Chapter I: Preliminary Definitions and General Plan of the Section

Summary : I.—Nominal description of civil tolerance.— In what sense we make it the exclusive work of the State.—What complete civil tolerance would imply.— There are not two schools, to be called, the one the school of tolerance, the other of intolerance. II.—General views of the subject : its complexity.— Plan and arrangement of this section.

THE effect of religious beliefs and philosophical opinions on the status, the rights, and liberties of citizens, gives rise to the problem of civil tolerance.

Whatever opinion we form on the duties of the State, and the corresponding rights of the Church, it is materially within the discretion of the temporal government to grant or deny to the Church its visible help and support. For this reason, putting aside for the present the question of responsibility, we consider this tolerance as the special work of the civil power.

Civil tolerance may be looked at from many points of view, and lends itself to many divisions.

In regard to its supreme principle or its reasons, civil tolerance asserts itself as a permanent, sacred, inviolable institution, which is dogmatic tolerance ; or it is content to be a concession, a rule of the nature of a compromise, founded on circumstances, which is practical tolerance.

The extension of civil tolerance may be considered as it is shown to the religions permitted in the State, and to the citizens and their liberties.

With reference to religions, civil tolerance may extend to all, or may be restricted to some only—as, for example, to Christian bodies, or religions already established.

It may permit them to make converts, or may simply authorize their existence.

It may grant them public and social life, either in their temples or outside, with liberty to form a hierarchical organization or to possess property ; or it may put certain limitations on that public life by decrees on the subject of associations, processions, and the public exhibition of religious symbols ; or it may even recognize only the individual liberty of conscience of their members.

With reference to citizens, tolerance may leave them free choice to continue in their own religion, or pass from one religion to another, or to no religion at all.

It may place all citizens on a footing of perfect equality, or content itself with punishing no one for his religion, while making certain civil rights depend on the profession of faith.

It grants or refuses them the free manifestation and propagation of their opinions and beliefs. In regard to its practice, tolerance of opinions and creeds may be combined with the recognition of a State religion, with favours reserved to the true religion, or to religion in general ; or it may observe strict neutrality, giving no preference to one religion over another, or to religion over unbelief. Experience tells us that there are two kinds of neutrality—the one sympathetic and trusting, like that of the United States of America ; the other contemptuous and suspicious, like that of the present French Republic or its younger sister, the new Republic of Portugal.

In the opinion of many modern political writers, the complete scheme of civil tolerance implies— The dogma of tolerance.

Perfect equality, civil and political, among believers in any religion whatever, and unbelievers. The free manifestation and diffusion of all opinions and all systems.

The perfect neutrality of the State, and its indifference to religion and irreligion. This description seems to us to err both by excess and by defect.

On the one hand, as we shall see better by-and-by, it is not necessary for the existence of tolerance that it should be raised to a dogma ; and the most liberal tolerance does not require official indifference in religious matters. Moreover, the State, by dissociating itself from religion and from God, does not remain neutral ; it professes practical atheism, and by its very abstention preaches religious indifference, and so, as Sarcey said, men are accustomed to do without religion, and are slowly and gradually drawn away from the faith.

On the other hand, simple individual liberty does not give liberty to religious bodies ; it gives no security to the social form and organization which are essential to all religions. The programme of tolerance, therefore, is not complete, unless it contains some provision guaranteeing the freedom of religious society.

It may be said that complete civil tolerance does not yet exist except as a dream. In many countries the head of the State must belong to some particular religious body. The rulers abandon the position of unstable equilibrium in which they would be placed by abstract neutrality, in order to show themselves either timidly friendly to religion or, more frequently, boldly hostile to it ; and the Church nowhere enjoys perfect freedom. Even in Belgium, where civil tolerance exists to a greater extent than in any other country in Europe, the priority of civil marriage, which is obligatory under the Constitution, is derogatory to the liberty of worship.

In spite of the variety of opinions and systems, neither complete intolerance nor complete tolerance finds any defenders, as we shall proceed to prove. We cannot allow any class of persons to arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to be called tolerant, and to fix the reproach of intolerance on all their opponents ; and this is the less permissible because the specious banner of tolerance often covers the most insidious designs against religion. M. Briand, addressing the extreme Left in the French Parliament, repeated, almost word for word, the statement of Sieyès in the Constituent Assembly of 1791, when he said : “ You have so little idea of liberty that you cannot tolerate it.”¹

¹ Session of October 25, 1910.

Now that we have arrived at civil tolerance, we have reached the heart of our subject, but we are still faced with this difficulty : In the minds of many, if not of most persons, the problem of tolerance is reduced entirely to civil tolerance ; and no one can remain indifferent to a matter in which every practice supposes a theory, in which every speculation leads straight to practical conclusions, in which religion and its rights, the State and its mission, the private individual and the guarantees of his liberty, are all vitally concerned. But this universal interest is mixed up with too many different passions to facilitate clearness of views and harmony of conclusions. Philosophers do not agree upon the principles, nor historians upon the facts, nor politicians in their appreciation of the facts or the lessons they teach.

Moreover, the problem of tolerance varies in its aspect with the centuries ; its Protean form changes with the various doctrines which bear upon tolerance and its fundamental principles, with the political factions which use it as a weapon of party strife, and with the circumstances which increase or diminish the necessity for it. It originated in the day when, thanks principally to the influence of Christianity, men rose in conscientious resistance to a tyrannical law. It was then harmoniously solved in Europe by universal acceptance of the same faith, and was again raised at the time of the disastrous schism which destroyed the religious unity of the civilized world. It spread till the beginning of the nineteenth century, when it was radically modified, as discussions extended to the existence and personality of God, and soon after to morality and social order. An intolerance of an unforeseen character arose at the same time, so violent in its first outbursts that its very exaggeration put an end to it, apparently for ever. But by degrees it reappears, preparing and already renewing its attacks on religion.

The problem of tolerance does not present itself, either theoretically or practically, in the same form to-day as yesterday ; nor was it yesterday the same as it was the day before.

Our task therefore is somewhat complicated, and the order to be followed creates a new difficulty ; we have to state and discuss principles, and to come to a conclusion on controverted facts, and therefore cannot adopt a purely logical or a purely historical method. Considering the unequal manner in which the facts agree with the theories, and also the diversity of the principles appealed to, we have thought it best, for the sake of clearness, to divide the subject into three periods, ending respectively with the Reformation of the sixteenth century, the French Revolution, and the present day.

The first period, in which a great Empire fell and gave place first to barbarous kingdoms and then to the Christian republic of the Middle Ages, is more full of events than theoretical discussions. All interest is concentrated on the explanation of facts, and is finally absorbed in a judicial institution—the Inquisition. This is what, in spite of the multitude and diversity of facts, gives to this period a sufficient unity. The principles are, then, in the acts, and we have only to consider the policy followed and form our judgment upon it. In the course of the second period tolerance is discussed among Christians, or at least among theists ; acts are distinguished from opinions, and are influenced by them. We shall principally occupy ourselves with a rapid review of systems, and with criticisms upon them, without refusing to the facts the consideration they demand. In the third period the ground of the discussion is changed ; it is no longer religious, but legal. The adversaries of religion flatter themselves that they have secured a lasting victory for tolerance. We shall have to test the truth of their assertion. Finally, we shall elect for a theory of tolerance which is in accordance with Catholic principles, and is the only one that can be justified by sound reason.