Chapter — Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts
Commentary VI: On Concupiscence
1.
- In the preceding Commentary there was discussion of the first impediment of the human act, namely of ignorance, which holds itself on the part of the intellect, which is the first principle of the human act. It must now be said in the present Commentary concerning concupiscence, the other impediment of the human act. For concupiscence holds itself chiefly on the part of the will, which is the second principle of the human act. Indeed ignorance takes away cognition of the intellect; but concupiscence chiefly affects the inclination of the will, at the same time affecting the cognition itself of the intellect.
2.
- By the name of concupiscence in this place is not understood that depraved tinder of cupidity by which we flee honorable things and are borne into illicit pleasurable things, Rom. 7:8, 23; but generally, any passion whatever of the sensitive appetite is understood, which is borne into pursuing the good proper to itself and into avoiding evil. Let us explain the several elements of this definition in a few words.
3.
- It is called any passion whatever; for concupiscence here is not taken for the special passion of the sensitive appetite, but generally for any motion of the sensible appetite. For concupiscence, properly speaking, is a special passion, and St. Thomas treats of it in 1. 2. qq. 30 and 31. After he treated of the passions of the soul in general, qq. 22-25, he then begins to treat of the passions of the soul in particular, namely of the passions of the concupiscible and irascible powers, qq. 26-48. But the special passion of the concupiscible power is concupiscence, according as it is distinguished from the other passions of the concupiscible power, namely from love and delight, and from their opposites, that is, hatred and sadness. “The pleasurable good,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 30. a. 2., “according to sense, is commonly the object of the concupiscible power; whence according to its differences the diverse passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished... But there is another account of the moving power of the end itself or good, according as it is really present and according as it is absent: for according as it is present it makes one rest in itself; according as it is absent it makes one be moved toward itself. Whence the pleasurable thing itself according to sense, insofar as it in some way adapts and conforms the appetite to itself, causes love; but insofar as being absent it draws to itself, it causes concupiscence; but insofar as being present it gives rest in itself, it causes delight. Thus therefore concupiscence is a passion differing in species both from love and from delight... The pleasurable good is not absolutely the object of concupiscence, but under the account of absent... For particular conditions of this kind diversify the species of passions, or even of the powers of the sensitive part, which regards particulars.”
4.
- Of the sensitive appetite, generally, according as it includes the concupiscible and irascible power; the distinction of which is from the object itself, according as namely it is either absolutely a sensible good, or a difficult and arduous good. “The object of the concupiscible power,” says the Angelic Doctor, 1. 2. q. 23. a. 1., “is sensible good or evil accepted simply, which is pleasurable or painful. But because it is necessary that sometimes the soul suffer difficulty or struggle in obtaining some such good, or in fleeing some such evil, insofar as this is in some way elevated above the easy power of the animal; therefore the good or evil itself, according as it has the account of arduous or difficult, is the object of the irascible power. Therefore whatever passions regard absolutely good or evil pertain to the concupiscible power, as joy, sadness, love, hatred, and the like; but whatever passions regard good or evil under the account of arduous, according as it is something obtainable or fleeable with some difficulty, pertain to the irascible power, as daring and fear, hope and things of this sort... The good insofar as pleasurable moves the concupiscible power. But if the good has a certain difficulty for obtaining it, from this very fact it has something repugnant to the concupiscible power. And therefore it was necessary that there be another power which would tend into it; and the account is the same concerning evils. And this power is the irascible. Whence consequently the passions of the concupiscible and irascible powers differ in species... To this end the irascible power has been given to animals, that the impediments may be removed by which the concupiscible power is prohibited from tending into its object, either on account of the difficulty of obtaining the good, or on account of the difficulty of overcoming evil. And therefore all passions of the irascible power are terminated at the passions of the concupiscible power. And according to this also the passions which are in the irascible power follow joy and sadness, which are in the concupiscible power.”
5.
- Of the sensitive appetite. For “there is a twofold delight: one which is in intelligible good, which is the good of reason. Another, which is in good according to sense. The first delight indeed seems to be of the soul only. But the second is of soul and body, because sense is a power in a bodily organ. Whence also good according to sense is the good of the whole composite. But the appetite of such delight seems to be concupiscence, which pertains at once both to the soul and to the body, as the very name of concupiscence sounds. Whence concupiscence, properly speaking, is in the sensitive appetite, and in the concupiscible power, which is denominated from it.” Hence it is clear that concupiscence is not the same as desire. “It must be said that desire can pertain more, properly speaking, not only to the lower appetite, but also to the higher. For it does not import some association in desiring as concupiscence does, but a simple motion into the thing desired.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 30. a. 1.
6.
- Into the good proper to itself, namely the pleasurable, sensible good apprehended by imagination. “To seek something under the account of a good pleasurable according to sense, which is properly to desire concupiscently, pertains to the concupiscible power.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 30. a. 1. ad 3. “Concupiscence is appetite of a pleasurable good. But something is pleasurable in two ways: in one way, because it is fitting to animal nature, as food and drink and other things of this kind. And concupiscence of a pleasurable thing of this kind is called natural. In another way something is said to be pleasurable because it is fitting according to apprehension: as when someone apprehends something as good and fitting, and consequently is delighted in it. And concupiscence of a pleasurable thing of this kind is called non-natural, and is more accustomed to be called cupidity. Therefore the first natural concupiscences are common to men and other animals, because to each there is something fitting and pleasurable according to nature; and in these all men agree... But the second concupiscences are proper to men, to whom it is proper to devise something as good and fitting beyond that which nature requires.”
7.
- Into pursuing the good proper to itself, and into avoiding evil. For the object of the concupiscible power according to the Angelic Doctor is good and evil; from appetite of good flight from evil is caused. “The objects of the concupiscible power are good and evil. But naturally good is prior to evil, because evil is the privation of good; whence also all passions whose object is good are naturally prior to passions whose object is evil: for because good is sought, therefore the opposite evil is rejected.” Moreover concupiscence, in the present question concerning its influence on the voluntary, as has already been said, is taken not in the stricter sense for the appetite of sensible good alone, but in the broader sense for any motion whatever of the sensible appetite, or for any passion whatever of this appetite, and insofar as generally it is “a motion of the appetitive sensitive power, which is from the imagination of good or evil.” St. Thomas, 3. D. 26. q. 1. a. 1.
8.
- The question is moved in the first place: whether concupiscence causes the involuntary? — Concupiscence does not cause the involuntary. For concupiscence rather does this, that something is voluntary, than that it is involuntary. “For something is called voluntary from this, that the will is borne into it. But through concupiscence the will is inclined to willing that which it desires.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7.
9.
- But concupiscence is one thing antecedent, another consequent. The former precedes the free act of the will, and consequently is stirred up merely naturally. The latter follows the free act of the will. The former draws and inclines reason and will. The latter overflows from the will. The former is not voluntary; the latter is voluntary either in itself, if the will deliberately wills and stirs it up, or in the cause, if it results naturally from a free act of the will. “The sensitive appetite,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6., “can have itself to free choice both antecedently and consequently. Antecedently indeed, according as passion of the sensitive appetite draws or inclines reason or will. Consequently, however, according as the motions of the higher powers, if they are vehement, overflow into the lower. For the will cannot be moved intensely into something without some passion being stirred up in the sensitive appetite.” Therefore concupiscence can be at once antecedent and consequent: antecedent in its beginning and consequent in its continuation, insofar as namely the consent of the will comes to it, fostering it. But since concupiscence by its own nature always inclines and impels to act, there is no consideration and distinction of concupiscence causing and concomitant.
10.
- Antecedent concupiscence diminishes the voluntary both in the account of the voluntary and in the account of the free. Wherefore an act proceeding from it is less voluntary under each account, the more intense that concupiscence is. The reason of the first part is that an act is voluntary insofar as it is from an intrinsic principle. But concupiscence is extrinsic to the will. Therefore an act proceeding from its impulse is less voluntary in the account of the voluntary. Hence St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6. ad 3., says: “It must be said that although the motion of the will is more intense when stirred up by passion, nevertheless it is not so proper to the will as if it were moved to sin by reason alone.” And in the body of the same article: “An act is sin insofar as it is voluntary and existing in us. But something is said to exist in us through reason and will. Whence the more reason and will do something from themselves, not from the impulse of passion, the more it is voluntary and existing in us; and according to this passion diminishes sin, insofar as it diminishes the voluntary.”
11.
- The reason of the second part is that an act is less voluntary in the account of the free, the less dependence it has on the part of the free will and advertence on the part of reason. But when the preceding passion is more vehement, the less is the dependence of this consequent act upon the will freely determining itself and upon reason considering. For the free will, the more it finds the soul already inclined by passion, the less it itself influences the determination of the consequent act. Then, although passion cannot directly influence judgment, nevertheless it can indirectly influence it in three ways: 1.º through a certain distraction, for sense is less attentive to individual things when it attends to many; 2.º through a certain contrariety, insofar as it inclines to things contrary to that which ought to be judged, and the soul becomes weak and feeble; 3.º through bodily alteration, for it perverts the phantasy, which does not furnish itself for the right operations of the intellect, as is seen in the insane and the furious from the vehemence of passions. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 7. ad 3., q. 10. a. 3., q. 73. a. 6. ad 2., q. 77. a. 1. 2. 3. 6. 7.; Suarez D. 3. S. 3. 4.
12.
- But although from antecedent concupiscence an act of the will is less voluntary, because it is not so proper to the will as if the will were moved by reason alone, nevertheless it becomes more intense and easier. And according as the passion is greater, by that much it renders the effort of the will easier. And thus soldiers from hope of glory, parents and friends from love of children and friends, bear any burdensome things pleasantly. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6. ad 3.
13.
- Consequent concupiscence presupposes an act more voluntary in proportion as it itself is more intense. The reason is that consequent concupiscence is stirred up in us consequently to the act of the will freely determining itself. Wherefore, whether it is stirred up naturally through a certain overflowing from the higher part into the lower, or is stirred up voluntarily, either indirectly through voluntary negligence and omission of repressing rising motions, or directly, with effort applied and studiously stirring up motions in the lower part, concupiscence, as consequent and not preceding the free act of the will whence it proceeds, cannot exercise any influence of causality upon it; nor can it increase or lessen the voluntary of which it is the effect, but it presupposes that same act of the will, which rather exercises influence upon it. And if the discussion again is of concupiscence which, whether voluntarily or naturally, is stirred up from the very act of the will, since an effect ought to be proportioned to its cause and cannot surpass it, consequent concupiscence does not diminish the voluntary, but rather increases it, insofar as namely it signifies and demonstrates a greater propensity and inclination of the will to the act. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 73. a. 6. ad 2., q. 77. a. 6.
14.
- “It must be said that the passions of the soul can have themselves to the judgment of reason in two ways: in one way antecedently; and thus, since they cloud the judgment of reason, upon which the moral goodness of the act depends, they diminish the goodness of the act. For it is more praiseworthy that someone do a work of charity from the judgment of reason than from the passion of mercy alone. In another way they have themselves consequently, and this in two ways: in one way by way of overflow, because namely when the higher part of the soul is moved intensely into something, the lower part also follows its motion; and thus passion existing consequently in the sensitive appetite is a sign of a more intense will; and thus it indicates a greater moral goodness. In another way by way of election, when namely man from the judgment of reason chooses to be affected by some passion, so that he may operate more promptly, with the sensitive appetite cooperating; and thus the passion of the soul adds to the goodness of the action.... It must be said that passion tending into evil, preceding the judgment of reason, diminishes sin; but consequent passion in one of the aforesaid ways increases it, or signifies its increase.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 24. a. 3. ad 1. 3. Therefore consequent concupiscence which arises from a merely natural resulting and overflowing of the higher part into the lower, renders, as is clear, that which proceeds from it voluntary, and more voluntary in the cause, the more intense it is, by this very fact that it depends upon the will. But it renders that less voluntary in itself, since it always in some way clouds reason and in some way impedes the free exercise of the will. St. Thomas, On Evil, q. 3. a. 10. But consequent concupiscence directly stirred up for acting, for example if someone deliberately stirs up hatred in himself against an enemy by turning over in his mind injuries received, so that he may desire vengeance more pertinaciously and execute it with greater boldness, renders that which proceeds from it more voluntary simply, because that passion directly and voluntarily stirred up is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger. “But this,” as St. Thomas observes, On Evil q. 3. a. 11., “is not to do good or to sin from passion, but rather to suffer passion from the election of good or evil.”
15.
- Whether concupiscence diminishes merit and demerit? — One must answer affirmatively concerning antecedent concupiscence; for it diminishes the voluntary in the account of the free, whence merit and demerit are taken. “Passion,” says St. Thomas, On Evil q. 3. a. 11., “preceding the motion of the will, diminishes the account of merit and demerit, because merit and demerit consist in election proceeding from reason. But passion clouds or binds the judgment of reason. But the purer the judgment of reason has been, the more perspicacious the election is for meriting or demeriting.” And 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6. ad 2: “Good passion, consequent upon the judgment of reason, increases merit. But if it precedes, so that namely man is moved to acting well more from passion than from the judgment of reason, such passion diminishes the goodness and praise of the act.” — But negatively one must answer concerning consequent concupiscence, since it is a sign of the magnitude of the affection of the will, and demonstrates its intensity. And thus St. Thomas, On Evil q. 3. a. 11., says “that he who gives alms with greater compassion merits more, and he who commits sin with greater lust sins more, because this is a sign that the motion of the will is stronger.” Cf. n. 10. 11. 13. 14.
16.
- It follows from what has been said that, if the discussion is of a will not obeying but resisting depraved concupiscence, the magnitude of concupiscence proceeding from a merely natural cause increases merit, and on the contrary the weakness of concupiscence from the same natural cause lessens merit; for a greater effort of the will is required against the former, a lesser against the latter. “Magnitude of concupiscence or weakness.... sometimes proceeds from a bodily cause; for certain persons from natural complexion are more prone to desiring concupiscently than others, and again certain persons have opportunities of delights inflaming concupiscence more ready than others. And such weakness of concupiscence diminishes merit, but magnitude increases it.” St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 155. a. 4. ad 2. But if the magnitude of concupiscence proceeds from the will itself, namely from its lesser effort and labor in the exercise of self-mortification and of virtues, and on the contrary the weakness of concupiscence proceeds from the great effort and labor of the will in acquiring holiness, then the greater concupiscence diminishes merit, and the lesser concupiscence increases merit, by reason of the aforesaid cause, namely of the lesser or greater labor and effort of the will. “But sometimes,” St. Thomas adds in the cited place, “weakness or magnitude of concupiscence proceeds from a praiseworthy spiritual cause, for example from the vehemence of charity or the strength of reason, as is in a temperate man. And in this way weakness of concupiscence increases merit by reason of its cause, but magnitude diminishes it.”
17.
- Whether passion diminishes sin? — R. “It must be said that sin essentially consists in an act of free choice, which is the faculty of will and reason. But passion is a motion of the sensitive appetite.... If therefore passion is taken according as it precedes the act of sin, thus it is necessary that it diminish sin. For an act is sin insofar as it is voluntary and existing in us. But something is said to exist in us through reason and through will. Whence the more reason and will do something from themselves, not from the impulse of passion, the more it is voluntary and existing in us. And according to this passion diminishes sin, insofar as it diminishes the voluntary. But consequent passion does not diminish sin, but rather increases it, or rather is a sign of its magnitude, insofar namely as it demonstrates the intensity of the will toward the act of sin. And thus it is true that the greater the lust or concupiscence with which someone sins, by so much the more he sins.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 6.
18.
- Hence it follows that sin is diminished the more, the more vehement the preceding passion is. “It must be said that it belongs to the account of sin that it be voluntary. But that is called voluntary whose principle is in the agent himself. And therefore the more the interior principle is increased, by so much also sin becomes graver; but the more the exterior principle is increased, by so much sin becomes lighter. But passion is a principle extrinsic to the will; but the motion of the will is an intrinsic principle. And therefore the stronger the motion of the will has been for sinning, by so much the sin is greater; but the stronger the passion has been impelling to sinning, by so much the sin becomes less.” St. Thomas, On Evil q. 3. a. 11. ad 3. Cf. n. 10. 11. 12.
19.
- But an act proceeding from consequent concupiscence is more voluntary and a greater sin, the greater that concupiscence is. “If under concupiscence there is also included the motion itself of the will, thus where there is greater concupiscence there is greater sin.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 73. a. 6. ad 2. Likewise concupiscence directly stirred up increases sin. For since it is voluntary, the greater it itself is, the greater was the voluntary from which it arose. And for the same reason greater merit is had in the voluntary restraining of concupiscence and in its lessening. Cf. n. 13. 14. 16.
20.
- Whether passion totally excuses from sin? — “It must be said that an act which from its genus is evil is totally excused from sin only according to this, that it is rendered totally involuntary. Whence if the passion is such as to render the following act totally involuntary, it totally excuses from sin; otherwise not totally.... Sometimes indeed passion is so great that it totally takes away the use of reason, as is clear in those who become insane on account of love or anger. And then, if such passion was voluntary from the beginning, the act is imputed to sin, because it is voluntary in its cause.... But if the cause was not voluntary, but natural, for instance when someone from sickness or from some cause of this kind falls into such passion, which totally takes away the use of reason, the act is wholly rendered involuntary, and consequently is totally excused from sin. But sometimes passion is not so great that it totally intercepts the use of reason; and then reason can exclude passion by turning aside to other thoughts, or prevent it from following its effect, because the members are not applied to work except through the consent of reason. Whence such passion does not totally excuse from sin.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 77. a. 7., q. 6. a. 7. ad 3. Cf. also q. 10. a. 3.
21.
- But the reason is that the will in its mode of acting depends upon the intellect. But the intellect can propose something to the will in two ways. First, from a sudden and simple apprehension, which then happens when, by means of the phantasy and the sensitive appetite, it suddenly apprehends some pleasurable good by which the appetite is affected, and proposes this to the will under the account only of a pleasurable good, and in no way under the account of evil. For then the will is determined to seeking this, and it is not in its power to seek and reject, because the intellect determinately proposes to it a good which it may seek, and does not at the same time propose to it an evil which it may reject. Secondly, from previous deliberation or use of reason, which then happens when the intellect not only apprehends some object, but at the same time sees in it the account of good and evil, and besides judges and discourses concerning the whole matter. For then the will can indifferently either seek that object on account of the account of good, or reject it on account of the account of evil, or finally cease from every act, because neither the good mixed with evil can necessitate it to seeking, nor the evil mixed with good can necessitate it to rejecting. Becanus, Tr. 1. C. 2. q. 10. n. 34. 35.
22.
- Whether the first motions of depraved concupiscence are always sins, and of what kind? — There can be no doubt that the first motions of depraved concupiscence are sins, and mortal sins, for the matter is grave, if, when they arise, the will in the subsequent time consents to them, and by consenting is morosely delighted in them, whether with a long delay, or a brief and very brief delay. For the act concerns a gravely base matter, and is fully deliberate; and that first motion of concupiscence, although it may have been stirred up wholly independently of the will, with the consent of the will coming to it, now begins to be a commanded act in its delay and permanence. Wherefore that delay is a voluntary delay.
23.
- Likewise there is no doubt that the first motions of depraved concupiscence naturally stirred up and independently of the will, which then according to its powers dissents from and resists them, are in no way sins. For the acts are wholly involuntary, and without the voluntary there is no sin. Indeed merit then belongs to the will resisting. “The first motion,” says St. Thomas, 2. Dist. q. 1. a. 4. ad 3., “does not have the account of fault except according as in some way it is in the power of the will. Whence as long as the will does not resist, it has the account of sin. But when the will now begins to resist, then man merits.”
24.
- Finally, if the will, when the first motion of concupiscence arises, neither consents nor dissents, but permits it, not prohibiting it, then a motion of this kind now has the account of sin, because in some way it is in the power of the will. For that motion is now not against and beyond the will, which indeed does not intend it, but at least permits it. But the sin is not mortal, but slight. For mortal sin consists in aversion from God, which cannot be had without reason turning itself away from God through deliberation, which aversion is not had here. Therefore that sin is not mortal, but venial. It is venial sin because it is disordered, with no excusing cause, to cease from all resistance and to do nothing in so dangerous a matter; and since this is not mortal, nevertheless it cannot be exempted from venial fault. “The first motion is a motion of sensuality preceding the deliberation of reason.... But it pertains to the nature of sensuality and of reason that a motion of sensuality which is without deliberation of reason cannot be mortal sin, because mortal sin is that which consists in aversion from God, to whom man cannot be converted except through reason; and consequently aversion from God, which constitutes mortal sin, cannot be except in reason.” St. Thomas, Quodl. 4. a. 22. Moreover the disorder which constitutes mortal sin is in the will, which wills evil. But here the will does not truly will, but permits; and to permit evil per se is not sin, or certainly is not mortal sin. For to will evil is from the perfect dominion of the will; to permit evil is only from its imperfect dominion, since it is only not to prohibit evil. “The will has complete dominion in some things, but incomplete in others. It has complete dominion in those acts which proceed from the command of the will, and these are acts following deliberation, which are ascribed to reason. But it has incomplete dominion in those acts which do not proceed through the command of reason, but nevertheless the will could impede them, so that thus in some way they are subject to the will, as to being impeded or not impeded; and therefore the disorder which happens in these acts causes the account of sin, yet of incomplete sin, and therefore in these acts sin is very slight and venial.” St. Thomas, 2. Dist. 24. q. 3. a. 2.
25.
- The doctrine of St. Thomas is the same in Quodl. 4. a. 21: “It must be said that motion imports a certain inclination to a term; and this inclination pertains to appetite in human acts. But in man there is a threefold appetite. One indeed is natural, according as the appetitive power pertains to the vegetative soul, as also the digestive, expulsive, and retentive power do. The second appetite is of sensuality, which is moved according to apprehension of sense. The third appetite is of the will, which is moved according to the judgment of reason. Sin which has the account of fault, of which we are now speaking, cannot exist except in a voluntary act, which namely is in some way in the power of the one sinning. But the act of the natural appetite is not subject to the command of reason, just as neither is the act of the other powers of the vegetative soul; and therefore fault cannot consist in the act of such an appetite, just as that a man hungers or thirsts is without fault; and the same must be said in other things of this kind. But an act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, because reason, preceding it, can command it or also impede it; and therefore such a motion can now have the account of fault; and if it follows the judgment of reason, it will also be able to be mortal sin, just as the motion of the exterior members commanded by reason. But if it precedes the judgment of reason, it is indeed sin, if it tends into something illicit, because it was in the power of man to restrain it; yet it is venial sin and very slight.... and this is called the first motion of sin. But the motion of the higher appetite, that is, of the will, following the judgment of reason, can now be mortal sin.”
26.
- But, practically speaking, grave sin is also present if, positive resistance having been omitted, someone is manifestly exposed to the danger of voluntary approval and consent; which can easily happen in a matter especially alluring. And as regards those who are not of fearful conscience, and who in so dangerous a temptation do nothing against it, it is greatly to be feared lest in reality they sin gravely. But it is one thing to resist positively, another to fight directly. To positive resistance belongs the mere dissent of the will, which indeed is not to be continually repeated if the temptation remains for a long time; but it suffices to flee to God with humble prayer. Direct attack consists in eliciting contrary acts of the contrary virtue; but indirect attack is had by turning the soul away from the thought of base things, and seriously occupying it with other honorable things. This indirect attack is especially to be applied in depraved thoughts and in temptations of luxury. For by turning the soul away from the thought of base things there is had an efficacious remedy for repelling those thoughts and temptations. Directly to will to attack them detains the soul in those things, which easily, far from driving away the temptation, can increase it, “because where there is greater solicitude, the imagination is fixed more upon such an object, and through imagination” depraved motions “are especially increased.” La-Croix, l. 5. n. 111.
27.
- Whether custom or habit increases the voluntary or the free, or diminishes it; and consequently whether it increases fault or merit, or diminishes it? — “It must be said that from custom and the habit acquired through it, it happens that the will is borne with greater promptness, because it operates from habit with greater facility and delight than without it, other things being equal. But indeed with greater effort we operate those things which we accomplish more easily and pleasantly; therefore in this way habit increases the voluntary, because an increase of the voluntary consists in this, that the will is borne with greater impulse. But concerning the free, it must be said, as a little before we were saying concerning the affection of the will, or concerning consequent concupiscence, that habit indeed per se and formally diminishes liberty, because by inclining the will more to the other part it diminishes its indifference; nevertheless morally and in order to moral effects it is not judged to diminish it, as long as that custom is free and voluntary, on account of the same reason, because a free disposition, as such, does not diminish the free. Whence it becomes probable, if custom and habit become involuntary through a contrary act, efficacious as much as is on the part of man, who repents that he has acquired such a custom or habit, and proposes to do as much as is in him to conquer it, then, I say, it is very probable that custom diminishes liberty and consequently fault, because such custom has been turned in some way into nature, and now it is not in the power of man to conquer it so quickly, and otherwise it is now involuntary, and therefore is not reputed as a free supposition, but as necessary.” Suarez D. 3. S. 3.; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 78. a. 2. 4. Cf. Commentary Fifth n. 30. 31.
28.
- Whether grace increases the voluntary or the free, or diminishes it? — “It must be said, speaking per se, that it increases the voluntary, because it moves and inclines the will to willing; and although grace is accustomed to be called an extrinsic principle, nevertheless, speaking per se, it moves either on the part of the object, drawing the will much more sweetly than concupiscence is accustomed to draw it... or on the part of the power through a habit infused in it, or through a vital motion of it, and proceeding intimately from it. But concerning the free, it can happen that grace sometimes diminishes it by inclining the will more to the other part; nevertheless this is not always necessary, for in this there is much difference between grace and concupiscence: for concupiscence moves to one thing under some account, by hiding or diminishing cognition of the same object under other accounts; but grace, speaking per se, illuminates and shows in the object every account of good and evil which can be considered in it, and inclines to pursuing it under the most perfect and supreme account of good, which it makes one weigh and esteem as it is worthy. And thus from the force of grace it is not necessary that liberty be diminished, although, as I have said, sometimes it can be diminished.” Suarez D. 3. S. 3. Cf. also Tr. 3. D. 5. S. 3. n. 18. Therefore in no way does grace take away liberty, but it perfects it.
29.
- Aptly Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter Libertas, 20 June 1888: “The power of divine grace, since it enlightens the mind and impels the will, strengthened with salutary constancy, always toward moral good, makes the use of native liberty more ready and at the same time more secure. And it is far removed from the truth that, when God intervenes, voluntary motions are less free; for the force of divine grace is inward in man and congruent with natural propensity, because it flows from him who is the author of our soul and will, by whom all things are moved fittingly to their nature. Indeed divine grace, as the Angelic Doctor warns, for this reason, that it proceeds from the maker of nature, is wonderfully born and apt for guarding each nature, and for preserving the habits, force, and efficacy of each.” And already before the same Leo XIII skillfully observed: “If to be able to fall away from good according to nature were the perfection of liberty, then God, Jesus Christ, the Angels, the Blessed, in all of whom that power is not, either would not be free, or certainly would be less perfectly free than man as wayfarer and imperfect. Concerning this matter the Angelic Doctor often disputes many things, from which it can be effected and compelled that the faculty of sinning is not liberty, but servitude. Most subtly that saying upon the words of Christ the Lord, John 8:34: He who commits sin is the servant of sin. Each thing is that which befits it according to nature. Therefore when it is moved by something foreign, it does not operate according to itself, but from the impression of another, which is servile. But man according to his own nature is rational. Therefore when he is moved according to reason, he is moved by his own motion and operates according to himself, which belongs to liberty; but when he sins, he operates beyond reason, and then he is moved as if by another, held by alien limits, and therefore: ‘he who commits sin is the servant of sin.’”