Chapter — Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts
Commentary XI: On the Object of Human Acts
1.
- As has already been said, the morality of human acts, and their moral goodness or malice, is from relation to the ultimate end and law of human life, from fittingness or unfittingness with the same end and law. Moreover this relation, this fittingness or unfittingness, can arise intrinsically in a human act from a threefold head, namely from the object of the same act, from the end, and from the circumstances. Hence it is commonly accustomed to be said that the object, the end, and the circumstances are the three sources of morality in a human act, and that a human act takes its moral goodness or malice from this threefold head, namely its particular, specific, and individual goodness or malice; for not all good acts are in the same species, nor likewise all evil acts in the same species. But the object, the circumstances, and the end can have order, and a diverse order, to the ultimate end and law of man. And morality consists in this order of human acts to the ultimate end and law.
2.
- By the object of a human act is not here understood whatever is presented to the will; for thus both the end and the circumstances would also be its object. Rather, the object is understood as that thing which someone immediately or directly and of itself wills. — The object is not considered here physically, namely as it is some existing thing. Concerning the same object physically considered, moral acts diverse in species can be concerned. Concerning the same wife, for example, there can be an honorable conjugal act and a base act of adultery. The object is considered here morally, namely as it falls under the rule of morals, or law, commanding, prohibiting, permitting. And thus the object of theft is not another’s thing precisely as it is a thing, but insofar as right reason forbids that it be taken away against the owner’s will. Hence the Angelic Doctor says, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8: “A human act, which is called moral, has its species from the object in relation to the principle of human acts, which is reason.” And ibid. a. 2 ad 1, he says, “it must be said that although exterior things are good in themselves, nevertheless they do not always have due proportion to this or that action.” And ibid. a. 5 ad 3: “The conjugal act and adultery, according as they are compared to reason, differ in species and have effects differing in species, because one of them merits praise and reward, the other blame and punishment. But according as they are compared to the generative power, they do not differ in species. And thus they have one effect according to species.” And q. 19. a. 2 ad 3: “It must be said that the good is represented by reason to the will as object, and insofar as it falls under the order of reason it pertains to the genus of morals, and causes moral goodness in the act of the will.” Cf. q. 18. a. 5; S. q. 41. a. 3 ad 5.
3.
- Human acts take their first and essential moral goodness or malice from the object. — The reason is that acts are intrinsically specified from the object. Therefore, as they have species from the object, so they also have goodness and malice. “The good and evil of an action,” says St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 2, “just as also of other things, is considered from the fullness of being, or from its defect. But the first thing which seems to pertain to the fullness of being is that which gives species to the thing. But just as a natural thing has its species from its form, so an action has species from its object, just as motion also from its term. And therefore, just as the first goodness of a natural thing is considered from its form, which gives species to it, so also the first goodness of a moral act is considered from a fitting object. Whence it is also called by some good from its genus, for example to use one’s own thing. And just as in natural things the first evil is if a generated thing does not obtain its specific form, for example if a man is not generated, but something in place of a man, so the first evil in moral actions is that which is from the object, as to take another’s things. And it is called evil from its genus, genus being taken for species, in that manner of speaking by which we call the human genus the whole human species.” And q. 18. a. 5: “Every act has species from its object.” And q. 19. a. 1: “But the difference of species in acts is according to objects.” Likewise ibid. a. 2: “The goodness of the will depends on that one thing alone which of itself makes goodness in an act, namely on the object, and not on the circumstances, which are certain accidents of the act.” For the first source of morality in a human act is its object. From the object, as from a formal principle, the human act has its being, and the first thing that occurs in each thing is its being.
4.
- Nor indeed is it valid to object that the first and essential moral goodness is to be taken from the end, which is the first foundation of all morality, and because every willed object is willed for the sake of the end, and consequently the end is willed before the object. For the human act indeed regards first the end, but the end of the work, which is the intrinsic end and coincides with the object itself, which consequently is ordered by that intrinsic end to the ultimate end, and orders the human act first and essentially to that same ultimate end.
5.
- In order that an act be morally evil, it suffices that the malice be indirectly, virtually, or implicitly willed in another thing to which it is annexed. The reason is that malice cannot be intended otherwise. No one operates intending evil; but someone does not seek evil except by reason of some good which he apprehends in it. Therefore it suffices that someone seek in a thing the pleasurableness to which he knows malice to be annexed.
6.
- But in order that an act be morally good, it is required that goodness be formally and directly willed in itself, at least in the act exercised. The reason is that honorableness is appetible in itself. Therefore right reason dictates that it is to be sought in itself. But it is not necessary that someone intend honorableness in a signate act, but it suffices that someone intend that which he sees to be honorable. And thus it is not necessary that one giving alms intend its honorableness, but it suffices that he wish to relieve the misery of his neighbor. “Evil occurs,” says St. Thomas, q. 19. a. 7 ad 3, “from singular defects, but good from a whole and complete cause. Whence whether the will is of that which is evil according to itself and under the aspect of good, or is of good under the aspect of evil, it is always evil. But in order that the will be good, it is required that it be of good under the aspect of good, that is, that it will the good and on account of the good.”
7.
- Whether an act is good if the object is good, but the end evil? — R. In the negative. For he who acts for an evil end, although he wills the good, nevertheless wills it under the aspect of evil, and therefore as it is willed by him it is evil. The honorableness of the means is then in no way truly sought, but only the means of attaining a depraved end is sought. “When someone wills to give alms on account of vain glory, this is one act of the will, and this whole act is evil, although it does not have malice from everything that is in it.” St. Thomas, 2 D. 38. q. 1. a. 4 ad 4; 1. 2. q. 19. a. 7. And St. Alphonsus says: “If the object is good, but the end of the one operating is evil, the human act is wholly evil from the malice of the end, which destroys every goodness.” Tr. de Act. hum. n. XXXVIII; Suarez, D. 6, S. 1, 2; D. 8, S. 1, n. XIII.
8.
- Whether an act is good if the object is evil, but the end good? — R. In the negative. And indeed the Apostle condemns those saying: “Let us do evils that good things may come.” Rom. 3:8. But the reason is that the intention of a good end, as extrinsic to the willed object itself, if this is evil, does not prevent someone from in reality willing evil. Suarez, D. 4; D. 8, S. 1, n. XX ff.