Part II: Tolerance in Public Life

General View and Divisions.

Summary : Unlike tolerance in private life, public tolerance is divided according to the matter, according to the reasons for its exercise ; dogmatic and practical tolerance; and according to the authority which tolerates, religious or civil authority.—Range of ecclesiastical tolerance.

The tolerance of private life is practised principally among equals, and is summed up in the respect which one person is bound to pay to the rights of another. This right forbids me to regulate the thoughts and speech of another by my own, or to disturb him in the liberty of opinion or worship which is granted to him by Divine or human law. Undoubtedly, when sanctioned by man, liberties may be wisely or unwisely granted, and they extend to all the circumstances of life ; but one private individual is not allowed to restrict the liberty of another, whatever be its origin or the circumstances to which it extends. So far we have treated of private tolerance, without discussing the merits of the liberties which put it to the test, and have not confined ourselves to tolerance in matters of religion, with which we are chiefly concerned.

The Sovereign, on the other hand, must concern himself with all the titles which every liberty can show to justify its existence. There are superior or necessary liberties, which even he is bound to respect; useful liberties, which he sanctions or restricts according to circumstances ; and dangerous liberties, which he grants reluctantly, because he cannot do otherwise. While the other liberties are granted as rights, the last-named are only impunities, and they alone, strictly speaking, are the object of the laws of tolerance.

Intolerance is twofold in character : it may refuse to recognize an inviolable liberty, or to grant a reasonable indulgence. Oppression or tyranny may be an abuse of power, or only an excess of severity. But tolerance is one : it permits a thing which is disapproved, or is at least looked upon unfavourably. The official grant of any liberty leads naturally to a discussion as to the nature and cause of the concession : is it a right which is intended to be permanent, or is it a necessity of fact to which the authorities think it advisable to bow ? And different questions arise according as the liberty belongs to the political, moral, or religious order.

Hence arise distinctions in respect of the source of the tolerance, its purpose, and its object.

According to its object, public tolerance is divided into as many branches as there are matters for discussion. We shall be concerned only with tolerance in religious matters.

According to the reasons on which it is founded, tolerance is dogmatic or practical. Dogmatic tolerance is a principle ; practical tolerance is an ex-pedient. The one claims liberty of opinions and worship as a right which must be respected ; the other yields to circumstances so far as is required by social conditions or the common good. To the advocates of dogmatic tolerance, the word “ tolerance ” seems improper; they would abolish it, and only use it as consecrated by ancient custom. Religious liberty signifies for them the liberty of profession of individual belief or unbelief, and sometimes also the liberty of organization granted to religious bodies. The professors of practical tolerance give the word its proper value, and, being accustomed to consider liberty as a function of truth, they define religious liberty as the liberty of the true religion.

Lastly, according to the authority which tolerates, toleration is ecclesiastical or civil. Ecclesiastical tolerance is that of religious authority or the Church ; civil tolerance is the act of the civil power or the State. We have already had occasion to state this, and also to draw attention to the following difference in the field of the two kinds of public tolerance :

Many independent States exist simultaneously, and no one questions the lawfulness of their coexistence. From this independence each State derives its sovereign right of internal administration, for which it is not obliged to give an account to any neighbouring State. Civil tolerance, therefore, is only understood as existing within the State, shown by the Sovereign to his subjects. Having no directly religious mission, the State, as such, does not enter into conflict with another State which professes another religion. But the religious society may be one, and obligatory for all : it has therefore a mission of propagation and conquest which puts it in opposition with other religions and false creeds. Hence we have to consider its possible tolerance in a new light, in the attitude which it adopts towards other religions and their adherents.