Commentary IV: On the Other Divisions of the Voluntary

1. If the voluntary is considered in order to the act itself, which proceeds from the will, and in order to the object, about which that act is occupied, other divisions of the voluntary are had.

2. Two things concur in the voluntary, namely an intrinsic principle and cognition of the end. By reason of this cognition, one voluntary is perfect, another imperfect. But this division can be taken in two ways. For if only an imperfect cognition of the end is had, as to its intrinsic nature, as is sensitive cognition, which consists in the apprehension alone of the thing which is the end, without the fact that the account of the end and the proportion of the means to the end are known, then the imperfect voluntary is had, which also belongs to brute animals. But if perfect cognition of the end is had, as to its intrinsic nature, as is the intellective cognition of the thing which is the end, of the thing which is the means, and at the same time of the account of the end and of the proportion of the means, then the perfect voluntary is had, which belongs only to rational nature. Therefore the imperfect voluntary is the act of the sensitive appetite; the perfect voluntary, from the act, is the rational appetite. S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 2.

3. The perfect and imperfect voluntary can besides be had in the very act of the will, according to its accidental perfection. The perfect voluntary is had in those acts of the will which proceed with full cognition and advertence. The imperfect voluntary is had in those acts of the same will which proceed with half-full cognition and advertence, as are sometimes the acts of children, and the acts of the half-fatuous, the half-asleep, the half-drunk, acts of sudden anger. The aforesaid deliberation is situated in the consideration of various objects, which are proposed as to be chosen to the liberty of the will, and it can be completed in a very brief time and in a single moment. Whence it happens that in this imperfect voluntary there can be great latitude, such as there can be in imperfect advertence. Yet in this division the imperfect voluntary is taken insofar as the perfect voluntary is excluded, and consequently insofar as there is excluded the perfect use of reason which may suffice for the exercise of liberty, according to the capacity of the object. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 3. 4.

4. By reason of the voluntary itself, or of the inclination of the will, one voluntary is such simply or perfect, another is such secundum quid or imperfect. The first is that which proceeds from the will, by the full inclination of the same will, without any repugnance, as, for example, the leader of an army going on to triumph after victory has been obtained. The second is that which indeed proceeds from the will consenting, but not without some repugnance of the same rational will, so that there is indeed an actual volition, but one mingled with a conditional nolition of the object. Thus a sailor, when the danger of shipwreck presses, actually wills and deliberately wills to throw out the merchandise, which nevertheless, by a deliberate will also, he would wish to preserve, if shipwreck were not threatening; whence not without a deliberate repugnance of the will, but an inefficacious one, he absolutely consents to throw it out. Whence “those things which are done through fear are not voluntary simply, but mixed.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 142. a. 3. Cf. n. 6 and S. Th. 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 3., a. 7. ad 2., 3. q. 47. a. 1. — This division of the voluntary into the voluntary such simply and into the voluntary secundum quid, into the perfect and imperfect voluntary, can be taken in various senses, as is already clear from what has been said and will further be clear from what is soon to be said. For that denomination can be taken from various respects of the voluntary.

5. By reason of the free, or by reason of deliberation, one voluntary is absolute and simply, another secundum quid, which is also called velleity. And thus, while a temptation of sin stands in the will, which nevertheless someone deliberately resists, the will, as nature, or secundum quid, wills the sin; but nevertheless the same will, as the will of reason, absolutely and simply detests the sin. Appositely St. Thomas, 3. p. q. 21. a. 4., where at the same time he gives the reason for this division: “The will of man simply is the will of reason. For this we will absolutely, which we will according to deliberate reason. But that which we will according to the motion of sensuality, or even according to the motion of the simple will, which is considered as nature, we do not will simply, but secundum quid, namely if something else does not stand in the way, which is discovered through the deliberation of reason. Whence such a will is rather to be called velleity than absolute will; because, namely, man would will this, if something else did not stand in the way.”

6. By reason of the object toward which the will tends, one voluntary is absolute and simply, another is that which is velleity and secundum quid, namely insofar as it is considered absolutely, as it in fact is, according to all its circumstances, or only insofar as it is in itself, abstraction having been made from the circumstances. To the point, the Angelic Doctor, 1. p. q. 19. a. 6. ad 1: “Everything, according as it is good, is thus willed by God. But something can be, in the first consideration of itself, according as it is considered absolutely, good or evil, which nevertheless, insofar as it is considered with some adjunct, which is the consequent consideration of it, has itself in the opposite way. Thus for a man to live is good and for a man to be killed is evil, according to absolute consideration; but if there is added concerning some man that he is a murderer, or one living to the danger of the multitude, thus it is good for him to be killed and evil for him to live; whence it can be said that a just judge antecedently wills the man to live, but consequently wills the murderer to be hanged. Similarly God antecedently wills every man to be saved, but consequently wills certain men to be damned according to the demand of his justice. Nor however do we will simply that which we will antecedently, but secundum quid: because the will is compared to things according as they are in themselves, and in themselves they are in particular. Whence we will something simply, according as we will it with all the particular circumstances considered, which is to will consequently. Whence it can be said that a just judge simply wills the murderer to be hanged, but secundum quid would will him to live, namely insofar as he is a man. Whence it can rather be called velleity than absolute will. And thus it is clear that whatever God simply wills, comes to be, although that which he antecedently wills does not come to be.” And hence it is clear that the throwing of merchandise into the sea, which was spoken of above in n. 4, by one account is voluntary secundum quid, but by this account must be called voluntary absolutely and simply, namely by looking at the thing as it is done here and now.

7. The voluntary, also by reason of the object and by reason of its perfection, is one kind of voluntary that is absolute, efficacious, perfect, or complete, as it is called by St. Thomas, and another is voluntary which again is called velleity, of simple complacency, or imperfect and incomplete, as it is called by the same Holy Doctor. The first is that which extends itself even to the attainment of the thing, by willing the thing and the means to it. The other is that which does not proceed as far as the attainment of the thing, but rests in simple complacency toward it. Thus the Angelic Doctor assigns the reason of this division, 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5. ad 1: “It must be said that the will is middle between the intellect and exterior operation. For the intellect proposes its object to the will, and the will itself causes exterior operation. Thus therefore the principle of the motion of the will is considered on the part of the intellect, which apprehends something as good in the universal. But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to order to operation, through which someone tends to the attainment of the thing: for the motion of the will is from the soul to the thing; and therefore the perfection of the act of the will is attended to according to this, that something is a good for someone to do. But this is possible. And therefore the complete will is only concerning the possible, which is good for the one willing. But the incomplete will is concerning the impossible, which according to some is called velleity: because, namely, someone would will that, if it were possible.” And thus a sick man hoping for health wills health with a complete will: for he has an absolute and efficacious will for health, at the same time willing the means inducing health. A sick man despairing of health, whence he neglects to apply the means necessary for recovering it, wills health with an incomplete will; for he has only simple complacency, or velleity, for health, since at the same time he does not will the means inducing health.

8. Complete and incomplete will, therefore, is not to be taken thus, as if incomplete will were a non-deliberate willing, or not capable of merit and demerit, or as if incomplete will were a half-deliberate willing. For someone can deliberately and with full deliberation will to expel God from his kingdom if he could, and similar things; where it is certain that sin and grave sin are found. But the completion and incompletion of the will must be taken according to the order of the will to operation, namely according to the manner of the motion of the will to the thing. Hence, from the fact that the motion of the will is to the thing, to be attained, disposed, etc., by the mediation of exterior operation, it is not perfect with the perfection apt by nature to be found in the genus of the motion of the will unless it is terminated at an achievable good, although it is perfect as to consent, deliberation, and other things of this kind. And thus a sinner, even a great sinner, who wills to be converted to God and therefore wills to do penance, has a complete will. Cajetan in l. c. And in q. 20. a. 4 the same Angelic Doctor says: “If we speak of the goodness of the exterior act, which it has (the exterior act) according to the matter and the due circumstances, thus it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or motion is perfected in this, that it obtains the end or reaches the term: whence there is no perfect will, unless it is such that, given the opportunity, it operates. But if possibility is lacking, the will existing perfect, so that it would operate if it could, the defect of perfection, which is from the exterior act, is simply involuntary.” Therefore the will can be called and be complete in two ways. In one way according to that relation by which the thing willed is in the will. In another way according to that relation by which the will tends into the real attainment of the thing willed. According to the first mode, the perfection of the will is signified by this, that there is willing perfectly; but according to the second, by this, that there is having perfectly, or attaining and possessing the thing willed. Whence a will prepared to operate if it could is a perfect will, because it perfectly wills, and this pertains to the perfection of the first relation; and it is imperfect simply, because it does not arrive at this, that it really have, attain, and possess that which it wills and which it is naturally ordered to have. For every motion falling short of the term is imperfect through privation consisting in the attainment of the term. And since the first perfection is of another account than the second, and the whole latitude of the first is compared to the second as imperfect to perfect, the consequence is that however much the interior act of the will may grow, and however intense it may be, by itself it will never arrive at this, that it be perfect simply, without exterior attainment. On account of this the Savior said, John 15:13: Greater charity no one has, than that someone lay down his soul for his friends; he said “lay down,” not “wish to lay down.” Cajetan in l. c.

9. The voluntary, by reason of the very act of the will by which it proceeds from the will, is one kind direct, another indirect. The direct is from the will acting. The indirect is from the will not acting, not prohibiting. And here one must distinguish between omission and the effect of omission. An omission is voluntary, although there is no obligation of positing the act. For if the intellect adverts to that which is omitted, now that omission depends upon the will, so that it be posited or not posited, and thus it is always voluntary. Nor is it required for this, that it be voluntary, that there be a precept of positing the act. He who, intent on study, omits Mass on a weekday, omits it no less freely than on a feast day. Whence an omission is not always culpable; for this other thing depends upon a precept, which certainly can be present, of positing the act, but such a precept is not always had. Indeed there are many voluntary omissions which nevertheless at the same time are not culpable. He who gives himself to prayer or study omits lawful recreation, not through a direct volition of that omission, but from the voluntary choice of prayer or study at that time, and certainly he does not sin, indeed he merits. But the effect accompanying or following an omission is not voluntary apart from an obligation of impeding it, unless perhaps the omission is ordered to this effect. For the aforesaid effect does not proceed physically from the will; for the will, not acting, can exercise no physical influence into it. Nor indeed does it proceed morally from the will; for, since it does not proceed physically from the will, the will in no way influences it, and therefore neither can it be attributed to it morally, except insofar as the will can and ought to impede it. For then that effect is imputed to the will, insofar as the care of impeding the effect is incumbent upon the will. Wherefore, setting aside this obligation of impeding the effect following from the omission, an effect of this kind is not voluntary. Appositely the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 3: “Not always is that which follows upon a defect of action traced back, as to a cause, to the agent from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman could not direct the ship, or if the governance of the ship had not been committed to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him. Therefore, because the will by willing and acting can impede this which is not willing and not acting, and sometimes ought to do so, this which is not willing and not acting is imputed to it, as existing from it.”

10. “It is confirmed 1.º from the distinction which exists between the omission itself and that effect following or accompanying it, respectively to the will. An omission of itself immediately, no other cause intervening, depends upon the will; for the will can no less immediately not will than will. Whence, in order that non-volition or the omission of willing be voluntary indirectly, it does not need another cause, but only advertence and the suspension of influence in a vital mode, which it provides by eliciting another act incompossible with the act which is omitted; for then the omission proceeds indirectly from an intrinsic principle with cognition of the end. But the effect following or accompanying an omission is not of itself immediately from the will, but by the mediation of another intervening cause; if, for example, while I omit to separate two men fighting, the killing thereafter following is caused neither by my will nor by my omission, but by the sword of the killer; likewise when a sailor omits to govern the ship, neither his will nor his omission sinks the ship, but the storm. Therefore, in order that such an effect be referred back to the will as to a cause, and be called interpretatively voluntary, something must be assigned by which it happens that it pertains in some manner to the will and has some connection with it; and nothing else can be assigned except the precept of impeding that effect. 2.º There are effects following or accompanying a voluntary omission which in no way are voluntary, because of a defect of obligation to impede them: thus God voluntarily omits to impede the sins of men, and nevertheless the sins are not voluntary to him, because he is not bound to impede them.” Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 1, a. 1.

11. But it has been said, unless perhaps the omission is ordered by way of means to this effect; for if the aforesaid omission is ordered by the agent himself as a means to this effect, “then it is manifest that such an effect would be directly intended and willed, and consequently positively and directly voluntary: as, if someone, to this end that he suffer cold, for the sake of mortification, omits to approach the fire; the cold is positively voluntary to him, because intended and willed of itself.” Billuart, l. c. But if the aforesaid omission of itself is ordered as a means to this effect, as, for example, if someone omits to eat and drink and then dies from hunger and thirst, then, because of that intimate conjunction between the omission and the effect, the effect with it is judged to constitute one object, and pertains to the same species with its cause. He who wills the antecedent also wills the consequent intimately connected with it, sufficient cognition being supposed. Whence in a voluntary of this kind, a precept can contribute only to this, that that voluntary be base or honorable, but not to this, that it be voluntary, since the voluntary is from the intrinsic, and the precept is extrinsic. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

12. The voluntary, likewise by reason of the very act of the will and by reason of the object which immediately terminates the act of the will, is one thing as voluntary in itself, another as voluntary in the cause. The first is had when someone immediately wills something in itself; but the second when someone wills the cause from which he foresees that some effect will follow; for then he does not will this in itself, but in another, namely in its cause. He is said to foresee, that is, merely to foresee; for if besides he wills it, now that effect will be directly and in itself willed and voluntary, and not only in the cause. Hence, moreover, it follows that that effect will no longer be willed and voluntary as an effect; nor likewise will its cause be willed and voluntary as a cause; but then the effect in respect of the will will have the character of an end, and the cause the character of a means. For that which someone wills for its own sake has the character of an end; that which someone wills for the sake of another has the character of a means. Nor indeed is it valid to object that, if the effect is merely foreseen, and the will is not borne into it by its own act, now that effect is outside the intention, and can in no way be voluntary even in the cause. For because the will, by not willing the cause, can impede the effect, and sometimes ought to do so, the effect is imputed to it; and consequently, since it is not willed in itself, it will be willed in the cause. S. Th. q. 6. a. 3., q. 71. a. 5. And thus the evil things of the deed, committed against the neighbor in drunkenness, are voluntary in the cause for him who has been voluntarily made drunk, foreseeing those evils from previous experience, although he neither willed nor intended those same evils. Cf. the following number and Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4, etc.

13. Many Theologians wholly distinguish the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause from the direct and indirect voluntary. And thus Suarez says: “the voluntary in itself is clear enough; for then something is called voluntary in itself, when it is willed in itself, so that the will is immediately occupied about it, either through a proper act, if it is direct voluntary, or through the lack of an act, if it is indirect voluntary.” D. 1. S. 4. Likewise St. Thomas, q. 77. a. 7: “Two things,” he says, “seem to have to be considered. First indeed, that something can be voluntary, either according to itself, as when the will is borne directly into it; or according to its cause, when the will is borne into the cause, and not into the effect; as is clear in him who is voluntarily made drunk. For from this, that which he commits through drunkenness is imputed to him as quasi-voluntary. Secondly it must be considered that something is called voluntary directly or indirectly. Directly indeed, that into which the will is borne; indirectly, however, that which the will was able to prohibit, but does not prohibit.” — But others call the voluntary in itself and in the cause direct and indirect voluntary, and they express this by another division, namely of the positive and negative voluntary. For the positive voluntary is that which proceeds from a positive voluntary action. The negative voluntary, on the contrary, is that which depends upon the voluntary omission of some action. And thus the positive voluntary is in him who by his command or counsel provokes another to committing theft; the negative voluntary is in him who does not impede a theft when he can and ought to impede it. Cf. Gury-Ballerini n. 5., Suarez, l. c.

14. Further, a comparison having been established between both divisions, of the voluntary in itself and in the cause, and of the direct and indirect voluntary, and insisting on the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, it must be said that the direct voluntary comprehends under itself both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause: for the direct voluntary is said by the Angelic Doctor to be “that which proceeds from the will as from an agent,” q. 6. a. 3. ad 1. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause proceed from the will insofar as it is acting and willing. — But the indirect voluntary can be reduced both to the voluntary in itself and to the voluntary in the cause. The indirect voluntary is said by the same Holy Doctor to be “that which is from the will, as from one not acting,” l. c. But both the voluntary in itself and the voluntary in the cause include the will acting and willing. Therefore the indirect voluntary is neither properly voluntary in itself, nor likewise properly voluntary in the cause. Yet it can be reduced to each. For the indirect voluntary is said either only of the interior act of the will, or also of the exterior act. If the first, since not willing is immediately from the will, it can be called voluntary in itself. If the second, since exteriorly not acting is as it were the object exteriorly completing that not willing, as the latter is in some manner voluntary in itself, so also the former; since, as it were, one complete non-act is constituted, for example, not willing to hear Mass and not hearing Mass in fact, from both the lack of the interior and of the exterior act, as one complete act is constituted from the internal and external act, of willing to hear Mass and of hearing Mass. Now, as from the positing of an act, as from a cause, some effect can follow, so upon the omission of an act another act can follow; and although this is not properly the effect of that omission, as that omission is not properly the cause of the following act, since not acting cannot properly be a cause, nevertheless it can be considered as an effect; whence it can be called voluntary in the cause, and thus, for example, the death of those sailing is indirectly voluntary, and, in the sense stated, is voluntary in the cause for the helmsman of the ship ceasing from governing.

15. Concerning a bad effect in particular, the question is raised: what is required so that a bad effect following, voluntary only in the cause or indirectly, be imputable to the will unto fault? — The matter concerns only a bad effect; for if the discussion is about a good effect, if this is outside the intention, it can attribute no morality to the act of the will by reason of itself. The will does not touch it by its act; therefore the goodness of the will cannot arise from it. “For this,” says S. Th. q. 18. a. 7. ad 3, “that the will be good, it is required that it be of the good under the aspect of the good, i.e. that it will the good on account of the good.” On the contrary, if the effect is bad, although the will does not intend it, it can receive its imputation, namely if it is bound to impede it, and consequently to abstain from positing its cause. It is said by reason of itself; for by reason of the cause itself we have already seen how the exterior act adds something of goodness or malice. Cf. n. 7.

16. Further, for the aforesaid imputation three conditions are required. The first is that he who posits or omits the cause advert at least confusedly that such an effect is going to follow from that cause; because nothing is willed unless it is in some manner foreknown. Wherefore, with ignorance of the future effect standing, no one can be held by any obligation of not positing the cause, namely the cause either by doing something or by omitting to act. Therefore the effect will be able in no way to be imputed to him. Hence death is not imputed to him who offered to another a liquid which he did not know to be poisonous. Nor is drunkenness imputed to him who, ignorant of the strength of the wine, drank to satiety. Precognition of the effect can be had in two ways: first, if it is directly foreseen; secondly, if it is in the power of the one acting to forethink and notice it, and from negligence he omits to do this.

17. The second condition is that the agent be able to impede such a cause, i.e. physically, which is clear of itself; there is no obligation to impossible things; and likewise morally, or without a graver inconvenience, according to the nature of the thing. For, with attention to the matter in question, not only physical but also moral impossibility can excuse. Consequently the sins of subjects are often not imputed to a Superior, because it is impossible for the Superior himself to impede them, at least without a graver inconvenience.

18. Finally, the third condition is that the agent ought to omit or remove that cause, by reason of the aforesaid bad effect that is going to follow; because an effect following outside the intention is not imputed to one pursuing his own right. For then the agent in fact does not will the effect, but wills the permission of the effect. Appositely S. Th. q. 6. a. 3: “But it must be known that not always is that which follows upon a defect of action traced back as to a cause into the agent, from the fact that he does not act, but only then when he can and ought to act. For if the helmsman (of the ship) could not direct the ship, or if the governance of the ship had not been committed to him, the sinking of the ship, which would happen through the absence of the helmsman, would not be imputed to him.” And thus also if someone has not kept the ecclesiastical fast, and at night experiences pollution, this pollution perhaps following from the aforesaid intemperance is not imputed to him; for he was not bound to observe the law of fasting by reason of impeding this effect, but from elsewhere, by reason of the precept of the Church. On the contrary, he sins who gives alms to a poor man whom he knows will abuse it to make himself drunk; for although that alms is a cause wholly per accidens of the aforesaid drunkenness, nevertheless one is bound from charity to abstain from giving the alms precisely by reason of the aforesaid bad effect. The reason is that when there is an obligation of not positing the cause by reason of such an effect, although cause and effect are not connected physically and one is not the cause of the other, nevertheless they are connected morally, insofar as, with the obligation standing of impeding the effect as far as possible, its cause, although only per accidens, constitutes with it one moral object, according to the account of disconvenience, and therefore the will of one is judged to be the virtual will of the other. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

19. These things having been set down, another question is easily resolved: when is someone bound to remove or not posit a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, which he foresees? It is said, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow; for the question is not about the obligation of a cause not to be posited or to be removed by reason of itself. For if it is good in itself, it is not to be removed by reason of itself; but if it is evil, whether a bad effect follows or does not follow, it cannot be posited, because it is evil in itself. Thus, for example, someone eating meat then suffers shameful motions; abstracting from this effect, he indeed can eat meat on Sunday, but cannot eat it on Friday, not on account of that effect which happens on Friday, for otherwise he could not eat it even on Sunday, but because on Sunday it is permitted by the Church to eat meat, and on Friday it is prohibited. Wherefore the question in this case is such: whether, namely, on account of that foreseen bad effect, he ought to abstain from meat, both on Friday and on Sunday and on any other day.

20. Now someone is bound to remove a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, 1.º when from it per se, or from its intrinsic nature, directly and primarily, and uniquely, a bad effect follows. The reason is that then a cause of this kind must be evil in itself. For a cause according to moral estimation is judged from the effect into which of itself, or from its nature, it directly and primarily tends; since this is nothing but bad, consequently the cause is bad. And then the case is verified that, abstracting from the effect, someone cannot posit the cause by reason of itself; and thus neither can he tend in any manner into the effect, since, the cause being removed, the effect is removed. And thus it is not licit to offer poison to someone, from which nothing but death would follow.

21. Someone is bound 2.º to remove a cause, if, although a good effect follows from it, nevertheless the bad effect follows from it per se, directly and primarily; and only through this as medium, another good effect follows from it per se, namely secondarily and indirectly. The reason is that, notwithstanding that secondary and indirect good effect, the cause remains evil; and evils are not to be done that goods may come. The same must be said if the good effect follows only per accidens, in whatever way it happens. For a cause is specified not by an effect per accidens, but by an effect per se. “The power of a cause is estimated according to effects per se, but not according to effects per accidens.” S. Th. q. 20. a. 5. “For judgment concerning some thing is not given according to that which is per accidens, but only according to that which is per se.” S. Th. ib. c. And thus a girl cannot procure abortion in herself in order to avoid infamy; for the good effect follows from another preceding bad effect, from the killing of the innocent through the procured abortion, which is assumed as a means to that end.

22. Someone is bound 3.º to remove a cause, by reason of the bad effect that is going to follow, when, although the cause is honorable or indifferent in itself, nevertheless one is bound to impede the effect from justice, or from charity, or from a precept which urges as to be fulfilled. Hence a physician and a surgeon, suffering bad motions in the exercise of their own art, do not sin, because they are not bound, by reason of impeding such an effect, to omit the exercise of their own art. But he would sin if someone wished to play for the sake of recreation while the last Mass on Sunday will soon be celebrated, so that consequently he omits it from distraction. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 1. n. 152. “For he who is obligated to a law must necessarily be obligated to procure the ordinary means, and those proximately necessary from the very nature of the thing for observing the law..... Ordinary, I say; for human laws do not compel to extraordinary and excessively difficult things.” Ithurriaga, Cas. 32. n. 4. But the reason, as has already been said, is taken from this: that by reason of the precept, that cause and the effect following from it, although physically they are connected only per accidens, and neither is the cause of the other, nevertheless morally they are judged to have the account of one disconvenient object, or of one to be avoided by the will; and therefore the will of one is judged the virtual will of the other. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4. 5. Therefore homicide would deservedly be imputed to him who, against a law prohibiting it, left heavy vessels upon a window without securing them, or impeding them by some barrier from falling into the public way, if they then were carried away by the wind and killed a man.

23. From this it is understood that for this voluntary, not just any precept of avoiding the cause is sufficient, one which is wholly extrinsic to such an effect, as appears in the example brought forward in him who in the time of Lent is bound to fasting and to abstinence by reason of the precept of the Church, but not lest pollution follow. Rather, there is necessary a precept which induces an intrinsic obligation of avoiding that cause, precisely by reason of such an effect, and consequently which induces a moral mutation in that object, by reason of that moral connection with the effect, that precept standing. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

24. Finally, someone is bound 4.º to remove the aforesaid cause, by reason of the bad effect, when, although that cause is honorable in itself or indifferent, nevertheless from the part of the agent there is no proportionate necessity, utility, or fittingness. The reason 1.º is that natural equity requires this, that we avoid evil as far as can reasonably be done. Wherefore a reasonable cause for permitting a bad effect is necessary, and this can be nothing other than either necessity, or utility, or at least the fittingness of the action, or the good which is in that action, or which comes from that same action. 2.º Because then an honorable end of the one acting is lacking from the part of the agent. 3.º Because then to will a cause of this kind without any proportionate reason shows of itself a bad affection directly toward that evil future effect, or at least there is often the proximate danger of such a bad affection directly toward the aforesaid evil effect. Wherefore a priest does not sin when administering Communion to a hidden sinner publicly asking, because he does this to avoid the public harm which would follow from that public denial of the Eucharist. On the contrary, he would sin administering Communion to a public sinner publicly asking, because now that honorable end is lacking for impeding that immense sacrilege, which would not be without public scandal.

25. On the contrary, someone is not bound to omit or remove a cause by reason of the aforesaid bad effect when, setting aside that special obligation from charity, from justice, from an urgent precept, of impeding the effect, the bad effect follows merely per accidens, or from extrinsic circumstances, or follows only from another preceding good effect. For since the cause must be judged from the effect per se, and from the effect into which it tends directly and primarily, that cause is either good, or at least indifferent, in itself. Wherefore, if an honorable end of the one acting is not lacking from elsewhere, the agent can posit or preserve it. “And although also the goodness of the action is not caused from the goodness of the effect, nevertheless from this the action is called good, that it can induce a good effect; and thus the very proportion of the action to the effect is the reason of its goodness.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2. ad 3. And thus the leader of an army in war directing fiery balls against a fortress in which there are enemies attacking is not bound to desist from the assault of the fortress from the fact that those enemies therefore blaspheme God. For that assault is a cause wholly per accidens, from extrinsic circumstances, of those blasphemies.

26. Likewise someone is not bound to omit or remove a cause, precisely by reason of the bad effect, if from it there follows at the same time a good effect which the agent intends; at the same time, because namely that cause tends equally directly and primarily, by an almost parallel influence, into a good and bad effect. For then the cause in itself according to moral estimation is indifferent, but honorable insofar as it is subject to the intention of the agent; for the bad effect is not intended, but only permitted. Wherefore the agent can posit that cause, if again one is not bound to impede that effect in the particular case on account of charity, justice, or another special precept to be fulfilled, nor from the part of the one acting is an honorable end lacking. “Nothing prevents,” says the Angelic Doctor, “one act from having two effects, of which one only is in the intention, but the other is outside the intention. But morally acts receive their species according to that which is intended, not from that which is outside the intention, since it is per accidens.” 2. 2. q. 44. a. 7. Therefore it is licit to repel force by force; for equally from this repulsion of force by force inflicted there follows the defense of one’s own life and the destruction of another’s. Cf. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 64. a. 7.

27. Nor indeed is it required that the good intended in the positing of the cause equal the evil which also follows from it. For first, morally speaking, that equalization is impossible, since good and evil are in a diverse genus. Besides, the liceity of such an action does not depend on this equalization, but on the fact that that action is honorable in itself, since, objectively speaking, it is indifferent, but, subjectively speaking, only an honorable end is intended in it. It is confirmed from the fact that, where the matter concerns avoiding the evil of others, we are often not bound to that except from charity, and charity does not oblige with grave inconvenience: the gravity of this inconvenience, from the doctrine of all, is considered per se, namely independently of equalization with the evil to be permitted. Moreover, if that equalization were always required, already it would be a most grave inconvenience if someone always had to abstain from acting in order to avoid the evil which also follows from it; and such an inconvenience would be still graver if it had to be undergone by all. Wherefore, although that equalization between good and evil is not had, if the inconvenience to be undergone is considered in the particular case, nevertheless it is had if it is considered generally with respect to all, and with respect to all cases. Finally, confirmation is added from what Theologians commonly teach. For from the common doctrine, one is not bound, on account of bad effects against chastity, to abstain from horseback riding, from a more comfortable manner of lying in bed, from the moderate taking of drink or hot foods, from leading honorable dances. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483. A woman can go to church to hear Mass, although scandal of someone follows from his own malice. Nor indeed is someone bound to give a driver a wage greater than is just, lest he blaspheme. The bad effect in these cases certainly exceeds, and far exceeds, the good effect.

28. Now, since that cause of permitting the bad effect is situated in the good itself which is had or follows from the action whence that bad effect arises, although compensation and equalization are not required between the good and bad effect, nevertheless a proportionate reason is required for positing the cause of the bad effect, as was said in n. 24. Wherefore a reason for acting is required to be greater in proportion as the cause touches the bad effect more proximately and immediately, in proportion as the influence of the aforesaid cause into the bad effect is more necessary, in proportion as its influence into this effect is greater, in proportion as the bad effect is more certain and graver, in proportion as less right to the action considered in itself is had. And this consideration has place especially where the matter concerns avoiding harm to others, whether temporal or spiritual. And if the discussion is about spiritual harm or sin, that must be weighed in particular: whether, namely, the sin arises rather from another’s malice than from our action. — If therefore a cause influences the bad effect remotely and lightly, and from it some good effect also follows, for this reason there is not an obligation of taking away the cause, because a lesser reason is required for positing a cause influencing evil only lightly and remotely than if it influenced gravely and proximately. Hence you are not bound to abstain from honorable and useful conversation with a woman on account of bad motions arising thence. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 1, art. 1.

29. Another question concerning this matter remains to be resolved: whether an effect that has followed, gravely culpable, voluntary in the cause or indirectly, is always imputable unto grave fault, so that someone contracts the grave malice proper to that effect, if someone illicitly posits the cause, without any sufficient reason. — The aforesaid malice cannot be contracted in the case except insofar as someone wills the cause; for the matter concerns the voluntary in the cause, or the indirectly voluntary; the effect, as going to follow, is foreseen only from the cause. But the cause cannot contain in itself the malice proper to the effect except insofar as it influences the effect. If therefore the cause influences the effect merely per accidens, and there is no special obligation of not positing the cause by reason of the bad effect, cf. nn. 18, 19, 22, 23, no malice from the effect can redound into the cause. Therefore although someone posits the cause without sufficient reason, not for that reason does he contract any malice of the effect, although he sins from elsewhere. With respect to such an effect the will has itself merely permissively. The reason is that, since the effect follows only per accidens, there is no connection, so far as is from the nature of the thing, between the cause and the effect. And for this reason he who wills the cause does not also will the effect, but wills only the permission of the effect, if perhaps it follows. But since the malice of the effect in no way redounds into the cause, for the effect does not follow from that cause per se, but merely per accidens, someone willing the cause, every intention of the bad effect being excluded, contracts no malice of this, neither grave nor light, although perhaps from elsewhere he even sins gravely. And thus if someone foresees pollution from excess of drink or food, without willing and intending it, he will sin lightly or perhaps even gravely by reason of that excess, but by no means will he sin by reason of the pollution, since this effect is not willed, but happens outside and against the intention, and the cause is outside the genus of luxury. Nor indeed is someone bound to remove all causes influencing some bad effect only per accidens, by reason only of the bad effect itself; and in no way also is he bound to abstain from positing that cause if, supposing that it is honorable or at least indifferent in itself, there is present a reasonable motive for positing a cause of this kind. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

30. But if the cause per se, that is from its own nature, influences the effect, and influences gravely, grave malice redounds from the effect into the cause. Wherefore someone contracts the grave malice proper to the effect by willing its cause without any sufficient reason. Moreover, at least practically speaking, he who wills a cause per se gravely influencing a bad effect, gravely evil, without any sufficient reason, in fact directly wills the bad effect itself; since on the one hand the cause and effect are inseparably connected with each other, so far as is from the very nature of the thing, and on the other hand, since there is no other honorable reason present for positing the cause on account of another honorable effect, as is supposed, this is certainly a sufficient sign that someone wills the effect itself. He who, for example, knowingly and prudently sets fire to another’s house, whence the whole house is burned, certainly wills the burning of the house, and this is deservedly imputed to him. Yet except the case in which, although the cause per se gravely influences the bad effect, nevertheless in the particular case, on account of peculiar dispositions of the agent or of the patient, that cause is deprived of such an effect, although per accidens.

31. If finally the cause indeed influences the effect per se, but only lightly, only light malice can redound from the effect into the cause. Wherefore he who wills the cause of that bad effect gravely evil, without sufficient reason, can sin only lightly, always excluding the proximate danger of further consent. Moreover, practically speaking, in such a case a sufficient indication of bad affection directly toward the effect itself is not had. For since the cause per se has only a light influence into that effect, gravely bad, a cause of this kind is not of itself sufficient for the positing of the effect, and thus, so far as is from the nature of the thing, they are not inseparably connected with each other. Wherefore, at least practically speaking, it is not because someone wills the cause that he also wills the effect; but he can have himself only permissively with regard to this effect. And indeed there are many who utterly shudder at mortal sin, but do not hate venial sin in such a way that they would not admit it even by a deliberate purpose. These easily consent to a lightly bad cause; but they are in no way borne into a gravely bad effect. — Hence the proper reason must be sought why, although smallness of matter is not given in the venereal matter, nevertheless it is given in those acts of mere sensuality, such as lookings, from a cause of mere curiosity, at things less honorable, with the intention of the venereal thing itself being again excluded, as the most common opinion of theologians holds. For since here the cause influences the effect only lightly, only light malice can redound from the effect into the cause, nor must someone willing the cause necessarily will also the effect.

32. In the last place it must be noted “that the same act can be voluntary in another causally, and nevertheless be involuntary in itself objectively, as if someone by a direct act wholly does not will to kill a man, and nevertheless wills to shoot an arrow, sufficient diligence not being used, lest he kill a man; for then homicide, if it should happen to occur, is in itself involuntary formally by reason of the prior act, and nevertheless it is voluntary in another and virtually by reason of the posterior act. And the reason is that those two acts in themselves are not formally contrary; and otherwise, since the will is free, although it does not will homicide, it can fail to be applied actually to showing the necessary diligence lest homicide follow; and therefore I said that it is involuntary objectively rather than causally.” Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, s. 4.

33. You will resolve from all that has been said about the voluntary in the cause: 1.º “If the cause of pollution is gravely influencing it, and the man does not abstain from positing that cause or action, it is clear that the pollution is imputed unto sin, even if it was not intended, provided it was foreseen at least confusedly. But causes of this kind are without doubt all those which per se are grave faults in the genus of luxury, namely touches or looks upon the shameful parts of another’s or one’s own body with base and deliberate pleasure; the sight of human intercourse and lingering thoughts about venereal matters. Therefore all pollutions coming from these causes certainly are mortal sins. Thus S. Th. 2. 2. q. 154. a. 5, and others commonly. And then that base act, which is the cause of pollution, has special malice against nature, as Sanchez says, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45. n. 23, and all consent.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 482. Special malice, namely of the effect or pollution, which is a sin against nature, besides the proper malice which consists in the pleasure excited from a base object. Cf. Salmant., Theol. Schol., Tr. 13, D. 10, n. 274.

Gravely influencing: wherefore if the cause, whether by reason of itself or by reason of the disposition of the subject, does not gravely influence, grave fault is absent by reason of the pollution perhaps going to follow; since then it follows outside the intention and per accidens. Salmant., Theol. Mor., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.

Per se they are grave faults: “the common and more probable opinion teaches that pollution is not mortal (namely in the cause), unless it comes from a cause per se mortal in the genus of luxury... The reason is that, since pollution is not willed except in the cause, it will be evil in that degree in which the cause itself is evil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — In the genus of luxury: whence “it is inferred that pollution is not mortal which happens outside the intention from causes illicit still mortally in another genus than luxury, for example from drunkenness, or from eating, excessively immoderate or on a forbidden day.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.

34. 2.º “If someone, about to do some necessary or licit and honorable thing, foresees that pollution will naturally follow, and this applies much more to distillation, which nevertheless he in no way wills or intends; then, provided the danger of consent to pleasure is absent, he is not bound to abstain from such an action, because an effect per accidens and outside the intention following upon one pursuing his own right is not imputed. Hence, notwithstanding pollution, it is licit to hear the confessions of women, to study cases of conscience, to touch oneself from necessity, cautiously and from necessity to kiss women, to embrace them according to the custom of the country, if otherwise he would have to be regarded as uncivil.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 481. “It is licit for someone who suffers great itching in the private parts to drive it away by touch, even if pollution follows.” l. 3. n. 483. The reason is that these acts either per se influence only lightly, or, although per se they gravely influence, nevertheless since they are not done from a base cause of concupiscence and pleasure, but from an honorable cause, necessary, useful, fitting, they no longer have the same force and influence into the effect, which is gravely increased from that bad propensity of the will, and on the contrary is greatly diminished from the will being turned to another thing and, so far as is in itself, resisting. Whence the bad effect, if it follows, is attributed rather to the infirmity of nature than to the aforesaid acts as to a cause. Moreover, the aforesaid honorable end standing, someone is not bound to abstain from the cause in order to impede the bad effect. For when a cause has two effects, one good, the other evil, it can be posited from the intention of the good effect alone, having itself permissively toward the evil. Therefore that bad effect in the case truly follows per accidens and outside the intention. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483.; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.

35. 3.º “It is inferred that the pollution which arises from a not long conversation with a girl, or from a light look, or from curious reading venially base, is only venial; because, as was said, since those causes influence lightly, the subsequent pollution proceeds rather from a natural cause than from them.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.; Billuart, Dissert. 1, art. 1. But if someone has a just cause, he sins in nothing, St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 29. A just cause is “any reasonable cause of necessity, utility, or fittingness.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484., l. 5. n. 29. And “if in some body by reason of infirmity... or of another cause, there is a positive indisposition to venery, although causes are applied to him which otherwise of themselves gravely influence into pollution or carnal pleasure with respect to others..., nevertheless with respect to him... they will not be gravely influencing, but only lightly, or even in no way, or they will be causes only materially of the genus of luxury; wherefore commonly... by reason of their influence into pollution he will not sin mortally.” Salmant., Tr. 16, c. 7, v. 41.

36. 4.º A fortiori, grave fault is absent in those actions which influence remotely and per accidens, since they are outside the genus of luxury. Therefore, although pollution or bad commotion is foreseen as going to follow, it is licit to ride horseback not only for the sake of necessity and utility, but also for the sake of recreation; to lie down in some position for resting more comfortably; moderately to take hot foods or drinks; to lead honorable dances, etc. St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 483. Grave fault is absent: for whether light fault is present in the positing of such causes without a just reason, on account of the future effect, is disputed. Holzmann and others deny it, “because, as they say, then pollution arises rather from the infirmity of nature than from that cause, which concurs in pollution only per accidens and remotely. But more probably Sanchez, Lessius, and others affirm it... because to permit pollution without a rational cause always seems something indecent and disordered.” St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484. — Sanchez, De Matr. l. 9. D. 45.; Sporer, De Matr. n. 644 and following; S. Th. 3. p. q. 80. a. 7.; St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 484.; Salm., Tr. 26, C. 7, n. 41.; Lessius, De Iust. et Iure, L. 4, C. 3, Dub. 14, nn. 97-102.

37. Since the cause as such participates in the specific malice of the effect, but not in a diverse malice, it suffices to accuse only the malice of the effect in confession; or, if the cause in itself has another special malice, it suffices to state each separately. And thus, if on account of play you omitted Mass, it suffices to accuse this omission; if on account of theft you likewise omitted Mass, then you can accuse separately the theft and the omission of Mass. Cf. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 9.; Lugo, De Poenit., D. 15, n. 479.

38. The last question concerning the same matter remains to be resolved, namely: when is an effect willed in the cause imputed? — If the discussion is about internal sin, this certainly is first committed then, when the will consents to the culpable cause to be posited. But if the matter concerns the external act itself of sin, an effect voluntary in the cause and imputable is imputed, speaking per se, first then, when someone has posited the cause, or from the time when he could and ought to have impeded it, if he noticed it after the cause had been posited. “The reason is that the free volition, or the non-impeding of an evil effect, is formally evil, but not the physical existence of the effect; and thus formal sin is committed when a perverse volition or nolition of this kind is had... Thus therefore he who, for example, offered poison to another... does not sin when the death of the other follows... but when he freely posited the cause of this effect”; Struggl, q. 1, art. 3, n. 32.; and sin is always committed then, whether the effect follows or does not follow, because, for example, the other did not take the poison, the poison did not harm, etc. It is said, speaking per se, for if someone can impede an effect of this kind up to its very execution, and does not impede it, or takes complacency for himself in its futurition or existence, in his mind he continues the sin whose cause he earlier freely and culpably posited. Struggl, l. c. But whether, when the effect from the posited cause in reality follows necessarily, it is imputed, or at least imputability is so increased that someone ought to explain it in confession, some affirm, others deny. St. Alphonsus affirms it, l. 5. n. 10. “An omission,” says the Holy Doctor, “voluntary in the cause is also imputed unto sin, even if afterwards the will cannot operate; for instance if someone makes himself drunk, foreseeing that by reason of drunkenness he will omit Mass, then he is bound to confess the cause and its effect, namely drunkenness and the omission of Mass, as Salm. etc. better say, with others commonly against Vasq. etc., provided the will is not retracted before the effect has followed, as Sanch. etc. probably teach; for then it is probable that he is not bound to confess the effect that followed. From this also it is deduced that if the effect happens after retraction, a censure imposed against sinners is not incurred, because that requires contumacy in the act of sin.” Cf. also l. 4. n. 149 and l. 7. n. 40. But Lugo denies it, who has these things: “It must be supposed in the sin, for example, by which you killed another with poison, that there intervenes first an internal act of the will, by which you willed to give him poison; then an external action, by which you prepared and gave the poison; then the effect that followed, namely his death.... The first and sufficiently common opinion affirms that the external effect must be explained... Father Vasquez, etc., broadly defends the contrary opinion. That opinion has always seemed truer to me... The more common reason... is that the external act, which is denominated free from the actual liberty of the internal act, is truly and properly sin; but the effect afterward following, in sleep for example, is not properly sin... but the effect of sin; but in confession all and only sins must be explained; therefore the external act must be explained when it is actually free, but not the effect afterward following... because there cannot be actual sin in him who actually does not sin, nor can he actually sin who actually does not act: but he who sleeps, while his enemy dies by poison, then does nothing; therefore then he does not sin.” De Poenit., D. 16, nn. 437, 439, 440, 449. But this opinion must be limited, unless the penitent has incurred a censure or a reserved case on account of the effect that followed. Lugo himself has this limitation, indeed he adds: “It can also happen that a censure is incurred by him who already through contrition, or through attrition with the sacrament, has been justified from the past sin”; n. 453. Cf. also n. 460 and Laymann, l. 1, Tr. 2, c. 2, n. 5. But, as Ithurriaga observes very well, Cas. 40, n. 31 and following, Cas. 50, n. 26 and following, there is no reservation where there is no subject of reservation, or sin, since it has already been absolved. For of no being there are no properties. What is not, is not such. But where only a retraction of the will has preceded, the cause retracted by the will is no longer in itself a culpable effect. But reservation or censure cannot be incurred when there is no sin through the act.

39. Finally, one voluntary is actual, another virtual, another habitual, another interpretative. — The actual voluntary is given when someone actually wills something, whether he wills explicitly, that is, clearly and in particular, or implicitly, that is, confusedly, namely by a universal or quasi-universal will which is extended also to this object; for example, he who wills to receive the subdiaconate also wills to elicit the vow of chastity connected with it; he who wills to marry also wills to sustain his wife, etc. — The implicit voluntary is often also voluntary virtually, insofar as it contains in itself, according to force and virtue, another act into which the will then consequently breaks forth. And thus he who conceives true sorrow for sins committed implicitly and virtually conceives the purpose of not sinning thereafter, whence he then explicitly elicits it.

40. The virtual voluntary is clear in three ways. — The virtual voluntary, first, is that which perseveres in some virtue of itself, and is given when the explicit and clear will itself, or intention of the end, no longer exists, but only the volitions of the means exist explicitly and clearly, which volitions of the end itself accompany in a remiss degree. Cf. Lugo, De Fid., D. 1, n. 98. Thus, for example, when a priest wills to celebrate Mass and then vests himself, approaches the altar, and performs the other customary things, without still having that clear actual will of consecrating, the consecration will be virtually voluntary in this first mode, if, while he performs all things voluntarily, the will of consecrating is always present confusedly and remissly. — Or at least the acts of the cogitative or estimative then remain, which first are generated when the mind proposes its object to the will, which acts then go on to influence all subsequent actions. For when the mind apprehends that object, the apprehension of it is at the same time generated in the cogitative or estimative, which pertains to sensible cognition, and moves the sensible appetite and the exterior members to motion. Lugo, De Sacr. in genere, D. 8, s. 5, n. 87. — Next, the virtual voluntary is that which perseveres in the exterior work itself commanded by the prior act of the will, or in the voluntary execution of the means, which someone voluntarily applies by the force or virtue and impulse of the prior intention of the end, although not even a remiss volition concerning the end any longer exists. Thus a pilgrimage undertaken to the sanctuary of the Blessed Virgin will be virtually voluntary for one journeying, although on the journey he no longer attends to it, indeed thinks about wholly diverse things. Cf. Laymann, l. 1, Tr. 2, C. 3, n. 4; S. Th. 3. p. q. 64. a. 8. ad 3. “It must be said that it is not necessary that someone always think about the last end whenever he seeks or operates something. But the virtue of the first intention, which is with respect to the last end, remains in any appetite whatever of any thing, even if the last end is not actually thought about. Just as it is not necessary that he who goes along a road think in every step about the end.” S. Th. 1. 2. q. 1. a. 6. ad 3. — The virtual voluntary, third, is that which perseveres in some moral effect of its own; thus, for example, a contract entered into by a procurator will be virtually voluntary to the principal agent, who gave him the faculty of acting in his name. It is said, perseveres in some moral effect of its own, so that a merely physical effect may be excluded, into which perhaps that prior act of the will influences, as it is a physical act; for instance, if, after a will of consecrating has been had, then while sleeping you consecrate in a dream, the consecration is null. For that prior act of the will does not influence this effect as it is a human or moral act, but merely as it is a certain physical action. Cf. Laymann, l. c.; Lugo, De Poenit., D. 24, S. 4.; Suarez, Tr. 3, D. 6, S. 5.; Tr. 2, D. 8, S. 3, n. IV.; De Relig., V. 2, Tr. 6, De Voto, l. 1, C. 10.

41. The habitual voluntary, which St. Thomas often uses in place of the virtual, is properly that which was, but neither is in itself, not even remissly, nor in the exterior commanded work, or in the execution of the means, nor in any positive moral effect, but is, morally speaking, in a merely negative effect, insofar namely as the prior will has not been retracted. Hence a will of this kind suffices for certain moral effects. Thus if an adult, invalidly baptized, is rebaptized while he sleeps, the baptism is valid. Thus also, “for contracting,” says St. Alphonsus, l. 3. n. 769, “an interpretative or conditional will does not suffice, as we said n. 773, but an actual or virtual will is required, or at least one sometime had and not retracted according to the things to be said, l. 6. n. 324.” Cf. Laymann, l. c.

42. The interpretative voluntary is an act of the will which neither is nor was, because cognition of the object is not present and was not present, but would be, if cognition of this kind were had. Therefore that act of the will indeed is not in itself, but is only in its cause, i.e. in the actual disposition and propensity of the will. “But if someone rightly considers, this is not properly voluntary; for if someone wholly ignorant by chance had killed an enemy, yet was so disposed that if he knew him to be an enemy he would more easily kill him, for that reason the action would not be judged voluntary to him; rather Aristotle called it non-voluntary, and it can also be called not involuntary. Whence this interpretation rather serves so that the action be judged not to be against the will of another, for example of a Superior, than so that it be judged to be from his will; and therefore it must be said to be in fact neither voluntary nor involuntary to him.” Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4. — The voluntary interpretatively is also called the implicit voluntary, or voluntary by virtue on the part of the work. And thus one intending an honorable good which of itself is referred to the glory of God, although he does not explicitly think about the glory of God, nevertheless operates interpretatively on account of the glory of God.

43. The Angelic Doctor, De Veritate q. 15. a. 4. ad 10, takes interpretative consent for consent which is not contained in the formal act of the will consenting, but in the absence of an act of resisting, when namely the will can and ought to resist. For by the very fact that the will then does not resist or dissent, it is judged to consent. For St. Thomas raises the objection: “The same judgment seems to be concerning interpretative and expressed consent. But interpretative consent does not seem to be a mortal sin, because sin is not transferred into some power except through an act of that power; but in interpretative consent there is not found any act of reason by which it is said to consent, but only negligence of repressing illicit motions. Therefore interpretative consent into pleasure is not a mortal sin. Therefore neither, similarly, is expressed consent.” To this objection he responds thus: “It must be said that before reason weighs pleasure, or the harm of it, it does not have interpretative consent, even if it does not resist; but when reason has already weighed the pleasure arising and the harm following, as when a man perceives himself to be inclined totally through pleasure of this kind into sin and to rush headlong, unless he expressly resists, he seems to consent. And then sin is transferred to reason through its act, because to act and not to act, when someone ought to act, are reduced to the same genus of act, according as a sin of omission is reduced to a sin of act.”

44. Of the interpretative will, as of a true will, there is also some moral effect, namely by its force to interpret a law, and also to moderate its rigor, which is commonly done generally by theologians and canonists, and by all in particular cases where there is place for legitimate epikeia. Hence the question is raised: when the permission of a Superior is required for the liceity of an act, does his interpretative will suffice? R. 1.º Negatively, if a positive act of the will of the Superior is required for the validity and substance of the act, as in dispensing impediments diriment of marriage, in the conferral of jurisdiction of a confessor, etc. The reason: because then the act, without the bond of law dissolved by the authority of the Superior, without jurisdiction imparted by the Superior, will be always against the law and null. — R. 2.º Affirmatively, if permission is required only so that it be clear that the Superior is not unwilling. The reason: because, if his will is in fact reasonably presumed, now it is clear that he would not be unwilling if he knew; and thus now the matter is done with due dependence upon his will, and no right of his is injured, as if someone, while the superior is absent, celebrates or ministers the sacrament of penance in his Church. Sanchez, De Matr. l. 3. D. 35. n. 17. 24.; Struggl, T. 1. q. 1. a. 2. n. 21.; Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 1, S. 4.

45. From what has been said it is easily drawn out what it is for a man to operate on account of an end either actually, or habitually, or virtually, or interpretatively, which Suarez explains thus in 1. 2. Tr. 1. D. 2. S. 4: “The will is said actually to operate on account of an end when it is actually moved by the end; whence for this mode of operating there is required in the first place actual cognition and thought about the end itself, because unless it is actually apprehended, it cannot actually move. Then there is required an actual motion of the will either into the end itself or into another thing on account of it, because this is what actual operation on account of an end signifies... Habitually, when this habitual relation is judged to have been left from some preceding act, by which that work either in particular or at least under generality has been referred to such an end, although when that work is done the preceding act or relation is in no way either actually, or in some virtue which it has left so that through it it might influence the work, but merely habitually; because that intention, once had, was not retracted. As, for example, someone referred very early in the morning all the works of the day to God; afterwards, however, in the course of the day he operates something referable of itself to God, yet without that memory of the prior intention, and without any actual or virtual influence; then that man is said habitually to operate on account of God, on account of the relation left by habit from the prior intention had and not retracted... Concerning the third mode, virtually on account of the end, it must be noted that it is as it were a middle between the preceding ones, because it neither requires actually an influence on account of the end, as the first; nor absolutely none, as the second; but requires some influence through some virtue left from the prior intention... For this mode it is necessary that actual cognition and intention of such an end have preceded, because otherwise there would be nothing whence that virtue would have been left. Then it is necessary that such an intention not have been retracted by a contrary intention, because otherwise this contrary intention would have destroyed the virtue left by the prior intention. Third, it is necessary that some effect left from the prior intention endure, so that from it in some manner the work may proceed, which afterwards is said to be done virtually on account of such an end. But what this effect is seems to have to be explained in one way with respect to external acts, in another way with respect to the internal act of the will itself. For an exterior act can be done on account of an end without actual thought and intention of the end. The common example is when someone makes a journey which he begins on account of some end, but in the actual progress itself he does not always remember the end itself; indeed sometimes he does not even remember the very walking or motion. And the same happens in the celebration of Mass from a prior intention. Then therefore the virtue left from the prior intention seems to be nothing other than the application of the executive power itself to the actual external operation, which endures and is continued in the effect itself, so long as he does not wholly cease from the action, nor the act is suspended through a contrary will. And although it happens that external actions are varied, nevertheless because one succeeds another in the mind, one also excites to another, and in this way the interior virtue is judged to endure in the effect itself. But when the external action has been wholly interrupted, for example by sleep or something of this kind, then it is necessary that the act of the will be begun as it were anew; and since an act of the will cannot be without cognition of the intellect, therefore from the part of that it seems conveniently that this virtue left from the prior intention be expounded, because namely from the preceding intention, apprehension, consultation, and other similar acts, it has been brought about that, when such an object is proposed to the power, for example that a journey is to be made, it is at once represented as to be executed, without another motion or special consideration of it or of the end to which it is ordered; and in this way the will at once executes that which is proposed, and begins to use that means which is proximate, or which then first occurs as to be executed, and thus it is rightly said virtually to operate on account of the end. Concerning the fourth mode, which we have called operating interpretatively on account of an end, it must be noted that sometimes the will intends some object in which it rests by force of consideration and of this actual motion; nevertheless that thing intended by its own nature is borne and ordered to another end. Then therefore the will is said properly, and as it were explicitly, to intend the end proposed to it; but interpretatively it is said to intend the further end to which the end intended in the prior mode is borne by its own nature. And in this way he who operates honorably on account of the goodness of mercy or justice, thinking nothing about God or about another end, is said to operate on account of God, or on account of beatitude, and to fulfill that saying of Paul, 1 Cor. 10: Do all things unto the glory of God; because, namely, the honorable good itself which is intended is borne by its own nature to God, and is the means by which one tends to beatitude. And therefore, although man by his own act does not intend that further end, he is said to operate on account of it interpretatively, which others call operating on account of an end from the nature of the work itself rather than from the intention of the one acting.”

46. And these things are concerning the voluntary considered in itself. For if the voluntary is considered according as it is brought forth exteriorly by some sign, then expressed, tacit, presumed, and interpretative will are distinguished. Expressed will is that which is expressed by words, letters, nods, or some exterior deed. This is one thing explicitly expressed, when namely someone by an exterior sign manifests some act of the will clearly and explicitly, or in particular; it is another thing implicitly expressed, when someone by an exterior sign manifests that he wills something with which another thing is connected. Tacit will is that which is manifested by silence itself, as when a Superior, having been questioned, is silent. He who is silent is seen to consent, Rule 43 of Law in the Sixth; namely 1.º in favorable things, for to accepting these the will is borne by natural inclination itself; 2.º when someone is bound and is able to speak, for then the reason is consent, and the reason for dissent is lacking; 3.º when no manifest reason for being silent is present. For there can be no place for conjecture against a manifest reason. — Presumed will is that which, although it is not known to us a posteriori by some exterior sign or by silence itself, nevertheless is gathered a priori to be present. For some sufficient cause is present for judging so. — Interpretative will is that which, since in fact it neither was present nor is present, nor is it gathered to be present or to have been present by some exterior sign a posteriori, nor by some sufficient cause a priori, nevertheless there is present some sufficient reason for gathering that it would be present, if cognition of the object were had. — The aforesaid cause or reason present is the disposition of the soul by which, supposing that someone had thought about the matter, or if he were thinking about it, he in fact wills, or would will, the thing. Cf. Struggl, Tr. 1, q. 1, a. 2.

47. Presumed will is often confused with interpretative will. Often also the former is distinguished from the latter by distinguishing presumed will concerning the present, which is properly called by us presumed, and presumed will concerning the future, which is properly called by us interpretative. In order that the difference of each may become better known, the matter can be declared by this practical example. A religious on a journey, the Superior being absent, wishes to buy a thing of some importance, of great utility for the whole community. He writes about the matter to the Superior. While the Superior, having received the letter, writes back, the occasion urges buying the thing and he buys it, the response not yet having been received because of lack of time, presuming an affirmative response from the otherwise well-known will of the Superior. Here you have will simply presumed, or presumed concerning the present. But whether the will of the Superior is in fact present or is falsely presumed to be present, the truth itself must be inspected, which the response of the Superior afterward received will declare. But if the same occasion urges buying a thing as useful as possible to the community, say a huge supply of excellent books at the least price, and there is no time to consult the absent Superior, nevertheless from the same will of the Superior, otherwise well known, that religious presumes that he would agree if asked, and buys the books with money received for the journey, preferring the utility of the monastery to a more comfortable journey: you have will presumed concerning the future, or interpretative. St. Alphonsus, Theol. Mor., l. 4. n. 18.; Laymann, l. c. n. 3.; Struggl, l. c. n. 20.