Commentary XII: On the End of Human Acts

1. By end here is properly understood that which the agent further intends through such and such an act, as the reason on account of which he operates. This is that end which is called the end of the one operating. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 2 Dist. 36. q. un. a. 5 ad 5, “that some act has a twofold end, namely the proximate end, which is its object, and the remote end, which the agent intends.” But if the agent does not intend another end diverse from the very intrinsic end of the action which he does, then the end of the one operating coincides with the end of the work, as appears in him who wishes to steal so that he may steal, i.e. so that he may become rich from another’s property. The end of the work cannot in any way be excluded by the one operating, if he himself knows the nature of the work; for that end is intrinsic to the work. Now the end of the one operating can be considered in two ways: 1.º with respect to the intention of the will, that is, with respect to the act of the will intending it; 2.º with respect to the act itself which is commanded, as a means to that end. Under the first consideration, the end is properly the object of the will, indeed its principal object, since the end is what moves the will to the means. Under the second consideration, the end is a mere circumstance of the commanded act, and thus is usually numbered among the circumstances. He who steals, for example, so that he may commit adultery, principally wills adultery; he intends this and efficaciously procures it. And from this adultery comes the principal malice of the will. But the act commanded for this reason by the will of adultery, namely theft, for example, has its own substantial malice from its proper object, that is, from the taking of another’s thing against the will of the owner; but that it is referred extrinsically by the one operating to such and such an end is altogether accidental to it, not from its own nature, but from the judgment of the one operating. Therefore the end which is a circumstance of the act is not the end itself of the work, which gives species to the act, but some adjoined end: just as the fact that a brave man acts bravely on account of the good of fortitude is not a circumstance; but it is a circumstance if he acts bravely for the liberation of the city, or for Christ, or something of this sort. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3 ad 3; q. 18. a. 6 ad 2.

2. The end of the one operating can be one thing as primary, another as secondary. The primary end is that which someone first proposes to himself, and is the cause simply of the action. The secondary end is that which is added to the primary, and is not the cause simply of the action, but only, with the primary end, impels that it be done better, that is, more eagerly, more easily, more pleasantly, etc.

3. Human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end. For the end can be considered as a circumstance and as the object of a human act. If the end is considered as a circumstance, it can, not otherwise than the other circumstances, state an order of conformity or deformity to reason. Thus it is conformable to reason not only to give alms, but also to give them in satisfaction for sins; just as it is repugnant to reason not only to steal, but also to steal in order to become drunk. Therefore, as circumstances give goodness or moral malice to a human act, so also does the end. And as circumstances of themselves give only accidental goodness and malice, so also does the end. But if the end is considered as object, then human acts take species from the end as from an object, and therefore from it they take not only moral goodness or malice, but also from it they take essential moral goodness or malice.

4. “The same act numerically, according as it once goes forth from the agent, is not ordered except to one proximate end from which it has species, but it can be ordered to several remote ends, of which one is the end of another.” It is said according as it once goes forth from the agent, for there can be several ends of his act according as this is continued and repeated; for example, to take another’s property, so that one may become rich from another’s property; to retain another’s property, or again to take it, so that it may be preserved for the owner. It is said from which it has species, for there can be several ends, even proximate ends, of the work of one and the same act, but one is the primary end of the work from which comes the species, as it were, substantial to the act; the others are accidental and rather take on the nature of circumstances. Thus, for example, if someone undertakes a pilgrimage so that he may celebrate Mass in the Sanctuary of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus, the sacrifice of the Mass is the proximate end of the work, from which the very celebration of Mass intrinsically takes its species; but to celebrate in that Sanctuary in honor of the Most Sacred Heart of Jesus is also the proximate end of the work of that celebration, but as a certain extrinsic circumstance not giving species to the act. But the remote end of the one operating, to which the act is ordered, can itself also give species to the act; indeed, if it is the ultimate end in that series, it itself is what gives species to the act most of all, because it is what is prior in intention and on which all the other ends depend, since all those are subordinated. And thus he who commits adultery so that he may steal, and steals so that he may commit homicide, is rather a murderer than an adulterer and thief, because homicide is the formal and motive reason of the other acts. “When many acts differing in species are ordered to one end, there is indeed diversity of species on the part of the exterior acts, but unity of species on the part of the interior act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6. “Nevertheless it is possible that one act according to the species of nature be ordered to diverse ends of the will. Thus this very thing which is to kill a man, which is the same according to the species of nature, can be ordered as to an end to the preservation of justice and to satisfying anger. From this there will be diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it will be an act of virtue, in another way an act of vice.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2.

5. “The end is the object of the will, but not of the other powers. Whence as to the act of the will, the goodness which is from the object does not differ from the goodness which is from the end, as in the acts of the other powers, except perhaps accidentally, according as an end depends on an end and a will on a will;” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 2 ad 1; namely when several ends subordinated of themselves and willed are together, as when someone wills healing medicine on account of going into military service, on account of victory, the formal goodness of the object, for example being healthy, differs from the goodness of another end, for example military service; and when the will of one end, for example adultery, depends on the will of another end, for example theft, as when someone wishes to commit adultery so that he may steal, the malice also of the object, for example adultery, differs from the malice of the end, for example theft. But each is accidental; for it happens to an end that it is subordinated to another, and it also happens to the will that it depends on another; otherwise this would belong to every end and every volition. Cajetan, in the cited place. Moreover a human act is human insofar as it is voluntary. But in a voluntary act a twofold act is found: the interior act of the will and the exterior act. Each of these has its proper object. “But the end is properly the object of the will. But that about which the exterior action is concerned is its object. Therefore, just as the exterior act receives species from the object about which it is concerned, so the interior act of the will receives species from the end as from its proper object. But that which is on the part of the will stands as formal to that which is on the part of the exterior act, because the will uses the members for acting as instruments, nor do exterior acts have the character of morality except insofar as they are voluntary. And therefore the species of a human act is considered formally according to the end, but materially according to the object of the exterior act. Whence the Philosopher says that he who steals in order to commit adultery is, speaking of himself, more adulterer than thief.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6.

6. Now a commanded act can be considered according to itself and taken specificatively, and it can be considered formally and reduplicatively as commanded. If it is considered in the first way, it takes its essential and specific goodness or malice from the object, and accidental goodness or malice from the end. The extrinsic end of the one operating comes to the act already constituted in its species from its proper object. And it is altogether accidental to such an act, considered according to itself, that it be ordered to such an end. Thus the volition of giving alms, commanded by penance, primarily and immediately regards the honorableness of almsgiving or mercy, but only secondarily and mediately the honorableness of penance. If the commanded act is taken in the other way, i.e. formally and reduplicatively as commanded, it has its essential species from the end, because the commanding act and the commanded act are considered one act, whose principal object is then the end which each regards.

7. Therefore human acts take moral goodness or malice from the end because, insofar as they are acts, they receive species from the end as from an object. And this can also be shown otherwise. For human acts can be considered after the manner of actions and after the manner of passions, because through them man moves himself and is moved by himself. But action obtains species from the principle of acting, while passion obtains species from the term of motion. And thus heating as action is nothing other than a certain motion proceeding from heat; heating as passion is nothing other than motion toward heat; and a definition manifests the account of species. For indeed each thing obtains species according to act, and not according to potency; and therefore motion, which is distinguished through action and passion, insofar as it is action, takes species from the act which is the principle of acting; but insofar as it is passion, it takes species from the act which is the term of motion. Moreover “acts are called human insofar as they proceed from a deliberate will, but the object of the will is good and end. And therefore it is manifest that the principle of human acts, insofar as they are human, is the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3. For the end is not only an end, but also the object of the will, and through this is in the place of form, which is the principle of acting. But the end is the object of the will, and is the reason of acting for it, precisely insofar as it is end; for it is that which is sought of itself; and thus the end is good, and “good has the character of end.” St. Thomas, ibid. a. 4 ad 1. “The motive and object of the will is the end... the end, although it is not of the substance of the act (namely of the commanded act), is nevertheless the most principal cause of the act (aforesaid), insofar as it moves the agent to act. Whence also the moral act most of all has species from the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 4, body and ad 2. “The end is first in the intention of reason, according to which the species of moral acts are taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 7 ad 2. “The end, according as it is prior in intention, according to this pertains to the will. And in this way it gives species to the human or moral act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3 ad 2. “And similarly (the end) is the term of the same (acts). For that at which the human act is terminated is that which the will intends as an end.” Namely, the human act is from the end, and is to the end: from the end as action; to the end as passion; from the end as object, the intrinsic form of the act, the principle of the act by which the will acts; to the end as the term of the act, for the sake of which it acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3.

8. Therefore human acts, besides the absolute and intrinsic goodness or malice which they have from their proper object, have goodness or malice from the end on which they depend. “For the disposition of things in goodness and in being is the same. For there are certain things whose being does not depend on another. And in these it suffices to consider their being itself absolutely. But there are certain things whose being depends on another, whence it is necessary that they be considered by consideration toward the cause on which they depend. But just as the being of a thing depends on the agent and the form, so the goodness of a thing depends on the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4; q. 72. a. 3.

And hence this is understood: good and end are convertible, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 2 ad 2. For whatever the will wills and does, it wills and does as good and for the sake of good.

9. Whether the intention of an extrinsic end can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work? — R. Some affirm it; others deny it. The opinion of the latter seems to us alone true. The reason is: 1.º because nature cannot be changed; 2.º because the intention of the one operating adds nothing to the work, indeed it does not even touch it, since it is entirely extrinsic to it. Therefore our good intention cannot make an evil work good, nor can our evil intention make what is good evil, nor transfer what is evil intrinsically into another species of malice. But this does not prevent, as is clear, that where the question concerns an object indifferent of itself, the extrinsic end of the one operating can give moral goodness or malice. For this is not to change the intrinsic nature of the exterior work itself, but to determine its intrinsic indifference insofar as it is a human work; and this determination in morals is only from intention. And thus, although the depraved intention of a judge to harm the guilty person cannot intrinsically change the nature of a just sentence and constitute it an unjust causing of damage, nevertheless the intention of taking another’s property determines the taking itself, according as someone takes another’s thing so that he may preserve it for the owner, or so that he may take it for himself and steal it. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584, 636. — Therefore if someone without force and fraud, but from hatred, or even so that he may harm another, impedes him from the attainment of a good to which he has no right, for example if someone impedes a testator from leaving an inheritance to someone who has no right to it, he is by no means bound to restitution. For he sins either only against charity, or even against justice, but affectively only, not effectively. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 584.

10. Whether an act is good if it has a twofold end, one good and the other evil? — R. 1.º In the affirmative, if the evil end has itself merely antecedently or consequently, that is, merely precedes the whole act or is added to the act already preexisting, or even if it has itself merely concomitantly, that is, influences nothing in the being of the act itself but is only joined to it. The reason is that then it is wholly extrinsic to the act constituted in its whole being. For it is not the reason on account of which of the act itself, but is only the reason, for example, of a certain simple complacency which precedes, accompanies, or follows the deliberate act. But this simple complacency can exercise its influence without infecting the act, so that someone may be moved more easily to a good act, for example if alms were proposed to someone as contributing to eternal life, and to this were joined a simple complacency over the esteem to be had thence among men. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. Sometimes, in carrying out a good work, a certain sense and imperfect affection touches someone’s soul, although in no way is it the end which he proposes to himself. Whatever of fault is found in this, the goodness of the work which someone does does not perish on that account. — 2.º In the negative, if the evil end has itself truly causatively and influences the substance of the act. The reason is that then someone wills the good at least inadequately under the aspect of evil, which is to will evil. “In order that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of good, i.e. that it will the good and on account of the good.” St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3. — Except unless the end is only lightly evil. The reason is that then the only lightly evil end influences not the substantial being itself of the act, but only the accidental being of the act, and therefore the whole substance of the act remains good. And thus almsgiving will be good, even if a slight ostentation has crept into that act and has truly influenced it. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4 ad 3; De Malo, q. 2. a. 4 ad 2; Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. XIV ff. The question concerns, as is clear, an exterior act which is one in the genus of nature and multiple in the genus of morals. “If one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; yet if it is one by unity of nature and not by unity of morals, it can be good and evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.

11. Whether he sins who acts for the sake of pleasure? — R. In the affirmative, if he acts for the sake of pleasure alone, namely by positively excluding the further honorable end of the work; and this sin, speaking of itself, does not exceed venial. In the negative, if he acts simply for the sake of pleasure. The reason for the first is that pleasure is for the sake of operation, not conversely, namely so that man may be enticed to the operations necessary or useful for human life. Therefore pleasure is not the end of action, “but the means to exercising the action more constantly, more easily, and better.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2. It is confirmed from proposition 8, condemned by Innocent XI: “To eat and drink even to satiety for the sake of pleasure alone is not a sin, provided it does not harm health, because the natural appetite can lawfully enjoy its acts.” The reason for the second is that since pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, unless someone establishes his ultimate end in it, which without doubt would be grave, there is not had a grave disorder in the human action. The reason for the third is that pleasure of itself is not evil, but good, and it is consonant with the very order of nature that man be enticed by pleasure to operating. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 26, nn. 6, 7; 1. 2. q. 4. a. 2 ad 2. Otherwise, it would have to be said that he also sins who would be moved to acting honorably from heavenly pleasure. Moreover nature indeed more principally intends the operation itself, to which pleasure is joined. But secondarily the same nature intends that man, from the appetite of pleasure, seek the operation. Therefore pleasure can be intended as an end, provided it is not intended as the ultimate or principal end. Therefore if someone, although he expressly thinks nothing of a further honorable end, is moved by pleasure to an action which he apprehends as consonant with nature, or in which he finds nothing contrary to the order of reason, for example to taking food, playing, etc., he does not sin at all. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 141. a. 1 ad 1.