Chapter — Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts
Commentary VIII: On Force or Violence
1.
- Force or violence is called that which is from an extrinsic principle, against the inclination of the will, so that he who suffers force cannot do the contrary, and wholly resists.
2.
- That which is from an extrinsic principle against the inclination of the will; for the coerced and the violent are opposed to the natural and voluntary, which are said of that which is from an intrinsic principle according to proper inclination. Wherefore St. Thomas says: “what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. “Violence makes something to be against the will,” ibid. a. 5. Hence the will cannot inflict force or violence upon itself. Moreover, the difference appears between force or violence and fear: for, since force or violence is that which is from an extrinsic principle, it is not from the will, while, on the contrary, since fear is in the will itself, it is from the will, as conceiving fear.
3.
- So that he who suffers force cannot do the contrary: for if he can act against it, force or violence is now not had; for force or violence ought to be against the inclination of the will. But that which someone admits in himself, although he can remove it, certainly is not against the inclination of the will. “When someone is coerced by some agent, so that he cannot do the contrary, this is called necessity of coercion.” Thus St. Thomas, 1 p. q. 82. a. 1. Under this head force or violence can be distinguished as twofold, absolute and total, in a certain respect and partial, according as namely someone can in no way do the contrary, or can at least attempt and do something against it, for lessening the force and violence. Yet resistance altogether absolute and continuous to the coercion inflicted is not always required for avoiding fault, when namely on one side it would be useless, but on the other the matter is less dangerous. Thus martyrs led to the temples of pagans did not sin, although they walked on their own feet. But in every case one must resist as much as is required for averting proximate danger of sin and scandal, and injury to religion. Likewise someone can be excused from resistance to be opposed on account of fear of graver harm; nevertheless it is always necessary that internally, as much as he can, he resist sin by will. Wherefore, for bearing judgment concerning fault from omission of resistance, it must be considered not only whether someone could have resisted, but also whether he ought to have resisted. Therefore he who, resisting or acting contrariwise as much as he can, suffers force; or even resisting nothing and doing nothing contrary, because he can do nothing, because he is bound to nothing, cannot be called a cooperator and accomplice.
4.
- And wholly resists: for although force and violence inflicted from outside are such that someone can do nothing contrary, if nevertheless that repugnance of the will is lacking, he now does not suffer force and violence unwillingly. Hence again the difference between violence and fear is clear, because he who suffers force contributes nothing to that which is done through force and violence; but “to that which is done through fear the will of the one fearing contributes something.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 6. ad 1. And since interior repugnance of the will of this kind can be total, and can also be not altogether full, hence again under this head also force and violence can be distinguished as absolute and in a certain respect. “Something,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5., “can be called voluntary in two ways: in one way according to action, as when someone wills to do something; in another way according to passion, namely when someone wills to suffer from another. Whence when an action is inflicted by someone exterior, the will of suffering remaining in him who suffers, it is not simply violent, because although he who suffers does not contribute by acting, nevertheless he contributes by willing to suffer. Whence it cannot be called involuntary.”
5.
- From what has been said it follows that violation is voluntary for a woman if, when she can repel the invader of her chastity, she does not repel him; or if, when she cannot repel him, she does not resist the force by her will, and voluntarily admits him, or at least does not resist him in every way in which she can. On the contrary, violation would be altogether involuntary for a woman if she could in no way resist the invader of her chastity and by her will wholly resisted him. Wherefore coercion can be in a certain respect in two ways, objectively and subjectively. Objectively, if the force of the one coercing truly is not so great that it cannot be repelled or at least weakened by the resistance of the one suffering. Subjectively, if, although the coercion can neither be repelled nor weakened, nevertheless someone according to his powers does not resist it, nor wholly resists it by his will. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 16.
6.
- Now force or violence cannot be inflicted upon the will as regards its own acts. “As regards the proper act itself (namely elicited) of the will, violence cannot be inflicted upon it. And the reason of this is that an act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an interior cognoscitive principle.... But what is coerced or violent is from an exterior principle.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. Indeed, if acts of the will are elicited by the will itself, as by an active intrinsic principle, since the will is their active intrinsic principle, the same acts cannot be from an extrinsic, violent principle; for violent is that which is from an extrinsic principle, with the thing suffering not contributing force. “No one can will something unwillingly, because one unwilling to will cannot will.” St. Anselm, On Free Choice, cap. 6. Nevertheless, in the common mode of speaking, force is said to be inflicted upon the will when force is applied so that the purpose of the will is changed, which indeed cannot happen without a proper act of the will.
7.
- Hence it is clear that in a twofold sense acts elicited by the will can be understood to be coerced: namely first, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by an active principle, which cannot be; secondly, so that they are called violent or coerced by violence or coercion as by a motive. For just as fear can move or impel someone to doing something which otherwise he would not do, so also external force and coercion. Becanus, Tr. 1. C. 2. q. 10. n. 40.
8.
- “As regards acts commanded by the will, the will can suffer violence, insofar as through violence exterior members can be impeded from executing the command of the will.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 4. But the will can suffer violence in the exterior members, although an explicit command of the will is not properly had, as, for example, if someone is seized against his own will, bound hand and foot, thrust into prison, etc. — And this is valid not only as regards exterior members, but also as regards interior faculties. For it is clear that the will not only can command the hand, for example, not to subscribe one’s own name in the promissory note of a fictitious creditor, and that hand, seized by that man by force, must subscribe; but it can also command the intellect to think and consider some thing, and the distracted intellect is carried away to think about other things; it can command the sensible appetite to obey reason, and that appetite may be moved against reason. Likewise an extrinsic cause, for example a demon, can stir up phantasms in the imagination against the will, stir up sensible motions in the sensible appetite, with the will likewise resisting, etc. Cf. Suarez D. 2.; Lessius on q. 6. a. 4.; St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 80.
9.
- Commanded acts, as is drawn from the very definition of coercion and the notion of a commanded act, indeed cannot be called coerced in relation to the faculty physically eliciting them, but only morally in relation to the will commanding them. For the rest, no act which happens without the command of the will can properly be called commanded. But the will cannot be coerced to the commanded acts of other powers. For the will cannot command acts of other powers except through an act elicited by itself. But it cannot be coerced to an act elicited by itself. Therefore it cannot be coerced so that it commands acts of other powers.
10.
- Indeed the will itself can command an act against the natural inclination of the faculty, as when someone bends the members against their natural flexibility. That commanded act, although it is violent in a certain respect, nevertheless is not simply violent. For since the part exists on account of the whole, the part must not be viewed only according to itself, but chiefly according to its order to the whole. Hence what is violent to the part according to itself is not violent to it according to its order to the whole. “It must be said that, as the Philosopher says, Physics, book 8, text 27, the motion of an animal, by which sometimes an animal is moved against the natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, nevertheless is in some way natural to the animal, to which it is natural that it be moved according to appetite; and therefore this is not violent simply, but in a certain respect. And similarly it must be said when someone bends the members against natural disposition; for this is violent in a certain respect, namely as regards the particular member, but nevertheless not simply as regards the man himself.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5. ad 3.
11.
- Violence, as regards the act to which it coerces, causes the involuntary as such in a contrary way. For “Violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, as also to the natural. For it is common to the voluntary and the natural that each be from an intrinsic principle. And on account of this, just as in things which lack cognition, violence makes something against nature, so in cognizing things it makes something to be against the will. But what is against nature is said to be unnatural; and similarly what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Whence violence causes the involuntary,” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5.; violence simply causes the involuntary simply; violence in a certain respect causes the involuntary in a certain respect; not indeed as regards elicited acts, but as regards commanded acts. For only as regards commanded acts, and not also as regards elicited acts, can the will suffer violence. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 6. a. 5. ad 1.
12.
- Wherefore, when some passion is simply violent, because namely the force inflicted upon it is irresistible, and someone resists and repels by will in every way in which he can, it is simply and contrarily involuntary, and therefore not human, nor imputable. But when it is only violent in a certain respect, because namely it was not altogether unconquerable, and according to his powers someone does not resist and repel it by his will, then the account of the voluntary is not taken away, and therefore neither the account of a human and imputable act, but it is only diminished according to the greater or lesser force inflicted, according to the greater or lesser resistance and repugnance. St. Alphonsus, l. 5. n. 18.