the will is as it were applied, determined, moved unto the end from elsewhere, namely by the very instinct of nature, by God himself conferring nature, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed, as the Holy Doctor says. Hence the former act, strictly and properly speaking, is voluntary; the latter should rather be called of the will. The former is from the power of the will, namely from the will which can be toward either; the latter is only from the natural inclination of the will. Since that former free act is in reality not concerning the end, namely concerning the necessary end which we necessarily will, by the natural instinct itself, but concerning the means to be chosen for the end; hence St. Thomas constantly narrows the voluntary to the free choice of means.

17. “Since each is from an intrinsic principle, namely that they act, and that they act on account of an end, the motions and acts of these are called voluntary.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. To act on account of an end, as is clear of itself, is not the act itself by which we desire the end, but is the act by which we choose and assume the means, or something as a means to the end. And then, l. c.: “Hence since he most of all knows the end and moves himself (namely unto the end), in his acts the voluntary is found most of all.” The tendency and motion unto the end is contained in the choice of means. And l. c. a. 2: “Perfect cognition of the end is followed by the voluntary according to the perfect notion, according as, namely, with the end apprehended, someone can, deliberating concerning the end and concerning those things which are to the end, be moved unto the end or not be moved.” And q. 10. a. 1, the Holy Doctor sets the voluntary against the natural in the very acts of the will, so that some are voluntary or free, others natural from the very intrinsic necessity of nature. And as the will is founded, as in its principle, in nature itself, that is, in the very substantial nature of man, so the voluntary act is founded in the natural act of the will, as in its principle, namely in the act by which man wills good in common or the ultimate end. For the free act of the will, or voluntary act, is concerning a determinate good, and that which is an end; but the natural act is concerning good in common and the ultimate end. But in every volition the volition of good in common and the volition of the ultimate end is included, as the principle is included in the conclusion. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6., Cajetan on this place; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1., Cajetan on this place.

18. Hence, if by the name voluntary is understood that which is from the will, acting of itself, or moving itself and applying itself to act, that which is from the rational appetite as author and master, which comes under the name voluntary strictly and properly, without doubt the free is altogether of the notion of the voluntary. But if by the name voluntary is understood merely an act of the will, namely an act elicited by the will, or an act elicited by the will according to its own propensity and inclination, the free is not of the notion of the voluntary. For first, the imperfect voluntary from imperfection of cognition is not rarely necessary, as may be seen in sudden motions. Secondly, beatific love is a perfect voluntary, for it is from perfect cognition of the object, and from the will loving God perfectly known by the whole inclination of its proper nature, and it is necessary. Thirdly, “Naturally man wills not only the object of the will, but also other things which belong to other powers, as cognition of the true, which belongs to the intellect; and being and living, and other things of this kind, which regard natural consistency, all of which are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. “It must be said that the ultimate end moves the will of necessity, because it is the perfect good, and similarly those things which are ordered to this end, without which the end cannot be had, such as being, and living, and things of this kind.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 2. ad 3. And these things man wills even by a perfect act of the will. - Therefore man naturally wills three things: first, good in common; secondly, beatitude, or happiness; thirdly, everything fitting to the one willing according to his nature. Suarez, in 1.2. tr. 2. D. 1. S. 3.

19. Now then, as in exterior things the natural is found in two ways, namely always or frequently, so also in natural motions of the will the natural is found in both ways. For toward certain objects, namely toward the first and the second, the will is so naturally determined that it cannot in any way will the opposite. But toward certain things it is so naturally inclined that it can by accident will the opposite, and such is that third object. For that which naturally befits man, such as being and living and other things of this kind, can be considered in two ways. First, these things can be looked at as certain particular goods according to themselves, and thus they can, although rarely, be rejected by the will because they have annexed the defect of some good which is desired, as may be seen in those who kill themselves. Secondly, they can be considered as they are necessarily connected with beatitude or happiness, and thus, so far as is on their part, they cannot be rejected by the will. Wherefore, if they are known sufficiently and in due manner by the intellect and proposed to the will, the will necessarily wills them and cannot not-will them. Cajetan on q. 10. a. 1. 2.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 1. § 3.

20. From what has been said, the distinction between the voluntary and the permitted is clear. The voluntary is that which is from an intrinsic principle, namely from the will, which by its affection, its propensity, its inclination, is borne into it, and therefore truly wills it, and by its volition contributes, as much as it can, that it be. “This the name voluntary imports, that the motion and act be from one's own inclination.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. “The act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle, just as the natural appetite is a certain inclination from an interior principle and without cognition.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. And thus the good which is in the world is voluntary to God, for God truly wills it and by his will contributes that it be. The routing of enemies in the siege of a fortress is voluntary to the leader of the army, for he truly wills it and by his will contributes that the defeated yield to the victors. The permitted is that which someone, although he does not will it, since it is contrary to his proper propensity and inclination, and consequently he positively contributes nothing by his will that it be, nevertheless does not will to impede, although absolutely he can, since from elsewhere he is not bound to do this. Wherefore sin is not voluntary to God, but only permitted by God, since certainly it is against the natural propensity of God and his proper inclination; nor does God positively contribute anything by his will that it be, but he only does not impede it, although he can do this, on account of most wise causes. Likewise, “it must be said that human law is said to permit some things, not as approving them, but because it is not able to direct them.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 93. a. 3. ad 3. The death of innocents, in the assault upon a city, is not voluntary to the leader of the army, since it is outside his intention and affection, and consequently he himself can positively contribute nothing by his will toward it; but it is permitted by him, since, on account of sufficient and rational causes, he does not impede it, although absolutely he could, for he could desist from that assault upon the city. But sin is voluntary to man, and not only permitted by him. “It must be said that that into which the will tends by sinning, although it is evil and contrary to rational nature according to the truth of the thing, nevertheless is apprehended as a good and as fitting to nature, insofar as it is fitting to man according to some delight of sense, or according to some corrupted habit.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 3. And in this way the will is inclined and borne into it by its affection, and wills it: “when the will is moved by the appetible according to its own inclination, the motion is voluntary.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. ad 2.

21. Further, from what has been said, what the involuntary is is clear. The involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. Therefore the involuntary can be taken in three ways. First and properly for the involuntary, according as it is distinguished from the non-voluntary, or for the involuntary contrarily. Such an involuntary “is said through this, that the will is contrary to that which is done, whence sadness follows upon the involuntary.” St. Thomas, De Malo, q. 3. a. 8. Wherefore the involuntary contrarily is that which in a voluntary act is against the positive affection of the will. Secondly, the involuntary is taken for the non-voluntary. “The non-voluntary is said through the mere removal of the act of the will.” St. Thomas, l. c. Moreover, the removal of the act of the will can be understood in two ways: first negatively, for a mere negation of the voluntary. Of this kind are all acts which are neither elicited nor commanded by the will. Secondly privatively, insofar as an otherwise voluntary act lacks under some respect some condition required for a voluntary act, and thus that voluntary act is at the same time called an involuntary or non-voluntary act. Therefore the involuntary privatively is that which, in a voluntary act, is not from voluntary consent, insofar as some condition of the voluntary is lacking, namely due cognition on the part of the intellect and deliberation on the part of the will, and yet there is not in the will a contrary affection. Hence, says St. Thomas, l. c., sadness follows upon the involuntary, which nevertheless does not always follow upon the non-voluntary. For sometimes it happens that someone approaching one not his own, whom he believes to be his own, although he does not actually will to approach one not his own, because he does not know her to be not his own, nevertheless wills habitually and would will actually if he knew; whence when he afterward perceives that she was not his own, he is not saddened but rejoices, unless he has changed his will.” But if he neither wills habitually, nor would will actually if he knew, it would not be held merely non-voluntary, but involuntary. And from this example it appears how the involuntary and the non-voluntary privatively are verified only in a voluntary act, while for the non-voluntary merely negatively no act of the will is prerequired.

22. If in the involuntary that contrary affection of the will is of itself efficacious for impeding the contrary motion, so far as is on the part of the one operating, and the thing is so displeasing to the will that it wills it in no way, the involuntary simply is had. But if that affection is a simple affection, of itself not efficacious for impeding the contrary act, or if the thing is not so altogether displeasing to the will, and the will wills it at least in some way, then the involuntary in a certain respect is had. Hence an indication can be taken concerning consent or dissent of the will with respect to temptations to be repelled; concerning perfect or imperfect resistance of the will to the same; so that although perhaps mortal sin is excluded, nevertheless some defect, negligence, and venial sin are not excluded. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 3., a. 7. ad 2.

23. Since the voluntary is had by an act of the will, various questions are raised here concerning the object of this act, concerning the will itself passing from potency to act, concerning the very act of the will required for the voluntary. And first, with respect to the object, it is asked: whether the will is concerned only with good. - The answer must be affirmative. The reason: the will is the rational appetite. But every appetite is only of the good, because appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination of the one appetizing into something. “But nothing is inclined except into something similar and fitting. Since therefore every thing, insofar as it is a being and a substance, is a certain good, it is necessary that every inclination be into good.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. But since each power extends itself to those things in which the notion of its object can be found in any way whatsoever, and since the notion of good is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are to the end, the will extends itself to all these things, St. Thomas, ib. a. 2. But since the will tends into apprehended good, “for the will to tend into something, it is not required that it be good in the truth of the thing, but that it be apprehended under the notion of good.” St. Thomas, ib. a. 1. Therefore the will can indeed be concerned with evil as material object, but by no means as formal object. But since the same power is of opposites, yet not bearing itself in the same way to each, the will is related both to good and to evil: to good by desiring it, but to evil by fleeing it. Hence, since whatever the will wills or does, it wills or does because it is good or on account of good, good and end are convertible, and the object of the will is said to be good and end. St. Thomas, ib. ad 1., q. 1. a. 2. ad 3. - Cf. Becanus, On Beatitude and Human Acts, C. 2. q. 7.; Lessius in l. c. St. Thomas.

24. Moreover, the good into which the will tends must not only be apprehended, but also determinate and possible. - First, the voluntary cannot be except concerning a determinate thing. For the will is moved only into good; but good has the notion of an end. “Since good is what all things desire, and this has the notion of an end, it is manifest that good imports the notion of an end.” St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 5. a. 4. But an end is only something certain and determinate. And therefore he who wills to contract betrothal with either of two does not contract, and the priest who wills to consecrate any one host out of several hosts does not consecrate. Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 1. D. 26. S. 1., Rubr. Miss. De Defectibus, § VII. n. 1. - Furthermore, the voluntary cannot be concerning an impossible thing. For “the will is a certain rational appetite; but every appetite is only of the good. The reason for this is that appetite is nothing other than a certain inclination into something. But nothing is inclined except into something similar and fitting.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. - Although, however, the object of the will must be a possible good, it is not nevertheless necessary that this good also be existing, because, since it moves the will only metaphorically through cognition, it is enough that it be apprehended by the mind and represented in the imagination. For it does not move the will except insofar as it is judged by the intellect to be fitting or good.

25. Having been established that the voluntary must be concerning a possible good, can the voluntary at least be concerning a thing impossible not in fact, but in law? - Concerning a thing impossible as to the fact itself, the voluntary cannot be, as is clear from what has been said, cf. n. 24, if someone uses reason rightly. Hence no one can seriously will to touch with his hand a vacuum space outside the world. The question is concerning a thing impossible only as to law, for example, to contract marriage with one having a diriment impediment, to consecrate water, to baptize with wine, etc. But it seems that the answer must be affirmative, since the will is borne into the fact itself, and need not necessarily be borne at the same time into the law, or into the fact only dependently upon the law. And thus one who contracts marriage with a diriment impediment unknown, and one who even attempts marriage before a civil magistrate, truly wills, so far as in him lies, to contract marriage. Hence it is that the Church afterward sometimes dispenses in the root, namely without consent being renewed, and validates the marriage, Sanchez, On Matrimony, l. 2. D. 33. And indeed in C. Ex sponsalibus, un., de Spons. in 6., it is said: “from pure and certain betrothals, even if they are null by reason of consanguinity, affinity, frigidity, religion, or any other reason, provided they are not null from defect of consent, there arises ... the impediment of justice of public honesty.” Therefore true consent with a diriment impediment is openly supposed.

26. From the object of the will we proceed to the very faculty of the will, as passing from potency to act.

Hence the first question arises: whether the will is moved by the intellect? - The will is by no means moved by the intellect with respect to the exercise of the act. The reason is that the will is an inclination into the good of the whole supposit, while the other faculties are inclinations into some particular good of the supposit. But the inclination into the good of the whole ought to move and incite the particular inclinations, because particular goods ought to be referred to the good of the whole, and not conversely; just as a cause which regards the universal end moves causes which regard particular ends. Therefore “it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. Since the first final principle pertains to the will, it itself is the first mover in man. St. Thomas, 1.2. q. 9. a. 1., q. 11. a. 1. ad 2. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1.; Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 2. D. 6. S. 7. But the intellect moves the will with respect to the specification of the act. For the intellect is what proposes the object to the will. “But the object moves by determining the act after the manner of a formal principle, from which action is specified in natural things.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. After the manner of a formal principle, because it is not an intrinsic formal principle but an extrinsic one, nevertheless not separated, as an idea or exemplar, but conjoined.

27. Another question follows: whether the will is moved by the sensitive appetite? - The answer must be negative with respect to the exercise of the act, on account of the same reason brought forward in the preceding number. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1. But sense moves the will not directly and immediately, but indirectly and mediately, by inducing a disposition in the willing subject with respect to the specification of the act. For “that which is apprehended under the notion of good and fitting moves the will by mode of object. But that something appears good and fitting happens from two things, namely from the condition of that which is proposed, and of him to whom it is proposed. For fitting is said according to relation, whence it depends on each of the extremes. And thence it is that taste disposed in diverse ways does not receive something in the same way as fitting and as not fitting. Whence the Philosopher says in 3 Ethics, cap. 5. a med. to. 5., As each one is, such does the end seem to him. But it is manifest that according to passion of the sensitive appetite man is changed to some disposition, whence according as man is in some passion something seems fitting to him which does not seem so to him existing outside the passion: as to the angry man something seems good which does not seem so to the quiet man; and in this way, on the part of the object, the sensitive appetite moves the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 2. Nor indeed does it stand in the way that the mover is not moved by that which it moves, so that there would be reciprocal motion. But the will moves the sensitive appetite, insofar as it obeys reason. For St. Thomas answers, l. c. ad 3: “It must be said that reason, in which the will is, moves by its command the irascible and concupiscible, not indeed by despotic principality, as a slave is moved by his master, but by royal or political principality, as free men are ruled by a governor, who nevertheless can move contrariwise. Whence both the irascible and the concupiscible can move the will in the contrary direction. And thus nothing prevents the will from sometimes being moved by them.” Cf. St. Thomas, l. c. a. 5.; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6. S. 6. 7.; Cajetan on q. 9. a. 2.

28. Aptly St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1: “It must be said that something needs to be moved by another insofar as it is in potency to several things. For that which is in potency must be reduced into act through something which is in act, and this is to move. But some power of the soul is found to be in potency to diverse things in two ways: in one way as to acting or not acting; in another way as to acting this or that; as sight sometimes sees actually and sometimes does not see, and sometimes sees white and sometimes sees black. Therefore it needs a mover as to two things, namely as to the exercise or use of the act, and as to the determination of the act; of which the first is on the part of the subject, which sometimes is found acting, sometimes not acting; but the other is on the part of the object, according as the act is specified. But the motion of the subject itself is from some agent. And since every agent acts on account of an end, as was shown above q. 1. a. 2., the principle of this motion is from the end. And thence it is that the art to which the end belongs moves by its command the art to which that which is to the end belongs, as the art of steering commands the art of shipbuilding.... But good in common, which has the notion of an end, is the object of the will. And therefore on this part the will moves the other powers of the soul to their acts. For we use other powers when we will. For the ends and perfections of all the other powers are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain particular goods. But always the art or power to which the universal end belongs moves to acting the art or power to which the particular end belongs, comprehended under that universal: as the leader of an army, who intends the common good, namely the order of the whole army, moves by his command some one of the tribunes, who intends the order of one battle-line.” Therefore according to the Angelic Doctor the will is not moved with respect to the exercise of the act either by the intellect or by sense. But on the contrary, it itself is what moves the other faculties with respect to the exercise of the act. Hence the same Holy Doctor, l. c. ad 3, says still more clearly: “It must be said that the will moves the intellect as to the exercise of the act, because even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is contained under universal good, as a certain particular good.”

29. Since the will, as has been said, is moved in some way by the inferior appetite, another question thence arises: whether the will is moved of necessity by the inferior appetite. - It must be said that either reason is totally bound by the passion of the sensitive appetite, or reason is not totally absorbed by passion, but there remains, as to something, the free judgment of reason. If the first is verified, then there is not any motion of reason, and consequently neither of the will. If the second has place, according as the free judgment of reason remains as to something, consequently something of the motion of the will remains. “Therefore insofar as reason remains free and not subject to passion, so far the motion of the will which remains does not tend of necessity to that to which passion inclines. And thus either the motion of the will is not in man, but passion alone dominates; or if there is a motion of the will, it does not follow passion of necessity.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 3. Wherefore, although the will cannot make it that motions of concupiscence do not arise, nevertheless it can not will to desire, or not consent to concupiscence. For although reason is clouded over by passion, nevertheless something of reason remains free. And according to this someone can either repel the passion totally, or at least contain himself lest he follow the passion. Sometimes indeed the sensitive part is totally subjected to reason, as happens in the virtuous and in the saints. Sometimes, conversely, reason is totally absorbed by passion, as happens in those who through vehement anger or concupiscence become furious or insane; concerning such persons the same account holds as concerning brute animals, which of necessity follow the impulse of passion. But we will and operate many things apart from passion of the sensitive appetite, through the choice alone of the rational appetite, as is clear in those things in which reason resists passion. St. Thomas, l. c. ad 1. 2. 3.

30. Since the will is moved neither by the intellect nor by sense to the exercise or use of the act, it is now asked: whether the will moves itself to act. - With respect to the specification of the act, the will is moved by the object, as is already clear from what has been said in n. 26. With respect to the exercise of the act, the will moves itself in the volition of means. For to move oneself is to reduce oneself, to apply oneself, to determine oneself from potency to act, by ordering oneself to the end. But the will, with respect to the volition of means unto the end, because it is free and has dominion over the act, is itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end. Therefore. On the contrary, by an exterior principle, which is the cause of the will itself, it is moved with respect to the exercise of the act in the first volition of the end. For in this volition the will is not itself that which determines itself to act and orders itself to the end, but it is determined by the natural instinct itself of the will, received from an exterior principle, namely from God. Hence the principle of voluntary motions is something naturally willed, which is good in common, the ultimate end itself, and universally all those things which befit the one willing according to his nature. But the will does not always will these various objects actually, although it always has the aforesaid natural instinct, “but only when it is in some determinate disposition,” by which the aforesaid natural power is then stirred up to act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 10. a. 1. c. ad 1. 2.

31. That according to St. Thomas the will moves itself with respect to the exercise of the act in the volition of means is affirmed most clearly in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3, where the Angelic Doctor treats this question expressly: whether the will moves itself. In the paragraph Sed contra, he says: “because the will is mistress of its act, and in it there is to will and not to will; which would not be if it did not have in its power to move itself to willing. Therefore it moves itself.” And then he responds: “It must be said that.... it belongs to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will. But... in this way the end is related in appetible things as a principle in intelligible things. But it is manifest that the intellect, through the fact that it knows a principle, reduces itself from potency into act as to the knowledge of conclusions. And in this way it moves itself. And similarly the will, through the fact that it wills the end, moves itself to willing those things which are to the end,” passing from act to act. And ad 1: “It must be said that the will does not move and is not moved according to the same thing. Whence neither according to the same thing is it in act and in potency; but insofar as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are to the end, namely so that it actually wills them.” The same is clear from 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2: “It must be said that it is necessary that all agents act on account of an end. For among causes ordered to one another, if the first is removed, it is necessary that the others be removed. But the first among all causes is the final cause. The reason for this is that matter does not obtain form except according as it is moved by an agent. For nothing reduces itself from potency into act. But the agent does not move except from intention of the end. For if an agent were not determined to some effect, it would not act this more than that. Therefore, in order that it produce a determinate effect, it is necessary that it be determined to something certain, which has the notion of an end. But this determination, as in rational nature it comes about through the rational appetite, which is called will, so in other things it comes about through natural inclination, which is called natural appetite.” St. Thomas then adds the things which have already been reported in n. 1, and in c. ad 1. 2 he says that man is moving himself to the end; that those things which have reason move themselves to the end, because they have dominion over their acts; that it is proper to rational nature that it tend to the end as acting itself, or leading itself to the end; that man through himself acts on account of an end; that man orders into the end and acts himself into the end. This discussion indeed is about the volition of means. St. Thomas treats the question: whether to act on account of an end is proper to rational nature. Now to act on account of an end is to will and assume something as a means proportioned to attaining the end. And it is the same thing to move oneself to the end, to tend into the end, to act or lead oneself to the end, to order into the end; and, as the same Holy Doctor has it, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. ad 3, to be moved by itself according to the notion of the end; for he says that the will is moved by itself as to the exercise of the act, according to the notion of the end. And in the same place, when the second difficulty has been proposed: “A movable thing is moved at the presence of the mover. But the will is always present to itself. If therefore it moved itself, it would always be moved, which is clearly false,” he responds: “To the second it must be said that the power of the will is always actually present to itself; but the act of the will by which it wills the end sometimes is not always in the will itself. But in this way it moves itself. Whence it does not follow that it always moves itself;” since one actually willing the end moves himself to the means to be willed.

32. As regards the volition of the end, in 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4 the Holy Doctor asks whether the will is moved by some exterior principle; and he responds by distinguishing motion as to specification and as to exercise, saying: “It must be said that according as the will is moved by the object, it is manifest that it can be moved by something exterior. But in that way in which it is moved, as to the exercise of the act, it is necessary to posit that the will is moved by some exterior principle. For everything which is sometimes an agent in act and sometimes in potency needs to be moved by some mover. But it is manifest that the will begins to will something when previously it did not will this. Therefore it is necessary that it be moved by something to willing. And indeed, as was said in the preceding article, it moves itself insofar as through the fact that it wills the end it reduces itself to willing those things which are to the end. But it cannot do this except by means of counsel. For when someone wills to be healed, he begins to think how he might attain this; and through such thought he arrives at this, that he can be healed through a physician, and this he wills; but because he did not always actually will health, it is necessary that he began to will to be healed from some mover; (that is, some principle was the cause for him why he began to will). And if indeed it moved itself to willing, it would have been necessary that it do this by means of counsel from some presupposed will, but one must not proceed to infinity. Whence it is necessary to posit that, into the first motion of the will, the will comes forth from the instinct of some exterior mover.” But this exterior mover, as is held from article 6, is God.

33. In order that these things may be made clear, it must be noted that for the will to move itself can be taken in two ways: first, according as it merely signifies that it passes from potency of volition to the act of willing, the active power of the will being sufficient for this in its own order, namely in the order of a second cause, without another mover being required as though supplying a defect of the active faculty of the will in that order of a second cause. And in this sense, whether the discussion is about the volition of means or about the volition of the end, “it is certain,” says Cajetan in l. c., “that for willing the will with the object suffices.” Whether the will wills the end or wills the means, it always wills, and the active power of the will is always the same; nor is a greater active power required for willing one thing than for willing another. Whence it is also clear that if in this sense, according to the Angelic Doctor, the will moves itself in the volition of means, the will also moves itself in the volition of the end. Therefore, besides this ordinary and evident sense, there is another peculiar and more intimate sense. For the will to move itself can signify not only that the will wills, but that the will acts, and reduces and applies itself to acting; and to will is not the same as to act, to move; nor does that which suffices for willing suffice for acting, for moving. For willing, as has been said, the will and the object suffice; but for acting something else is required, for the end also is required; for to act is to act on account of an end. “It is necessary that all agents act on account of an end.” Indeed the appetite of the end is prerequired, either in time or by nature. “The first among all causes is the final cause... An agent does not move except from intention of the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2. For moving oneself, that is, for determining oneself to act, the end is likewise prerequired, namely the appetite of the end. And the reason is clear, because an agent, by moving itself, that is, by reducing itself from the potency of acting to the act of acting, reduces itself from that potency to a certain act, to a determinate act, and this can be only from intention of the end. St. Thomas, ib. Whence it is also that in this sense the will moves itself only when it proceeds from one act into another, from intention of the end to the choice of means. And in this sense St. Thomas takes that expression, the will moves itself, and upon this, that the agent acts on account of an end, and upon motion, which is the act of the movable by the mover, he builds his whole doctrine. Cajetan on q. 9. a. 4.

34. And this truly signifies that the will moves itself, for, as is clear, it does not signify that the will simply wills, but signifies the will acting from itself, namely the causative force or causality of the will applying itself to acting; and for this the will with the object does not suffice, but the will is required as pre-willing the end by nature or in time, as has already been said. Wherefore that moving itself or acting from itself does not import in this sense, as in the former, the exclusion of another mover, as though furnishing powers for acting, but it excludes only the application to acting from intention of the end made by an exterior mover: the will itself, mistress of its act, from the prior intention of the end applies itself to acting, or to willing the means. The will, through the fact that it wills the end, moves itself to willing those things which are to the end... Insofar as it actually wills the end, it reduces itself from potency into act with respect to those things which are to the end, so that, namely, it actually wills them... The will is moved by itself according to the notion of the end. St. Thomas, l. c. Whence it is more than sufficiently clear that St. Thomas derives from the prior volition of the end the fact that the will acts from itself, or moves itself. This indeed is not verified in the first volition of the end; and the reason brought forward by the Holy Doctor is now well understood, why, although the will moves itself in the volition of means, nevertheless it does not move itself also in the very volition of the end, namely in the first volition of the end, because if indeed it moved itself to willing the end, it would have been necessary that it do this by means of counsel, namely from a prevolition or intention of the end, for this is to act from counsel, just as to know by means of syllogism and from principles is the same; and consequently from some presupposed will of the end, which would be to proceed to infinity. Wherefore it is necessary that, into the first motion of the will concerning the end, the will comes forth from the instinct of some exterior mover, namely God, that is, from the very instinct of the will's proper nature tending to good, given indeed by an exterior principle, not received from the object, but from God, the cause effecting and creating the will with its proper nature. Wherefore in the first volition of the end, it is not the will itself which moves itself, acts from itself, as mistress of the act ordering, acting, leading, directing itself into the end; but the will in this volition is moved and acted, ordered and directed by an exterior mover, namely by God. Aptly Cajetan in l. c.: “And this act (of volition of the end) is said to be from an exterior agent... because to this act the will does not concur as acting on account of an end, but as tending to the end from the direction of the superior agent ordering it in this. And for this reason this act, although it is willing, and of the will, and from the will as eliciting the act, nevertheless is not voluntary, because it is not from the will as applying itself to willing, but natural; because the giver of nature applies it by means of an inclination given for willing. For it is necessary, as is said in the text, that there be an infinite process in voluntary things unless one arrives at one non-voluntary but natural act of the will, in which there is a stopping point.” Cf. Contra Gentiles, l. 2. c. 48., l. 3. c. 88. 89.; Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4.

35. Besides, no doubt truly can remain for anyone concerning the mind of the Holy Doctor, if one remembers the texts which have already been reported in the preceding numbers, in which the Holy Doctor explains what he himself understands by moving oneself and being moved, when he explains the distinction between a rational and irrational agent; where he says that to move oneself is to order oneself into the end, which rational nature does, but to be moved is to be ordered by another into the end, namely by God, which is verified in irrational nature. Wherefore according to the Holy Doctor, to move oneself is to move oneself into the end; to be moved is likewise to be moved into the end, which the Holy Doctor sometimes says explicitly, sometimes more briefly, only implicitly; the term of that motion is not precisely act, but act toward the end; for it is one thing, speaking precisely, to move oneself to act, another to move oneself to a certain act, and consequently to an end, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2; for in reality it is not act and motion as such, but act and motion toward an end. And thus St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 2, explicitly says: “Those things which have reason move themselves to the end...., those which lack reason tend to the end through natural inclination, as moved by another.” And 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1: “That which has no knowledge of the end, although in it there is a principle of action or motion, nevertheless the principle of that which is to act or to be moved on account of an end is not in it, but in another, by whom the principle of its motion unto the end is impressed upon it. Hence things of this kind are not said to move themselves, but by others to be moved. But those things which have knowledge of the end are said to move themselves, because in them there is a principle not only so that they act, but also so that they act on account of an end.”

36. Now powers are of a twofold order. Some are those which are exercised by their own act alone, as are all natural and animal powers which are not subject to the superior command of our will. But some are those in which the use of the proper act is distinguished from the act itself; such are all natural and animal powers insofar as they are subject to a superior command and use, which, namely, we use when we will. For command is an act of the will as moving to act; use is likewise an act of the will as applying the executive powers, and of those same powers as executing. Powers of the first order have simply to operate, and to operate this, from the same mover: the exercise and the species of the act. Use or ordination into the end is had only from the first and universal mover, or from God, giving or causing nature. But powers of the second order, as is clear, have the exercise and use of the act and its ordination to the end from one mover, and from another they have the specific or specified act, because the use and exercise of the act is something other than the specified act. Moreover, by exercise of the act the Angelic Doctor understands use properly so called, which is an act of the will as of a principle moving and applying the executive powers, and of these same powers as executing. Wherefore by being in potency to act and not to act, he does not understand potency to its own acting and not acting itself, according to themselves, but potency to acting and not acting according as they are subject to use and to active ordination to the end. For the visual power, for example, if it is referred to seeing and not seeing as such, and seeing this, say white or black, is reduced by the same mover, say white, both into the act of seeing and into the act of seeing white. And this is to compare the power to only its own act and object according to itself. But if it is referred to seeing and seeing white as it is subject to use, then, since use is the act of the visual power not according to itself, but as executing the will commanding the use, thus it needs one mover for this, that it be reduced into the act of use and of ordination into the end, and another for this, that it be reduced into the act of its own proper species. Therefore sight according to itself does not need a twofold mover, one for this, that it see, and another for this, that it see white. And it is similar in other natural things. From the same mover each is had, both that they operate and that they operate this. And it is clear that reason supports this from the fact that in the concrete there is not indeed a twofold real potency to a twofold real act, one potency to acting and another potency to acting this; but there is one potency to one adequate act, requiring one adequate mover, namely that, as that act cannot be an act in reality without at the same time being this act, so the mover cannot move to act without at the same time moving to this act; and conversely, it cannot move to this act without at the same time moving to act. Therefore one power does not need two movers diverse over against one another, such as are on the part of the object and on the part of the subject. And this is confirmed: for when an active power, of itself sufficient for the act, and the object are posited, if all other things prerequired for acting are not lacking, that power, because it is active and sufficient, puts forth its powers and acts, and it does not need another extrinsic or intrinsic mover. Thus in the present question, for the will to will, for example, is for the will to elicit an act of volition. Once the will is posited, a faculty active of itself, and once the object is sufficiently proposed to it on the part of the intellect, the will is reduced into act by its own proper force, without any other motive force, either extrinsic or intrinsic, impelling it to act. Besides, the difficulty would return concerning that other motive force, which would itself need another motive force, and so on to infinity. Hence, as is clear, the necessary concurrence of God for acting is not thereby excluded, which is required for another reason, namely because as a creature depends on God in its being, so also it depends on God in its operating.

37. Wherefore, besides the mover on the part of the object, there is no need of an extrinsic mover on the part of the subject in order that a power operate simply, or that it be determined to operating. Otherwise the will, in necessary natural acts, would not be a sufficient active power for willing, and in free acts it would no longer be able toward either, nor would it be mistress of the act, nor would it itself determine itself to act, as St. Thomas himself hands down in very many places. Therefore a mover on the part of the subject is needed only so that the power acts, that is, acts on account of an end and is ordered to the end. It stands, therefore, that one power, according to itself, needs one mover; and, as it is subject to another, it needs another, as is clear. And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 1., cf. n. 28, when he establishes the necessity of a mover on the part of the subject, does not speak generally of any power whatever which simply passes from potency to act, as otherwise his doctrine would have to be understood in the most general sense, but he speaks of a power of the soul. But he speaks of the powers of the soul not absolutely according to themselves, but he speaks of these powers which we use when we will, and therefore according as they are subject to a superior power. Nor does he speak simply of the exercise of the act, but of the exercise or use of the act, and its ordination into the end, as is clear from the reason brought forward from the end, and from the more general end which moves to the means and to particular ends, since that motion belongs altogether to another superior faculty, namely insofar as the art or faculty to which the end or more universal end belongs moves another subordinated to itself, to which the means or particular end belongs. Hence the motion of this is not simply according to itself, but according as it is subject to the prior faculty and to ordination into the end. Hence in the cited q. 9. a. 1, St. Thomas explains this motion only by command: the superior faculty, he says, moves the inferior by its command. Wherefore there, ad 3, St. Thomas says, “It must be said that the will moves the intellect as to the exercise of the act, because even the true itself, which is the perfection of the intellect, is contained under universal good (the object of the will) as a certain particular good.” Therefore the matter is not about the simple exercise of the act of the intellect, or according to itself, but about that exercise of the act according as it is subject to the command and use of the will. And, in truth, if it were otherwise, it would then follow that the intellect could not be moved to act without a prior motion of the will, which is clearly false.

38. And since the will, by its innate liberty, also commands itself, and also uses its own free act in order to attain the end, it is clear that in elicited and free acts of the will of this kind, there is need of a twofold motion, one on the part of the object, with respect to the specification of the act, the other on the part of the subject with respect to the exercise or use of the act and of its ordination into the end. For when the object has been proposed to the will by the intellect, the will still remains in potency to willing or not willing; it needs another motion, distinct from the motion of the object, by which it is moved in reality to act and is ordered to the end, and this is on the part of the subject, that is, of the will itself willing the end, or of the act of the will by which it wills the end. For in this way the will moves itself, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 3. ad 2. Therefore the will moves itself insofar as through the fact that it wills the end, it reduces itself to willing those things which are to the end. St. Thomas, l. c. a. 4. c. Whence the aforesaid motion is not required for this, that the will simply will, but that it act itself into the end. But into the first motion of the will the will proceeds from the instinct of an exterior mover, ib. a. 4. c. From this it is clear that the will does not move itself in every act of its own, but only in some, namely in those which are appetitions of means. And thus St. Thomas expressly says, l. c. a. 4. in c. and ad 3, that the will cannot move itself with respect to all things. Wherefore the will, with respect to the same exercise of the act, in its free acts, itself moves itself to act, by choosing means to the end and by ordering itself to the end; which nevertheless does not exclude that it is also moved by God, the first cause.

39. But in necessary acts it is itself what wills by its innate power, since the will is a vital and active power, but it does not move itself to act by ordering itself to the end: it proceeds into the aforesaid act and is ordered into the aforesaid end by the force of the natural instinct implanted in it by God. For that natural instinct has been implanted in the will by God, the cause of the will, so that the will can rightly be said to be moved by God. “The will,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 4. ad 3, “with respect to something sufficiently moves itself (in free acts) and in its own order (because the will is the proximate principle, which does not exclude the first principle which is from without, ibid. ad 1); but it cannot move itself with respect to all things (namely also in necessary and natural acts); whence it needs to be moved by another, as by the first mover,” insofar as the natural instinct has been implanted by him. Cfr. also 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. ad 1. ad 3. “Whence the Holy Doctor says in the body of the article, it is necessary to posit that into the first motion of the will (necessary and natural) the will proceeds from the instinct of some exterior mover,” who is God. For it is God who implants this instinct in the will toward good in common, by which afterward the will is inclined toward particular good, either likewise naturally, by the force of the natural instinct itself, or freely by determining itself to that. “God,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6. ad 3, “moves the will of man, as universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good, and without this universal motion man cannot will anything.”

40. But from the fact that the will does not move itself except by willing those things which are to the end, and not by willing the end itself, it does not follow that in reality the will does not move itself by willing any end whatever. The reason brought forward by the Holy Doctor, that otherwise there would be a process to infinity, altogether excludes this. For that reason proves the intended point only with respect to the first volition of the end. And this is confirmed by the fact itself; for it is evident that the will does not will every end naturally and necessarily, but can also well will ends freely, and by willing these ends sin. Moreover, from the fact that the will does not move itself except by willing those things which are to the end, it does not follow that the will ought always to order all things explicitly to some extrinsic end, and ought explicitly to will all things under the notion of means or under the notion of end. For acts commanded by a free will are on account of an end, because actions of this kind proceed from intention of the end by choice of means, and are usually the principal means for attaining the end. Acts elicited by the will which are concerned with means, as choice is, are most of all on account of an end, because likewise they proceed from intention of the end and are ordered to obtaining the end. But even an act of intention of the end is on account of an end. For intention proceeds from love of the end. Therefore it is on account of the end, since to act on account of an end or for the sake of the end is the same; and that which is done from love of the end is done for the sake of the end. But an act of this kind tends to a definite aim, not rashly, but from the direction of the agent himself; and therefore man in that act truly operates on account of an end, as moving himself by that act into the formal end, with prior cognition of it. Simple love or simple will is also on account of an end. For in loving a good, it is loved on account of its intrinsic goodness. And thus God is rightly said to be loved, as ultimate end, on account of himself, on account of his intrinsic infinite goodness. And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. c., teaches universally that every human act is on account of an end, and simple love of God, as ultimate end, freely elicited, is a human act. Therefore simple love is on account of an end, not because it is on account of some extrinsic reason for willing such an end, but because it is on account of the intrinsic goodness of it. Nor indeed does that particle on account of signify an extrinsic reason for willing, but it simply denotes the reason for willing, the causality and motion of willing. Suarez, in 1. 2. tr. 1. D. 2. S. 1.

41. Moreover, the will, as will, is concerned rather with the end, which it properly wills; as free, it is concerned rather with the means, to which choice properly pertains. An act of the will is sometimes efficacious, sometimes inefficacious by way of simple complacency. That thing which is the end contains in itself the notion of honorable and delectable good, the notion of the appetible on account of itself, the notion of an end; which last notion does not consist in this, that good appetible on account of itself moves the will to love or desire of itself, for this is had from the notion of good appetible on account of itself; but rather it is in this, that by love and desire of itself it moves the will to the choice of means by which that good can be obtained if absent, or conserved if present. The same must be said of a means; for in it there is the notion of useful good, the notion of the appetible on account of another, the notion or causality of means. Moreover, there cannot be given an act of the will, whether efficacious or inefficacious, which is not concerned either with the end or with the means, at least materially. For every good is desired either on account of itself or on account of another. Nevertheless there can be given an inefficacious act of the will, or one by way of simple complacency, which explicitly is not concerned with means insofar as they have the notion of means, nor with the end insofar as it has the notion of end. For someone can, by way of simple complacency, love honorable or delectable good under the notion of good appetible on account of itself, abstracting from the notion of end. And similarly he can love useful good under the notion of good appetible on account of another, abstracting from the notion of means. A married man can indeed love the good of chastity on account of itself, under the notion of the honorable, stopping in it itself, namely in such a way that from love of it he is not moved to choosing means; for he can will not to attain it, and therefore he does not love it under the notion of an end. Similarly he can love it on account of another, under the notion of useful good, stopping in it, namely in such a way that he neither chooses nor assumes it as a means to attaining some end. Becanus, tr. 1, On Beatitude, c. 2. q. 8.

42. Therefore to the question, whether God moves the will, “it must be said, with the Holy Doctor, 1. 2. q. 9. a. 6. ad 3, that God moves the will of man, as universal mover, to the universal object of the will, which is good. And without this universal motion man cannot will anything.” For whatever man wills, he always wills good, and he is moved to willing good by God, who gives this natural inclination to the will, by universal motion, as the Angelic Doctor says. Therefore God moves the will insofar as he gives it a natural instinct toward good, and thus he moves it as universal mover and by universal motion. For “in all ordered movers it is necessary that the power of the second mover be derived from the power of the first mover, because the second mover does not move except insofar as it is moved by the first.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 33. a. 3. Therefore the second mover is moved by the first mover, insofar as it has power derived from the first mover; for otherwise, from the fact that the second mover does not move except as moved by the first mover, it would not follow that it receives power derived from that one. Therefore the human will is moved by God, the power of natural instinct toward good having been implanted in it. And in 1. 2. q. 13. a. 2. 3, “it must be said,” says St. Thomas, “that, as is said in Physics l. 3. text. 16 and following, motion is ‘the act of the movable by the mover’; and therefore the power of the mover appears in the motion of the movable; and on account of this, in all things which are moved by reason there appears the order of the moving reason, although the things themselves which are moved by reason do not have reason. For thus an arrow tends directly to the mark from the motion of the archer, as if it itself had reason directing it; and the same appears in the motions of clocks and of all human contrivances which are made by art. But as artificial things are compared to human art, so all natural things are compared to divine art. And therefore order appears in those things which are moved according to nature, just as in those things which are moved according to art, as is said in Physics l. 2. text. 49. And from this it happens that in the works of brute animals certain sagacities appear insofar as they have a natural inclination to certain most ordered processes, as ordered by the highest art. And on account of this also certain animals are called prudent or sagacious, not because there is in them any reason or choice; which appears from this, that all things which are of one nature operate similarly.” Therefore the human will, insofar as it has from God a natural instinct toward good, is moved by God and is moved to the end, as by a universal mover and universal motion, in the way that a clock is moved by the artificer and by art, to indicating the hours, by the workmanship fashioned in it. By universal motion: for “man through reason determines himself to willing this or that, which is truly good or apparently good.” Therefore God so moves the human will that in free acts he does not determine it to the act, since it is itself what determines itself to the act, where the matter concerns the volition of good in particular. Wherefore in such a volition of particular good God so moves the will that this will can be toward either: “But nevertheless sometimes God especially moves certain persons to willing something determinately, which is good, as in those whom he moves through grace, as will be said below, q. 109 and 112.” q. 9. a. 6. ad 3. For God moves the will in the supernatural order both as to exercise and as to specification, by infusing various supernatural habits and acts, concerning which there is treatment in the Treatise on Grace. - Besides this reason why God moves the will, namely that God has given to the will a natural inclination to the good of reason, there is another reason which the Holy Doctor assigns in the body of the cited article, namely that God is the author of the will itself, and that this consequently depends in its being and operating upon God as upon the first cause. And this reason is the root and foundation of the former, and is common to the will and to all other created things. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 1. ad 3. Whence it follows that the human will is moved by God alone, as by an exterior principle, since the human will depends on God alone in its being and operating; from God alone, the cause of its nature, it has the universal inclination to good; and therefore it is moved by God alone as by an exterior principle, insofar as he is for it the cause of willing. Thus, therefore, the human will is moved by God in its acts in such a way that it is not excluded that it simply moves itself: for something can be moved by another which nevertheless moves itself, “and thus it is with the human mind.” St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 24. a. 1. ad 5.

43. Finally, the question is raised concerning the very act of the will required for the voluntary: whether the voluntary can exist without every act? - The Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3, treats expressly the question whether the voluntary can exist without every act; and he says, § Sed contra: “That of which we are masters is called voluntary. But we are masters of that which is to act and not to act, to will and not to will. Therefore just as to act and to will is voluntary, so also not to act and not to will.” Then he responds: “It must be said that voluntary is said of that which is from the will. But something is said to be from another in two ways. In one way directly, namely what proceeds from another insofar as it is acting, as heating from heat. In another way, indirectly, from this very fact that it does not act, as the sinking of a ship is said to be from the pilot insofar as he ceases from piloting. But it must be known that not always is that which follows upon defect of action reduced as into its cause into an agent from the fact that it does not act, but only then when it can and ought to act. For if the pilot could not direct the ship, or the piloting of the ship had not been entrusted to him, the sinking of the ship which happened through the absence of the pilot would not be imputed to him. Since, therefore, the will by willing and acting can impede this which is not to will and not to act, it is imputed to it as if existing from it. And thus the voluntary can be without an exterior act with an interior act, as when one wills not to act; but sometimes also without an interior act, as when one does not will.” Nor indeed is it valid to object that cognition is of the notion of the voluntary. But cognition is through some act. Therefore the voluntary cannot exist without some act. For the Angelic Doctor himself, l. c. ad 3, responds: “It must be said that an act of cognition is required for the voluntary in the same way as an act of the will, namely that it be in someone's power to consider, to will, and to act. And then, just as not to will and not to act, when the time has come, is voluntary, so also not to consider.”

44. The same Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 5, treats the question whether in any sin whatever there is some act, and responds: “It must be said that this question is raised principally on account of the sin of omission... if in a sin of omission there is understood only that which pertains per se to the notion of sin, thus sometimes the sin of omission is with an interior act, as when someone wills not to go to church; but sometimes it is without every act, either interior or exterior, as when someone, at the hour in which he is bound to go to church, thinks nothing about going or not going to church. But if in the sin of omission there are also understood the causes or occasions of omitting, thus it is necessary that in the sin of omission there be some act. For there is no sin of omission except when someone passes over what he can do and not do. But that someone decline to not doing that which he can do and not do is only from some cause or occasion, conjoined or preceding. And if indeed that cause is not in the power of man, the omission does not have the notion of sin, as when someone because of illness passes over going to church. But if the cause or occasion of omitting is subject to the will, the omission has the notion of sin; and then it is always necessary that that cause, insofar as it is voluntary, have some act, at least interior, of the will. This act indeed is sometimes borne directly into the omission itself, for example when someone wills not to go to church, avoiding labor. And then such an act pertains per se to the omission. For the will of any sin whatever pertains per se to that sin, because the voluntary is of the notion of sin. But sometimes the act of the will is borne directly into something else, through which man is impeded from the due act; whether that into which the will is borne is conjoined with the omission, for example when someone wills to play when he ought to go to church; or whether it is preceding, for example when someone wills to keep watch late in the evening, from which it follows that he does not go to church at the morning hour. And then this interior or exterior act is related per accidens to the omission, because the omission follows outside the intention; but we say that to be per accidens which is outside intention. Whence it is manifest that then the sin of omission indeed has some conjoined or preceding act, which nevertheless is related per accidens to the sin of omission. But judgment about things must be given according to that which is per se, and not according to that which is per accidens. Whence it can more truly be said that some sin can exist without every act; otherwise, acts and surrounding occasions would also pertain to the essence of other actual sins.” In response to the second objection he adds: “Something is called voluntary, not only because an act of the will falls upon it, but because it is in our power that it happen or not happen... Whence even not willing itself can be called voluntary, insofar as it is in man's power to will and not to will.”

45. Indeed there seems to be no doubt concerning the doctrine of St. Thomas, that namely, absolutely speaking, there can be a voluntary without every act, when the voluntary is not from the will acting, but from the will not acting, namely suspending an act either of volition or of nolition. “And it is proved, because liberty of the will includes the power of acting and not acting. Therefore, once the object is known, which does not bring necessity upon it, it can not operate by the force of its liberty. Therefore that lack of act is in the will from its liberty. Therefore it will be voluntary, both because it is free, and the free supposes the voluntary, and because in the mode in which it is, it arises from the intrinsic potency of the will from cognition. But for a suspension of act of this kind, an act is not required, but lack of influx is enough. Therefore an act is not necessary for every voluntary”: thus Suarez, tr. 2. D. 1. S. 5. n. 2. Lessius also affirms this on q. 6. a. 3. D. 1, saying that it is gathered from the cited place of St. Thomas: “Nevertheless omission of an exterior or interior act can be voluntary without any internal or external act which is the cause of that omission. It is proved, because you can omit Mass without this, that you are unwilling to hear Mass, or that you will something from which the omission of Mass necessarily follows as an effect, or which is for you the cause why you omit Mass; in like manner you can omit internal acts, such as an act of love of God, of hatred of sin, without another internal act which for you is the cause of omitting.”

46. But Billuart, with others, denies it. The reason is that there can be no voluntary where the exercise or act of the will is not had; for voluntary is said of that which proceeds from the will. Therefore, if that omission is voluntary, there is given an act of the will which is the cause or occasion of that omission, which for that reason is called and is voluntary. “It is confirmed: when the object has been proposed by the intellect, either the will determines itself to willing or not willing, and then there is some act of volition or nolition; or it determines itself to suspending every act of volition and nolition, and thus there is also some act, because that determination to suspension happens through some act; for the will is of itself a power indifferent to suspending or not suspending, just as to acting or not acting. Or finally it in no way determines itself but remains, as before, in pure indifference to willing or not willing, to suspending or not suspending, and thus there is no exercise of liberty, but the power remains as if dead, nor from it can there be the voluntary except in first act.” D. 1. a. 3.

47. Now, whether no act is required for the indirect voluntary, or whether some act is necessarily demanded, this above all must be noted with respect to practice: that for the notion of the indirectly voluntary there does not suffice power in the will and negation of foresight, but three things must concur, namely, to be able, to be bound, and not to will. Wherefore, as the direct voluntary belongs to the agent, so the indirect voluntary belongs to the one not prohibiting, in him who could and ought to prohibit.

48. From this doctrine it follows that the evils which subjects, children, servants, etc., commit when bishops, pastors, rulers, public magistrates, parents, masters, etc., command, counsel, or in any other way impel them, are directly voluntary to those latter; but the evils which the former commit when the latter neglect and omit to withstand the wickedness of their respective subjects are indirectly voluntary to them, if nevertheless they can and ought to oppose this resistance in particular cases, and omit it by not warning, not correcting, not punishing, and not applying other means which they can and ought to use.