Commentary XIV: On Merit

1. A human act, according as it is in the power of the will, has the character of laudable or culpable, according as it is good or evil. According to the order which it has to the end, leading to it or deviating from it, it has the character of rectitude or sin. But according as it is for the profit or harm of another, it has the character of merit or demerit. “To merit first seems to be in services by which men merit wages, in which wages first appears named. But we experience it as extended from services to attentions and benefits, when we call both those who render service and those who confer benefits well-deserving of us or of the republic.” Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 114. a. 1. Consequently merit or demerit is the value of a work, by reason of which there corresponds to it reward or punishment according to the retribution of justice. For retribution according to justice is made to someone from the fact that he acts for the profit or harm of another. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 21. a. 3. Justice then intervenes, whose office is to render to each one his own. For indeed "merit and reward are referred to the same thing. For that is called reward which is recompensed to someone in return for work or labor, as a certain price of that very thing. Hence, just as to render a just price for a thing received from someone is an act of justice, so also to recompense the reward of work or labor is an act of justice." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1. "The presentation of merit and the rendering of reward are acts toward another, according to an equality of thing to thing, namely of merit to reward and conversely. Therefore for the notion of merit the notion of the just is required, although it is not sufficient," because besides this "for the notion of merit the voluntary is required." Cajetan, on I-II, q. 114, a. 1.

2. Therefore merit or demerit is had from the fact that someone acts unto the good or evil of another, namely of the Community, or of another singular person. "But when someone does that which turns to his own good or evil, retribution is also owed to him, insofar as this too turns to the common good, according as he himself is part of the college; although retribution is not owed to him insofar as it is the good or evil of a singular person, who is the same as the one acting, unless perhaps by himself, according to a certain likeness, as there is justice of a man toward himself." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3.

3. Merit in general is a property of human acts, by virtue of which some are worthy of retribution. Of itself it is indifferent to good and to evil; but by usage now received, merit, said simply, is taken for merit of reward, and merit of punishment is called demerit, or evil merit, or merit of punishment.

4. Merit, of which we are treating, namely merit of reward, is generally defined: service rendered to another, able of itself to move him to retribution. It differs from impetration and from satisfaction: for impetration moves after the manner of a submissive petition, satisfaction after the manner of compensation for an injury inflicted, but merit after the manner of service. Under the name of service comes a work yielding to the utility or honor of someone. Hence it is clear that a human act, insofar as it is good or evil, can have the notion of merit or demerit not only before men, but also before God. For although our acts, according to themselves, can bring no utility to God, no advancement or harm to him, since nothing can increase or decrease in God, nevertheless man, insofar as he is in himself, withdraws something from God or presents something to him, when he keeps or does not keep the order which God has instituted; and by keeping the order he renders honor and glory to him. And therefore we merit something only insofar as we work for his glory, namely by manifesting his goodness by our good works. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 4, ad 1.

5. Merit before God is one thing natural, another supernatural. Natural merit is that which is found in good works of the natural order. For good works are meritorious before God of some reward. Appositely St. Thomas says appositely, I-II, q. 21, a. 4: "It must be said that the act of some man has the notion of merit or demerit according as it is ordered to another, either by reason of him or by reason of the community. But in both ways our good or evil acts have the notion of merit or demerit before God. By reason of God himself, indeed, insofar as he is man's ultimate end; and it is owed that all acts be referred to the ultimate end; hence he who does an evil act, not referable to God, does not preserve the honor of God, which is owed to the ultimate end. But on the part of the whole community of the universe, because in any community he who rules the community chiefly has care of the common good; hence it belongs to him to render retribution for those things which are done well or badly in the community. But God is the governor and ruler of the whole universe, and especially of rational creatures. Hence it is manifest that human acts have the notion of merit or demerit by comparison to him; otherwise it would follow that God would not have care of human acts."

6. Supernatural merit is that which is perfected by supernatural grace, and is worthy of a supernatural reward. The supernatural merit of our human acts is divided into merit de condigno and de congruo. Merit de condigno is that which has a certain equality with the reward, and this is owed to it from some justice, at least with God's promise acceding. Merit de congruo is had when either equality is not present, or a promise is not had, so that only the fittingness, suitability, congruity of the reward is had from the liberality of the one rewarding. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3.

7. The equality of merit with reward in a meritorious work de condigno is not an absolute equality of thing to thing; this equality is that which a thing has to a thing from its intrinsic quantity or entity, apart from all other extrinsic circumstances of persons. Hence that equality is invariable, when the utility or honorableness of the thing is unchanged. Such is the equality between price and reward in buying, and likewise between the labor of a hired worker and the reward by which that labor is compensated. For equality is had from the intrinsic quantity of the value of the thing bought or of the reward conferred, compared with the intrinsic quantity of the value of that price, of that labor; insofar as each is so much or so much; apart from every estimation of the dignity of the person selling and buying, of the one working and the one accepting that labor. This equality is also called entitative, quantitative, or arithmetical equality. To merit with someone is not to buy the reward from him. - The equality required for merit de condigno between work and reward is another equality, altogether distinct from this, namely respective equality. For it is equality according to a certain right estimation, by which a thing is not absolutely compared and set with a thing as considered in itself, but merit is respectively set with reward, with attention to the meritorious work itself and the reward, and to the very dignity of the one working, by which that work is dignified, and to the opulence and munificence of the one rewarding, so that to confer such a reward with respect to the one rewarding is not greater or more difficult than to furnish such merit with respect to the one meriting.

8. Therefore this equality is that which merit and reward obtain from the meritorious work itself and the reward, and with respect to the condition and dignity of the person meriting and of the person rewarding. For since actions are of supposits, hence one and the same thing or operation, according as it is from a person more worthy or less worthy, increases or decreases in its value. And thus a work which, done by the leader of a whole army, would be merit de condigno for obtaining some principality from a king; the same thing done by a simple soldier is at most merit de congruo; and the reward which would be given condignly to the former would be bestowed on the latter only congruously. This respective equality, as is clear, is equality of proportion, insofar, namely, as merit is related equally to the one meriting as reward to the one rewarding; for otherwise either something greater or something less would be repaid. To the point, St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3: "According to equality of proportion we merit eternal life de condigno. For equality of proportion is considered when this is related equally to that, as another thing to another. But it is not a greater thing for God to bestow eternal life than for us to present an act of virtue; but as this is fitting to this one, so that is fitting to that one; and therefore a certain equality of proportion is found between God rewarding and man meriting."

9. Now, however, it must be diligently noticed that this respective equality or equality of proportion, which is also called geometrical, presupposes on the part of merit and reward a certain fittingness and connection of both with each other; for merit has a certain intrinsic value of the reward by which that merit is repaid. And thus St. Thomas, in the place cited, immediately continuing, says: "provided, however, that the reward be referred to the same genus in which the merit is; so that if the reward is what exceeds every faculty of human nature, as eternal life does, the merit also must be through such an act in which there shines forth the good of that habit which is divinely infused, consigning us to God." Therefore natural works can in no way condignly merit a supernatural reward. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 2.

10. Merit is related equally to the one meriting as reward to the one rewarding. For, as St. Thomas says in the place cited, "it is not greater for God to bestow eternal life than for us to present an act of virtue, but as this is fitting to this one so that to that one." And indeed, although eternal life is a good far greater than the merit of a just man, and thus between that and this there is not an arithmetical equality and equality of quantity, nevertheless with respect to God, who loves the just man as his adopted son and friend, it is not a greater thing to communicate to him eternal life, that is, his blessedness and happiness, than, with respect to the just man, the adopted son of God and friend, to render service and honor by supernatural acts. This is related equally to that, as another thing to another; for it is altogether equitable that God also recompense a just man working according to the dignity and excellence of his supernatural virtue, according to the excellence of his own virtue.

11. The Angelic Doctor again explains the aforesaid proportion, I-II, q. 114, a. 3, by equality in virtue, and he plainly derives it from a twofold head, the dignity of the work and the dignity of the one working, and explains it by a comparison of seed in relation to a tree, of a pledge in relation to a debt, of a fountain in relation to flowing water. "It must be said that the grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have in the present, although it is not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal in virtue, as the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree. And similarly through grace the Holy Spirit inhabits man, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life; hence he is said to be the pledge of our inheritance, 2 Cor. 1. It must be said that the meritorious work of man can be considered in two ways. In one way, according as it proceeds from free choice; in another way, according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit. If it is considered according to the substance of the work, and according as it proceeds from free choice, thus there cannot be condignity there because of the greatest inequality; but there is congruity there because of a certain equality of proportion. (Then namely merit de congruo is present.) For it seems congruous that God recompense a man working according to his own virtue according to the excellence of his own virtue. But if we speak of a meritorious work according as it proceeds from the grace of the Holy Spirit, thus it is meritorious of eternal life de condigno. For thus the value of the merit is considered according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit moving us into eternal life, according to that of John 4:14, there shall be made in him a fountain of water springing up unto eternal life. The price of the work is also considered according to the dignity of grace, through which man, having been made a sharer of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom an inheritance is owed by the very right of adoption, according to that in Romans 8:17, if sons, then heirs."

12. Now, however, although in merit de condigno the aforesaid equality of proportion is had, and man can merit something from God de condigno, nevertheless he cannot do this according to the absolute notion of justice, but only in a certain respect. For the absolute notion of justice is in equality, and it belongs to it to render to each one what is his own. "It is manifest that between God and man there is the greatest inequality, for they are infinitely distant, and everything that is man's good is from God. Hence justice of man toward God cannot exist according to absolute equality, but according to a certain proportion, namely insofar as each works according to his own mode." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1.

13. Merit de congruo, one kind is infallible on account of the divine promise, as the last disposition to first sanctifying grace, which the sinner infallibly merits; but another kind is that which does not have the divine promise joined to it, and to which the reward is owed from a certain fittingness alone, as are the remote dispositions to justification. Suarez, De Gratia, bk. 12, ch. 36, nn. 4-7. Although in infallible merit de congruo a divine promise is had, merit de condigno is not therefore had. For even with the divine promise, there still remains in that merit a defect of the condignity of the work, according to equality of proportion. Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 36, n. 4. "To merit ex condigno," says Cajetan on I-II, q. 114, a. 3, "is to merit in such a way that it is owed to him according to justice; so that it would be unjust for the reward not to be rendered to merit ex condigno. Hence also it received its name from the equal dignity of merit to reward."

14. Merit properly so called is prior in nature and causality to the reward; but it causes the reward because it is, after the manner of a moral efficient cause, and by no means does it cause it after the manner of a final cause, or that it may be. For the remunerator is moved by the merit to bestow the reward in retribution and compensation of that merit. Therefore merit is prior by nature, either as absolutely existing or as absolutely foreseen, so that it can move the remunerator to the retribution of that merit, which consequently it causes because it is, not that it may be. "Merit," says St. Thomas, "is the cause of the reward, not indeed after the manner of a final cause, for in this way the reward is rather the cause of merit; but rather, according to reduction to the efficient cause, insofar as merit makes one worthy of the reward, and through this disposes to the reward." De Veritate, q. 29, a. 6, ad 15.

15. If merit de congruo is compared with merit de condigno, although each is true merit, nevertheless the notion of merit is principally and perfectly in merit de condigno, secondarily and imperfectly in merit de congruo. Each is true merit; for each obtains the reward by the title of the work itself; in each, in view of the work, the remunerator renders the reward. But merit de condigno is perfect merit, because it brings condignity and equality of the meritorious work with the reward. But merit de congruo is less perfectly merit, because that title of the work does not attain to this condignity and equality; but the defect of this must be supplied by the bounty and liberality of the remunerator. Hence merit de condigno demands the reward from some justice; but merit de congruo demands the reward from the liberality of the giver. Therefore the notion of merit is analogous, not indeed by extrinsic and metaphorical analogy, but intrinsic, through a certain imperfect participation of merit in merit de congruo, but through perfect participation in merit de condigno. Therefore merit de congruo must be known through its relation to merit de condigno, of which it is a certain participation falling short of its perfection.

16. Since supernatural merit depends intrinsically upon grace, the increase and diminution of merit arise from a threefold head: from greater or lesser voluntariness, because merit is a free act; from greater service of God, because merit is service rendered to another; from the greater grace with which one acts, because merit before God is supernatural. "Since merit," says St. Thomas, "does not consist in a habit, but in an act, nor in any act whatever, but in that which is informed by the habit of grace, and since every meritorious act proceeds from the will, merit must have something from grace, and something from the will, and something also from the object of the act, whence the species of the act is drawn; and therefore from these three the efficacy of meriting can be measured: from grace, will, and object. For by as much as an act is informed by greater charity and grace, by so much is it more meritorious; similarly also, by as much as it is more voluntary, it has more of the notion of merit and of the praiseworthy; similarly also when the object is more arduous, by so much is the act more meritorious... But that some arduous thing increases the notion of merit it does not have from the difficulty of the labor, but from goodness, because by as much as something is better, by so much it is more elevated above the powers of the man working... except accidentally, namely insofar as toward that which is difficult someone rises up with greater attention and with a greater striving of the will." II Sent., dist. 29, q. 1, a. 4.

17. Now, however, whether it be merit de condigno or merit de congruo, on the part of the meritorious work the following conditions are required:

• 1. For merit of reward before God there is required a proper and positive act of the will. - For merit properly so called contains an order to retribution because of service rendered to another, i.e., because of a work done for his utility or for his honor and glory. But this service is not done without some positive act. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 91, a. 5; II-II, q. 79, a. 1; Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 2.

18. 2. It belongs to the notion of a meritorious act that it be free from necessity. - For indeed Sacred Scripture and the Fathers ascribe reward only to works freely done. Moreover, from the merit or demerit of human acts the freedom of the human will is deduced. Therefore merit or demerit includes freedom of acting. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3; q. 114, a. 3; Suarez, l. c., ch. 3.

19. 3. A meritorious work must be morally good. - In Sacred Scripture and among the Fathers it is never read that God will remunerate indifferent acts with reward, and much less evil acts, but only good and supernatural acts. Moreover an evil work is not worthy of reward, but of punishment. But an indifferent act either is not given in the individual, or if it is given, by its nature it does not demand reward rather than punishment. Lastly, merit is service rendered to another, of itself apt to obtain something after the manner of retribution or reward. But only a morally good work can redound to the service of God, to his honor and glory. Suarez, l. c., ch. 4.

20. 4. In order to have a meritorious work it is in no way required that it be a work of supererogation, or that the work be done spontaneously without the obligation of a precept. - Sacred Scripture and the Fathers everywhere teach that the reward of eternal life has been promised to the observation of the precepts. Moreover, man does not merit before God from the fact that he does something which is useful to God, but insofar as he works for his glory. But he works for his glory even in things commanded. Finally, a precept neither takes away nor diminishes man's freedom; it neither takes away nor diminishes the honorableness of the work; it neither takes away nor diminishes the notion of service; indeed rather it increases it, since it adds to the virtuous work the circumstance of formal or virtual obedience. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 1; Suarez, l. c., ch. 5.

21. 5. For theological merit it is required that the act be supernatural, or proceeding from the aid of grace. - For from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers, all our merits are gifts of God. St. Augustine, Ep. 194, ch. 5, n. 19: "When God crowns our merits, he crowns nothing other than his own gifts." The reason is that merit and reward must be of the same order, so that if the reward exceeds the powers of nature, the merit also exceeds them; for there must be proportion between merit and reward. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3; I-II, q. 109, a. 5; Suarez, l. c., ch. 33.

22. 6. That an act be meritorious, it is more probably required that it be from some supernatural motive. - For Sacred Scripture, when it promises eternal life to moral works, adds something which signifies that those works must be done from a supernatural motive. It promises eternal life to works done for Christ, for the name of Christ, in the name of Christ, etc. Moreover, Scripture and the Fathers teach that the just man lives by faith, that faith is the beginning, root, and foundation of justification, and consequently that man does not merit except through works done from faith. But faith proposes a supernatural end to our works. Indeed supernatural merit must have a relation to God, the supernatural end of man. Hence the Apostle at Heb. 11:6: "To those who... seek glory and incorruption and honor, he will render eternal life." Namely, to those who intend by their works glory and honor before God, and incorruptible or supernatural goods, God will repay eternal life. Furthermore those acts are meritorious of eternal life which are elicited by infused virtues. But infused virtues are distinguished in species from acquired virtues according to order to the ultimate end and according to their proper objects. "Intention makes the work good; faith directs the intention." St. Augustine, on Psalm 31, n. 4. "But, because what does not proceed from the fountain of faith does not arrive at eternal rewards, the condition of heavenly works is one thing, that of earthly works another." St. Leo the Great, Sermon 7 on Lent, ch. 3;

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 63, a. 4; Suarez, l. c., ch. 10; Maur., bk. 6, q. 92; Struggl, part 8. Cf. here n. 6 ff.

23. 7. Finally, for theological merit there is required an act absolutely existing in some difference of time. - The words of Christ, Luke 10:13, clearly prove this: "If in Tyre and Sidon the mighty works had been done which have been done in you, they would long ago have done penance, sitting in sackcloth and ashes." Here merits are had as conditionally existing, but nevertheless without reward; for in the following verse the same judgment is asserted as going to be upon these cities as upon Sodom. And indeed an efficient cause, although morally, as merit is, must be presupposed to its effect according to real existence, at least in the order of nature. But what would be future under a condition never existing, neither is, nor is future, nor was. And hence it does not have real existence.

24. On the part of the person meriting, in order that an act be meritorious, the state of a wayfarer is required. - The state of the way, positively, is the state of this mortal life, which according to the common and ordinary law is spent in this world; negatively, it is the state in which one has not yet obtained the vision and fruition of God, but tends to it through faith. - For indeed Sacred Scripture plainly teaches that the time of life alone is the time of merit, and that the time of death is the time of retribution. The Fathers also teach the same. The a priori reason is the will of God alone; the reason of fittingness is that merit has the notion of the way, reward the notion of the terminus. But the present life, in which we walk by faith, is the state of the way with respect to the future life, in which we shall see God face to face, and which has the notion of terminus with respect to the former. Hence the Blessed in heaven do not merit; likewise neither do the souls being purified merit, but they only satisfy by suffering. St. Thomas, I, q. 62, a. 9; III, q. 19, a. 3; Suarez, chs. 15, 34. - The Blessed "are not in a state of acquiring according to anything of themselves; and therefore they merit neither for themselves nor for others, because what they now impetrate for us happens from this, that previously, while they were living, they merited that they should impetrate this." St. Thomas, III Sent., dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; I, q. 62, a. 9.

25. On the part of God rewarding, for theological merit it is required that there be present a divine ordination of merit to reward, at least consequent, or such by which the work is accepted unto actual and efficacious merit of a determinate reward. - Such-and-such an ordination of merit to such-and-such a reward from the divine will is to be distinguished from a rigorous promise, by which God has obligated himself to giving such a reward to one so working. Theologians scarcely distinguish between the two; but it seems better that the distinction be made with Suarez, "for there could be ordination without promise, by establishing conditions sufficient for merit, and nevertheless not obligating himself to giving the reward, but reserving this to his own liberality; although, on the contrary, there cannot be a promise of reward without a previous ordination of merit." Suarez, l. c., ch. 17, n. 1. That ordination in two ways can be understood first antecedently, and it is the will anteceding the work itself, of accepting it, if it is done, for such a reward; secondly consequently, and it is the will following upon the work itself, accepting it, now actually posited, for such a reward. Merit is compared to this divine institution and ordination in such a way that from it it has that it is efficacious and actual, so to speak. For although before that divine ordination and acceptance an act can be called meritorious of itself, or in first act and aptitude, nevertheless in the being of actual merit and in its efficacy it is consummated through that ordination and acceptance. Therefore merit must be distinguished in first act and in aptitude for obtaining a reward; and thus merit is nothing other than a work condign and equal to the reward, or suitable and merely congruous for obtaining the same; and merit in second act and in efficacy of reward, and this is the exigency which merit has for reward, which is not present to it except from positive ordination and promise. Hence for merit in first act ordination and promise are not required, but these are required for merit in second act. Some ordination of God is necessary for theological merit, because God, who disposes all things sweetly and wisely, and does not add anything superfluous, has in fact disposed it so, as that well-known sentence indicates: "So great is the mercy of God, that he has willed those things to be our merits which are his gifts." Celestine Pope, Ep. to the Bishops of Gaul, ch. 9. Moreover the proportion of dignity or congruity which is in the work itself, unless either law or pact or certainly some positive ordination is had, is not sufficient for having a perfect relation between merit and reward, as is evident from human affairs themselves. That dignity or congruity of the work can be only its foundation. Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.

26. As regards merit de condigno, on the part of the meritorious work itself, in order that the supernatural act of a just man be condignly meritorious of the substantial reward, it is not required that it be elicited or commanded by charity. - For the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, indiscriminately attributes merit of eternal life to all good works done in God. "The principal place of meriting," says St. Thomas, III Sent., dist. 30, a. 5, "is in charity; but in the others, according as they are informed by charity." Therefore the root of charity is required, since works must be done in God, but it is not required that they be elicited by charity or formally commanded by charity. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 24, a. 8; II Sent., dist. 40, q. 1, a. 5, ad 3; Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, l. c., chs. 8, 9, 10, 12; Struggl, q. 2, a. 4.

27. To have merit de condigno, as has already been said, cf. n. 9, there is required in the work a foundation of condignity and of proportion with the reward. - For "merit and demerit are spoken of in order to retribution, which is made according to justice." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 3. But the notion of justice imports a certain equality of things with one another. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3; Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.

28. For merit de condigno, on the part of the person meriting, the state of grace is necessary. - This is clearly proved from Sacred Scripture, which promises eternal life only to the adopted sons of God. And the reason is clear, for then a sinful man, if it were otherwise, could before the remission of sin merit eternal life by a special help of God, while at the same time he merits eternal death, because he is a sinner. Therefore merit de condigno is founded not only in the excellence of the work, but also in the dignity of the person and friendship with God. Moreover, he who has merit de condigno has a right to eternal life. But this right belongs only to sons and friends by virtue of sanctifying grace. Therefore only those who are in the state of grace can have merit de condigno of eternal life. And the same is consequently evident concerning merit de condigno of habitual grace, which is the pledge of glory. Finally the dignity of the work is especially drawn from the dignity of the person working; for operations are of supposits. But without the state of grace there is not had the dignity of the person working with respect to eternal life; for a person without grace remains in the natural order, most distant from supernatural beatitude. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 2; Suarez, l. c., ch. 14; Bellarmine, De Iustif., bk. 5, ch. 12.

29. Therefore acts which are elicited with supernatural help of grace have of themselves only suitability to some supernatural reward. But condignity is not had in them except from the very dignity of the person. Indeed the condignity of merit according to the Angelic Doctor is considered both according to the virtue of the Holy Spirit, who is the principal principle of the supernatural meritorious act, and according to the dignity of grace, by which man becomes a sharer of the divine nature, and consequently can work worthily of God. Then it plainly appears how the reward of eternal life, which is the proper inheritance of the sons of God, not of servants, is given as a condign reward not to servants, but to sons, namely to those who are endowed with sanctifying grace, through which they are constituted sons of God. St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 3. Cf. here nn. 11, 35.

30. Even if dignity and proportion are supposed in the works, nevertheless, in order that they be actually meritorious de condigno of such a reward, on the part of God rewarding there is necessary a divine ordination, through which glory, for example, has been proposed as a reward to be obtained through such works, and by which God has decreed to accept such works unto the merit of such glory. "The mode and measure of human virtue is from God. And therefore the merit of man before God cannot exist except according to the presupposition of the divine ordination; namely, that man should obtain from God through his own operation, as a reward, that to which God has deputed for him the power of operating; just as also natural things obtain through their proper motions and operations that to which they have been ordered by God; yet differently, because the rational creature moves itself to acting through free choice, whence its action has the notion of merit, which is not found in other creatures." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1. Now, however, besides the intrinsic ordination of grace itself, some extrinsic ordination is needed, already explained above at the beginning of this number. For merit de condigno is certainly spoken of in order to retribution, which is made according to justice. But retribution according to justice cannot be had if the other does not accept that merit. For retribution according to justice restores equality. But unless the other accepts that merit, no inequality can arise between the one meriting and the remunerator; this inequality arises only then, when the remunerator accepts the merit. Therefore for merit de condigno there is required a divine ordination by which God accepts such merit, and by which he proposes such a reward to be obtained. Suarez, l. c., ch. 17.

31. Once divine ordination alone is admitted, insofar as this is distinguished from any promise and convention, the meritorious act is ordered by the seed of grace by God to causing eternal life, just as other natural acts are ordered to their own termini. Besides this ordination Cajetan denies another pact, or promise, or, as he says against Scotus, another superadded ordination. Therefore an act through grace is meritorious from this alone, that it is from grace, that it is of such a nature, and God cannot deny reward to it, since God, who ordered it, cannot act against himself. And this, says Cajetan, is founded on the words of the Apostle, if sons, heirs. "Because to an obedient son and one working as a son, the paternal inheritance is owed by the very strict right alone, so that he cannot be deprived except unjustly. But grace alone constitutes sons of God, with any ordination whatsoever excluded. Therefore." And it is confirmed because "a human act, from the fact that it is morally good or evil, has the notion of merit or demerit even before God. For from this it follows that, from this very fact that the act is good, it is ordered by God to reward." On I-II, q. 114, a. 3. But if the discussion is of the intrinsic ordination of grace, insofar as by the force of grace alone the just man is an adopted son of God, having a right to eternal life, and his works are worthy of eternal life, without another promise, this indeed is most true, but merit and reward are not yet had properly and formally. For a distinction must be made. "For it is one thing for a work to be worthy of some wage or reward, but another for such a wage or reward to be owed to the work from justice. For it can happen that someone labors a whole day in another's vineyard, and his labor is worthy of a day's stipend, and nevertheless the other is not bound from justice to pay him that stipend, unless he has made an agreement with him. So the matter stands in the proposed case. The works of a just man existing in the state of grace are worthy in themselves and have proportion with eternal life, because they proceed from grace, which is the seed of glory; nevertheless God is not bound from justice to compensate those works, with pact and promise excluded. Hence it can rightly and briefly be said that works of this sort, with promise excluded, are worthy of eternal life, not by dignity of justice, but of proportion of means to end. But once the promise is posited, they merit eternal life from justice." Becanus, Tr. 4, De Mer. Cath., ch. 5, q. 1, n. 12. "The sixth condition (of merit)," says Billuart, De Grat., diss. 6, art. 1, "is the ordination or promise and pact of God ordering a good work to a prize or reward: not that the good work has its intrinsic value or condignity from that promise, but because beyond the dignity, which it has wholly from grace, there is necessary a promise concerning the reward to be rendered, in order that he who has worked well from grace may have a right to the reward, and God may be obligated to render it to him. Thus commonly."

32. Merit de condigno before God is in reality preceded by the divine promise made to such a work, or, what is the same, to a man under the condition of such a work. For this is positively evident from Sacred Scripture and the tradition of the Fathers, and agrees better with reason. For merit de condigno in second act, besides condignity and equality, imports an actual right to the reward on the part of the one meriting, and a debt on the part of the one rewarding. But God cannot be obligated by another, except by himself and by his own promise. Hence the Council of Mainz, ch. 8, says: The works of the just are worthy of the remuneration of eternal life, because God has mercifully promised reward to those working well. Bellarmine, De Iustific., bk. 5, ch. 14. And if St. Thomas says that God is not simply a debtor to others, but to himself, the Angelic Doctor attends to the first root of that debt, which cannot be other than God himself, interposing his own promise. Therefore because "our action does not have the notion of merit except from the presupposition of the divine ordination, it does not follow that God becomes simply debtor to us, but to himself, insofar as it is owed that his ordination be fulfilled." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 1, ad 3. - Therefore the merit of a just man before God is certainly not from the rigor of justice. The rigor of justice requires such a contract that between the contracting parties no grace and liberality intervene in which the merit is founded. But this does not occur between God and man, because the whole merit of man is founded in the grace and liberality of God, especially in justifying grace, which is given to him gratuitously, and in the liberal promise of God, by which he willed to repay reward to our merits, which by many titles are owed to him. There is added also, according to the common opinion of the Scholastics, that God remunerates the works of the just above the condign. - Nevertheless, to render a reward condign to merits certainly belongs to justice, according to equality or proportion to be preserved between reward and merit. But this justice or equality to be preserved can rest only on the wise Governance of the Community, as is drawn from St. Thomas, I-II, q. 21, a. 4, and therefore on legal justice; it can rest on a promise wholly gratuitous, and therefore on fidelity; and it can also rest on some convention and pact, and therefore on justice at least in some way commutative. Hence to render a reward condign to merits will be a work of justice also, if the debt and the obligation of the same are considered. There are those who in theological merit deny every debt of justice in God, even with God's promise supposed, and admit only an obligation of fidelity, namely insofar as God would be unfaithful if he did not keep what was promised, but would do injury to no one. But there are also those who admit a debt of justice from the divine promise, by which God is bound to render the promised remuneration not only by a debt of fidelity, but also by a debt of justice. - Lugo, De Incarn., disp. 3, sect. 1, 2; Suarez, l. c., ch. 18; Bellarmine, De Iustif., bk. 5, ch. 17.

33. This liberal promise of God being supposed, of eternal life "which God has promised to those loving him," Jas. 1:12, it follows that God owes to us, or to our merits, the reward of eternal life from some justice, and that he does not owe it to himself alone from his mere liberality and fidelity, as is the most common opinion. "The impetration of prayer," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 6, ad 2, "rests on mercy; but merit of condignity rests on justice; and therefore by praying man impetrates many things from divine mercy which nevertheless he does not merit according to justice." Cf. also ibid., next article, ad 1. Hence the same St. Thomas in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3, in the earlier response to 4, saying that "God is not made debtor to us," adds: "Unless perhaps from a promise, because he himself has promised reward to those working good things, and therefore it is not unfitting if someone can merit from him, from which he is in some way a debtor." And Sacred Scripture plainly says that eternal life is a crown of justice, which the Lord, the just judge, will render, 2 Tim. 4:7-8; that it is rendered according to debt, Rom. 4:4; that it is a reward, Wis. 5:16; Matt. 5:12; retribution, Col. 3:23-24; remuneration, Heb. 10:35; retribution, which is owed from convention, Matt. 20. Therefore eternal life is owed by more than simple fidelity, but from some true justice. "God is not unjust, who defrauds the just of the reward of justice." St. Augustine, Contra Julianum, bk. 4, ch. 3; Bellarmine, De Iustif., bk. 5, chs. 14, 18. The reason is clear. For, as Sylvius rightly argues on I-II, q. 114, a. 3, question 5, conclusion 1, "a promise under the condition of a condign work induces an obligation from justice, if it has been accepted and that work is furnished; but God promised eternal life under the condition of a good work, which, when it proceeds from grace in a just man, has condignity; and there is no doubt that the just man has accepted that promise either explicitly or implicitly. Therefore from this an obligation of justice arises. But God is he who made that promise. Therefore God is he who owes. For he is the debtor of the wage who hired the laborer and promised the wage."

34. This justice participates in commutative and distributive justice at once. For the formal notion of commutative justice is situated in the exchange of what is given and what is received, preserving equality of thing to thing, and assigning to each his own right. Now then, between merit and retribution a true exchange of what is given and what is received intervenes; for one thing is really given for another. But God, remunerating meritorious works, preserves that equality. For he who "renders to each according to his works," Matt. 16:27; Rom. 2:6; who "makes a place for each according to the merit of his works," Ecclus. 16:15; who "gives to each his reward according to his labor," 1 Cor. 3:8, plainly repays reward equal to merits. Moreover the lord of the vineyard "agreed with his workers for a denarius," Matt. 20:14, and assigns to each what is his own. "Take," he says, "what is yours and go." And the Apostle demands "his deposit" from the most just judge by the equity of justice. "I am certain, because the just judge is able to keep my deposit unto that day." 2 Tim. 1:12. Indeed the right of reward, acquired by one's own labors and equal works, and founded in the pact of the remunerator, "I will give if you do," is a proper right, which in moral estimation is equated to possession itself, or to a right in the thing. Therefore, if in the justice of God repaying reward to merits there is present a true exchange of what is given and received, if equality of reward and merit is not lacking, if a proper right of man with respect to God, even though built upon the pact of God as upon a solid and most firm foundation, is abundantly found, assuredly that justice contains the true and formal notion of commutative justice. Hence the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, after it had said that eternal life must be faithfully rendered to the good works and merits of the just, according as fidelity is general to every promise, immediately specifying it adds: "For this is that crown of justice which the Apostle said was laid up for him after his combat and course, to be rendered to him by the just judge, and not only to him, but also to all who love his coming." Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 30.

35. The Angelic Doctor acknowledges the equality of condign merit to reward in II Sent., dist. 27, a. 3, and I-II, q. 114, a. 3, where at the third objection he says: "It must be said that the grace of the Holy Spirit, which we have in the present, although it is not equal to glory in act, is nevertheless equal in virtue, as the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree. And similarly through grace the Holy Spirit inhabits man, who is the sufficient cause of eternal life; hence he is also said to be the pledge of our inheritance, 2 Cor. 1." St. Thomas acknowledges a right in man in the body of the same article, saying: The price of the work is also considered according to the dignity of grace, through which man, having been made a sharer of the divine nature, is adopted as a son of God, to whom the inheritance is owed by the very right of adoption, according to that in Rom. 8:17: if sons, then heirs." Likewise the same Angelic Doctor explicitly acknowledges an exchange of what is given and received, and therefore commutative justice: "The form of divine judgment is considered according to the notion of commutative justice, according as rewards are recompensed to merits and punishments to sins." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 61, a. 4, ad 1. "Proportional retribution belongs to commutative justice when it is considered according to a legal debt, as if it is confirmed by pact that so much be repaid for so much." St. Thomas, II-II, q. 106, a. 1, ad 2; III, q. 85, a. 3.

36. But the Angelic Doctor does not remove every commutative justice from God, but only commutative justice properly so called, which includes equality of quantity, or perfect equality; not commutative justice less properly such, which consists in respective equality and equality of proportion. "But this pertains," says St. Thomas, "to the mode of commutative justice, not indeed according to equality of quantity preserved, according as is required in commutative justice properly so called, but preserved according to equality of proportion; because namely God is related to that which he does superabundantly as the creature is to that in which it is deficient... Between master and servant there cannot be commutative justice properly so called; for no equality according to quantity can be constituted between them, since everything that belongs to the servant belongs to the master; nevertheless some mode of commutative justice is preserved, insofar as equality of proportion is found between them. Hence also the Philosopher distinguishes dominative justice from political justice, which is justice properly so called; and in this way also there can be justice of God toward creatures." IV Sent., dist. 46, q. 1, a. 1, q. 3, c., ad 4.

37. But the retribution of eternal life participates in distributive justice by the very fact that each one receives a reward equal to his merits. For according as the merits will be greater or lesser, the reward will be greater or lesser, preserving due proportion with them, not from insufficiency of the reward, but from the very nature of the thing, because from one equality another necessarily results, with a multitude of persons and a variety of rewards supposed. Suarez, De Grat., bk. 12, ch. 32. "In the rendering of reward to merits, the form of distribution is preserved more than of commutation, since he renders to each according to his works, whereas God receives nothing from us." St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3. Indeed God receives nothing from us, and nevertheless God has been made debtor to us, as has already been said, by his promise. Hence Augustine, Sermon 16 on the Words of the Lord, says: "God has been made debtor to us, not by receiving something, but by promising what pleased him." And St. Bernard, at the end of the book On Grace and Free Choice: "Promised indeed from mercy, but nevertheless to be paid from justice." And God preserves the form and proportion of justice between work and reward, as is indicated in Matt. 7:2; 10:41, and 1 Cor. 3:8. "Each shall receive his proper reward according to his labor." Therefore in the retribution of eternal life the form of commutative and distributive justice is preserved. For God not only gives to each as much reward as he has merited, which is the form of commutative justice, in which equality of thing to thing, or of what is given and what is received, is preserved; but he also preserves this proportion between merits and rewards, that the greater merits each one has, the greater rewards he receives. Becanus, Tr. 4, De Merito Cathol., ch. 5, q. 8, n. 6.

38. A meritorious work proceeding from grace and the Holy Spirit can be compared to God as retributor. And thus only the notion of dominative or paternal justice is had. For between God and any creature whatever, much less than between father and son, there can be justice simply. For man in grace is a pure creature, and an adoptive son obtains no more justice before the father than a son simply. And it is confirmed from that saying of the Apostle, 2 Tim. 4: which the Lord, the just judge, will render. But if it is referred to the reward, namely to eternal life, thus there is the notion of justice simply and equality, yet equality not in act, but in virtue, as is the seed of a tree, in which there is the virtue toward the whole tree, a fountain toward springing water, a pledge toward a debt. "Concerning the notion of justice," says Cajetan on I-II, q. 114, a. 1, "found in the merit of man before God, note that such merit, beyond the relations which it has to the man meriting and to God as preordaining, has two others: one to the reward, another to the renderer of the reward. And indeed, if the merit of man is compared to God, justice simply will never be found. But if the merit of man is compared to the reward owed according to itself, thus it is not unfitting that the merit should be equivalent to the reward to be rendered, and that an act of so great a value be ordered by God to an equivalent reward. And since the reward to be rendered by God, however much according to itself it may be equivalent to the merit, nevertheless as it is rendered by God, exceeds the merit of man, for whom there cannot be equality simply to God in anything; therefore simply there cannot be merit simply of man toward God, but according to proportion, although absolutely there can be merit simply and justice of man toward the reward itself."

39. Finally, for merit de condigno it is required that one merit for himself. - "Our work has the notion of merit from two things: first indeed from the force of divine motion, and thus someone merits ex condigno; in another way it has the notion of merit according as it proceeds from free choice, insofar as we voluntarily do something; and on this part there is merit of congruity, because it is congruous that while man uses his virtue well, God according to superexcellent virtue should operate more excellently. From this it is clear that by merit of condignity no one can merit first grace for another, except Christ alone, because each one of us is moved by God through the gift of grace, so that he himself may arrive at eternal life; and therefore merit of condignity does not extend beyond this motion. But the soul of Christ was moved by grace not only so that he himself might arrive at the glory of eternal life, but also so that he might lead others unto it, in as he is head of the Church and author of human salvation... but by merit of congruity he can merit first grace for another; for since a man constituted in grace fulfills the will of God, it is congruous, according to the proportion of friendship, that God fulfill the will of man in the salvation of another, although sometimes there can be an impediment on the part of him whose justification some holy person desires." St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 6; Suarez, l. c., ch. 16.

40. For merit de congruo it is sufficient that the conditions universally required for merit be present, and that even one of the requisites for merit de condigno be lacking. - For that the state of grace is not necessary for merit de congruo is the common opinion of theologians, among whom are St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 4, and Suarez, l. c., ch. 34, nn. 1-3. But that for merit de congruo that condition of meriting for oneself is not necessary is also the common opinion of theologians. The same St. Thomas teaches thus, I-II, q. 114, a. 6; Suarez, l. c., ch. 35. As regards the promise, a promise of reward under the condition of such a work is not repugnant to merit de congruo, nor does it immediately render the merit de condigno. For to have merit de condigno, promise alone is not sufficient, even under the condition of a work, but it must suppose the condignity of the work, according to equality of proportion. Cf. Suarez, l. c., ch. 24, n. 37; ch. 36, nn. 4-6. But a promise is not necessary for merit de congruo. But according as merit de congruo has the promise of reward joined to it or lacks it, one merit de congruo is infallible, i.e., having an infallible retribution, which at least cannot be denied without infidelity; another is fallible, i.e., whose retribution can be suspended or denied, because when it is repaid, it is given not from any precise obligation, but only from a certain fittingness or congruity. - Furthermore, for merit de congruo there are required the conditions universally necessary for merit, for merit de congruo is true merit. They suffice: for 1. equality of the work can be lacking, because reward is owed to merit de congruo not from justice but only from a certain fittingness. 2. The state of justice can be lacking, because when the state of justice is lacking, the value of the condignity of the work with the reward is everywhere lacking, not the value of congruence also of the same work with the reward. 3. The promise of God can be lacking, for in order that an act be meritorious de congruo it is sufficient that in itself it have a certain proportionate goodness, so that by reason of such a work, or in view of it, God can confer some benefit on man. But an act can be of this kind, although it does not have a promise of such a reward. For 1. that proportionate goodness of the act is in some way intrinsic to that reward, and in no way depends on the promise, which is extrinsic to it. 2. That rendering of the reward in view of the work itself can also be made without any previous promise, but through God's gratuitous acceptance following the work. 3. The condition of meriting for oneself can be lacking. For according to the law of friendship, it is congruous that a friend do the honorable will of a friend. But true friendship intervenes between man and God. Therefore it is congruous that God fulfill the will of man unto the salvation of another. St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 3, ibid., a. 4; I-II, q. 114, a. 6. - Merit de condigno is perfect merit; merit de congruo is imperfect merit. As all the requisite conditions are demanded for everything perfect, so for the imperfect the defect of even one required condition suffices.

41. Lastly, as regards the object of merit: 1. First actual grace in no way falls under merit. - For we would merit it only by acts of nature, which cannot be.

42. 2. We cannot merit de condigno a second actual grace, but efficacious. - For otherwise it would follow either that a just man working well is confirmed in grace by the force of his own merit; or that one who has fallen into sin after justification did not have merit de condigno.

43. 3. We can merit de congruo other helps of grace, even efficacious ones. - For God is accustomed to accept the good works both of the just man and of the sinner, from his goodness and indulgence, by which he does not deny further grace, often joined with effect, to one doing from the powers of grace what is in himself. Therefore we can merit for ourselves richer and efficacious graces for conquering temptations, and for receiving, preserving, and increasing sanctifying grace.

44. 4. The just man can merit de condigno actual graces, insofar as they are of themselves sufficient, so that he can cooperate with them and be saved, if he wills. - For "all those things fall under merit de condigno which are necessary for a just man, after the first grace has been received, for obtaining eternal life. But such are the helps of actual grace. Therefore these helps fall under merit de condigno. And it is confirmed... from the opposite; because if the just man could not merit the helps of grace which are necessary for him for the attainment of eternal life, now he could not merit the very attainment of eternal life, which is absurd." Becanus, De Grat., ch. 5, q. 6, n. 2; Valencia, q. 6, De Grat., part 4, assertions 4, 5. Cf. here n. 51.

45. 5. We cannot merit de condigno first justifying grace. For merit de condigno is not had without the state of grace. Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 8; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 5. - We can merit first justifying grace de congruo. "And thus God gives grace to the unworthy, because to those who are not sufficiently worthy for this; but nevertheless they have some disposition for receiving, from which they are said in some way to merit grace ex congruo; nor from this does it follow that he is unjust, but liberal." St. Thomas, II Sent., dist. 27, q. 1, a. 4, ad 4. The dispositions by which we merit the aforesaid grace de congruo are acts of faith, hope, charity, and penance.

46. 6. It is of faith that the just can merit an increase of grace and glory, from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, canon 32. - It is disputed whether they can also merit de condigno first glory, to which man is accepted by the force of sanctifying grace first infused. Some deny it, others affirm it, among whom is St. Thomas, I-II, q. 112, a. 2, ad 1. "A certain preparation of man," says the holy Doctor, "for having grace is simultaneous with the very infusion of grace, and such an operation is indeed meritorious, but not of grace, which is already had, but of glory, which is not yet had," and this evidently is first glory. Suarez, bk. 12, ch. 28. Sacred Scripture, promising glory as a wage to good works and merits, in the proper, natural, and usual sense, does not promise only a part of glory and an increase of glory, but promises glory simply, or all glory and its substance. "If you wish to enter into life, keep the commandments." Matt. 19:17. Likewise the Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 16, absolutely hands down that for the just "eternal life is to be proposed, both as grace mercifully promised to the sons of God through Christ Jesus, and as a reward to be rendered, according to God's promise, to their good works and merits." And canon 32 numbers under merit not only the increase of glory, but also simply eternal life. For by saying first simply eternal life, it includes all glory; then by adding increase of glory it plainly declares that by eternal life it understood the very substance of glory from its beginning, which is the same as first glory. Therefore that act of contrition, for example, by which man prepares himself and is proximately disposed for justifying grace, is simultaneous in time with sanctifying grace, for grace is infused in an instant. But that contrition in the first instant of nature, since it is the act of a person not yet sanctified by sanctifying grace, indeed merits grace de congruo, but cannot merit glory de condigno. But in the second instant of nature, that same act is now dignified by sanctifying grace, and merits first glory de condigno.

47. 7. The just man cannot merit de condigno for himself restoration after a fall. - For by the very fact that the just man sins he becomes unworthy of eternal life and worthy of eternal punishment, and consequently he can immediately be punished with this punishment, and in no way be disposed again to justification and to eternal life. Council of Trent, sess. 6, ch. 8; St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 7.

48. 8. The just man can probably merit de congruo restoration after a fall. - The probability of this assertion is founded on a certain fittingness of divine justice taken more broadly, namely that God, notwithstanding a supervening sin, remember the preceding merits, and in view of them stir up the sinner to rise again from sin; especially where outstanding merits have preceded, and the subsequent sin is committed from some vehement temptation or human frailty. It is confirmed, because, experience bearing witness and the Fathers standing as sponsors, the just man more easily rises again from a fall; and because the just man can merit grace de congruo even for another sinner; therefore also for himself as sinner.

49. 9. We cannot merit final perseverance de condigno. - For from Sacred Scripture and the Fathers perseverance is uncertain; and therefore there is not present a promise of it, which is necessary for merit de condigno. It is confirmed from the fact that it is evident that the just, after most excellent merits, sometimes have not obtained perseverance.

50. 10. We can merit final perseverance de congruo. - For it seems altogether congruous that one working well and soliciting God by frequent prayer, while he does not place a voluntary obstacle, should obtain the grace of salvation; partly because the most sweet governance of God and his love toward his own require this; partly because the utility of men requires that, with the heavenly reward proposed, they be sharpened both to praying well and insistently and to working.

51. Hence it is clear that merit de congruo can quite well stand together with impetration. In the latter, the reason of bestowing gifts is God's mercy and the promise on account of the merits of Jesus Christ. But in the former, the reason of bestowing goods is at once God's liberality and at least some dignity of the work offered to God, which God regards with his own benignity.

52. 11. Temporal goods, insofar as they are useful for works of the virtues, by which we are led into eternal life, just as they can be called goods simply, so also fall simply and directly under merit. But insofar as they are considered according to themselves, just as they are not goods of man simply, so they do not fall under merit simply, but in a certain respect. "It must be said," says St. Thomas, I-II, q. 114, a. 10, "that what falls under merit is a prize or reward, which has the notion of some good. But the good of man is twofold, one simply, the other in a certain respect. The good of man simply is his ultimate end... and consequently all those things which are ordered as leading to this end; and such things fall under merit simply. But the good in a certain respect and not simply of man is what is good for him as now, or what is good for him in a certain respect; and things of this sort do not fall under merit simply, but in a certain respect. According to this, therefore, it must be said that if temporal goods are considered insofar as they are useful for works of the virtues by which we are led into eternal life, according to this they fall directly and simply under merit, as also the increase of grace (which is merited de condigno), and all those things by which man is helped to arrive at beatitude after first grace. For God gives to just men so much of temporal goods, and also of evils, as is expedient for them for arriving at eternal life; and to that extent temporal things of this sort are goods simply. Hence it is said in Ps. 33:2: Those fearing the Lord shall not be diminished of every good; and elsewhere, Ps. 36:25: I have not seen the just man forsaken, etc. But if temporal goods of this sort are considered according to themselves, thus they are not goods of man simply, but in a certain respect; and thus they do not fall under merit simply, but in a certain respect, namely insofar as men are moved by God to doing certain things temporally, in which they attain their purpose, with God favoring; so that just as eternal life is simply the reward of works of justice through relation to the divine motion... so temporal goods considered in themselves have the notion of reward, with respect had to the divine motion by which the wills of men are moved to pursuing these things; although sometimes in these things men do not have a right intention." Hence according to the mind of St. Thomas, not only the just, but also sinners, can by morally good works merit temporal goods de congruo. But temporal goods are not given to the just according to the proportion and quantity of merits, but according as they more or less conduce to the attainment of eternal life. Hence it happens that many just persons are left in poverty, others abound in riches, others obtain temporal goods moderately, according as it is more expedient for them unto salvation.

53. 12. Merit in favor of another is proper to Christ alone, as head of all, and from whose fullness John 1:16 testifies that we all have received. Nevertheless we can merit de congruo for another even first habitual grace and helps of actual grace, and the very first actual grace which we cannot merit for ourselves. The reason has already been indicated in n. 39. Yet merit of this sort is not infallible, as is plainly evident from the reasoning of St. Thomas related in the cited number and from Sacred Scripture. God said to Samuel: "How long will you mourn Saul, since I have rejected him, that he should not reign in Israel?" 1 Kings 16:1. Likewise Ezek. 14:16: "Those three men (namely Noah, Daniel, and Job) shall deliver neither sons nor daughters, but they alone shall be delivered." And Jer. 15:1: "If Moses and Samuel stood before me, my soul is not toward this people."

54. But from the fact that we offer our meritorious works to God for others, our merit is not thereby diminished, but rather increased. For since charity of neighbor impels us to procure the salvation of others, we do better works, by which the reward of eternal life will be repaid to us more abundantly. Hence merit de congruo does not exclude merit de condigno of the good works of the just, which besides this meritorious force also have impetratory and satisfactory force.

A. M. D. G.