Commentary III: On Elicited and Commanded Acts of the Will

1. If the mode by which the voluntary proceeds from the will is considered, the voluntary is manifold. Moreover this mode of proceeding from the will can be considered 1.º in order to the very power and faculty of the will from which it proceeds; 2.º in order to the act itself which proceeds from the will; 3.º finally in order to the object about which that act is concerned. Hence various divisions of the voluntary arise, about which we shall speak in order in distinct Commentaries. In the present Commentary we shall set forth the divisions which are had from that first head.

2. If human acts are considered in order to the power and faculty of the will from which they proceed, some human acts are internal, others external, according as they are completed by the interior will alone, or by another interior faculty; or they obtain their complement by the exercise of an exterior faculty. Others, moreover, are natural, others supernatural, according as they are effected by the powers of nature alone, or also by the powers of grace. Finally, some are called elicited and others commanded in relation to the faculty by which they are immediately exercised, or by whose act they are determined. Thus an act of faith is an elicited act of the intellect, commanded by the will. An act of contrition from the motive of charity is an elicited act of the will, commanded by the same will. Similarly, love of God and love of enemies are elicited acts of the will, but the latter is commanded by the former.

3. Therefore, if it is attended to whether the voluntary proceeds from the will immediately or mediately, one voluntary is such elicitedly, another commandingly. The first is had when the whole act is completed by the will alone and in the will, without the aid of another faculty, whether interior and spiritual, or exterior and corporeal; as are volitions and nolitions. The other is had when the act indeed depends on the command itself of the will, but is nevertheless completed by another faculty of the agent; whether interior, as are intellect, phantasy, memory; or exterior, as are the members of the body and the organs of the senses, such as to walk or to speak. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. ad 2, q. 6. a. 4; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 1. S. 1, D. 10. But an act can be at once elicited and commanded, for the will can command itself in its own acts. Then the act proceeds not from the will alone, but also from another act of the will itself; and for this reason theologians say that one virtue, e.g. charity, commands the acts of other virtues, when the will from the motive of one virtue elicits an act of another virtue, for example, from love of God it has mercy on the poor. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 5; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 10. S. 1.

4. There is a twofold division of elicited acts of the will, according as these acts consist in the pursuit of good or in flight from evil; according as they are concerned with the end or with the means. As to what pertains to the first division, some elicited acts of the will in reality consist in the pursuit of good, others in flight from evil, as is to be seen in love, desire, joy; hatred, fear, sadness. Desire is concerned with absent good, joy with present good; love abstracts from both. Fear likewise is concerned with absent evil, sadness with present evil, hatred with both. “Just as for delight two things are required, namely the conjunction of good and the perception of this kind of conjunction, so also for sorrow two things are required, namely the conjunction of some evil, which for this reason is evil, because it deprives some good, and the perception of this kind of conjunction.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 35. a. 1.

5. Love is the first and simplest act of all. For from it desire is born, and the hope of obtaining the good, and, with daring, of approaching those things which are serviceable to this, and finally joy concerning the good obtained. To love is nothing other than to will good to someone. Hence it has a twofold respect: one to the good which we will; the other to the person to whom we will good. From the prior respect, i.e. from the good which we desire, there is had love of concupiscence; from the latter, i.e. from the person to whom we will well, love of benevolence. But the good which we desire can be not only a good distinct from the person, but also the person himself. And thus we can love God by love of benevolence, by way of the person to whom we will good, and by love of concupiscence, by way of the good which we will for ourselves. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 26. a. 4.

6. Hatred is opposite to love. Yet hatred is said to arise from love, insofar as someone therefore hates another thing because it is contrary to the loved thing. But hatred is twofold, of abomination and of enmity. Hatred of abomination is that by which we detest evil, or by which we do not will to someone evil for the person. Hatred of enmity, by which on the contrary we will evil to some person. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 29. a. 1.

7. Between love and hatred there is present a twofold difference. “First, because the same act can at once be love of concupiscence and of benevolence. For, with respect to the good which we will, it is called of concupiscence; with respect to the person to whom we will it, it is called of benevolence. But the same act in number cannot at once be hatred of abomination and of enmity. For one act is that by which I abominate or detest the evil of some person; but another by which I will and desire evil to some person. The prior arises from love of the person. The latter from displeasure with the person. Secondly, although in hatred there is also a twofold respect, as in love, nevertheless not in the same mode. For in an act of love each respect is by way of pursuit or complacency: one to the good which we will, the other to the person to whom we will it. But in hatred one is by way of displeasure, the other by way of complacency. And indeed in hatred of abomination the respect to the person is by way of complacency, the respect to the evil by way of displeasure. The contrary happens in hatred of enmity, where the respect to the person is by way of displeasure, the respect to the evil by way of complacency.” Becanus, tr. 1. c. 3. q. 1. n. 4.

8. Moreover, love and hatred can be considered in two ways. “First, by way of simple complacency and displeasure; and thus they are acts really distinct from desire, joy, fear, and sadness. For the one is concerned with good absolutely, the other with evil absolutely, abstracting from presence and absence. Secondly, by way of efficacious complacency and displeasure. And thus love is essentially included in desire and joy; hatred in fear and sadness. For desire is the act by which we efficaciously will the good which is absent. Joy is the act by which we efficaciously will the good which is present. Similarly fear is the act by which we efficaciously abominate absent evil, sadness that by which we abominate present evil. Hence it follows that, just as love and hatred of abomination include a twofold respect, one to the good or evil which we will or do not will, the other to the person to whom we will or do not will it, so also the same must be said of desire and joy, and likewise of sorrow and sadness. For just as through love I absolutely will good to someone, so through desire I efficaciously will absent good to him, and through joy I efficaciously love his present good. The same holds concerning the opposite acts.” Becanus, cited place, n. 5.

9. Now then, if the pursuit of good and flight from evil are attended to, and good and evil are considered both as taken simply and according as they have the notion of the arduous or difficult, or insofar as there is something attainable or fleeable with some difficulty, then this series of acts is had: love, to which hatred is opposed; desire or concupiscence, to which flight or abomination is opposed; delight, to which sadness is opposed; hope, to which despair is opposed; daring, to which fear is opposed; and anger, which has no opposite. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 1. Love, desire, and joy tend toward good simply; hatred, flight or abomination, and sadness recede from evil simply. Hope tends toward arduous or difficult good, but insofar as it is good; despair recedes from good, but insofar as it is arduous and difficult. Similarly, arduous evil indeed has the notion that it should be avoided, insofar as it is evil, and fear pertains to this. It also has the notion that one should tend into it, as into something arduous, through which, namely, someone escapes subjection to evil, and thus daring tends into it. Wherefore daring and fear refer themselves to the same thing, namely to evil; but daring attacks that evil in order to overcome it, with danger neglected, while on the contrary fear flees it. Finally, anger is caused by difficult evil now lying upon one, at whose presence it is necessary that either the appetite succumb, and thus not go beyond the bounds of sadness, or that it have a motion to invading the harmful evil, or to avenging it, which pertains to anger. For anger is the appetite of vengeance, or the appetite of harming another, under the notion of vindictive justice. It cannot have a motion to fleeing, that is, to escaping or avoiding that evil, because the evil is now posited as present or past. If present, it cannot be impeded from affecting; if past, it cannot be avoided from having happened. And thus there is no contrary motion to anger by reason of approach and withdrawal from the same object, good and evil. Similarly neither is there a motion contrary to it according to the contrariety of good and evil, because to evil now lying upon one there is opposed good already attained, which now cannot have the notion of the arduous or difficult; nor after the attainment of good does any other motion remain except the resting of the appetite in the attained good, which pertains to joy. Whence it remains that only cessation from motion is opposed to it, and thus to become mild is opposed to this which is to be angry, which is not contrarily opposed, but negatively or privatively. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 2. 3. 4. “One who hates desires the evil of the enemy insofar as it is evil. But one who is angry desires the evil of him against whom he is angry, not insofar as it is evil, but insofar as it has a certain notion of good; namely, insofar as he judges it to be just, insofar as it is vindicative.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 46. a. 7. “Vengeance is made through the infliction of punishment. But it belongs to the notion of punishment that it be contrary to the will, that it be afflictive, and that it be inflicted for some fault. And therefore the angry man desires this, that he to whom he brings harm perceive and grieve, and that he know this to come about because of the injury inflicted on him. But one who hates cares nothing about this, because he desires the evil of another insofar as such.” St. Thomas, cited place, ad 2. Under acts of this kind all other acts are contained; e.g. envy is sadness concerning the good of another; shame is fear of what is shameful, etc. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 4, q. 24. a. 4. Thus, however, the preceding acts are ordered according to the way of generation. First occur love and hatred; secondly desire and flight; thirdly hope and despair; fourthly fear and daring; fifthly anger; sixthly and finally joy and sadness. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 25. a. 3.

10. As to what pertains to the other division, “every action of the will is concerned either with the end or with a means, which happens to be done in two ways, either by desiring or by executing; from which there arises a twofold order of acts of the will and of the practical intellect, which governs the will in morals. The prior contains all those acts which are necessary up to the last choice of the means, which are will, intention, counsel, consent, choice. The two prior are concerned with the end; the later, in the order in which they have been numbered, are concerned with the means. But when choice has been established, the will proceeds to free execution, and thus there is the second order, in which only two acts are numbered: command and use; to which acts fruition is added, which is not an operation ordered to either desiring or attaining the end; but rather, the end having been obtained, it follows upon it.” Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6, at the beginning. Cf. Cajetan on 1. 2. introd. q. 8. - This twofold order of acts of the will is founded in the twofold relation of the will to the willed thing, namely both to the end and to that which is to the end, or the means. The first relation is according as the willed thing is in the will; the second relation is according as the will really tends to the willed thing itself in itself. Once a comparison has been established between the first and second relation, it appears that the first is compared to the second as the imperfect to the perfect; and consequently the will proceeds from the first to the other. The perfection of the will according to the first relation is only according to willing; namely, the will will be perfect when it completely wills the end and that which is to the end. But the perfection of the will according to the other relation is according to the very possession of the good had, when the will has completely attained it; namely, when it really has that which is to the end, and really obtains the end itself. St. Thomas explains this twofold relation of the will thus, 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4: “It must be said that the will has a twofold relation to the willed thing. One, indeed, according as it is in some way in the one willing through a certain proportion or order to the willed thing. Whence also things which are naturally proportioned to some end are said to desire it naturally; but thus to have the end is to have it imperfectly. But every imperfect thing tends into perfection; and therefore both the natural appetite and the voluntary appetite tend so that it may have the end itself really, which is to have it perfectly, and this is the second relation of the will to the willed thing. But the willed thing is not only the end, but that which is to the end.”

11. Will, or simple volition, is the first act of the will, so called from the power itself; just as the first act of the intellect concerning principles is also called from the very power, intellect or understanding. Will, according as it is used not for the power but for the act, signifies a certain simple act of the will, which is, as it were, the first inclination of the will into the object, proposed as lovable in itself, without any order to another. From this it is clear that this act is properly concerned with the end, for the end alone is a good lovable in itself. For the simple act of a power is toward that which is, according to itself, the object of the power. But since the principle of every motion of the will is the end, this act is the first motion of the will. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. 2; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 6. S. 1; Lessius in the cited place of St. Thomas; Cajetan in the cited place.

12. But this is not to be understood in such a way that will, taken for the act, is so exclusively of the end alone that an act which is concerned with means can in no way be called will. This appears false from the very common manner of speaking: for there is said to be a will of the end, and there is also said to be a will of the means. Therefore what has been said must be taken thus: that will, used for the act, is of the end alone and not of the means principally and properly, as the same Angelic Doctor has in De Veritate q. 22. a. 13. ad 9, a. 15. c. But although there is said to be a will of the end and a will of the means, the former principally and properly, the latter secondarily and less properly, nevertheless the distinction is not in mere speech, but in the thing itself. For the end and the means, or honorable good and useful good, are not related equally, but as that which is according to itself, or absolute, and as that which is according to another, or toward something, or relative. The former is reduced to the category of quality, the latter to the category of relation. Wherefore, although the same will, as power, in thing and nature, is concerned with each good, nevertheless will as act is not the same in thing and nature. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 2. ad 2. And here it must be noted that will, whether it is of the end or of the means, insofar as it resolves to do something, is usually called a purpose, for example, the will not to sin hereafter, to hear Mass, to abstain from servile works, etc. But then the will already approaches intention, and is true intention.

13. Intention by force of the name signifies to tend into another. “But both the action of the mover and the motion of the movable tend into something. But the fact that the motion of the movable tends into something proceeds from the action of the mover. Whence intention first and principally pertains to that which moves to the end. Whence we say that the architect and everyone commanding moves others by his command to that to which he himself tends. But the will moves all the other powers of the soul to the end. Whence it is manifest that intention is properly an act of the will,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 1, and not of the intellect; and it is an act of the will with respect to the end. “The will indeed does not order; but nevertheless it tends into something according to the order of reason. Whence this name, intention, names an act of the will, presupposing the ordering of reason, ordering something into the end.” St. Thomas, ibid. ad 3, q. 12. a. 5.

14. Therefore in the end two notions can be considered. The first, that it is a certain good lovable in itself, without any order to another, and thus is the object of the will. The other, that a good of this kind is to be obtained through due means. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3, q. 12. a. 4. “Whence it is gathered that intention of the end is found only in the absence of the end itself; wherefore God does not properly intend his happiness; nevertheless he wills and loves it, whence will can remain even after the end has been obtained, which also manifests the distinction of these acts.” Suarez, cited place. Indeed, as the same Angelic Doctor observes, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 1. ad 4, “the will regards the end in three ways. In one way absolutely, and thus it is called will, according as we absolutely will either health, or anything else of this kind. In another way the end is considered according as one rests in it, and in this way fruition regards the end. In a third way the end is considered according as it is the term of something which is ordered into it, and thus intention regards the end. For we are not said to intend health from this alone, that we will it, but because we will to arrive at it through something else.” “But the reason for this is that three things are required for integrating the notion of an end: the goodness itself lovable on account of itself; and the negation of further order; and the termination of other things to it. For the end, as such, must be loved on account of itself and not on account of another end, and other things must be loved on account of it. And the end indeed, insofar as it is lovable on account of itself, pertains to the act of volition; but insofar as it does not lead further, it pertains to fruition, which signifies rest in the term; but insofar as other things are to be ordered to it, it terminates intention. And from this you also have that when that which is to the end is loved absolutely, it puts on the notion of an end, and similarly when one stops in it, and in the same way when it is desired as to be attained through preceding things.” Cajetan in the cited place.

15. Moreover the end which intention regards is not necessarily the ultimate end, as in fruition, as will be said in its own place. “Intention,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, a. 2, “regards the end according as it is the term of the motion of the will. But in motion the term can be taken in two ways. In one way, the ultimate term itself, in which one rests, which is the term of the whole motion. In another way, some means which is the principle of one part of the motion, and the end or term of another. As in a motion by which one goes from A into C through B, C is the ultimate term, but B is a term, though not the ultimate. And there can be intention of each. Whence, although it is always of an end, nevertheless it is not necessary that it always be of the ultimate end.... Fruition indeed imports rest, which is in the end, which pertains only to the ultimate end; but intention imports motion into the end, not into rest.”

16. From these things which have been said about will and intention “it is inferred, first, that will is not distinct from love; for the notion of love is to tend into good absolutely, whether it is present or absent.... Only this seems to be added: that the name of love can be used more universally and sometimes signify an affection of the will whether concerning the means or concerning the end.... Secondly, many gather that the act of intention is not distinguished from the act of desire... for desire in a general signification signifies any appetite whatever for obtaining a good which someone lacks; and it extends itself not only to the appetite of an efficacious will, but also to imperfect volitions or velleities, and indeed even of impossibilities; but intention seems to signify only the absolute and efficacious will of obtaining the loved end through fitting means. Wherefore, if we speak of desire not in that general signification, but insofar as it is efficacious desire of the end, in this way it does not seem to have a formal notion distinct from intention, because it has the same formal object, namely, to obtain an absent good.” Suarez, cited place. Thirdly, “concerning an end not yet acquired, the will can have only two perfect acts which are necessary for the attainment of it, namely will and intention, or love and desire; but it can have other imperfect acts, which nevertheless are reduced to these.... There would be difficulty concerning the act of hope, which also is concerning an end not had.... But it must be said that the act of hope is not of itself necessary in this quasi-line of human acts, but accidentally concerning some object which is arduous and excellent, so that the appetite may be confirmed; and it is common to acts concerning the end and concerning the means: and finally, when it is necessary, it is concerned with the end and is reduced to intention, for it is, as it were, a certain volition of obtaining the end, however arduous and excellent it may appear.” Suarez, cited place. Fourthly, will is concerned only with the end and not with the means. The reason is that it supposes no prior act, which is repugnant to the volition of means as such. But an act of intention, either virtually or expressly, is an appetite of means in common. The reason is that intention is an efficacious will of obtaining the end. But to will the end absolutely as thus to be attained is virtually to will to execute all the means necessary to the end. Moreover someone can explicitly elicit this act: I will to employ all the means necessary to the end; which act is intention, because it precedes every consultation about means and choice, and is the principle of counsel and choice. Therefore. But it is said in common, not in particular, for by this reason it is distinguished from choice. And thus there can be intention of the end, even when those things which are to the intended end have not yet been determined, of which there is choice, as daily experience itself makes clear. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 1. 2. 3, q. 12. a. 4, De Veritate q. 23. a. 13. 15; Suarez, cited place, S. 2; Lessius in q. 8. a. 3 and in q. 12.

17. But for declaring the preceding acts still more, it is worth the effort to add those things which Laymann has, l. 2. tr. 2. c. 1. n. 6, explaining which acts are contained in hope as elements. “It remains,” he says, “that we explain the definition of theological hope, according to its stricter acceptance, handed down by the Scholastics with the Master in 3. D. 26: A certain expectation of beatitude from the grace of God and our merits. When expectation is said, note that these acts of the will are subordinated, namely love, desire, intention, expectation. For love extends more broadly than desire, for we love both with absence and with presence; we desire only absent things. Desire extends more broadly than intention and expectation, because desire of absent good is one thing when simple, by which we desire even those things which we judge to be very difficult or impossible to acquire, and therefore we despair of them and do not intend to attain them; in which way one condemned to be affected with punishment desires a longer life, which nevertheless he despairs of and sometimes does not intend to obtain. But another is efficacious desire of an absent good, or of one not yet possessed, which, insofar as it is judged possible to acquire through means, is called intention; but insofar as it is judged arduous, yet really to be acquired on account of the efficacy of the means, or on account of one's own faculty or that of another helper, is called expectation. From this it appears that the act of expectation or hope adds a certain mode of firmness above the act of intention on account of the faculty of obtaining having been seen through.” Cf. St. Thomas, 3. D. 22. q. 1. a. 1. ad 3, a. 3. ad 1. ad 2.

18. And from these things which precede, n. 16, it is clear that the motion of the will into the end and into that which is to the end can be considered in two ways. In the first way, according as the will is borne into each absolutely and according to itself. And thus there are simply two motions of the will into each. The first motion, by which it is borne into the end absolutely, and sometimes precedes in time, is will. As when someone first wills health, and afterward, deliberating in what way he can be healed, wills to hire a physician so that he may be healed. In the other way the motion of the will can be considered according as the will is borne into the end according as it is the reason for willing those things which are to the end, and into the very things which are to the end; and it is one and the same motion of the will, and it is intention. And conversely, according as the will is borne into that which is to the end, on account of the end, it likewise is one and the same motion of the will tending to the end and into that which is to the end. For when I say, I will medicine on account of health, I designate only one motion of the will. The reason for this is that the end is the reason for willing those things which are to the end. But the same act falls upon the object and upon the reason of the object. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 8. a. 3, q. 12. a. 4, De Veritate q. 22. a. 14. Fittingly Cajetan on q. 8. a. 3: “The end and that which is to the end, as willed things, are disposed in two ways. First formally and separately according to themselves; and thus they are loved by diverse volitions, and one is the cause of the other. Secondly, as one is virtually enclosed in the other; and thus by one volition, as to subject, they are loved.... For this willed thing is on account of that one, virtually participated in this one.... For thus they occur at least..., so that (the end is) the reason for loving that which is to the end. But I say at least because nothing prevents one also actually, by one act, tending into alms on account of God, into the former as matter, into the latter as form; just as one bodily vision tends into color and light. For those things which are to the end are compared to the end as matter to form, as is clear from what was said above in q. 5. And know that in things of this kind, which by one act are terminated to each, the word propter does not state the cause of the volition, but of the willed thing; for it states the cause why that material thing terminates the act of willing, and it does not state another volition causing this one, except virtually.”

19. Whether someone can intend several things at once; and, if several incompossible things are intended, which intention prevails? - Resp. To the 1.um, affirmatively. For either those things are ordered to one another or not. “If indeed they have been ordered to one another, it is manifest that man can intend many things at once. For intention is not only of the ultimate end, but also of an intermediate end; but someone at once intends both the proximate and the ultimate end, as the making of medicine and health. But if two things not ordered to one another are taken, thus also man can intend several things at once, which is clear from this, that man chooses one thing before another because it is better than the other. But among the other conditions by which something is better than another, one is that it is of use for several things. Whence something can be chosen before another from this, that it is of use for several things, and thus manifestly man intends several things at once.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 3. - Resp. To the 2.um: 1.º If those incompossible wills are simultaneous, the predominant one prevails, namely the one which would be chosen once the impossibility was known. 2.º If among contrary wills one succeeds another, the later prevails over the prior, for it is predominant in the order of time. Except: unless the prior has revoked, at least virtually, every subsequent will; for then the prior will, provided it is not expressly revoked, is certainly predominant. Cf. Lugo, On the Sacraments, D. 8. n. 121. 123; St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 24.

20. Wherefore, if one person has asked from you today's Mass for thanksgiving, another for one gravely ill, and you have elicited the intention of each, it must be held that it was applied for the latter, whether that one asked for it earlier or later. If you determine with yourself: Whatever vow I shall hereafter make without the permission of the confessor, I do not will it to have force; and afterward you vow something without consulting the confessor, it has no force, provided that will is not retracted expressly or virtually, namely if, mindful of the first vow, you were to make the second. If someone were to contract matrimony intending it to be soluble, with such a mind that if he knew it to be indissoluble he would not contract it, the matrimony is null; for indissolubility is an essential property of Christian matrimony. But he would contract validly if merely through error alone he thought matrimony to be dissoluble, because then the certainly predominant will is that of contracting the matrimony itself, and consequently that error does not take away the intention of contracting in the mode in which he ought. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 210. 700, l. 6. n. 24; Elbel n. 130.

21. Fruition is named from fruit. “But sensible fruit is that which is expected last from a tree and is perceived with a certain sweetness. Whence fruition seems to pertain to love or delight, which someone has concerning the last thing expected, which is the end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 1. Wherefore fruition is an act of the will including three things: love, possession, joy. It includes love, but is not love, because love of itself abstracts from the attainment of the object. This is also clear from the force of the name itself; for to enjoy is to take fruit from a thing, but love only states a weight toward the loved thing. “To love,” says Suarez, tr. 2. D. 7. S. 3, “is to be borne by a certain vital weight into a known good, and to be united to it; from which there follows the appetite of obtaining that good (desire), and, once presence is posited, joy follows, which does not unite the lover with the loved, but rather is a certain sweetness which arises from that union and possession of the good.” Hence fruition also includes possession. Whence Augustine, l. 1. On Christian Doctrine, cap. 4, says: “To enjoy is to adhere by love to some thing on account of itself.” But it is not possession, unless perhaps as informed, as it were, by joy and delight. This joy and delight of the will is that which properly comes under the name of fruition.

22. Therefore the object of fruition is good under the notion of good; but that good must be delectable, for it is the cause of delight. But delight is complacency in that which is fitting, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 1. ad 3; it is the rest of the appetitive power in some loved good and consequent upon some operation, St. Thomas, ibid. q. 34. a. 1. But both the end and the means can in some way be the object of joy, although the reason for rejoicing, or the formal object, is always the end. The 1st reason is that joy arises from the attainment of delectable good. But the means itself can be a delectable good. And thus we experience ourselves to be delighted when we obtain fitting means. Therefore. The 2nd reason is that every loved good either is an end, or is by reason of an end. Therefore every good which delights is an end, or by reason of an end. Cf. Suarez, tr. 2. D. 7; Cajetan on q. 11. a. 1.

23. Wherefore fruition properly such is not of means, but of the end; indeed fruition properly is of the ultimate end. For fruition, as has already been noted, is named from fruit; and two things pertain to the notion of fruit, namely that it be last, and that it quiet the appetite with a certain sweetness or delight. “But the last is either simply or in a qualified respect. Simply, indeed, that which is not referred to another. But in a qualified respect, that which is the last of some things. Therefore that which is simply last, in which someone is delighted as in the last end, this is properly called fruit, and someone is properly said to enjoy it. But that which is not delectable in itself, but is desired only in order to another, as a bitter drink for health, can in no way be called fruit. But that which has in itself a certain delight to which certain preceding things are referred can indeed in some way be called fruit, but not properly; and according to the complete notion of fruit we are said to enjoy it. Whence Augustine says...... that we enjoy known things in which the delighted will rests. But it does not rest simply except in the last, because as long as something is expected, the motion of the will remains in suspense, although it has already arrived at something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 3.

24. Fruition can indeed be given as pertaining to love of friendship. For it is certain that we can rejoice concerning the goods of a friend, because they are his, on account of his good. “Nevertheless it is true that the name of fruition is more properly attributed to joy which pertains to love of concupiscence, since to enjoy is to take fruit; whence it seems to import a respect to the advantage of the one enjoying.” Suarez, tr. 2. D. 7. S. 2.

25. But a twofold joy or fruition is distinguished, perfect and imperfect. “For since it is concerning the end attained, if the end has been perfectly attained, the fruition is perfect; if it has been attained in a certain hope, some fruition can arise from this, but imperfect, because that is already some kind of attainment; and this seems to be that fruition concerning which Paul says, rejoicing in hope.” Suarez, cited place. From hope of obtaining a good, delight also arises, for the good becomes in some way present to the mind. Hence also the memory of a good in which someone has already rejoiced furnishes delights to the one thinking. But a present thing floods the mind with far greater joy. To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 4: “To enjoy imports a certain comparison to the last, according as the will has something for the last end. But the last end is had in two ways. In one way perfectly, and in another way imperfectly. Perfectly, indeed, when it is had not only in intention, but also in itself. Imperfectly, however, when it is had in intention alone. Therefore perfect fruition is of an end already really had; but imperfect fruition is also of an end not really had, but in intention alone.” Wherefore the same Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 5. ad 2, says: “Fruition does not import the ordering of something into something, as intention does, but absolute rest in the end.”

26. This perfect and imperfect fruition is not the same as proper and improper fruition, about which it was said in n. 22-23. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 11. a. 4. ad 2, “that the rest of the will is impeded in two ways. In one way on the part of the object, namely because it is not the last end, but is ordered to another. In another way on the part of the one desiring the end, who has not yet obtained the end. But the object is what gives species to the act; but the mode of acting depends on the agent, so that it is perfect or imperfect according to the condition of the agent. And therefore fruition of that which is not the last end is improper, as deficient from the species of fruition. But fruition of the last end not had is indeed proper, but imperfect, on account of the imperfect mode of having the last end.” Therefore delight is of itself harmless, indeed good, when it agrees with reason and adds courage to man for the exercise of virtues; but worst is the delight of those “who rejoice when they have done evil, and exult in the worst things.” Prov. 2:14; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 34.

27. A more vehement delight is indeed sometimes drawn from the senses, but a more perfect and greater one is drawn of itself by the intellect. “For much more is man delighted concerning this, that he knows something by understanding, than concerning this, that he knows something by sensing, because intellectual cognition is both more perfect and is also more known, because the intellect reflects more upon its own act than sense does; and intellective cognition is also more loved. For there is no one who would not rather lack bodily sight than intellectual sight in the mode in which beasts or fools lack it, as Augustine says in book XIV of The City of God. But if intelligible spiritual delights are compared with sensible bodily delights, then, according to themselves and speaking simply, spiritual delights are greater. And this appears according to the three things which are required for delight, namely the joined good, and that which is joined, and the conjunction itself. For the spiritual good itself is greater than bodily good, and is more loved. A sign of this is that men abstain even from the greatest bodily pleasures so that they may not lose honor, which is an intelligible good. Similarly also the intellective part itself is much nobler and more cognitive than the sensitive part. The conjunction of each is also more intimate, more perfect, and firmer.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 31. a. 5. 6.

28. Choice is the pre-acceptance of one thing with respect to another; wherefore it imports a certain preceding comparison and discretion from the other. Therefore choice follows upon a sentence or judgment, which is like the conclusion of an operative syllogism. Whence that falls under choice which is disposed as a conclusion in the syllogism of things to be done. But the end in things to be done is disposed as a principle, and not as a conclusion. Wherefore the end, insofar as it is of this kind, does not fall under choice. It is said, insofar as it is of this kind, for that which is in one operation as an end can be ordered to something else as to an end; and in this way it falls under choice. And thus the ultimate end in no way falls under choice; but other ends can fall under choice: as, in the operation of a physician, health is disposed as the end, whence this does not fall under the choice of the physician, but he supposes it as a principle. But bodily health is ordered to the good of the soul; whence, for him who has care concerning the salvation of the soul, to be healthy or to be infirm can fall under choice. Therefore choice is an act of the will by which the will is borne into a particular means as means, or as useful good. Although choice is formally concerned with the means, nevertheless it virtually includes the volition of the end. For it is impossible to love one thing on account of another without at least implicitly loving this latter, since it itself is what moves to the love of the former. Indeed it can well happen that the will explicitly, by one and the same act, can will the end and the means by way of one object. For this reason intention and choice can be really and physically distinguished, and they can also really and physically not be distinguished. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 12. a. 4.

29. Therefore, although in the name of choice something is imported which pertains to reason, or to the intellect, and something which pertains to the will, nevertheless choice substantially or essentially is not an act of reason but of will; for choice is completed in a certain motion of the soul toward the good which is chosen. “For that it is directly an act of the will is clear from two things. First from the notion of the object: because the proper object of choice is that which is to the end, which pertains to the notion of good, which is the object of the will; for both the end is called good, as honorable or delectable, and that which is to the end, as useful. Secondly, from the notion of the act itself. For choice is the last acceptance by which something is accepted for pursuit, and this indeed is not of reason, but of the will. For however much reason prefers one thing to another, one thing has not yet been pre-accepted before another for operation until the will is inclined into one more than into another, for the will does not follow reason of necessity.” St. Thomas, De Veritate q. 22. a. 15.

30. Choice consequently proceeds from the efficacious intention of the end, and its object is useful good as such, and possible to us. For the reason for choosing something is that through it we can attain the end. But through that which is impossible one cannot attain the end. Nor indeed can it be that the end is possible unless that which is to the end has been possible. But no one is moved to that which is impossible. Wherefore no one can tend into the end except through this, that it appears that what is to the end is possible; and therefore choice can be had only of that which is possible. But choice retains its intrinsic nature, although it does not happen to be made among many things, when that means is only one. For an act is specified by its proper object, and the same object of choice remains, namely the means to the end, whether it is a single means, or is compared with others. Choice is by way of desire, because it is concerning the means as to be executed, and precedes execution; and therefore it is concerning an absent thing. Moreover, choice is the purpose of the will, since purpose is an act of the will by which someone determines that he is going to do something.

31. Finally, choice is always of human acts. For just as intention is of the end, so choice is of those things which are to the end. But the end is either an action, namely a human action, or some thing. But when some thing has been the end, it is necessary that some human action intervene; either insofar as man makes that thing which is the end, as the physician makes health, which is his end, whence also to heal or to make health is the end of the physician; or insofar as man uses or enjoys that thing which is the end, as for the miser money, or the possession of money, is the end. The same must be said of that which is to the end: for it is either an action, namely a human action, or some thing, with some human action intervening through which he makes that which is to the end, or uses it. And thus choice is always of human acts.

32. If a comparison is established between the simple act of the will, or volition or will, and choice, there is furthermore a difference between each; for the simple act of the will, namely volition or will, is not universally free as to the specification of the act, since it is necessarily terminated to some object, in such a way that it cannot be terminated to the opposite. But choice is always free both as to the exercise of the act and as to specification. For will is of the end, and therefore concerning perfect good, which is beatitude, it is not free. But choice, since it is not of the end, but of those things which are to the end, is not of perfect good, which is beatitude, but of other particular goods, and therefore it is free.

33. We have spoken of choice before counsel was treated, according to the order of the Angelic Doctor himself. For although counsel is prior to choice, as the cause of it, and therefore it would seem that one must speak first of counsel, nevertheless the order of doctrine requires that one speak first of choice according to itself and its intrinsic nature, and then indeed of its extrinsic cause. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 13; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 8. S. 1. 2; Cajetan, cited place; Lessius in this place. - Now counsel properly is an act of the intellect including two things: inquiry and discovery of means, and judgment concerning those things which are done by us and which come into doubt. It is an act of the intellect; for it belongs to counsel to inquire into and discover means to the end, which belongs to reason and intellect.

34. It includes inquiry. For choice follows upon a judgment of reason about things to be done. But in things to be done much uncertainty is found, because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which on account of their variability are uncertain. But in doubtful and uncertain matters, reason does not pronounce judgment without preceding inquiry. And therefore inquiry of reason before judgment about things to be chosen is necessary. And this inquiry is called counsel, because counsel begins from it. In this inquiry the principle is the end. For counsel is about operations; but the reason of things to be done is taken from the end. Whence what we first seek to know in this inquiry is, concerning that which is to be done on account of the end, whether it is fitting for leading into the end. And thus this inquiry of counsel is resolutive, namely beginning from that which is intended in the future until one arrives at that which must be done immediately. Discovery is furthermore added, for inquiry is ordered to discovery.

35. This inquiry and discovery is of means. For the end in things to be done has the notion of a principle, because the reasons of those things which are to the end are taken from the end. But a principle does not fall under question; rather principles must be supposed in every inquiry. Whence, since counsel is a question, there is not counsel concerning the end, but only concerning those things which are to the end, or concerning means to be chosen.

36. Besides the aforesaid inquiry into means and discovery of means, counsel includes a discretive judgment about the means more apt for attaining the end; this is to be done, for that inquiry and discovery is terminated at a judgment concerning things to be done for the end. For the term of inquiry is that which is immediately in our power for us to do. For just as the end has the notion of a principle, so that which is done on account of the end has the notion of a conclusion. Whence that which first occurs as to be done has the notion of the last conclusion at which inquiry is terminated. “Counsel,” says Cajetan on q. 14. a. 1, “signifies completed inquiry, i.e. up to judgment inclusively. For inquiry itself, without judgment, is not counsel except inchoatively.”

37. Moreover, counsel is about those things which are done by us. Counsel properly imports a comparison had among several. For it is called consilium as if consilium, because many sit together for conferring at the same time. For it must be considered that, in particular contingents, in order that something certain be known, several conditions, or circumstances, must be considered, which are not easily considered by one person, but are more certainly perceived by several, while what one considers does not occur to another. But in necessary and universal matters there is a more absolute and simpler consideration, so that one person by himself can more sufficiently suffice for this kind of consideration. And therefore the inquiry of counsel does not pertain to universal and necessary things, but properly pertains to contingent singulars. But cognition of truth in such contingent singulars does not have anything great so that it would be appetible of itself, as cognition of universals and necessary things is; rather it is desired according as it is useful for operation, because actions are concerned with contingent singulars. And therefore it must be said that counsel properly is about those things which are done by us, or are to be done by us, namely to be done or avoided.

38. But counsel is not about all things which are done by us, but only about those things to be done by us which come into doubt. For those things which are already determined as to how they ought to be done do not need counsel, as happens in the arts, which have certain ways of operating and proceed by determined ways to determined ends. And thus a scribe does not deliberate how he ought to draw letters; for this is determined by art. Nor likewise do those things need counsel which are known of themselves, or are minimal, about which it does not much matter whether they are done thus or otherwise, because they help little and hinder little with respect to attaining the end. But reason takes what is little as almost nothing.

39. Therefore counsel involves not one but several acts of the intellect. For that inquiry does not happen without discourse and consideration of several things. But counsel sometimes signifies inquiry alone, sometimes judgment alone, although it does not proceed from discourse, but properly embraces each. Counsel in this last sense indeed frequently precedes choice, but not always. For when choice is made among many things, which happens more often, all those things must have been discovered, proposed, discussed, and judged by the intellect. But where the matter concerns things known of themselves, or determined by art, or minimal things, as has already been said, then there is not formal counsel.

40. In children not yet using perfect use of reason, and in the insane, there is some mode of choice, because they can compare means with the end and among themselves. Whence, when questioned, they give a reason on account of which they choose this rather than that. But this choice is not properly human or moral, because it is not made from perfect counsel and power of the one operating: then reason does not judge of itself, but follows the apprehension of sense, and the will accompanies the intellect. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 14; Cajetan in this place; Lessius in the same place; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 8. S. 5.

41. Consent. To consent is to sense together, and thus it imports a certain conjunction to that to which assent is given. To consent, according to the force of the word, properly imports the application of sense to something. But it is proper to sense that it is cognitive of present things. And because an act of the appetitive power is a certain inclination to the thing itself, according to a certain likeness, the very application of the appetitive power to the thing, according as it adheres to it, receives the name of sense, as though taking a certain experience of the thing to which it adheres, insofar as it is pleased in it. But it belongs to him in whose power appetitive motion is to apply appetitive motion to the doing of something, just as touching a stone indeed belongs to a staff, but applying the staff to the touch of the stone belongs to him who has in his power to move the staff. On account of this, properly, as to the thing itself, only the rational will is said to consent, which has its appetitive motion in its own power and can apply it or not apply it to this or to that.

42. Consent can be attributed to any free act of the will conforming itself, or consenting, to the judgment of the intellect, i.e. accepting the good proposed to the intellect, in which way sin is said to be perfected by consent; and thus it is not a special act, and is concerned not only with means but also with the end. But insofar as it is a special act, it is concerned with the means, and is not an act distinct in species from choice, but only by reason from diverse respects. For insofar as the will wills and accepts what the intellect judges to be useful, and thus conforms itself to it, it is called consent; but insofar as it prefers that either to other useful means, or certainly to other useless things not conducing to the end, it is called choice. But also in reality consent can be distinguished from choice, namely when consent is inefficacious.

43. For indeed, as has already been said, “consent names the application of appetitive motion to something pre-existing in the power of the one applying; but in the order of things to be done one must first take the apprehension of the end, then the appetite of the end, then counsel concerning those things which are to the end, then the appetite of those things which are to the end. But appetite tends naturally into the ultimate end. Whence also the application of appetitive motion into the apprehended end does not have the notion of consent, but of simple will. But those things which are after the ultimate end, insofar as they are to the end, fall under counsel. And thus there can be consent concerning them, insofar as appetitive motion is applied to that which has been judged from counsel. But appetitive motion into the end is not applied to counsel, but rather counsel to it; because counsel presupposes the appetite of the end, but the appetite of those things which are to the end presupposes the determination of counsel. And therefore the application of appetitive motion to the determination of counsel is properly consent. Whence, since counsel is only concerning those things which are to the end, consent, properly speaking, is only concerning those things which are to the end.... Choice adds above consent a certain relation with respect to that before which something is chosen. And therefore after consent, choice still remains. For it can happen that through counsel several things leading to the end are found, and while each of them is pleasing, consent is given to each of them; but from the many which are pleasing we pre-accept one by choosing. But if only one thing which pleases is found, consent and choice do not differ in reality, but only by reason; so that consent is said according as it pleases for acting, but choice according as it is preferred to those things which do not please.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 15. a. 3. With respect to those many things left aside, there is consent, but inefficacious; for consent is the adherence of the will to those things which are judged by the intellect to be useful for attaining the end. With respect to the one thing actually pre-accepted, choice is had, which is the pre-acceptance of one thing with respect to another, or an efficacious volition of some particular thing for attaining the end. - Suarez, tr. 2. D. 8. S. 2; Lessius in the cited place of St. Thomas.

44. The Holy Doctor raises the question in a. 4, “Whether consent to an act pertains only to the higher part of the soul?” and responds: “It must be said that the final sentence always pertains to him who is superior, to whom it belongs to judge concerning others. For as long as what is proposed remains to be judged, a final sentence is not yet given. But it is manifest that higher reason is what has to judge concerning all things, because concerning sensibles we judge through human reasons; but concerning those things which pertain to human reasons we judge according to divine reasons, which pertain to higher reason. And therefore as long as it is uncertain whether resistance is to be made according to divine reasons or not, no judgment of reason has the notion of a final sentence. But the final sentence concerning things to be done is consent to the act; and therefore consent to the act pertains to higher reason, according as the will is included in reason.” The Holy Doctor distinguishes higher and lower reason: according to the various notions of things of a higher and lower order with respect to the nature of the rational soul; and thus higher reason judges according to divine reasons, e.g. that an oath, matrimony, etc. is licit and honorable according to divine law, which heretics deny; lower reason judges according to human reasons, e.g. that an oath, matrimony, etc. is licit and honorable according to human laws. Therefore it is not one reason and another reason, but it is the same reason judging according to higher and loftier reasons, or according to reasons of a lower order. Moreover, the difficulty arises from this, that if higher reason intends the inspecting and consulting of eternal things, therefore to consent to an act does not pertain to higher reason alone; for many times man consents to an act, e.g. of sin, certainly not on account of eternal reasons, but on account of some temporal reasons, or even on account of some passions of the soul. To this it must be said that, if lower reason is considered according to itself, it does not have to consent to an act, because consent to an act is the final sentence concerning things to be done. And the final sentence always pertains to him who is superior, as to him whose role it is to judge concerning others; such in the proposal is higher reason. But if lower reason is considered according as it participates in higher reason, to which it is conjoined both suppositally and identically, then higher reason is what always has the final sentence and consent, since although, in the proposed case of sin, it does not move to acting according to eternal reasons, nevertheless it does not withdraw from acting according to those same reasons, however much it may see according to those reasons that one must abstain from so acting. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas in the cited place ad 3, “that higher reason is said to consent not only because according to eternal reasons it often moves to acting, but also because according to eternal reasons it does not dissent.” Cf. De Veritate q. 15.

45. Use is one thing active, another passive. The first is an act elicited by the will, by which the will moves the other powers to operating. For to use some thing is to apply it to its function; as riding is the use of a horse, and striking is the use of a staff. But it belongs to the will to apply the powers of the soul, the members of the body, and exterior things which are in our power, to their functions, or quasi-functions. The other is the act of the executing power, proceeding from active use, which power is compared to the will, by which it is applied to acting, as an instrument to the principal agent. But action is properly attributed not to the instrument, but to the principal agent, as building to the builder, not however to the instruments. Whence it follows that to use is properly an act of the will.

46. “But to operation we apply both the interior principles of acting, namely the powers themselves of the soul, or the members of the body, as the intellect to understanding and the eye to seeing; and exterior things, as a staff to striking. But it is manifest that exterior things we do not apply to some operation except through intrinsic principles, which are the powers of the soul, as the habits of the powers, or organs which are members of the body.... Whence it is manifest that to use is first and principally of the will as of the first mover, but of reason as directing, and of the other powers as executing.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 16. a. 1. Now, as to consent is to apply appetitive motion to something to be desired, so to use is to apply some principle of action to action. But to apply something to another belongs only to that which has dominion and choice over it; and this belongs only to him who knows how to refer something into another, which pertains to reason. And therefore to consent and to use pertain only to reason and not to sense. St. Thomas, cited place, a. 2.

47. Use properly is of means, for use signifies a certain motion of the will to something in order to another, i.e. to really obtaining the willed thing, or end. “To use,” says St. Thomas, q. 10. a. 3, “imports the application of something to something. But what is applied to another is disposed in the notion of that which is to the end. On account of this, both those things which are accommodated to the end are called useful, and utility itself is sometimes named use. But it must be considered that the last end is said in two ways. In one way simply, and in another way with respect to someone. For since the end is sometimes called the thing, but sometimes the attainment of the thing, or possession of it, as for the miser the end is either money or the possession of money, it is manifest that, speaking simply, the last end is the thing itself; for the possession of money is not good except on account of the good of money; but with respect to this man, the attainment of money is the last end, for the miser would not seek money unless so that he might have it. Therefore, speaking simply and properly, some man enjoys money, because he constitutes his last end in it; but insofar as he refers it to possession, he is said to use it.”

48. Use follows choice, if nevertheless use is taken according as the will uses the executive power by moving it. But because the will also in a certain way moves reason and uses it, use of that which is to the end can be understood according as it is in the consideration of reason referring it into the end. And in this way use precedes choice. But since the motion by which the will moves to executing precedes the execution itself of the work, and this motion follows choice, use, which pertains to the aforesaid motion, is between choice and execution. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4.

49. Use is distinguished in reality from choice when counsel is first made, and choice concerning the means according to itself, before there is treatment of execution; but it is least of all distinguished in reality from choice when the intellect suddenly determines the means and all the circumstances, and the will, in the same instant in which it chooses the means, also chooses the circumstance of actual execution, for from the force of such a choice there follows the action of the executing power. Wherefore use is the will executing the chosen means for attaining the end. Use and choice are not acts specifically distinct between themselves, because they tend into the object under the same notion of good, namely as it is useful for attaining the end. But choice is concerned with the means in the order of intention, as future and as the effect of the end. Active use is concerned with the same means in the order of execution, as present and as the efficient cause of the end had in reality. And thus these two acts are concerned with objects materially distinct. Finally, because acts of the will are reflected upon themselves, in any act of the will consent and choice and use can be taken: as if it is said that the will consents that it choose, and consents that it consent, and uses itself for choosing and for consenting. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 16; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 9. S. 1. 2; Lessius in the cited place of St. Thomas.

50. The command about which there is treatment here is the command by which someone commands himself, not that by which he commands others. Man can command himself in two ways: 1.º as it were in the exercised act, while he moves himself to doing something. 2.º in the signate act, by expressly eliciting the act of command: do this. A command of this kind is partly an act of the will, partly an act of the intellect, because to command is to move to acting: “but the first mover among the powers of the soul to the exercise of an act is the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. But to command is not to move in any manner whatsoever, but to move as though by imposing a law; but it is the intellect that imposes law on the will, since it judges concerning things to be done. Wherefore command is a motion of the will, by the ordering and intimation of reason, toward doing something. Hence if command is directed to another, it needs an external manifestation.

51. Now then it is asked here, what is this act of intellect and will which adequately constitutes command. As to what pertains to the act of the intellect, note: 1.º Before will and intention there precedes a practical judgment of the intellect, by which someone judges not only that a thing is good in itself, but also fitting for himself, and that it is expedient to love it. This judgment contains some notion of command. “For one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. 2.º Before choice and consent likewise a practical judgment precedes, whether it is by way of formal counsel or not, proposing a means apt for the end as choosable; and a judgment of this kind contains the notion of command more, since it moves more by announcing and intimating. 3.º After that choice which precedes active use in time, another more practical judgment precedes, distinct in this from the judgment which precedes choice, that it more immediately reaches the work and all determined circumstances necessary for the execution of the work. The reason is that before every act of the will there must precede a judgment of the intellect consonant with it, by which it may be directed and illuminated; and active use is an act of the will which adds something to the choice already made. This judgment participates still more in the notion of command, for it moves the will more vehemently, by announcing and intimating, not so much by its own power as by the power of the choice already made. For it is altogether ordered to the execution of the work, and inclines more to overcoming the difficulty of the work, which always appears greater at the time of execution than in consultation and abstract choice. 4.º Besides these practical judgments there is found in us another judgment, which we experience when we speak thus internally with ourselves: do this; and it explicitly expresses the efficacious act of the will to be elicited for executing the work. This judgment properly constitutes command. “To command is indeed essentially an act of reason; for one commanding orders him whom he commands to doing something, by intimating or announcing: but thus to order by way of a certain intimation belongs to reason. But reason can intimate or announce something in two ways: in one way absolutely; and this intimation is expressed by a verb of the indicative mood, as if someone were to say: this is to be done by you. But sometimes reason intimates something to someone by moving him to this; and such intimation is expressed by a verb of the imperative mood: do this.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. This judgment is not of itself necessary for the work; nevertheless it is a useful act, so that the will itself, and the whole man, may be moved more, or so that he may approach execution more quickly, or may persevere in it more constantly, because while man thus commands himself, he is, as it were, reflected upon himself and becomes superior to himself; and because, as external speech with respect to others, so internal speech with respect to oneself has the power of moving and arousing the soul.

52. As to what pertains to the act of the will, it must be noted that this command, if it is efficacious and true, supposes an absolute will; for if it is made without any will, it is fictitious and only words; but if the will which precedes is inefficacious, it too will be inefficacious. And the reason is that the whole efficacy of moving is from the will. Therefore a will of this kind completes the notion of that command. “To command is an act of reason, nevertheless with an act of the will presupposed, in the power of which reason moves through command to the exercise of the act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. The act of the will preceding the act of reason which is command is choice, by whose power reason moves. Wherefore command is the practical judgment itself, whether direct or reflexive, which, from choice already made, by announcing and intimating what is to be done, moves to execution. “It must be said that not every act of the will precedes this act of reason which is command; but some act precedes, namely choice, and some act follows, namely use: because after the determination of counsel, which is the judgment of reason, the will chooses; and after choice reason commands that through which what is chosen is to be done; and then at last the will of someone begins to use by executing the command of reason; sometimes indeed the will of another, when someone commands another; but sometimes the will of the one commanding himself, when someone commands himself.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 3. ad 1.

53. From these things it is deduced that command properly is not in use. For command is naturally prior to the use of command. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 3, “that use of that which is to the end, according as it is in reason referring it to the end (that is, insofar as use is taken for the act of the will moving reason to consulting and deliberating about the means, thus use evidently), precedes command. But use of that which is to the end, according as it is subjected to the executive power, follows command, because the use of the one using is joined with the act of that by which someone uses. For someone does not use a staff before he in some way operates by the staff. But command is not simultaneous with the act of him to whom command is given, but command is naturally prior to the obeying of command, and sometimes is also prior in time. Whence it is manifest that command is prior to use.” Nevertheless active use itself also has some notion of command, and is often called command. For the will commands the other powers, even the intellect. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 4. a. 2. ad 2. Indeed the will even commands itself. For the will commands all voluntary acts, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 6. ad 2, and one act of the will is commanded by another act of the same will. For to command belongs to one having dominion, and the will has dominion of all human actions.

54. Therefore there are three elements which constitute command. The first is the ordering of something to something. For when it is prescribed, Love God, someone is ordered to loving God. The other element is intimation or announcement; for unless the precept is intimated, or announced and manifested, someone cannot be moved by the precept, and consequently neither ordered to anything. The third element is motion: for by a precept someone is moved by the one commanding to that to which he is ordered through the same precept, which therefore is intimated and announced to him so that he may execute it and complete it in work. Ordering and intimation pertain to reason; but motion pertains to the will. For to order includes to compare or bring one thing together with another, which belongs to reason. To intimate or announce is to manifest and to speak, which also pertains to the intellect. But although to move of itself first belongs to the will, because it is the first mover among the powers of the soul to exercise, nevertheless it belongs secondarily and participatively to the intellect from the preceding act of the will, because the power of the prior act remains in the following act. Whence, just as in choice something remains of the power of the preceding act of counsel, namely the order of means, so in command something remains of the power of choice, namely the efficacy of moving. Therefore command is an act of reason, with an act of the will presupposed, in whose power reason moves through command to the exercise of the act. - Wherefore command is not a simple act, but composed of acts of intellect and will. - Moreover, whenever two things concur to constitute some one thing, one of them is as the formal with respect to the other. But it must be considered in acts of the soul that an act which is essentially and elicitively of one power or habit is materially disposed, and receives form and species from a superior power or habit, according as the lower is ordered by the higher. For if someone exercises an act of fortitude on account of love of God, that act indeed, e.g. to die for Christ, is essentially and elicitively an act of fortitude; but it is materially disposed with respect to love of God, and thus materially indeed it is an act of fortitude, but formally of charity. Similarly in command, since the will concurs as the supreme power, for it concurs as the first mover to exercise, and what is from a superior power is disposed as formal in a composite act, but what is from an inferior power is disposed as material; it follows that ordering and intimation in command are disposed as material, and motion as formal. Wherefore command is essentially and elicitively an act of reason, as to its material element, and of the will as to the formal element; or it is an act of reason participating in the will as first mover. - St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 1. 2. 3. 5; Quodl. 9. a. 12; Suarez, tr. 2. D. 9. S. 3; Cajetan in the cited place; Lessius in the same place.

55. Whether command and the commanded act are one act, or several? - Resp. Although command and the commanded act are several acts in the genus of being, nevertheless in the genus of morals they are one act, because from them one perfect action is made, “whence they are judged to be united as if by way of matter and form; from which it is gathered that not only command and the commanded act, but also counsel, choice, and use, insofar as they tend to the execution of the same action, if they are done together and without moral interruption, are all judged to complete one perfect human act.” Suarez, cited place, S. 3. “It must be noted that all acts which are after intention draw goodness or malice from intention, because they follow from the force of intention. For consultation is morally good or evil because it proceeds from a good or evil intention. The same must be said of judgment, choice, command, use, attainment. And so this whole series of acts is judged one sin in number in order to confession. Whence he who has committed homicide is not bound to say that he intended, consulted about means, judged, chose, etc.; but it is enough that he say that he committed homicide, unless perhaps some means otherwise illicit of itself had intervened, as if he had used magic art or the work of another.” Lessius on q. 17. a. 9. D. n. 31. Cf. also on q. 17. a. 4. And St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 4: “But just as in the genus of natural things some whole is composed of matter and form, as man from soul and body, who is one natural being, although he has a multitude of parts, so also in human acts the act of the inferior power is materially disposed to the act of the superior, insofar as the inferior power acts in the power of the superior moving it. For thus also the act of the first mover is disposed formally to the act of the instrument. Whence it is clear that command and the commanded act are one human act, just as a certain whole is one, but according to parts is many.”

54. Whether acts of the will, of reason, of the sensitive appetite, of the vegetative soul, and of the exterior members are commanded? - Resp. 1.º “It must be said that, as has been said, command is nothing other than an act of reason ordering, with a certain motion, to the doing of something. But it is manifest that reason can order concerning an act of the will. For just as it can judge that it is good to will something, so it can order by commanding that man will. From this it is clear that an act of the will can be commanded.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 5.

2.º “It must be said that, because reason is reflected upon itself, just as it orders concerning the acts of other powers, so also it can order concerning its own act. Whence also its own act can be commanded.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 6.

3.º It must be said that according to this some act is subject to our command insofar as it is in our power. The sensitive appetite is a power using a bodily organ. But every act of a power using a bodily organ depends not only on the power of the soul, but also on the disposition of the bodily organ. “But that which is on the part of the power of the soul follows apprehension. But the apprehension of imagination, since it is particular, is ruled by the apprehension of reason, which is universal, as a particular active power by a universal active power. And therefore on this side the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason. But the quality and disposition of the body is not subject to the command of reason. And therefore from this side it is impeded that the motion of the sensitive appetite be totally subjected to the command of reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 7.

4.º “Reason commands by way of an apprehensive power. And therefore those acts which proceed from the intellective or animal appetite can be commanded by reason; but not those acts which proceed from natural appetite. For acts of this kind are of the vegetative soul.... And on account of this acts of the vegetative soul are not subjected to the command of reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 8.

5.º “It must be said that the members of the body are certain organs of the powers of the soul. Whence in the mode in which the powers of the soul are disposed to this, that they obey reason, in this mode also the members of the body are disposed. Therefore, because the sensitive powers are subjected to the command of reason, but not the natural powers, all motions of members which are moved by the sensitive powers are subjected to the command of reason. But motions of members which follow the natural powers are not subjected to the command of reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 9.

55. Whether all acts of will, reason, and sense are commanded? - Resp. Negatively. For, 1.º as to the will, the first love or first will of the end is not an act properly commanded, because it proceeds from a less practical judgment and presupposes no other act of the will. It is said to be from a less practical judgment insofar as, as the Angelic Doctor says, that act of the will is not from the ordering of reason or from deliberating reason. Likewise, not all those indeliberate affections which are naturally excited are commanded acts. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 5. ad 3, 1. p. q. 82. a. 3. Let the same be said of all those acts of the intellect which, once the object has been apprehended through imagination, are elicited by the intellect by natural instinct.

2.º As to the intellect, the first act of the intellect likewise is in no way commanded, since it presupposes no other act of the intellect and will. - The will can indeed command other acts of the intellect as to exercise. “Nevertheless it sometimes happens that because of some impediments the intellect does not obey the will, as if the motion of sense or phantasy is so vehement that it almost snatches the intellect; for then either the will cannot use its choice, or certainly, while it itself wills, it obtains what it wills, yet immediately interrupts the act of the intellect. Therefore it can return to the same thought, if it is moved from elsewhere.” Suarez, tr. 2. D. 10. S. 1. - But as to the species of the act, the intellect does not depend on the will in simple apprehension and judgment, where there is evidence. The reason is that the intellect is a necessarily acting power when the object is perfectly proposed to it as necessarily true. But where there is not evidence, it can be moved by the will as to the species of the act, i.e. to assenting or dissenting. The reason is that then the intellect is not necessitated to the act by its object. Therefore it is determined to the act only by the will. And thus the act of supernatural faith is free not only as to exercise, but also as to the species of the act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 6, 2. 2. a. 9; Suarez, cited place.

3.º As to the sensitive appetite, when there is present in phantasy a sufficient representation of a fitting object, the will cannot command the sensitive appetite not to desire. The reason is that the will and intellect cannot immediately move the sensitive appetite unless there is present a representation of phantasy; but the sensible appetite of itself is a natural power acting necessarily, if the object is duly proposed. Moreover, sometimes the will cannot by its command remove the apprehension of imagination, and then also it cannot impede every act of the sensitive appetite. This is clear in those acts which altogether precede the use and advertence of reason, and in those which are necessarily caused by the real presence of the object, or by some material alteration of the body itself. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 17. a. 7. c. and ad 1, a. 9. ad 3. “Moreover, even when an act of phantasy does not proceed from a change of an exterior object, it can happen that the will cannot remove it, because the interior motion itself of the imagination, which often is made through the natural alteration of the humors and of the vital spirits, or on account of the operation of some intrinsic agent, an angel or a demon, can be so vehement and troublesome, that the will cannot at its own choice drive it away, because even then it depends upon the actual motion of the object, although made interiorly, which motion the will cannot impede. But it must be known that the will and reason, although by commanding they cannot restrain those motions, nevertheless can moderate them, if they attend to other things.” Suarez, l. c., S. 2. “When the apprehension of the imagination and the motion of the appetite do not proceed from the actual motion of the object, the will can both recall the imagination to something else, and impede the motion of the appetite... The reason is that the will is the general principle of human acts... Yet it is necessary to note that the efficacy of this command, of necessity, has force only so long as the will itself actually moves and the intellect attends; for as soon as the will ceases, the phantasy and the appetite can return to their acts.” Suarez, l. c. Whenever the will efficaciously commands the sensitive appetite, and by an absolute appetition seeks or flees some object, it always and necessarily obeys, not insofar as the will removes every repugnance, but insofar as the will is not drawn away by that repugnance. This is clear from the fact that we often attack things repugnant to the appetite itself.

4.º Hence the reason is understood on account of which the motive power obeys the will at a nod and without resistance, and the sensible appetite, which is more perfect and more similar to the will, often resists it. For the cause is that the exterior members are not moved, cf. Lessius on q. 17, a. 5 and following, by a proper object, as is the vital sensible cognitive and appetitive faculty, but are moved only by a superior power, as a certain instrument and organ, which is wholly subjected to the principal mover. Nevertheless they intrinsically require the due disposition for effecting motion; whence it can happen that from a defect of this the command of the will can be impeded. And because they have a certain natural weight, although they do not have a vital appetite, they also can in some manner resist the command of the will. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 17. a. 9.; Suarez, l. c.; Cajetan on q. 17.

56. Therefore twelve motions of the intellect and of the will can be numbered, which can be coordinated thus. 1.º The end is apprehended, for example, divine glory. 2.º There is the willing of that end. 3.º The intention of the same end. 4.º The imperfect fruition of the aforesaid end. And thus the first relation of the will to the end is completed. For since the aforesaid acts are in the will, the will perfectly has the end in itself, that is, it perfectly wills the end. Hence there begins also the first relation of the will to that which is toward the end. For the perfect and efficacious intention of the end gives the will a descent to that. Counsel then follows concerning those things which are toward the end. But because this counsel is voluntary, and reason is moved by the will to counsel, and this motion is truly use; hence in the 5.º place must be put the use of reason for counsel, but in the 6.º place counsel concerning those things which are toward the end, for example, concerning the study of Theology, concerning goodness of morals, etc. 7.º There is consent adhering to the conclusion, namely that these things are pleasing. 8.º There is election preferring one of the things concluded, namely perfect holiness of morals and the religious state to other states of life, Theology to other sciences, etc. And this election is “the last thing which pertains to the first relation of the will in respect of that which is toward the end...; for there is completed the proportion of the will, so that it should completely will that which is toward the end,” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4., and consequently that which is toward the end is had perfectly in the will. 9.º There is precept or command, which commands the things elected to be committed to execution. And hence begins the second relation of the will to that which is toward the end; since now it begins to descend to this, that it should have the end really. 10.º There is use, by which the will moves the executive powers, applying them to execution, namely the feet to going to school, and the intellect to studying, etc. 11.º There is execution itself, attaining, through that which is toward the end, namely through a journey, through study, etc., the end itself, e.g. to promote and contemplate the glorification of God. And thus 12.º the whole process is consummated by perfect fruition supervening, which is concerning the end really had and possessed. Cajetan on 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4. Cf. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 16. a. 4., Cajetan on q. 9. a. 4, par. Ad evidentiam — Scito secundo.