Chapter — Bucceroni, Commentaries on Human Acts
Commentary XIII: On the Circumstances of Human Acts
1.
- By circumstances of a human act are understood all those accounts which are accessory to the willed object, and are as accidents of the substance of the act, and are willed only concomitantly or consequently. “The name of circumstance,” says St. Thomas, q. 7. a. 1, “is derived to human acts from those things which are in place to human acts. But in local things something is said to stand around which is indeed extrinsic to the thing, yet touches it itself or approaches it according to place. And therefore whatever conditions are outside the substance of the act, and nevertheless touch the human act in some way, are called circumstances. But what is outside the substance of a thing, while pertaining to the thing itself, is called its accident. Whence the circumstances of human acts must be called their accidents.” As with the object, so circumstances are not considered here insofar as they are certain accidents physically affecting the act, but insofar as they are accidents of a human act, morally affecting it in its moral being, already constituted from the object. In its moral being, already constituted from the object, because if it gave the first and essential moral species, it would no longer be a circumstance, but would pass over into the condition of object and essential difference. Morally affecting, that is, insofar as they pertain to morals. For indeed it makes no difference to the moral being of the act that someone, for example, gave a slap to another or stole with the right hand or the left. But jurists and theologians consider circumstances differently. For the former consider them rather insofar as they disturb society; the latter, insofar as they offend God more gravely. Cf. Suarez, Tr. 2, D. 5.
2.
- Human acts also take their moral goodness and malice from circumstances. For since they tend not to an abstract but to a concrete object, or to an object determined by its individuating circumstances, as they take specific moral goodness and malice from the object, so also they take accidental moral goodness and malice from circumstances; and from them they put on various accidental qualities: just as man has the account of his species from the soul, but something accidental belongs to an individual man according to his individual accidents. And indeed, since good is convertible with being, just as being is said according to substance and according to accident, so also good is attributed to something both according to its substantial being and according to its accidental being, both in natural things and in moral actions. Therefore, just as “in natural things there is not found the whole fullness of perfection which is due to them from substantial form, which gives species, but much is superadded from supervening accidents, as in man from figure, from color, and so concerning others, and if any of these is lacking for a decent relation, evil follows; so also it is in action. For the fullness of its goodness does not consist wholly in its species, but something is added from those things which come upon it as certain accidents. And things of this sort are due circumstances. Whence, if something is lacking which is required for due circumstances, the action will be evil.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 3, 9.
3.
- For indeed a human act takes goodness or malice from the object for this reason, that the object states a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason. But circumstances also can import a relation of fittingness or unfittingness to right reason; thus, for example, it is not only unfitting to reason to steal, but also to steal in a sacred place. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.
4.
- “Thus, therefore, in a human action goodness can be considered in four ways. One indeed according to genus, namely insofar as it is an action, because as much as it has of action and entity, so much it has of goodness. Another according to species, which is taken according to a fitting object. The third according to circumstances, as according to certain accidents. But the fourth according to the end, as according to relation to the cause of goodness.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4. “Nothing prevents an action having one of the aforesaid goodnesses from lacking another, and according to this it happens that an action which is good according to its species, or according to circumstances, is ordered to an evil end, or conversely. Nevertheless an action is not good simply unless all the goodnesses concur, because any singular defect causes evil; but good is caused from an integral cause.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 4, body and ad 3.
5.
- Therefore a human act can have a threefold moral goodness or malice, either within the same species or even of a diverse species. Thus, for example, if someone were to steal a sacred thing so that he might give it as a gift to a prostitute for obtaining fornication from her, such an act from the object would be theft, from the circumstance of the sacred thing sacrilege, from the end fornication; and therefore it would have a threefold malice diverse in species. But the intrinsic and essential moral goodness or malice of the act is taken from the object. For from the object the will is first and of itself, or directly, moved to the act. Hence although, in order that a human act be good simply, it is required that it have no evil circumstance, nevertheless it is not required that it always have proper objective circumstances from which it receives accidental goodness or an increase of goodness, as is clear in an act concerning an altogether simple object, such as the love of God. Objective circumstances are meant, or circumstances on the part of the object, for at least some circumstances on the part of the act itself are always found which confer on it some goodness or malice. And thus always, at least morally speaking, which is enough in the present matter, there is in the act some intensity, pertaining to the circumstance how, by reason of which the act has some goodness or malice which can be called accidental, insofar as the species of the act could be preserved without it. But in order that circumstances confer their moral goodness or malice on the act, they must be willed either after the manner of an object, or at least after the manner of an act, because an object does not confer moral goodness or malice on a human act except insofar as it is intended and willed. Objective circumstances, that is, those which hold themselves on the part of the object, must be willed after the manner of an object, because circumstances of this sort affect the object itself, and the act indivisibly attains the object, not as if naked, but as if clothed with its own circumstances. But circumstances which hold themselves on the part of the act must be willed either after the manner of an object, if that circumstance is extrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance who; for the one operating can regard himself as the object of his will and will to apply the dignity or condition of his person to the work; or after the manner of an act, if that circumstance is intrinsic to the act itself, as, for example, is the circumstance how or when. And thus, in order that the goodness or malice of the act of the will be increased from intensity or duration, it is enough that the intensity and duration be voluntary after the manner of an act, namely insofar as the intense, lasting act itself is voluntary, etc. Cf. St. Thomas, C. G. l. 3, c. 138; 1. 2, cited places; Suarez, D. 4, D. 5, D. 6, S. 3.
6.
- Whether a circumstance can intrinsically change the nature of the exterior work and of the interior act? — R. In the affirmative. The reason is that a circumstance is intrinsic to the work itself or to the act itself, but by no means extrinsic, as is the end of the one operating with respect to the exterior work. Therefore it can modify the external work itself and the internal act. For not every circumstance always modifies the external work in such a way that it also intrinsically changes its nature. And thus, if a pastor recites the breviary at a time when he ought to minister the sacraments to a dying person, the intrinsic nature of the recitation of the breviary is not changed. Whence it is enough also to confess only the aforesaid omission of the administration of the sacraments. Nor indeed is that intrinsic modification to be understood in such a way that an external work, indifferent, good, or evil from its own intrinsic nature and in such a species by reason namely of the object properly, becomes from indifferent, by its nature, good or evil, from evil good, from good evil, or in another species. For since a circumstance is something accessory to the object, if the object, by reason of itself, is indifferent or good or evil and in such a species, it remains indifferent, good, evil, and in such a species under that respect, although intrinsically it can also become evil, be changed into evil, and assume another species of evil by reason of the circumstance. Thus, for example, the action of eating of itself is indifferent; but to eat on a fast day after another meal has been taken is a grave sin, and therefore the action is evil not by reason of eating, but by reason of the fast day, and by this circumstance of time it becomes evil. To use marriage is an honorable action; but to use marriage after a vow of chastity is a gravely sinful action, not by reason of the use itself of marriage, but of the vow; and by this circumstance of the vow it is changed from good into evil. To steal is an evil action against justice; but to steal a sacred thing is an action evil also against religion from that circumstance of the sacred thing, whence to the malice of theft is added the malice of sacrilege.
7.
- Now there are certain circumstances which change the nature of the work or act merely accidentally, namely within the same species, they increase or diminish moral goodness or malice; and therefore they are called aggravating or diminishing. Circumstances of this sort are all those which do not have goodness or malice according to themselves, but through order to another condition of the act which has that goodness or malice according to itself. Whence they increase or lessen the aforesaid goodness or malice. And thus, for example, the intensity and remission of an act, the long or short delay of an act, do not have moral goodness or malice according to themselves, but only through order to a good or evil act, of which consequently they constitute only an accidental diversity. Thus also to take something in a greater or lesser quantity does not of itself regard the order of reason in good or evil, but presupposes some other condition through which the act has malice or goodness, for example this, that it is another’s, which according to itself is repugnant to reason. Whence to take another’s property in a greater or lesser quantity does not diversify the species of sin. Circumstances which, by aggravating a sin, render it mortal from venial are called aggravating infinitely.
8.
- Of aggravating circumstances, some aggravate notably, others lightly. A circumstance is judged to aggravate notably in quantitative matter, or matter which consists in number, weight, and measure, when, taken separately and separated from the act, it would suffice for mortal sin; as one who, beyond five or six lire constituting in the case a mortal sin, should steal another five or six, namely ten or twelve. But in other matters it would be judged to aggravate notably when it notably exceeds the ordinary manner of sinning in matters of this sort, as if someone should spend the whole night in impurities with a woman, if someone should persevere for months and years in fraternal hatred, if someone should kill an enemy by cutting him limb by limb, etc. If neither of these occurs, it is judged to aggravate lightly, as that a thief steals seven or eight lire in the same case of grave matter of five or six lire, or that after a quarrel someone, being angry, remains for a little while in hatred. Billuart, De Act. hum., Diss. 4, art. 2, § 2.
9.
- But there are other circumstances which essentially change the nature of the work and act and are called those changing the species. Circumstances of this sort are those which according to themselves regard a special order of reason. Thus, for example, to take another’s property has species from the character of what is another’s; for from this it is constituted in the species of theft. And if beyond this the character of place or time is considered, it will have itself in the character of a circumstance. But because reason can also order concerning place or time and other things of this sort, it happens that the condition of place concerning the object is taken as according to itself contrary to the order of reason; for example, that reason orders that injury is not to be done to a sacred place. Whence to take something belonging to another from a sacred place adds a special repugnance as regards the order of reason. And therefore the place which previously was considered as a simple circumstance is now considered as a principal condition of the object repugnant to reason.
10.
- Nor indeed is it repugnant that a moral act be found constituted in multiple species. For a natural being cannot be except in only one species, because its being is physically determined; nor can there be physically a process of nature into infinity, whence it is necessary to stop at some ultimate form from which the specific difference is taken, after which there cannot be another specific difference. And hence it is that in natural things that which is an accident of some thing cannot be taken as a difference constituting species, since it comes upon a thing already constituted in its species. But a moral being can be constituted in multiple species, for the species of moral acts are constituted from forms according as they are apprehended by reason. But the process of reason is not determined to one thing; rather, when anything whatever has been given, it can proceed further. And therefore what in one act is taken as a circumstance superadded to the object which determines the species of the act can again be taken by ordering reason as a principal condition of the object determining the species of the act. And thus in theft, if the mere account of place is considered, it has itself as a circumstance; but if that account of a sacred place, for example, is considered as contrary to ordering reason, because reason orders the reverence due to a sacred place and that no injury be done to it, then that account is no longer considered as a mere circumstance, but as a certain principal condition of the object; whence, as from the object, so also from it the act receives species, as though from a certain specific difference of it.
11.
- Hence St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 10 ad 2, says: “a circumstance, remaining in the character of circumstance, since it has the character of an accident, does not give species; but insofar as it is changed into a principal condition of the object, according to this it gives species.” For indeed since an act, as the whole that it is, tends to the object, it is indeed specified by the object. But since it tends to a concrete object, it also attains its circumstances, and from them itself puts on various accidental qualities. But when those circumstances import some consonance or dissonance with reason, and are changed into a certain principal condition of the object, then the act, which attains the object as it is, namely according to that condition which it really has, and is specified by the object, also takes species from that condition of the object. Namely that circumstance, constituting the principal condition of the object, itself also becomes the object of the act, so that there is, as it were, a twofold act, or one act virtually twofold: one concerning the object of the act, the other concerning the object of the circumstance, as appears in theft in a sacred place; namely the taking of another’s thing, the object of the act of theft, and the injury inflicted on the sacred place, the object of the circumstance of theft. And thus the principle still stands: that an act is specified by the object; for in truth there is a twofold object which is attained by the act: since the object here is not simply this or that thing, but according as it bears relation to the order of reason; moreover both the object of the act properly such, and the circumstance of that object, will be able to be consonant with or discordant from the order of reason.
12.
- Cajetan aptly says on q. 18. a. 10 and 11: “Notice and consider diligently that just as in natural things certain accidents are forms according to themselves, such as whiteness and sweetness, but certain others are only conditions of presupposed forms, as more, less, greater, strongly, quickly, and other things of this sort; so in morals circumstances are twofold: some are goodnesses or malices according to themselves, as are all acts of virtues and vices; some are only conditions of supposed virtues or malices, as greater and less, more and less, and the like. The difference between these circumstances is manifest, because the latter never make an act good or evil, although they increase or diminish goodness or malice. But the former make an act good or evil; and the reason is ready at hand, because the former of themselves add goodness or malice, the latter do not. Again, the difference between them is that the former according to themselves are certain species of morals having their own objects, fitting or unfitting to reason, as is clear concerning theft done in a sacred place. For to the act of theft is joined injury of a sacred place, which has its proper species from the sacred place, as an object for reason, as suffering injury: for this object is according to itself discordant from reason. But the latter are not according to themselves species of morals, nor do they have their own objects; and from this it follows that the former give species to the act which they circumstantiate, since the act is concerned with that object of the circumstance.”
13.
- The matter can still be explained otherwise. “It must be said that according to its substance something cannot be in two species, of which one is not ordered under the other. But according to those things which come to a thing, something can be contained under diverse species. As this apple according to color is contained under this species, namely of white, and according to odor under the species of sweet-smelling. And similarly an act which according to its substance is in one species of nature can, according to supervening moral conditions, be referred to two species.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 8 ad 1.
14.
- What, generally, are circumstances changing the species? — “A circumstance is sometimes taken as an essential difference of the object, according as it is compared to reason; and then it can give species to a moral act. — And this must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from goodness into malice; for a circumstance would not make an act evil except through this, that it is repugnant to reason.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 18. a. 6 ad 4. This same thing must be whenever a circumstance changes an act from indifferent into good or evil, by giving namely the first and essential species of goodness or malice. — Thus, for example, if someone after a vow of chastity should use marriage, from that circumstance of the vow the act is changed from goodness into malice; if someone for the sake of recreation wished to ride in a church, or to hold a wedding banquet in a church, or to eat a small quantity on a fast day after several other small meals; from the circumstance of place and fast the act becomes evil from indifferent, and is constituted in a determinate species of malice. — For indeed, from the fact that a circumstance according to itself is repugnant to or fits reason, it imports malice or goodness according to itself, and bears before itself an object repugnant to or fitting to reason; and through this it places in its proper species the act which it changes into evil from good, or changes into good or into evil from indifferent. For the constitution of an act in the being of evil or good is from the object. But it is clear that the changing of an act from good into evil, from indifferent into evil or good, is a constitution in the being of evil or good.
15.
- From what has been said it is clear, 1.º that circumstances changing the species can be threefold: because they give to the act a new species of goodness or malice beyond the preceding species from the object; because they change the act from good into evil; because they give to the act its first moral goodness or malice. 2.º There are two general rules concerning circumstances giving species to moral acts. The first is that whenever a circumstance makes an act evil from good, or good or evil from indifferent, it gives species to the act. The second is that whenever a circumstance regards a special, of itself proper order of reason, it again gives species to the act. But it regards a special proper order of reason when it of itself exhibits something congruent with or discordant from reason. St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 72. a. 8, 9; q. 73. a. 7; q. 88. a. 5; De Malo, q. 2. a. 6 ad 2, a. 8.
16.
- Whether an act is good if the circumstance is evil? R. 1.º In the affirmative, if the question concerns one and the same act in the genus of nature, and one which is multiple in the genus of morals; for example, someone chants the canonical hours in choir, or sings the conventual Mass, and at some time during the singing consents to vain glory concerning his beautiful voice, etc. The reason is that then an evil circumstance of this sort is altogether extrinsic to the good act itself, for example to the celebration of the divine offices, etc. And thus in the celebration of Mass, a priest consecrating in the state of grace places a good act; then, gravely sinning by adhering to a base thought and sacrilegiously receiving Communion, he places an evil act. — 2.º In the negative, if the question concerns one and the same act of the will in the genus of morals. The reason is that the act of the will which embraces all these things together, namely the object and circumstances, is one most simple act, and therefore, if it is not good on every side, it will be evil. “And therefore,” says St. Thomas, 2 D. 36. q. un. a. 5, “it happens that an act has goodness from matter and yet be done badly because of undue circumstances.” And in 1. 2. q. 18. a. 1, an act of this sort is called by the Holy Doctor good in a certain respect and evil in a certain respect; and generally, insofar as it falls short of goodness, so it is called evil: “for example, if there be lacking to it either a determinate quantity according to reason, or a due place, or something of this sort.” And q. 19. a. 2 ad 2, he says: “it must be said that, supposing that the will is of the good, no circumstance can make it evil. Therefore what is said, that someone wills some good when he ought not, can be understood in two ways. In one way, so that this circumstance is referred to the thing willed. And thus the will is not of good, because to will to do something when it ought not be done is not to will good. In another way, so that it is referred to the act of willing. And thus it is impossible that someone will good when he ought not, because man ought always to will good, except perhaps accidentally, insofar as someone by willing this good is prevented from then willing some due good. And then evil enters not from the fact that someone wills that good, but from the fact that someone does not will another good. And similarly it must be said concerning other circumstances.” — Hence, if the circumstance is only lightly evil and extrinsic to the object, and the will embraces it concomitantly, this lightly evil circumstance does not corrupt the good act, since it is altogether accidental to the substance of the act constituted in itself. This indeed happens in natural things; the same ought much more to be in moral things. Suarez, D. 8, S. 1, n. VII ff. “And thus an affection for mortal sin in Communion corrupts it substantially and renders it sacrilegious; an affection for venial sin in Communion does not corrupt it in its substance, although it renders it less fruitful.” But if a circumstance, even lightly evil, is intrinsic to the object itself, then the whole act is evil, because that circumstance is the ultimate determination of the moral object. And thus the whole action of a Religious giving alms against the vow of poverty or against the precept of a Superior is evil, although the prohibition by reason of the vow, or by reason of the precept of the Superior, is only light.
17.
- How many circumstances of human acts are numbered? — R. Seven, and they are these: who, what, where, by what aids, why, how, when. “The reason of this enumeration can be taken thus. For a circumstance is said as though existing outside the substance of the act, yet in such a way that it touches the act itself in some way; but this happens to be done in three ways. In one way, insofar as it touches the act itself. In another way, insofar as it touches the cause of the act. In a third way, insofar as it touches the effect. But it touches the act itself either after the manner of measure, as time and place, or after the manner of the quality of the act, as the mode of acting. On the part of the effect, as when what someone did is considered. But on the part of the cause of the act, as to the final cause, why is taken; but on the part of the material cause or object, there is taken about what (which is comprehended under what); but on the part of the principal agent, who acted is taken; but on the part of the instrumental acting cause, by what aids is taken.” St. Thomas, 1. 2. q. 7. a. 3.
18.
- How are the aforesaid circumstances to be considered? — R. They are not to be taken insofar as the substance of the act depends on them, but insofar as they affect it accidentally. Otherwise they would no longer have the character of circumstances. Therefore: 1.º Who does not signify the substance of the one operating, but his quality or condition, for example that he is bound by a vow, joined in marriage, a public magistrate, etc. Lugo, de Poen. D. 16. n. 200, refers the custom of sin to this circumstance; for by it is explained how someone is disposed to sinning more easily. The circumstance of person, generally speaking, does not transfer a sin into another species, unless the sin is directly opposed to a conjunction, an office bringing a special obligation, his vow, or his state; as if a priest commits fornication, it passes into sacrilege, but if he blasphemes, he is guilty of blasphemy alone, just as another blasphemer. St. Thomas, 2. 2. q. 65. a. 4; q. 110. a. 4 ad 5. 2.º What and about what likewise does not express the substance of the effect or object, but its quality or quantity; for example, in theft it does not denote that the stolen thing is another’s, for this pertains to the very substance of the act, but that it is sacred or profane, of great or small quantity, with resulting damage of a poor man, of wards, of marriageable girls, with scandal of many, etc. The circumstance what and about what can easily be one changing the species. But what, i.e. the effect, when it is foreseen and willed, draws into its own species; as if a woman, going to church, knows that she is to be loved there, and wills this, although she does not go on account of this but on account of hearing Mass, that act draws species from that evil effect. To this circumstance can be referred how many times, or the multiplication of acts. Yet St. Thomas did not count it among the circumstances. And the reason is that circumstances are about the same act. But the number of operations does not circumstantiate one and the same operation. For the second theft is not a circumstance of the first, or conversely, nor the third of the second, and so thereafter. From which it follows that, because someone is no less bound to confess the second sin than the first, and no less the hundredth than any other, it is not enough to say that he stole several times, but it is necessary to explain how many times he stole, if he remembers the number; and if he does not remember, he ought to express how frequently, so that a probable number may be had. 3.º Where does not signify bare place; for it is certain that any act of man is done somewhere; but the quality of the place, for example that it is public, whence scandal arises; that it is sacred, whence sacrilege is had, etc. The circumstance of sacred place, although it aggravates all sins accidentally, nevertheless draws only that sin to the species of sacrilege which is directly opposed to the sanctity of the place or to the immunity annexed to it, as outpourings of blood or of human seed, and other actions which by law impede divine worship from being offered there, for which the place is directly sanctified, and violent removals of the guilty from it. 4.º By what aids signifies accidental instruments or means which the one operating has used, for example if someone has used sacred vessels for poisoning, has employed the help of a demon, has induced other men by command or counsel to the execution of sin. Although this circumstance sometimes seems to have itself merely materially toward sin, nevertheless sometimes it also changes the species. 5.º Why denotes not the intrinsic end of the work, for this does not differ from the object and pertains to the substance of the act, but the extrinsic end and that of the one operating, as if someone steals in order to become drunk. But the extrinsic end of the one operating can coincide with the intrinsic end of the work. Why can manifestly give another species to the act. 6.º How designates the accidental mode by which the interior act of the will is done, for example intensely or remissly, from contempt, from levity, from ignorance, from fear, from passion. It also designates the mode of the exterior action, that you killed by poison, by sword, with cruelty and savagery, etc. How, although it is ordinarily aggravating or diminishing of sin, sometimes can also give species. 7.º When signifies the quality or quantity of time, for example on a feast day, of Communion, of Holy Week; for a long time, for a short time. The circumstance of sacred time is aggravating of sin, yet not adding the species of sacrilege unless it is done in contempt of sacred time. Lessius on q. 7; Cajetan on the same q.; St. Alphonsus, l. 6. n. 923; St. Thomas, 4 Dist. 32. q. 1. a. 5, q. 4, solution 2.ª