Commentary IX: On the Morality of Human Acts

1. We have spoken of human acts in relation to man, who through them orders himself to the ultimate end of human life, or beatitude. It must now be said of the same acts in order to the aforesaid end, or of the morality of those same acts. For the order of human acts to the common end of the whole of human life constitutes the moral order, or the morality of human acts, as will soon be explained, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 21. a. 2. ad 2. But first it must be said generally of morality itself, and specifically of the moral goodness and malice of human acts. Then indeed we shall speak of the various sources of this morality in human acts. And this we shall furnish in distinct Commentaries.

2. Human acts can be considered either all generically, or these or those specifically. If they are considered generically as human acts, they are capable of conducting man to the end, namely to the ultimate end, in the possession of which happiness and beatitude and his full perfection are constituted. For through them man orders and leads himself to the end. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 1. 2., q. 7. a. 2. If these or those specifically, as such acts, are inspected, they are actually ordering and leading, or not, to the end, according as they are conformable to the end or not. And thus, for example, cognition of God and love of God, by their nature, order and lead man to the end; ignorance of God and hatred of God, by their nature, turn and remove man from the end.

3. If human acts, in the first way, are viewed generally, they are called moral. If, in the second way, they are considered as constituted in a particular species, they are called morally good or evil, honorable or base. “Good and evil,” says St. Thomas, q. 18. a. 5., “diversify species in moral acts.” Therefore morality constitutes the genus; goodness or malice the species. Let us first consider the reason of each appellation; then, for declaring the matter itself, by the way indicated from the name of the thing to the thing itself, we shall come to it.

4. The reason of the former appellation is that human acts, by which man directs himself to the end, are free acts; namely, they are in reality those acts from whose repetition habits are properly begotten, which by the Latins are called mores. For mos signifies a frequent and more often repeated mode of operating proceeding from the free determination of the will. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 58. a. 1. Certainly the free pertains especially to habits and mores. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 49. a. 4. “There the genus of morals begins, where dominion of the will is first found.” St. Thomas, 2. D. 24. q. 3. a. 2. But acts from which habits or mores are begotten are most aptly called moral. Moreover, since human or free acts of this kind are those means with which man has been furnished so that he can tend to the end, namely so that he may use them not only once or another time, with attention to the nature of man, but so that he may exercise himself in them, and persevere in doing well unto the end of life, St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7.; hence also this whole order of human actions to the end is most aptly called the moral order. “And because,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 1. a. 3., “Ambrose says.... mores are properly called human, moral acts properly receive species from the end: for moral acts and human acts are the same.”

5. There is no real difference between a human act and a moral act. The difference is only from the diverse account by which the human act is considered. For if it is viewed according to its physical being, insofar as it is an act proceeding from reason and free will, it is held as a human act. But if it is viewed according to the relation which it has to its norm, whence is its goodness and malice in order to the end to be attained, it is a moral act. Wherefore morality adds to the voluntary and the free a relation to the norm of honorableness.

6. We proceed to the reason of the other appellation, namely of an act morally good or evil, honorable or base. Now if human or moral acts are conformable to obtaining the ultimate end, then nothing is lacking to them, not only insofar as they are physical actions done with advertence and deliberation, but also insofar as they are a means, instituted by nature, for attaining the end. But, on the contrary, if they do not lead to the end, although nothing is lacking to them insofar as they are physical actions done with advertence and deliberation, nevertheless something is lacking to them insofar as they are a means to the end. But that to which, considered under some respect, nothing is lacking, is called good under that respect; but evil, if something is lacking, under the same respect. But this respect or order of human acts to the end, as has already been said, is called the moral order or respect. Therefore human acts, if they are viewed specifically, are rightly called morally good or evil. “Thus therefore it must be said,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 1., “that every action, insofar as it has something of being, has so much of goodness; but insofar as something of the fullness of being which is due to human action is lacking to it, so far it falls short of goodness, and thus is called evil.” And 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5: “For each thing, good is that which befits it according to its form; and evil is that which is beyond the order of its form.... Whence it is manifest that good and evil diversify species in moral acts, for differences per se diversify species.”

7. Moreover to praise someone is to impute to him, or to attribute to him as author, the goodness of his act, just as to blame someone is to impute to him the malice of his act. Wherefore acts are imputable to praise or blame according as they are good or evil. But if the goodness or malice by which an act is imputed to someone for praise or blame is in the moral order, then the act which is imputed to praise is called honorable from being honored, and that which is imputed to blame is called base from being blamed. “From this,” says St. Thomas, q. 21. a. 2., “an act is called culpable or laudable, because it is imputed to the agent. For to be praised or blamed is nothing other than for the malice or goodness of one’s act to be imputed to someone. For then an act is imputed to the agent when it is in his power, so that he has dominion over his act. But this is in all voluntary acts, because through the will man has dominion over his act... Whence it remains that good or evil in voluntary acts alone constitutes the account of praise or fault.”

8. And hence it is clear that honorable can be taken in two ways: 1.º according as it is contradistinguished from useful and pleasurable; 2.º according as it is contradistinguished from base. In the first way it signifies the good which is sought per se; a good ordered to an end is called useful, q. 7. a. 2., q. 8. a. 3.; it is called pleasurable insofar as by possession of itself it quiets the appetite and brings delight, St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 3. In the other way it signifies an action which, beyond the entity of a human action, also has the account of a means to the end, that is, an action which not only is done with advertence and deliberation, but which is done conformably to the end, which consequently is consonant with right reason, and fitting to man insofar as he is man, and bringing decorum: “Something is called honorable insofar as it has a certain decorum from the ordering of reason.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 3. Hence moral good can be honorable good, useful good, and pleasurable good, when namely a human act is concerned with these goods according to the order of right reason, according as they can lead man to the end. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 145. a. 1. 2. 3. Cf. Commentary Tenth n. 7.

9. Coming to the matter itself, we note first that the Doctors commonly understand by morality the relation of human acts to their proper norm and rule, according to which they are ordered and directed. The diversity of opinions is situated rather in determining this norm and rule. And thus also commonly, genus being taken for species, acts are distinguished as moral and immoral, to designate right human acts and voluntary acts falling short of their proper rectitude. Moreover, omitting the discrepant opinions of others, and insisting upon the doctrine of the Angelic Doctor, morality considered generically, according to its primary and fundamental concept, can be defined: the capacity which human actions have in themselves to be good or bad in order to the end of creation, that is, to be conformable or fitting, or not, to attaining this end. But specifically it is the account of conformity or deformity which human actions have in themselves in order to the end of creation, as means to the end, insofar as namely they are fitting or unfitting for leading man, or not, to his end. It is said according to its primary and fundamental concept; for proximately and formally that conformity or fittingness, deformity or unfittingness, is only from law, which is manifested through right reason. For by this very fact that law commands something to be done or omitted, it formally and proximately constitutes that thing in the account of a means in order to attaining the end, the use of such a means bringing forth obligation in conscience. Whence St. Alphonsus rightly says: “The moral goodness of a human act consists in a certain conformity and fittingness of the free act with right reason and law.” Treatise on Human Acts XXXIV. For then there is right reason, when it proposes an act ordered to the due end of man, which cannot be if the act is discordant from the aforesaid end, if it is contrary to law. But this law is the eternal law, from which every other law is derived and in which it is founded. Cf. St. Thomas, qq. 18. 19. 20.; Suarez, Tr. 3. D. 1. D. 2. S. 1. 2., D. 3. S. 2. 3., D. 7. S. 1-6., D. 10. D. 11.

10. And indeed, if morality is the relation of human acts to their proper norm and rule, according to which they are ordered and directed, this primary and fundamental norm of all human acts can be nothing other than the end of the whole of human life. For acts are essentially ordered and directed to an end, and all human acts, that they may be ordered and right, ought essentially to be directed to the common end of the whole of human life. According to the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2., throughout, all human actions ought to be directed and ordered to the end, 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7.; the end is the proper and chief object of the will, q. 8. a. 2.; from the end human and moral acts are principally specified, q. 87. a. 6. ad 2. Therefore the primary and fundamental account of morality must be taken from the end. Moreover by the morality of human acts this also is commonly understood, namely the account of the rectitude or non-rectitude of those same human acts; and since human acts are means to the end, the end is the rule and measure of that rectitude or non-rectitude. By morality, again, this also is understood, that acts are according to reason or beyond reason; moreover reason manifests this and dictates that this must be followed in human acts, namely the end to be attained through acts congruent and conformable to it. But by moral goodness or malice this is commonly understood, that human acts are ordered or not ordered to that end; that they are according to right reason ordering proper acts to the end, or beyond this right reason. Hence the goodness of acts is insofar as they are useful for the end, q. 7. a. 2. ad 1. a. 4. ad 2.; and consequently from that end, and from the object ordered or not ordered to that end, a human act is constituted in the species of an act morally good or morally bad.

11. Since man is under God, the mind of man must be ordered under God, and all other things which are in man must be ordered under his reason. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, l. 3. C. 229. Then certainly human acts, rightly ordered as the very nature of man requires, will be right, and the reason proposing them and directing one to them will be right. Moreover the rectitude of any thing is taken from its proper nature and proper end, which has been placed in all things by God himself, according to the proper determinate nature of each thing. Therefore a human act which in itself does not preserve this order of nature itself, just as it does not follow right reason, which proposes the aforesaid order and manifests that it must be preserved, so consequently it will naturally be an unfitting act, and will not be able to be ordered by man to God the founder of nature. On the contrary, an act which bears before itself the natural order, which right reason also shows, is intrinsically ordered to God the founder of nature, since it is fitting to nature itself, and consequently can be referred by man in his human act to God by right reason.

12. Therefore the rectitude or aberration of a human act is only from its fittingness or unfittingness with the ultimate end, which is not had intrinsically in it except from fittingness or unfittingness with rational nature itself. “There cannot,” says St. Thomas, 2. D. 40. q. 1. a. 5., “be any act proceeding from someone deliberating without intention of the end. But that end is the good fitting to man either according to the soul, or according to the body, or according to exterior things.” The body is ordered to the soul, exterior things to both. And therefore if the use of the body and of exterior things is not contrary to the good of the soul, and is in the middle between excess and defect, the use will be right; otherwise the use will be vicious.

St. Thomas, in the cited place. The former use, corresponding to the nature of the thing, is of itself referred to God, the creator of nature and the ultimate end; but the latter use, contrary to the natural order of things, cannot of itself be referred to God. Whence it is that the former is right and good, the latter morally aberrant and evil. Reason apprehending this order of things and proposing it as to be observed practically in its own acts is that right reason of which St. Alphonsus speaks, n. 9. Therefore the ultimate account of morality is in this relation of human actions to the ultimate end of man, or God, which in the actions themselves intrinsically flows forth from the very nature of the things about which those human actions are concerned.

13. The Angelic Doctor explicitly teaches concerning this matter: “Human actions, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4..... have the character of goodness from the end... as it were according to relation to the cause of goodness,” namely to the primary and fundamental cause of goodness, since it is the first cause. “The specific difference which is from the end is more general; and the difference which is from the object ordered of itself to such an end is specific with respect to it,” q. 18. a. 7. Moreover all objects are of themselves ordered to the ultimate end. Therefore the specification of morality from the ultimate end is primary and fundamental. And ibid. ad 2: “It must be said that the end is last in execution, but is first in the intention of reason, according to which the species of moral acts are taken”; and consequently the species of good and the species of evil. And ibid. a. 5 ad 1, q. 18. a. 8: “Good, insofar as it is according to reason, and evil, insofar as it is beyond reason, diversify the species of morals.” “Whence, if the object of the act includes something that agrees with the order of reason, the act will be good according to its species... But if it includes something that is repugnant to the order of reason, the act will be evil according to its species.” But good is according to reason and evil beyond reason, as is said in q. 18. a. 5 in the body, insofar as it is fitting or not fitting to it. Moreover an object is fitting or not fitting to reason insofar as it corresponds or does not correspond to the end; and this is the same as to fit or not to fit the order of reason. “For since it belongs to reason to order, an act proceeding from deliberative reason, if it is not ordered to a due end, by this very fact is repugnant to reason and has the character of evil. But if it is ordered to a due end, it agrees with the order of reason; whence it has the character of good.” For this reason the whole rectitude of reason must also be taken again from the end. “In those things which are for the end, rectitude of reason consists in conformity to the appetite for the due end; but nevertheless the very appetite for the end presupposes a right apprehension concerning the end, which is through reason,” q. 19. a. 3 ad 2. “In moral matters reason is ordered to the common end of the whole of human life..... But since sin is through deviation from order to the end..... in moral matters, where the order of reason to the common end of human life is considered, sin and evil are always considered through deviation from the order of reason to the common end of human life,” q. 21. a. 2 ad 2. If the deviation of a human act is to be taken from the ultimate end, from the same end the rectitude of a human act must be taken. And thus the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 5. a. 7, says: “The rectitude of the will..... is nothing else than the due order of the will to the ultimate end.” Finally, “the goodness,” says the Holy Doctor, “of the will depends on the intention of the end. But the ultimate end of the human will is the highest good, which is God. Therefore it is required for the goodness of the human will that it be ordered to the highest good.” 1. 2. q. 19. a. 9. Cf. also ibid. a. 10. Therefore it is sufficiently and more than sufficiently established that the morality generally of human acts, and their moral goodness and malice, according to the primary and fundamental concept, is to be placed in the relation of the same acts to the end of human life, in a relation of fittingness or unfittingness. “But the will of some man willing some particular good is not right unless he refers it to the common good as to an end, since even the natural appetite of any part is ordered to the common good of the whole. But from the end is taken, as it were, the formal reason for willing that which is ordered to the end; whence, in order that someone by a right will should will some particular good, it is necessary that that particular good be willed materially, but that the divine common good be willed formally.” 1. 2. q. 19. a. 10.

14. Man, proceeding from God, ought ultimately to tend to God. Having in himself several higher and lower faculties, he himself ought so to act that the higher dominate the lower, and that reason and will not be subjected to the senses. Moreover, living in human society, he ought peacefully to make use of association with men. But as those things which are from God are ordered, so God, creating all things for His glory, necessarily commands that order be observed and forbids it to be violated. The prescription of observing and not violating this order, or law, and the consequent obligation, proximately and formally constitutes the morality of human acts. But men, by observing this order prescribed by God, attain their end from God; by violating it, wandering far from their end, they are repelled by the same God lest they attain the end. Therefore men are bound to observe this prescribed order not only by the mere necessity of the end, but also by the necessity of obeying God commanding, in which morality and moral obligation properly consist proximately and formally. For morality properly imports conformity or deformity with the proper rule of morals, which indeed is the reason and will of God, or the eternal law of God; nor can it be any other. For since human reason and will depend on God in their being and operation, the norm directing human acts to God Himself, the ultimate end of man, ought to be the very reason and will of God, and no other. And from this there follows and clearly appears moral obligation, which consists in this, that man cannot transgress the law of God without offending God.

15. But that, from the same Angelic Doctor, that morality, and moral goodness and malice, must proximately and formally be taken from the eternal law, is thus clear from 1. 2. q. 19. a. 4, where he at the same time shows how that morality, goodness, and moral malice also proceeds from reason: “It must be said,” he says, “that in all ordered causes, the effect depends more on the first cause than on the second cause, because the second cause does not act except in the power of the first cause. But that human reason is the rule of the human will, from which its goodness is measured, it has from the eternal law, which is divine reason. Whence it is said in Ps. 4: Many say: Who shows us good things? The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, has been signed upon us; as though he were saying: the light of reason which is in us can show us good things and regulate our will only insofar as it is the light of Thy countenance, i.e. derived from Thy countenance. Whence it is manifest that the goodness of the human will depends much more on the eternal law than on human reason.” The same is clear from a. 9: “That which is first in each genus is the measure and account of all things which are of that genus. But each thing is right and good insofar as it attains to its proper measure. Therefore, in order that the will of man be good, it is required that it be conformed to the divine will.”

16. Therefore the first rule and measure of the good human will is the divine will. Indeed the human will, in order that it be right, is not bound to be conformed to the divine will in the material thing willed, or in the very thing itself that is willed, unless the will of God becomes known by precept or prohibition. For a thing willed by God under the aspect of the common good, to which God attends as universal provider, is good; yet under the aspect of a particular good, to which man ought to attend, and to which God wills that he attend, it can be evil. Whence Augustine, in Enchir. C. 101. n. 26, says: “Sometimes with a good will a man wills something which God does not will.... As if a good son should wish his father to live, whom God with a good will wills to die.” But the will of God commanding or prohibiting obliges man to will and do what is commanded, and to be unwilling and not do what is prohibited. Therefore then the human will is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed, or in the material thing willed. Now although the human will is not always bound to be conformed in the material thing willed to the divine will, in order that it be right, nevertheless it is always bound to be conformed to the divine will in the formal thing willed, or in the reason for willing; and therefore it ought to will whatever it wills on account of the common and divine good as the ultimate end. For the formal thing willed by the divine will, or its motive and ultimate reason for willing, is the common and divine good, or the common good of the whole universe, insofar as it is ultimately ordered to God Himself and His glory: for the Lord has made all things for Himself. But by seeking the honorable good, virtually and implicitly the will seeks the divine good, since the ends of all things are finally ordered and directed to the ultimate end.

17. These are the words of the Angelic Doctor in the cited q. 19. a. 10: “The good of the whole universe is that which is apprehended by God, who is the maker and governor of the universe. Whence whatever He wills, He wills under the aspect of the common good, which is His goodness, which is the good of the whole universe... But the will of some man willing some particular good is not right unless he refer it to the common good as to an end, since even the natural appetite of any part is ordered to the common good of the whole. But from the end is taken, as it were, the formal reason for willing that which is ordered to the end. Whence, in order that someone by a right will should will some particular good, it is necessary that that particular good be willed materially, but that the divine common good be willed formally. Therefore the human will is bound to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed formally; for it is bound to will the divine and common good, but not materially.... For the apprehension of the creature according to its nature is of some particular good proportioned to its nature. But it happens that something is good according to a particular reason which is not good according to the universal reason, or conversely. And hence it happens that some will is good in willing something considered according to a particular reason, which nevertheless God does not will according to the universal reason, and conversely..... But what the divine thing willed is according to the common reason we can know; for we know that God, whatever He wills, wills under the aspect of good. And therefore whoever wills something under any aspect whatever of good has a will conformed to the divine will as to the reason of the thing willed. But in particular we do not know what God wills; and as to this we are not bound to conform our will to the divine will.” But the divine will can become known to us in three ways, namely by revelation, by precept, by operation. For by the very fact that God reveals, commands, or works something, it is manifest that He wills that very thing. And hence it is clear that morality proximately consists in the conformity or deformity of our will with the divine will and law, but remotely in the conformity or deformity of our actions with the ultimate end.

18. And this is also proved from the very account of the eternal law, from which morality certainly must be taken proximately. For “law imports order to the end actively, namely insofar as through it certain things are ordered to the end; but not passively, that is, as though the law itself were ordered to the end, except accidentally in a governor whose end is outside himself, to which it is also necessary that his law be ordered. But the end of divine government is God Himself; nor is His law something other than Himself; whence the eternal law is not ordered to another end.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 91. a. 1 ad 3.

19. The established doctrine is confirmed from the necessity which the Angelic Doctor asserts for a positive divine law besides the eternal and natural law, 1. 2. q. 91. a. 4. Through this natural law man is directed only to the ultimate natural end. For through the natural law the eternal law is participated according to the proportion of the capacity of human nature. And therefore a divinely given law is superadded, through which the eternal law is participated in a higher mode, so that in a higher mode man may be directed to the ultimate supernatural end. For “through law man is directed to his proper acts in order to the ultimate end. And if indeed man were ordered only to an end which did not exceed the proportion of man’s natural faculty, it would not be necessary that man have something directive on the part of reason beyond the natural law and the humanly posited law which is derived from it. But because man is ordered to the end of eternal beatitude, which exceeds the proportion of the natural faculty of man, therefore it was necessary that beyond natural and human law he also be directed to his end by a divinely given law.” But as man through nature itself is ordered to God, so also man through law is ordered to God. St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, l. 3, c. 128, paragraph beginning Item.

19. Since the eternal law is unknown to us according as it is in the divine mind, but nevertheless becomes known to us through natural reason, hence reason itself also is the rule and norm of human acts, and indeed the proximate one, as proposing immediately to the will good or evil according to the eternal law. But this proximate rule is subjective, merely proposing the object; law is the proximate objective rule, constituting rectitude, whose foundation is the very nature of things, which is entirely independent of human reason. Human reason merely knows, applies, and proposes order; it does not constitute it. Suarez, in 1. 2. Tr. 3. D. 2. S. 2. n. 12. For indeed the end of things and the order of means to the end is not effected by human reason, but, constituted from nature itself, is apprehended and manifested by human reason; hence, since reason is man’s proper nature, which is ordered to truth, that which is repugnant to right reason is called by the Angelic Doctor contrary to nature, not because it is repugnant to reason as though reason itself were constitutive of the natural order, but because it is repugnant to reason manifesting rectitude, which right reason is the nature of man. St. Thomas, Quaestiones de Malo, q. 14. a. 2 ad 8: “And therefore that which is contrary to the order of reason is properly contrary to the nature of man insofar as he is man; but that which is according to reason is according to the nature of man insofar as he is man.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 2. If reason did not propose that which is right in itself, but made it, then this rectitude of acting would depend on the judgment of reason, and nothing fixed and certain any longer would be in the moral goodness or malice of human actions. In those matters which by nature itself are not defined and ordered, human reason can indeed constitute order, which happens in positive laws; nevertheless nothing contrary to the nature of things and the eternal law of God can rightly be done against it. Therefore reason apprehends the rectitude of things and proposes that it is to be observed. And thus St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 5, says: “Certain acts are called human or moral according as they are from reason.” And q. 19. a. 1 ad 3: “It must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as an object; and, insofar as it falls under the order of reason, it pertains to the genus of morals and causes moral goodness in the act of the will. For reason is the principle of human and moral acts.”

20. But it belongs to right reason to order all things to the due end. Moreover this ordering is one by which man is well disposed immediately in relation to the end itself, which the theological virtues provide; another by which he is well disposed mediately to the aforesaid end, namely is well disposed in relation to those things by which he is directed to that end, which the moral virtues provide. St. Thomas, De Virtutibus in communi, a. 12; 1. 2. q. 61. a. 2. But since right reason apprehends and proposes nothing except the order of things constituted and prescribed by God, hence “it belongs to the same reason that vice and sin are contrary to the order of human reason and that they are contrary to the eternal law of God.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 71. a. 2 ad 4.

21. What is said of the eternal law must be understood of any other law, since any law is an ordering of reason constituting the order and rectitude of human acts to the end; nor indeed are all human acts either commanded or prohibited by the eternal law itself. Whence many human acts are commanded or prohibited only by positive law; and thus they are constituted proximately and formally in the character of a necessary means to the end. And the eternal law itself commands that laws of this sort are to be obeyed. Moreover, all laws, “insofar as they participate in right reason, are so far derived from the eternal law.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 93. a. 3. For they are derived from it as from an exemplary cause, because all laws, in order that they be just, ought to be conformed to the eternal law; as from an efficient cause, because all legislative power is from God; as from a more universal law, approving and commanding that, on account of the common good, other determinate laws be made according to the diversity of persons, places, times, and other circumstances. St. Thomas, in the cited place, ad 2 and ad 3.

22. The remote and fundamental norm of morality, namely the ultimate end of man, embraces all human acts; otherwise it would no longer be the remote and fundamental rule of morality. The reason is clear, because all human acts are means to the end of the whole of human life. Nevertheless not all have the same relation to this end, as is already clear from what has been said: for some are ordered of themselves, namely by their intrinsic nature ordered to this end, whether immediately or mediately, as, for example, the knowledge and love of God, love of neighbor, justice to be observed toward others, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically good, and because they are good, namely intimately and necessarily consonant with the order of reason, therefore they are then commanded by the natural law. Others, on the contrary, are of themselves repugnant, or by their intrinsic nature discordant with the common end of human life, whether again immediately or mediately, as, for example, blasphemy, perjury, sacrilege, theft, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically evil, and because they are evil, namely intimately and necessarily discordant with the order of reason, therefore they are then prohibited by the natural law. Finally, there are other acts which of themselves, or by their intrinsic nature, are not necessarily connected with the aforesaid end and consequently with the order of reason, as, for example, conversing with a friend, going into the country, etc.; and these acts are called intrinsically indifferent. Therefore, by the necessity of attaining the end, these acts neither must necessarily be placed nor must necessarily be omitted; but if someone of his own accord wishes to place them, he certainly ought to exercise them in such a way, by the very necessity of attaining the end, that he not withdraw from the end, but always tend to the end, since for this reason nature itself has given man the faculty of acting freely, that through free action he may lead himself to the end. Whence by the very fact that an act, namely an act in the concrete, is not repugnant to the end, it is already consonant with the end at least in some way and morally good. St. Thomas, 2 Dist. 40. q. 1. a. 5. And hence again it is clear what the order and rectitude of reason signify, namely it imports the proportion of the means to the end, which reason does not make, but knows and proposes to the will. And thus the Angelic Doctor calls moral good that which agrees with the order of reason, and likewise honorable good that which agrees with the rectitude of reason, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8, q. 39. a. 2.

23. Likewise the proximate and formal rule, namely law, also embraces all human acts: since it commands some and prohibits others; but those which it neither commands nor prohibits, but permits either positively or negatively, are to be performed, by that same commanding law, in such a way that they are not repugnant to the order and rectitude of reason; and thus acts of this sort are by that very fact morally good, since if in performing them the order of reason is observed, they are already fitting to reason and morally good and honorable.

24. If the fundamental rule is compared with the proximate objective and subjective rule, it is clear that in truth the end, by the very fact that it is the foundation of the morality or rectitude of the act ordered and directed to it, is not properly a rule, but is merely the end or term of that act, whose order to the aforesaid end or term ought to be measured according to some rule, which indeed is law and human reason; and if law is compared to human reason, the former is the remote rule, the latter the proximate rule. “It must be said,” says St. Thomas, q. 21. a. 1, “that evil is broader than sin, just as good is broader than right. For any privation of good in anything whatever constitutes the character of evil; but sin properly consists in an act which is done for some end, when it does not have the due order to that end. But due order is measured according to some rule, which rule, indeed, in those things which act according to nature, is the very power of nature, which inclines to such an end. Therefore, when an act proceeds from natural power according to a natural inclination to the end, then rectitude is preserved in the act, because the mean does not depart from the extremes, namely the act from the order of the active principle to the end; but when some act recedes from such rectitude, then the account of sin enters in. But in those things which are done through the will, the proximate rule is human reason, while the supreme rule is the eternal law. Therefore whenever the act of man proceeds to the end according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is right; but when it is bent away from this rectitude, then it is called sin. But it is manifest that every voluntary act is evil by this, that it recedes from the order of reason and of the eternal law. Whence it follows that a human act, from the fact that it is good or evil, has the character either of rectitude or of sin.... It must be said that the end is twofold, namely ultimate and proximate. But in a sin of nature an act indeed falls short of the ultimate end, which is the perfection of the generated thing; but it does not fall short of every proximate end, for nature works by forming something. Similarly, in a sin of the will there is always a defect from the ultimate intended end, because no evil act of the will is orderable to beatitude, which is the ultimate end, although it does not fall short of some proximate end which the will intends and attains. Whence, even when the very intention of this end is ordered to the ultimate end, in the very intention of an end of this sort the account of rectitude and sin can be found.”

25. From the nature of morality explained, it is easily deduced that it is altogether honorable to act for the sake of an end, in hope of remuneration or from fear of punishments; since every human action, in order that it be morally good, ought to tend to man’s ultimate end and lead man to it. Reward and punishment, which are proposed by God Himself the Lawgiver, so that He may move men to obey His law and thus attain eternal happiness, are most apt means for attaining the end; and therefore it is not against the right order of reason, but, on the contrary, it is according to right reason to act from the motive of the aforesaid hope or from fear of the aforesaid punishments. For he who acts from the aforesaid motive wills nothing except the true good of man and flees evil, since eternal happiness is the greatest good of man, and eternal damnation is the greatest evil. — Nor indeed would there be disorder in such an operation from the fact that then man would order God to himself. For when the good for the sake of acquiring which man acts is some particular good, entirely secondary and wholly accidental to himself, then certainly the end for the sake of which, or for the sake of attaining which, the will acts is secondary; and the end for whom, or the subject and person for whom that good is loved and sought, takes on the more principal character of end, because his perfection simply is intended more. But when that good for the sake of acquiring which man acts, or which he loves for himself, is the greatest and highest good with respect to him for whom it is loved, as God is with respect to man, then that good is also principal in the account of end, because it is simply the ultimate end and cannot rightly be ordered to another as to an end. Therefore, when man loves this good for himself, he does not order it to himself as to an end, but rather loves to be joined to that good as to his good and ultimate end; and therefore he does not order God to himself, but rather himself to God as to the ultimate end, namely he orders himself to God not as a means, but as a subject which can attain an end of this sort.

26. From the declared nature of morality, and its origin or source, it further follows that not every human act takes its rectitude or perversity from positive law. For antecedently to every law certain acts are naturally right, others naturally perverse. “This,” says St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, l. 3, c. 129, “the natural order requires, that lower things be subject to higher things. Therefore those things which are commanded by divine law are in themselves naturally right.” And altogether from this reason it is that man by natural reason itself breaks forth into natural moral principles of his own operations. These principles indeed concern those things which are naturally fitting to man and right in themselves, and not only because they have been constituted by law. St. Thomas, in the cited place. This natural rectitude is from the very nature of man, and therefore is most truly natural. “Of whatever things,” says St. Thomas in the cited place, “there is a determinate nature, there must be determinate operations which agree with that nature; for the proper operation of each thing follows its own nature. But it is clear that man’s nature is determinate. Therefore there must be some operations fitting to man in themselves.” Hence it is easy to determine many things which naturally fit man, both in order to himself, and in order to exterior things, and in order to other men, and in order to God, which are right in themselves. St. Thomas continues in the cited place: “According to the natural order the body of man is for the sake of the soul, and the lower powers of the soul are for the sake of reason, just as also in other things matter is for the sake of form, and instruments for the sake of the principal agent. But from that which is ordered to another, help ought to come to it, not some impediment. Therefore it is naturally right that the body and lower powers of the soul be so cared for by man that from this the act of reason and the good of reason itself be least impeded, and rather helped. But if it should happen otherwise, it will be naturally a sin. Therefore drunkennesses and feastings, and the disordered use of venereal things, through which the act of reason is impeded and is subjected to passions, which do not permit the free judgment of reason to exist, are naturally evil.... Moreover man naturally has this, that he uses lower things for the necessity of his life. But there is some determinate measure according to which the use of the aforesaid things is fitting to human life; and if this measure is passed over, it becomes harmful to man, as appears in the disordered taking of foods. Therefore some human acts are naturally fitting, and some naturally unfitting.... But it is natural to man that he be social. This is shown from the fact that one man alone does not suffice for all things which are necessary for human life. Therefore those things without which human society cannot be preserved are naturally fitting to man. Of this sort are preserving for each one what is his own and abstaining from injuries. Therefore there are some things in human acts naturally right.... Finally, those things by which each one tends to his own natural end naturally fit him; but those which stand contrariwise are naturally unfitting. Man is naturally ordered to God as to an end. Therefore those things by which man is led into the knowledge and love of God are naturally right; but those which are contrary are naturally evil for man. Therefore it is clear that good and evil in human acts are not only according to the positing of law, but according to the natural order. Hence it is that in Ps. 18:10 it is said that the judgments of God are true and justified in themselves. But by this is excluded the position of those saying that just and right things are according to law posited”; namely, in human acts there are some things right according to nature, and not only as if posited by law, as is had in the title of the chapter.

27. Whether morality, or moral goodness or malice, is found only in the interior act of the will, or also in the exterior act? — In an exterior act, a twofold moral goodness or malice can be distinguished. For first, the objective moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered, which that act has of itself, namely from its proper object and from the circumstances by which it is objectively affected, according to the right order of reason. Goodness or malice of this sort, which the exterior act has according to itself because of due or undue matter and due or undue circumstances, is derived from reason, according as that object and those circumstances exhibit the rectitude of reason or deviation from the right order of reason. This objective goodness or malice of the exterior act is prior to the goodness or malice of the act of the will. And thus the exterior act is the object of the will, insofar as it is proposed to the will by reason as a certain good apprehended and ordered by reason, or as departing from this order; and it causes moral goodness or malice in the will. Secondly, moral goodness or malice can be considered in the exterior act in order to the end, according as this exterior act is subject to the interior act of the will. For the end is the proper object of the will. And thus the character of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found prior in the act of the will, and from it is derived to the exterior act. Likewise, in so far as the exterior act consists in the execution of the work, it is an effect of the will and follows the will. The will then is compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause; whence the moral goodness or malice of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act as existing in the acting cause. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 1. Therefore “the goodness of the end from the will redounds into the exterior act, and the goodness of the matter and circumstances redounds into the act of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3.

28. Therefore the moral goodness or malice of the exterior act can be considered in the order of intention, as merely willed, as an object, and in the order of execution, insofar as the aforesaid act is commanded by the will, as execution or effect. In the first way, the goodness or malice of the exterior act gives moral goodness or malice to the interior act of the will, as the object specifying it. Therefore the goodness and malice which is in that act objectively is transferred into the act formally, so that the object has nothing objectively which is not in the act formally. Therefore the exterior act as object does not have any goodness or malice distinct from the goodness or malice of the interior act, since it is the same in both, with this difference, that it is objectively in the exterior act as in the object and motive of the will, and formally in the interior act as in the subject. In the second way, the exterior act has its moral goodness or malice from the act of the will, from which it has that it is voluntary and human. The exterior act, precisely as the execution or effect of the interior act, has no intrinsic moral goodness or malice, but is good or evil extrinsically, only denominatively from the goodness or malice of the interior act. “As from the healthy which is in the animal, healthy is derived to medicine and urine....; in this way from the goodness of the will is derived the goodness of the exterior act.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 3 ad 3. The reason is manifest, because formal morality is placed in a foreknown and freely willed conformity with the end and law, or with the rule of morals; and this free volition of the will is only in the interior act of the will itself.

29. Now the exterior act and the interior act of the will, as they are considered in the genus of morals, are one human act, St. Thomas, q. 20. a. 3. If the human act is thus considered adequately, the formal moral goodness or malice of the human act is intrinsically only in the interior act of the will, but in exterior acts only by a merely extrinsic denomination. For the morality of a human act, considered formally, is not found except in a free act, and freedom formally is only in the will. Likewise formal moral goodness is from order to the end. “But since the end is the proper object of the will, it is manifest that this character of good or evil which the exterior act has from order to the end is found first in the act of the will, and from it is derived into the exterior act.” St. Thomas, q. 20. a. 1. Whence it is clear that in the exterior act moral goodness of this sort, which is according to order to the end, depends entirely on the will. St. Thomas, ibid. a. 2. But that “goodness of the exterior act which it has from matter and circumstances is other than the goodness which is from the end; yet it is not other than the goodness of the will which it has from the very act willed, but is compared to it as its reason and cause.” St. Thomas, in the cited place, a. 4 ad 2. It is confirmed: “For however much the exterior act may seem good of itself and conformable to reason, if nevertheless it is commanded by an evil internal act, or by a depraved intention and choice, it is not good insofar as it is a human act. Therefore it is a sign that in the account of a human act it is good only by denomination from the interior act. The argument is similar because the exterior act, taken precisely and in itself, does not add formal moral goodness to man, nor does it make him more virtuous; for if we understand someone, thinking that he can perform an exterior act of virtue, to have an efficacious will of exercising such an act, he is right and virtuous, whether he can truly perform it or cannot, because virtue does not depend on a faculty, which can be lacking to us against our will, but on the will, supposing that the will is equal... This doctrine concerning external acts proceeds in the same way in acts of the intellect and of the sensitive appetite.” Suarez, D. 10, S. 1; Becanus, Tr. 1, c. 6.

30. Hence another question arises: whether the external act in some way adds morality to the internal act. — “First it must be said that the exterior act of itself does not bring an increase of goodness or malice, other things being equal, in the interior act: thus St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 4..... because the exterior act does not have goodness distinct from the interior act, and necessarily follows from it, if it is in our power; but if it is not in our power, it does not lessen the goodness of the will.... Secondly, it must be said that external action is sometimes necessary for the goodness of the will, or for such goodness; this also is what St. Thomas intends in that a. 4. For when it is in man’s power to execute an external action, he cannot have a perfect interior will unless he execute the exterior action, because the exterior act is the term and end of the interior act, and because an absolutely perfect will is one that works when it can.... Thirdly, it must be said that accidentally the exterior act can increase goodness or malice simply. Thus St. Thomas in the place cited above, and it is easily clear. For 1. on account of the exterior act a man often lasts and perseveres more in the interior act, indeed often also multiplies interior acts; and in this way it is morally worse to kill. 2. Because the exterior action itself both kindles the affection and thus contributes to the interior act, in which way vocal prayer is accustomed to contribute to interior devotion. 3. External actions are useful for moderating the passions and habituating the body, so that it may more easily serve justice.... It must also be added that good external acts are useful for the affection of satisfaction for the temporal punishment due for sin, because satisfaction is not taken only from goodness, but chiefly from the penality of the act; but the exterior act of itself brings its proper punishment and pain. Finally it must be added that exterior acts are necessary for certain effects of grace, which are conferred either ex opere operato or from special privilege, such as are the effects of the sacraments and the effects of martyrdom, and any others that are similar; because, since these effects do not depend on the mind alone of the one acting, they have been promised to one exercising such a work not only in affection but also in effect. And in the same way, conversely, evil external acts, or even their effects, are necessary for incurring certain punishments or censures which are not incurred through the interior act alone.” Suarez, D. 10, S. 2; Becanus, in the cited place. Hence the exterior act does not add goodness or malice to the interior act, but, as it were, extends and consummates it, or rather shows the perfection of the interior act. The matter concerns, as is clear, an interior act efficacious of itself. For if the interior act is inefficacious of itself, as, for example, to will to perform all possible good or all possible evil, one does not contract the same goodness or malice as if he were to carry out every possible good or evil. Cf. Commentary 4, nn. 7, 8.

31. The same St. Thomas says these things in the cited q. 20. a. 4: “It must be said that if we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has from the goodness of the end, then the exterior act adds nothing to goodness, unless it happen that the will itself according to itself becomes better in good things, or worse in evil things. And this indeed seems able to happen in three ways: in one way according to number, as when someone wills to do something with a good end or an evil one, and then indeed does not do it, but afterward wills and does it; the act of the will is doubled, and thus there is made a double good or a double evil. In another way as to extension: as when someone wills to do something with a good end or an evil one, and desists because of some impediment; but another continues the movement of the will until he completes the work. It is manifest that a will of this sort is more lasting in good or evil, and according to this it is worse or better. Thirdly, according to intensity; for there are certain exterior acts which, insofar as they are pleasurable or painful, are apt to intensify or lessen the will. But it is clear that the more intensely the will tends to good or evil, the better or worse it is. But if we speak of the goodness of the exterior act which it has according to matter and due circumstances, thus it is compared to the will as term and end, and in this way it adds to the goodness or malice of the will, because every inclination or movement is perfected in this, that it obtains the end or attains the term. Whence the will is not perfect unless it is such that it acts when there is opportunity. But if possibility is lacking, while the will exists as perfect, so that it would act if it could, the defect of perfection which is from the exterior act is simply involuntary. But the involuntary, just as it does not merit punishment or reward in doing good or evil, so also does not take away anything from reward or from punishment if a man involuntarily simply fails in doing good or evil.” Here the question concerns the goodness and malice of acts with respect to essential reward or punishment, for the exterior act adds to accidental reward, as the same Angelic Doctor says, 2 Dist. 40. a. 3. Cf. 1. 2. q. 13. a. 5 ad 1.

32. And in the same q. 20. a. 5, the Angelic Doctor, speaking of a following event, “whether an event of this sort adds something of goodness or malice to the exterior act,” responds: “It must be said that the following event is either forethought (namely foreseen and intended, either directly or indirectly, q. 73. a. 8 ad 1), or it is not. If it is forethought, it is manifest that it adds to goodness or malice. For when someone, thinking that many evils can follow from his work, nevertheless does not on this account leave it off, from this his will appears more disordered. But if the following event is not forethought, then a distinction must be made, because if it follows of itself from such an act, and as in most cases, according to this the following event adds to the goodness or malice of the act. For it is manifest that an act is better from its genus from which more goods can follow; and worse, from which more evils are apt to follow. But if it follows accidentally and as in fewer cases, then the following event does not add to the goodness or malice of the act. For judgment is not given concerning a thing according to that which is accidental, but only according to that which is of itself.” An effect following accidentally does not add goodness and malice to the interior act unless it is intended, or unless it is at least in some way foreseen and one can and ought to prevent it. An effect alone following of itself, even if it is not intended or foreseen, adds goodness and malice to the interior act, or rather is a sign of its perfection, because what follows an act of itself is virtually and implicitly willed.

33. The question is also raised: whether the same exterior act can be good and evil? — “It must be said that nothing prevents something from being one according as it is in one genus, and being multiple according as it is referred to another genus... And according to this nothing prevents some act from being one according as it is referred to the genus of nature, which is not one according as it is referred to the genus of morals... For continuous walking is one act according to the genus of nature, yet it can happen that there are several according to the genus of morals, if the will of the one walking is changed, which is the principle of moral acts. Therefore if one act is taken as it is in the genus of morals, it is impossible that it be good and evil by moral goodness and malice; and nevertheless, if it is one by unity of nature and not by unity of morals, it can be good and evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 20. a. 6.

34. But concerning the passions in particular it is asked: “Whether moral good and evil can be found in the passions of the soul? — It must be said that the passions of the soul can be considered in two ways: in one way, according to themselves; in another way, according as they are subject to the command of reason and will. Therefore, if they are considered according to themselves, namely insofar as they are certain movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is not in them moral good or evil, which depends on reason, as was said above, q. 19. a. 3. But if they are considered according as they are subject to the command of reason and will, thus there is in them moral good or evil. For the sensitive appetite is nearer to reason itself and to the will than are the exterior members, whose movements and acts nevertheless are morally good or evil according as they are voluntary. Whence much more the passions themselves, according as they are voluntary, can be called morally good or evil. But they are called voluntary either from the fact that they are commanded by the will, or from the fact that they are not prohibited by the will,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 24. a. 1, namely when they can and ought to be prohibited. Therefore it is not necessary that the passions always decline from the order of natural reason. Insofar as they are beyond the order of reason, they incline to sin; insofar as they are ordered by reason, they pertain to virtue, St. Thomas, ibid. a. 2. Hence the same Angelic Doctor says in article 3: “If by passions we simply name all movements of the sensitive appetite (and not only disordered movements), thus it pertains to the perfection of the human good that even the passions themselves be moderated by reason. For since man’s good consists in reason as in a root, that good will be more perfect the more it can be derived to the many things which fit man. Whence no one doubts that it pertains to the perfection of moral good that the acts of the exterior members be directed by the rule of reason. Whence, since the sensitive appetite can obey reason, as was said above, q. 17. a. 7, it pertains to the perfection of the moral or human good that even the passions themselves of the soul be regulated by reason. Therefore, just as it is better that man both will the good and do it by an exterior act, so also it pertains to the perfection of moral good that man be moved to good not only according to the will, but also according to the sensitive appetite, according to what is said in Ps. 83:8, My heart and my flesh have exulted in the living God, so that we take heart for the intellective appetite, but flesh for the sensitive appetite.” Therefore, just as exterior acts, so the passions can be considered in two ways: in one way according as they are in the genus of nature, and thus moral good or evil does not pertain to the species of the act or passion; in another way according as they are referred to the genus of morals, namely insofar as they participate something of the voluntary and of the judgment of reason, and in this way moral good and evil pertains to the species of the act or passion. Now, just as it has been said concerning exterior acts that they are good or evil according to themselves from the object, and that they are good or evil from the end, so it must be said concerning the passions. And as exterior acts are good or evil or indifferent from the object, because they bear before themselves something consonant with reason or discordant from it, or holding itself neutrally, as to pray to God and to help the poor man, theft and adultery, to walk and to speak: so in like manner some passions are consonant with reason, and some discordant, and some neutral, as mercy and shame, which is fear of a base thing; envy, which is sadness over another’s good; anger, which can be an appetite for ordered or disordered vengeance. Likewise, as exterior acts are morally good or evil from the end of the will, so also are the passions, as when someone from the judgment of reason chooses to be affected by some passion, so that, with the sensitive appetite cooperating, he may operate more promptly well or badly. And thus passion adds to the moral goodness or malice of the act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 24. a. 4; a. 3 ad 1. — Cf. the little work De Essentia boni malique moralis of Augustus Ferretti, who wrote excellently concerning the essence of morality against modern errors.