Chapter III: Civil Tolerance From the Reformation to the French Revolution

Summary : At the Reformation the principle of civil tolerance has no advocate.—Proof of this.—Political character of intolerance emphasized.—Universal decadence of the Inquisition as a mixed tribunal of repression.— Collective wars and repressions.—Protestant intolerance.—Its long-continued severity against Catholics in various countries of Europe and even in America.— Truces in religious wars.—Edicts and treaties of tolerance either on a social basis or on a geographical basis.

When the Reformation appeared, the principle of civil tolerance was nowhere advocated or practised. “ The unity of religion,” says M. Pirenne, “ was a guarantee of political unity in the view of the Princes of his [Charles V.’s] time. . . . Everyone, even Thomas More and Erasmus, proclaimed the necessity of a State religion.”¹ M. de Belesbat, in the plea for clemency which he addressed to Louis XIV., said : “ It is stated as an incontrovertible axiom that for a State to maintain itself in peace there must be one King, one law, one faith.’”¹

¹ Histoire de Belgique, t. 3, p. 332.

¹ Quoted by M. Dedieu, La Question Protestante d’après des Documents Inédits, in the Revue Pratique d’Apologétique, t. 10, p. 407.

The conviction which is the basis of civil intolerance imprints its own character upon it. “ What is the nature,” asks M. Jules Lemaître, “ of the intolerance of the old régime ?” and he answers : “ Even under the appearance of religion it is always essentially political.”² “ In France,” says M. Tanon, “ the Reformers were considered as criminals who disturbed the State by their rebellion against religion and their overt or secret conspiracies. In so far as they were heretics, they belonged, of course, to the Church ; but, in addition, they were seditious, and rebels against the King, because they violated his ordinances; and disturbers of the public peace, since the welfare of the kingdom and the tranquillity of the State depended principally on the preservation of the Faith. Thus considered, heresy, which was a crime ordinarily within the cognizance of the ecclesiastical judge, was absorbed in the crime against the State, which was exclusively within the cognizance of the secular courts : the ecclesiastical judge was concerned only with simple heresies, which in themselves did not amount to disobedience to the King, or sedition, or public scandal.”³ We have already seen that, according to an order of May 17, 1331, the tribunal of the Inquisition itself was regarded, not as an ecclesiastical tribunal, but one of royal institution.¹ According to the testimony of M. Pirenne, “ it was not only the Catholic convictions of Charles V., however firm and sincere they may have been, that dictated his conduct; it was principally political reasons, universally accepted, and professed alike by his enemies and his partisans.”² “ The repression of heresy, as he looked at it, was a public service, a police regulation, directed in the name of the Sovereign against a new species of crime.”³

² Second Conference of 1910 on the relations of Bossuet and Fénelon with Protestants.

³ Histoire des Tribunaux de l’Inquisition en France, etc., p. 353.

¹ Histoire des Tribunaux de l’Inquisition en France, etc., p. 550.

² Histoire de Belgique, t. 3, p. 332.

³ Ibid., t. 3, p. 336.

The centralizing and jealous absolutism of the Sovereigns of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, in bringing cases of heresy under their own jurisdiction, destroyed the Inquisition, which, moreover, was too slow and too old to cope with the religious movement whose audacious and turbulent youth was intoxicated with its rapid success. The words of M. Lonchay, “ The history of the Inquisition has not yet been treated as it ought to be,”⁴ remain as true as ever, especially for this period. It is certain, nevertheless, that from the sixteenth century the Inquisition declined as a mixed court of criminal jurisdiction. In France, under Francis I., the Parliaments, with their chambres ardentes, had already supplanted it, and its existence was only nominal when the last tribunal—that of Toulouse— was abolished under Louis XIV.⁵ The fact that it disappeared more slowly elsewhere was not a sign of its greater vitality.¹ Even in Spain, in which it killed some germs of Protestantism, autos-da-fé became less and less frequent; freemasons, blasphemers, and sorcerers sometimes settled their accounts with the Spanish Inquisition.² It was always languishing in Bohemia ; and, as we already know, it made only a short appearance in Germany in the thirteenth century. It disappeared early in South Germany and in Poland. England had never known the Inquisition properly so called, except for the suppression of the Templars. In 1414, Henry V. established a sort of half-secular Inquisition, which was abolished by Parliament under Elizabeth, but without any mitigation of the severity of the laws ; in England death was the normal punishment for heresy. Rome and the pontifical States possess an Inquisition which is more truly ecclesiastical. Its secrets have not been revealed, but its moderation is well known ; not a single capital sentence for simple heresy can be laid to its charge. Under Sixtus V.³ the Roman Inquisition finally became the Holy Office, the jurisdiction of which over faith and morals extends to the whole world.

⁴ Les Édits des Princes-évêques, etc., p. 28.

⁵ Tanon, op. cit., p. 554. It had already presented the extraordinary spectacle of a Grand Inquisitor declaring himself a Calvinist, and going bravely to the stake (1538).

¹ In Spain, after being suppressed by Napoleon in 1808, and re-established in 1814, it was finally abolished in 1820. Pius VII. had confirmed it in 1816, only on condition that torture and capital punishment were completely given up. Portugal preserved its tribunal of the Inquisition until 1821, while Goa had none after 1815.

² Under Ferdinand VI. See Llorente, Histoire crit. de l'Inquisition d'Espagne, t. 4, chap. 41, art. 2, p. 53 sqq.

³ C. Immensa æterni Dei.

The period we are considering is thus not so much one of judicial repression as one of violent struggles and commotions, in which wars, massacres, and collective repressions, play a more important part than individual trials before courts and tribunals.

The revolutionary Reformation, not content with destroying religious unity in Europe, made rapid progress over the Continent ; and how cruel and pitiless it was when it was in power ! The tribunals set up by the Calvinists and English Protestants employed all manner of ingenious and brutal tortures, and the list of their victims included those for whom their intrepid courage, their brilliant services to the State, the nobility of their birth, their sacred character, even their youth and gentle sex, might well have excited the pity of their judges. The leaders of the Reformation and their disciples called for the massacre and extermination of those who professed any belief but their own ; their fury, always excited against the Papists, extended sometimes to dissenters of other sects. Protestant St. Bartholomews, especially in the South, preceded and followed the Catholic¹ St. Bartholomew. England is not alone in presenting the spectacle of a people subjected to three successive conversions—first to schism, then to the Catholic Church, and again to schism and heresy. In the Palatinate, Frederic III. passed in 1563 from Lutheranism to Calvinism, and all his subjects were compelled to follow him or go into exile. His son Louis in 1576—that is, only thirteen years later—compelled them to return to Lutheranism ; and in 1583 Casimir forced them a second time into Calvinism, and its preachers pointed out his duty in the following lines :

¹ Or, rather, political. The remark is M. Jules Lemaître’s. Scholastic manuals, in spite of their boasted impartiality, do not present the facts in the true light.

O Casimire potens, servos expelle Lutheri ; Ense, rota, ponto, funibus, igne, neca.¹

¹ Oh, mighty Casimir ! expel the servants of Luther : Slay them by the sword, the wheel, the water, the rope, the fire.

Thus, in modern times two kinds of civil intolerance have come into conflict, one of which displayed the ancient Catholic standard, while the other waved the flag of some new sect—Lutheran, Calvinist, Anglican, or what not. But what a difference there was between them ! The former, at least, was legal and regular, while in Germany, France, and the Netherlands, the latter was often the work of fanatic rebels and grasping usurpers. Protestant intolerance, even when, like the other, it carries out the designs of constituted powers—designs generally framed for political purposes—is distinguished from the other by its arbitrary procedure, its principle, and the field of its application. Catholic Princes may be severe and tyrannical, but the respect which they profess for spiritual authority always places some restraint on their excesses, which more than once have been checked and rebuked by the Popes. They protect a religion whose creed they have accepted as subjects ; they protect it in favour of a Church which presents its credentials, and claims to be regarded as the authoritative organ of a religion necessary to salvation. Their intolerance is comprehensible, and does not degenerate into arbitrary despotism.

But the Protestant Sovereign is not bound to follow any counsel but his own. If he does not himself compose the articles of an unstable creed, he listens to the teacher who pleases him best; and he practises his intolerance, which knows no fixed rule or limit, in the name of a Protestantism which prides itself on introducing liberty of private judgment. Thus the intolerance of the theologians of the Reformation is a mystery which excites the curiosity and puzzles the ingenuity of historians to the present day.¹

¹ See the different attempts at explanation in Ruffini, La Libertà Religiosa, p. 59 sqq. We shall have occasion to return to this subject in Part III.

Catholic intolerance acts on the defensive; Protestant intolerance is aggressive. The Church desires to remain in countries from which the Reformation insists on excluding her, and to maintain her ground where Protestantism is determined to overthrow her ; she seeks to preserve the faithful whom Protestantism seeks to snatch from her, and to prevent apostasies which Protestantism would enforce, even by violent means.

Of the two kinds of intolerance we shall see that the Protestant is always the most arrogant, the most severe,² the most opinionative, and the most persistent.

² The severe edicts of Charles V. were, in a great measure, simply threats ; the English persecutions were, in both England and Ireland, a long and painful reality.

For more than two centuries a fierce Protestant intolerance raged in England ; it was unremitting against Catholics, but sometimes harassed the Nonconformist sects also. When Cromwell glorified liberty of conscience as one of the most precious gifts of God, he had just sworn to maintain the Constitution which refused to grant liberty to Catholics. The Mass appeared to him a symbol of political hostility. Popery was a crime. Charles II. tried in vain, on December 26,1662, and March 15, 1672, to include Catholics in a Declaration of Indulgence ; and in the very year (1689) in which James II. proclaimed complete liberty of conscience in Dublin, the English Parliament, rallying round William of Orange, expressly excluded Catholics from the benefits of the Toleration Act.¹ The Catholic Emancipation Act was not passed until 1829, and even now Catholics are ineligible for certain high offices of State.

¹ Macaulay, History of England, t. 3, pp. 84, 208 (ed. 1855).

In the time of Christian III., Denmark, which was closed to priests under pain of death, deprived Catholics of their political rights and all rights of succession. The code of Christian V., published in 1663, was equally severe against them, and it was only commercial and diplomatic reasons that moderated the severity of the rule, which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century.

The most enlightened Sovereigns of Sweden—even Gustavus Adolphus, who was praised for having declared himself the enemy of religious intolerance— did not know how to be equitable towards Catholics ; and Gortz, the Minister of Charles XII., was accused of permitting the violation of the fundamental laws of the kingdom by tolerating to some extent the liberty of Catholic worship. The Patent of Tolerance of 1783 gave them some measure of liberty, but reserved to Lutherans the monopoly of all public offices, and punished conversions to the Faith.

It is unnecessary to speak at length of the Cal- vinistic intolerance of Switzerland, which was shown in the middle of the nineteenth century in the war on the Catholic Sonderbund, with the support of Palmerston, and in the framing of the federal Constitution. An article of this charter makes the banishment of Jesuits one of the enactments of Modern Helvetia.

At the end of the seventeenth century the French Protestant pastor Jurieu maintained that Papists had no right to interfere with Protestants, but that the latter had the right to coerce and punish those who differed from them, and to have recourse to the secular arm for that purpose.¹ Similarly, at the Diet of Augsburg (1555) the Lutheran Princes claimed to regulate the religion of their own States, but refused to grant the same authority to Catholic Princes. Neither Henry IV. nor Richelieu succeeded in obtaining for the Catholic subjects of the German Princes the toleration which they granted to the Protestants of France.

¹ Des Droits de Deux Souverains en Matière de Religion, la Conscience et le Prince; Rotterdam, 1687, p. 284 sqq. Without imposing religion by force, this Calvinist advised the State to forbid Catholic worship and to take away their churches from Catholics. In short, he elaborated a plan of persecution for the use of contemporary Masonic Lodges.

Is it necessary to mention the Catholic martyrs of the Netherlands ? In spite of all the edicts of tolerance which appeared in that country, the laws imposing restrictions on Catholic worship were not abolished at the French Revolution.

In America, the Puritans displayed an intolerant fanaticism in Massachusetts. Maryland, on April 25, 1649, under a Catholic majority, adopted the Act of Tolerance, the first decree of complete liberty for all Christians, voted by a legislative assembly. As soon as the Protestants obtained a majority, the Act was abolished; restored later by Catholics, liberty perished again after 1676, when the country came under the rule of William of Orange. In the eighteenth century Catholics were not tolerated in Virginia nor the Carolinas, New England, the philanthropic colony of Georgia, New York, or New Jersey;¹ and when the American Constitution was debated, an article forbidding that any profession of faith should be a condition of holding any public office was rejected for fear lest power should pass into the hands of Catholics.

¹ See Ruffini, op. cit., pp. 315, 316.

Maria Theresa, reproaching Joseph II. for showing too little interest in the progress of Catholic truth, said with justice : “ I do not see this indifference in all Protestants ; on the contrary, I should wish that everyone could imitate them, and that no State permitted this indifference.”²

² Letter of July 5, 1777; édit. Von Arneth, l. 262, t. 2, p. 146.

However, conflicts wore themselves out, and commercial relations led to treaties of peace ; and the impossibility of agreement made men resigned to separation. Sovereigns granted edicts of tolerance to Dissenters, the most celebrated being that which Henry IV. signed at Nantes in 1598, to give relief to the French Huguenots ; others in Germany and Switzerland were in favour of the Lutherans and other Protestants. Or, again, rulers of States made compromises either on a geographical basis or a social basis, either by division of territory or on the broad foundation of mutual understanding. The Sovereign decides on the religion of his subjects— “ [Whose is the realm, his also is the religion] ”—or he engages not to molest the professors of another faith. The territorial solution is intolerant in principle, as it gives the Government the right to make a particular religion compulsory. The toleration of different religions in the same State may be dictated by practical considerations, but it does not require new theories or any sacrifice of principles. We have considered the facts, and now proceed to examine the doctrines of the same period.

1. Doctrines of Intolerance criticized.

Summary : Principles of intolerance.—The political absorption of religion.—Religious unity regarded as indispensable to the State.—Territorialism.—Refutation of these doctrines.

Christianity has rendered impossible for ever in our countries that political absorption of religious life which was the foundation of the intolerance of former times. Only the fierce enthusiasm of Zwingli and Calvin would have thought of ever again identifying the Church and the State. But though the distinction between the two is strictly observed, civil intolerance may be defended on this other principle, “ Religious unity makes the unity of the State.” When such unity really exists—above all, when it is the result of voluntary adherence to a religion which has been proved to be true—the proposition, though exaggerated in its expression, is not altogether unreasonable. But, taken literally as always true, it leads to an absolute intolerance, which imposes religious unity as essential to the State—nay, more, as the State’s necessary work: without being identified with religion, the State goes so far as to define what it is.

This absolutist idea, which was given up for centuries, reappeared in its old form towards the end of the Middle Ages. In the middle of the sixteenth century it took concrete form in Territorialism, whose classical axiom was [Whose is the realm, his also is the religion]. The State, as an exclusive association, assumed the exclusive right to define, as well as to protect, the interests of its members. To the pact which united them (pactum unionis) was added another, which made them subject to political direction in all things, even including religion (pactum subjectionis). The citizen, being controlled in all outward acts, was free only in his inward thoughts.

A similar doctrine, embellished with ancient quotations, is found in Grotius¹ and J. J. Rousseau,² those modern politicians who assert the universal supremacy of the State ; and, in fact, many collectivists have not yet discarded it.

¹ De imperio summarum potestatum circa sacra, t. 2, c. 8*

² Du Contrat Social, l. 4, c. 8.

And yet it is radically false : the State, not having religion for its object, does not find in religion the principle of its unity. It is therefore not true to say that “ religious unity makes the unity of the State.” But, since it strengthens the bonds of union between citizens, this unity is a great benefit to the State, provided always that it is unity in the truth. Religion, in fact, is so far-reaching in its influence on the life of every individual, and on men’s relations with one another, that common error on the subject of religion cannot fail to be prejudicial to the community. Such outward tranquillity as would be produced by agreement in common error would be more fitly called atrophy than real peace. In proportion as it is false,¹ a common religion gives tranquillity only in lessening vitality ; religious lethargy is an essential condition of its continuance. Agreement in common error, which is by nature precarious, is only lasting in the paralyzing effect it produces on men’s minds.

¹ Religions, in fact, are never wholly false ; some retain more truth, and some less. In proportion as they agree with the true religion, they may, by that part of the truth that they contain, become socially beneficial; but always less so than the true religion.

Religious unity does not make the unity of the State ; and the contemporary States in which this unity does not exist are not necessarily the worse for its absence : such is the position we take up towards the intolerance which makes a dogma of the necessity of unity to the State.

Still more absurd than the theory which makes the unity of the State depend on religious unity is the territorial theory which places the principle of this unity in the will of the Sovereign. The principle [Whose is the realm, his also is the religion], Protestant in its origin,² makes the citizens mere slaves of the Sovereign. The advocates of this principle, in their desire for unity at any price, do not hesitate to purchase unity by the oppression of all consciences, except that of the tyrant to whom they allow absolute despotism.

² “ It was, alas ! the Reformation which had the sad courage to adopt for its own profit the ancient axiom [Whose is the realm, his also is the religion].” Thus speaks Georges Frommel in the Protestant collection, Foi et Vie, les Destinées de l’Individualité à travers le Développement du Christianisme Catholique ; Paris-Geneva, 1903, p. 16. The author gives the axiom in this form, [This one’s realm, whose religion].

2. The Doctrines of Tolerance.

Summary : Different schools of tolerance, according to the motives and the form of tolerance.

When the disruption of Christendom appeared irremediable, there were not wanting clear-sighted men¹ who insisted on the necessity of mitigating the severity of laws and decrees. The rigorous measures taken against the French Calvinists were disapproved by many Bishops,² who declared that it was more important to convert than to punish, and that force was a poor means of conversion.

¹ Such as Justus Lipsius, Civilis Doctrinæ, l. 4, cc. 2 and 3.

² See Dargaud, Histoire de la Liberté en France et de ses Fondateurs, t. 1, p. 370. In spite of his distinctly anti- Roman bias, this author, in describing the Assembly of Notables held in 1560, mentions as advocates of tolerance Marillac, Archbishop of Vienne in Dauphiné, and Jean de Montluc, Bishop of Valence. The latter declared that “ bloody executions on account of religion were barbarities as contrary to the Gospel as to the great Councils of the primitive Church.”

There is no longer need to discuss such counsels ; but alongside the Catholic doctrine appeared a new doctrine of civil tolerance, which its advocates presented as if it were a dogma. It is, perhaps, too much to speak of a dogma, for unity was wanting. The advocates of the civil tolerance which was made a dogma did not agree on the motives that prompted it, or the practical conclusions to be arrived at. In giving their names, we must not confuse their ideas ; they pleaded different causes, and it would be wholly incorrect to suppose that for or against the same kind of tolerance a battle was fought, lasting for centuries, and ending to-day in a triumph of the modern idea over the religious idea, and especially over the Christian and Catholic idea.

Let us see, then, what arguments were successively adduced in favour of civil tolerance, and within what limits tolerance successively found champions and defenders.

I. The Motives appealed to in Favour of the Dogma of Tolerance.

Summary : Weakness of the arguments of the opponents of tolerance.—Reasons adduced by the supporters of the dogma of civil tolerance.—The syncretist idea.— The obscurity which covers the true religion.—The voluntary character of the religious society, and its spirit.—The respective position of religions and the State.—The incompetence of the State.—The designs of Providence.—Liberty of conscience.—The abuses of intolerance, and its evil results.—The advantages of tolerance.—The benefit of religion.

The reasoning of the opponents of the dogma of tolerance, Catholic as well as Protestant, has not always been very logical; and the weakness of their arguments has facilitated the task of a party which could not fail to become popular, as giving the advantage to man and liberty, as more favour-able to interests of the economic order, and later, also, as being more in accordance with the inexorable necessities of fact.

In the sixteenth century the misuse of Scripture was frequent: men did violence to texts in order to justify their violence to persons. One would hardly believe that the parable of the Wedding Guests could ever be quoted in favour of intolerance ; but it was, nevertheless. Did not our Lord say, Compelle intrare—compel them to come into the hall of feasting, that is, into the Church ? And, in spite of the context, in which no violence is done to those who were first invited, but made various frivolous excuses for their refusal, the words, which were intended to show the generous hospitality of the giver of the feast, and to inculcate zeal in the preaching of the Gospel, were quoted as justifying the use of the sword. This was what was argued, and the discussion filled volumes. Bayle took the text as the title of a voluminous apology for excessive tolerance.

Similarly, Kings were invested with a sort of Divine authority, which gave them the right not only to promote religion, but also to regulate its outward observance ; and the writers of the period, forgetting the solemn warning of St. Paul as to the new spirit inculcated by Christ, justified the severity of the Christian code by the obsolete severity of the Jewish law.

But we need not dwell on these arguments : time has done justice to them, and our work is devoted to tolerance.

Great is the variety of reasons by which men have sought, and still seek, to establish tolerance on absolute principles. These reasons are either religious or philosophical: they have their origin in God, His power, and His providence ; or in man, his rights, his interests, and his weakness ; they are suggested by abstract considerations of theory, or by the concrete counsels of experience, which men describe as universal. We shall consider these various reasons under several principal heads, which the reader will have no difficulty in grouping for himself into these two classes : the one which refutes intolerance, and the other which more directly seeks positive support for the dogma of tolerance.

Many persons find a reason for tolerance in the concept they form for themselves of the Christian religion, or of religion in general.

The syncretist idea has always been accepted by some persons, and has again come into favour. Manes long ago sought to exploit it for his own advantage.¹ It reappeared later with the Socinians and Anabaptists ; and it has again become popular together with the Modernist heresy. Some persons, possessed by this idea, reduce the essentials of faith to a certain number of fundamental points, and maintain that on all other points opinion and discussion should be free, as in the Church contradictory opinions are permitted on questions not yet defined.²

¹ St. Epiphanius said of Manichæism that it was a πολυκέφαλος αἵρεσις (a many-headed heresy), and compared it to the hydra. See Hæreses, lxvi. 87 (M.P.G., t. 42, cols. 171, 172. Cf. De Stoop, Essai sur la Diffusion du Manichéisme dans l’Empire Romain, p. vii).

² This idea finds favour with many Protestants. It is that of the Arminians of Holland, the disciples of Ar- minius, who was Professor of Theology at Leyden in 1602, and was engaged in an interminable quarrel with his colleague, Francis Gomarus. The Gomarists, more purely Calvinist, and more intolerant, reserved to the ecclesiastical synods a religious jurisdiction which the Arminians, who were more inclined to tolerance, but accused of semi- Pelagianism, attributed to the States of Holland.—The English Latitudinarians, who came into existence in the reign of Charles I. (1625-1649), owe their name to their tendency to regard as important only certain fundamental points, outside of which the fullest latitude of opinion was allowed to everyone.—Jeremy Taylor, in his Θεολογία ἐκλεκτική, A Discussion of the Liberty of Prophesying (1647), secs. 1 and 16, regards as necessary only the articles of the Creed, and denies that the Christian sects are different religions.—John Milton, in his tract of sixteen pages, Of True Religion, Heresy, Schisme, Toleration (1673), desires to unite all Protestants against their common enemy. Popery, and limits the fundamental points to the acceptance of Holy Scripture as the only rule of faith, and the rejection of implicit faith as understood by Catholics (I believe what the Church believes).—Chr. Thomasius, a Sophist, who took pleasure in drawing from the principles of the Reformation corollaries which were embarrassing to the leading Reformers, taught also that fundamental rules were sufficient. Cf. Das Recht evangelischer Fürsten in theologischen Streitigkeiten (1713), Second Proposition.—The fundamental articles are even indicated by the Catholic priest Bartolotti, in his Exercitatio politico-theologica (1782), p. 17, a work more interesting than original, in which he has borrowed largely from Protestant authors, and does not spare his praise of Joseph II.—In Germany a man who admitted the fundamental articles was, in the eyes of Protestants, less a heretic than a schismatic. Cf. Thomasius, Problema juridicum, an hæresis sit crimen (1697), a dialogue between an orthodox believer and himself (n. iii.).

The obscurity, or lack of evidence, of the true religion serves to others as an argument for not granting privileges or favours to any of the existing religions.¹ What competence, they ask, does the Sovereign possess to discern the ways of salvation, even with the aid of an official clergy?¹ Or, rather, others maintain, the truth is not identified with any religion. Every religion possesses some portion of the truth, which renders them all worthy of the same respect.² Much more, the different religions form a harmonious concert which proclaims the infinite majesty of the Supreme Being.³ Many others, less enthusiastic by nature, profess with regard to dogmas¹ a scepticism which leads them to an indifference² incompatible with any kind of zeal for orthodoxy : morality with them is the only thing of any importance.

¹ J. Bodin, Colloquium Heptaplomeres (1597), p. 129. Jules Simon, La Liberté de Conscience, fourth lesson (1857). Jeremy Taylor (op. cit., secs. 1, 3-11) argues thus from the obscurity of the true religion to plead the cause of tolerance. Basnage, Tolérance des Religions, pp. 44, 94-96.

¹ We know the argument of Lessing. Positive religions, founded on belief in contradictory evidence, give to their adherents a justifiable subjective conviction, which does not destroy the conviction of the adherents of another religion. In a certain family, authority depended on the possession of a wonderful ring. One possessor, who was equally fond of all his three sons, had two rings made, exactly similar to the original, and each son had a ring which his father left to him as the real one. After the death of their father, how were they to be undeceived ? All three held to their subjective belief in the words of their father. The judge was obliged to decide in this way : “ Prove the virtue of your ring. Increase it by gentleness, forbearance, benevolence, and complete submission to the will of God. . . . Then in a thousand years or so you will appear at the judgment-seat, and a wiser judge than I will decide between you ” (Nathan der Weise, Act iii., Scene 7).

This apologue, specious as it seems at first sight, will not bear examination. Religions, with the exception of the true one, are not the daughters of God : why should they share the affections of God, as three sons share the affection of their father ? To suppose the three rings identical is to suppose that all religions are equally good, which is not true. And how can we imagine that God would tell his children such a lie as the father in the story deliberately told to two of his sons ? Does God approve all religions equally ?

² Cf. Ruffini, La Libertà Religiosa, pp. 284-286. This idea is found in the philosophy which led the way to Modernism.

³ Bayle, Commentary, etc. “ Tolerance is the one thing in the world most likely to bring back the golden age, and to produce a harmonious concert of many voices and instruments of every kind-—-a harmony at least as agreeable as the uniformity of a single voice ” (Second Part, c. 6, p. 415). Nearer our own time, Dargaud wrote (Histoire de la Liberté Religieuse en France et dans ses Fondateurs, t. 4, p. 430) : “ Let all the different religions offer the incense of their prayers side by side ; these manifold prayers will be pleasing to God, and where we see only dissension, God will see harmony. The expressions of adoration are different, but the meaning is the same.” Celsus had long before used similar language.

¹ Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing. The author repels the accusation of scepticism, but objects to the positive affirmations of a dogmatism that admits no doubt. He preaches a modest philosophy, which contents itself with saying : I think so (p. 223).

² Frederic the Great of Prussia: “ There is no one religion which differs very much from the others on the subject of morals ; thus they may be all equal in the sight of Government, which consequently leaves every man free to go to heaven by any road that suits him. Let him be a good citizen, and that is all we require of him ” (Works, t. 1, De la Superstition et de la Religion, Art. 3, p. 241, 242). Carlantonio Pilati, Di una Riforma d'Italia, the work of a very anticlerical Catholic, who goes so far as to say : “ Equal tolerance of all religions produces indifference in men’s minds, and indifference produces peace and tranquillity and mutual love.”

Others ask, What is the Church ? A society of men, voluntarily banded together to offer public worship to God.³ What spirit does it inherit ? The spirit of meekness, which is inconsistent with violence and coercion.⁴ From these premisses they argue that there is an essential opposition between Christianity and intolerance.

³ Locke, A Letter concerning Toleration, etc., pp. 321, 331.

⁴ Roger Williams, an American author, who during his travels in England addressed to Parliament his famous dialogue between Truth and Peace, entitled The Bloody Tenent of Persecution (1644). His book was burned by order of the Presbyterians. The author wrote an answer to objections, the title of which begins with the words, The Bloody Tenent yet more Bloody. The preface to his first work contains his principal assertions on tolerance.—Bayle, Commentary, part i, c. 3, p. 372. Supplement, c. 7, p. 506.— Jules Simon, La Liberté de Conscience, p. 278.

Similarly, we are asked to consider the respective position of religions and the State. Being fully autonomous in the opinion of some writers, they are by the very fact exempt from all legal prohibition.¹ Many modern writers attribute to the State a supremacy over all religions ; but this supremacy does not authorize the State to interfere—at least, in private worship.² Being without light of its own, the State would be compelled to listen to the voice of a Church, and consequently to change its sovereignty into vassalage.

¹ The Congregationalists or Independents, founded by Robert Browne, 1581.—Busher, Religious Peace, p. 18.— Roger Williams, op. cit., preface and p. 96. G. Noodt, De Religione ab Imperio jure gentium Libera, pp. 7, 20, 25.

² The Arminians were called Remonstrants, from a defence or Remonstrance which they presented to the States of Holland in 1610 ; while a reply or Counter-Remonstrance of the Gomarists gave them the name of Counter-Remonstrants. The Remonstrants gave to the State jurisdiction over public worship. Similar principles are found in Puffendorf, De habitu religionis christianæ ad vitam civilem, 1687, nn. 6 and 43. As to insufficiency of means for settling controversies, see also Jeremy Taylor’s Discourse of the Liberty of Prophesying (1647), secs. 3-11.

But has the State the right to exercise any constraint whatever in religious matters ? Neither God nor the people have given it any authority to direct souls.³ Famous Sovereigns have spoken clearly on this subject. “ I am King of peoples,” said Stephen Báthori, “but I am not King of consciences.”¹ And Maximilian II : “ To interfere with consciences is to force the citadel of heaven.”² The State, in its attempts at usurpation, is powerless ; for how will it undertake to convince ? and is there any religion without real conviction ?³ To convert by force is to people the State with hypocrites ;⁴ to gain souls by the promise of rewards is to degrade men, and to be guilty of simony.⁵ Will it be said that it is for the good of the community ? But unity of worship is not necessary for the good of the community ;¹ for virtue has nothing to do with any particular form of religion.² The State has the right to interfere with religion only so far as to prevent the formation of associations opposed to public order and good morals.³

³ Roger Williams, The Bloody Tenent, preface.—Thomasius, op. cit., Prop. 7.—E. Saurin, Réflexions sur les Droits de la Conscience, p. 488.—Boehmer, Jus Ecclesiasticum Protestantium, l. 3, Dissertatio Præliminaris de Jure Circa Libertatem Conscientiæ, sec. 20.—Anonymous, Jefferson’s Notes on the State of Virginia, c. 2, p. 37.—Bartolotti, Exercitatio Politico-Theologica, c. 2, p. 37.—Basnage, op. cit., p. 41.

¹ “ God,” he said in his edict of religious pacification (De pace Religionis Servanda), " has reserved to Himself three things—the power to create out of nothing, to know the future, and to rule men’s consciences.”

² [To dominate consciences is to invade the citadel of heaven]. In his correspondence with Maria Theresa, Joseph II. similarly admitted his incompetence : " What power do men arrogate to themselves ? Can it extend to passing judgment on the Divine mercy, to saving men in spite of themselves, to assuming dominion over men’s consciences ?” (Von Arneth, Maria Theresia und Joseph II., Ihre Correspondenz, t. 2, l. 260, June, 1777).

³ All the advocates of the dogma of tolerance use this argument. Especially Busher, op. cit., p. 17 ; G. Noodt, op. cit., p. 38 ; Jefferson in the work quoted above, on the seventeenth question ; Thomasius, Problema Juridicum, an Hæresis sit Crimen, c. 11 ; Trautmansdorff, op. cit., p. 120.

⁴ Almost all use this argument. See Busher, op. cit., p. 17 ; Jefferson’s Notes, Appendix, pp. 26-28 ; Trautmansdorff, op. cit., p. 134 ; Philipot, op. cit., p. 33 ; Puffendorf, De Habitu Religionis ad Imperium, n. 48 ; Basnage, op. cit., p. 58.

⁵ Thomasius, Das Recht Evangelischer Fürsten in Theologischen Streitigkeiten (1696), Prop. 1 ;—Bayle, Commentary, etc.

¹ Reinhard, Meditationes de jure Principum Germaniæ cum primis Saxoniæ, circa Sacra (1714), p. 70; Boehmer, Jus Ecclesiasticum Protestantium, l. 3, Dissertatio Prælim. ; R. Williams ; and many others.

² Thomasius, op. cit., Prop. 1 ; Lessing, Nathan der Weise.

³ Noodt, op. cit., p. 24, and many others.

Some authors, taking higher ground, appeal to God Himself, His example, His Divine plan, His power : shall we punish, they ask, what He tolerates ?⁴ Shall we go against the dispositions of Providence, which has allowed men to arrive at different religions by the natural use of their reason ?⁵ And what have we to do with upholding a Divine religion ? Cannot God’s omnipotence do without our help ?⁶

⁴ Reinhard, Meditationes, p. 70.

⁵ Noodt, op. cit., p. 12 ; Basnage, op. cit., pp. 47, 54.

⁶ Jules Simon, op. cit., p. 228.

From the seventeenth century we note the first appearance of those arguments which are in favour to-day ; they tend to base tolerance on the inviolability of conscience.⁷ It is impossible to force men’s inward judgment, or compel them to see what they do not perceive ; we might just as well (to use the expression of De Bonald) “ command the circulation of the blood.”⁸ One man calls heresy that which is only another man’s error ; and error is not a crime. The crime is committed by the will; it cannot reside in the intellect.¹

⁷ Hence arose those discussions on what was called the rights of the two Sovereigns—the Conscience and the Prince.

⁸ Réflexions Philosophiques sur la Tolérance des Opinions. Œuvres, t. 7, p. 159.

¹ G. Noodt, op. cit., p. 33 ; Thomasius, Disputatio an Hæresis sit Crimen, viii.

There still remain numerous practical considerations, which the doctors call to the rescue of their reasons, and which carry conviction to the crowd better than the reasons themselves.

History shows us how many crimes and excesses may be laid to the charge of intolerance : coercion disturbs the public peace,² and makes a sincere search after truth impossible ; it puts a premium on cowardice and hypocrisy ;³ it makes religion the sport of ignorance or the caprice of Sovereigns,⁴ and brings about a fatal reaction which drives men to atheism and infidelity ; and society rushes towards the abyss in which morals are lost.⁵

² J. Bodin, Heptaplomeres, p. 357 ; R. Williams, The Bloody Tenent yet more Bloody, pp. 111, 112 ; Fuhrmann, De Tolerantiæ Religiosæ effectibus Civilibus, sec. 5, p. 35 ; Bayle, Commentary, etc., p. 375, and passim; J. Simon, op. cit., 1. 4, p. 254.

³ See the authors quoted in n. 4, p. 202.

⁴ Barbeyrac, Traité de la Morale des Pères de l’Église (1728), p. 180.

⁵ Bayle, Commentary, etc., part 2, c. 2, p. 399 sqq.; Boehmer, De jure circa Libertatem Conscientiæ, sec. 19.

On the other hand, it is not difficult to see that coercion will do as much service to error as to truth ; the rights of the conscience which is in possession of the truth are also the rights of the conscience which errs in good faith.⁶ Therefore, if you wish to avoid all risk of oppression of the truth, you must make it a universal principle that no one shall be molested on account of his religion.¹

⁶ Bayle, op. cit., part 2, c. 8, p. 422, sqq.; Noodt, De Religione, etc., p. 33 ; Thomasius, Problema Juridicum, etc., ix. This theory is opposed by Saurin in the very title of his book, Réflexions sur les Droits de la Conscience, où l’on fait voir la Différence entre les Droits de la Conscience éclairée et ceux de la Conscience Errante, on réfute le “ Commentaire Philosophique ” et le livre intitulé “ Droit des Deux Souverains.”

¹ Bayle, Commentary, etc., pp. 444, 523, and passim: Boehmer, op. cit., sec. 20.

And why these useless persecutions,² when the light of truth is sufficient to dissipate the mists of error ?³ Catholics, in their peaceful relations with non-Catholics, have abundant opportunities of making conversions by teaching and example ;⁴ and the advantages to liberty and peace⁵ are crowned by that given to religion itself.

² Michel de l’Hôpital, Harangues, e.g., that of 1561, t. 1, p. 469.

³ Williams, The Bloody Tenent.—Milton, Areopagitica, 65, 67.—Jefferson's Notes, and Appendix, III., pp. 26, 28.

⁴ Joseph II., Letter of July 20, 1777 (édit. Von Arneth, l. 264, t. 2, pp. 151, 152).

⁵ Williams, op. cit., preface, ii. ; Fuhrmann, op. cit., sec. 34 ; Bayle, Commentary, 1. 2, c. 6, p. 415.

Can we, then, doubt the providential usefulness of heresy ? It purifies the Church, and gives her better-instructed and more zealous ministers, forced by their contact with heresy to develop their intellectual activity and the ardour of their devotion. How much scientific progress is due to heresy !⁶

⁶ Bartolotti, Exercitatio, etc. (1782), c. 4, pp. 155, 156 ; Basnage, op. cit., pp. 72, 89.

In short, there is no good that tolerance does not encourage us to wait and hope for. With peace and improved manners, it brings also progress in arts and sciences ; it opens an era of abundance and prosperity.⁷ “ Misdirected zeal,” wrote Frederic II. of Prussia, “ is a tyrant that depopulates provinces ; tolerance is a tender mother that cares for them and makes them flourish.”¹ “ Let there be liberty of belief,” said Joseph II., “ and there will no longer be but one religion, which will be that of directing all the inhabitants for the good of the State.”²

⁷ Bartolotti, ibid., c. 4, pp. 154, 159.

¹ De la Superstition et de la Religion, Works, t. 1, pp. 241, 242.

² Letter of June, 1777 (edit. Von Arneth, t. 2, p. 160).

If a solemn treaty of tolerance were concluded among all the rulers of the world, it would insure “ a rich harvest of conversions, and victories and triumphs for the true Church.”³

³ Saurin mentions this theory, but without admitting it (op. cit., p. 693).

Let us conclude, then, with Voltaire⁴ that intolerance can only be justified when it is necessary to put down fanaticism and its excesses.⁵

⁴ “ In order to deserve tolerance, men must begin by not being fanatics ” (Traité de la Tolérance, c. 18).

⁵ The law of religious liberty which Jefferson caused to be passed in Virginia in the beginning of 1786 is very interesting reading. In its preamble it enumerates, so to speak, all the reasons for tolerance. " God has created free thought ; attempts at coercion only tend to make cowards and hypocrites, and are contrary to the Divine plan laid down by the Author of our religion. Our Saviour, who is Lord of the body as well as of the soul, condemned the use of force in teaching religion ; the wicked acts of public authorities have resulted only in establishing false religion, in the greater part of the world ; our rights do not depend on our religious convictions ; privileges are fatal to religion ; the magistrates have nothing to do with our opinions.” See also Questions sur la Tolérance (Abbés Trailhe and Maultroit ?); Geneva, 1758.

2. Practical Conclusions of Systems of Tolerance.

Summary : Systems of Saurin, Joseph II., Philipot, and Puffendorf.—Covenants or decrees of tolerance, especially the treaty of Westphalia.—To what acts or opinions their tolerance extended.—What part was left to a dominant religion.—Many excluded Catholics from the benefit of tolerance.

The manner of understanding tolerance has varied as much as the motives for introducing it. Thus, in 1697 the Calvinist minister Saurin summed up his opinions in these terms : “ The Magistrate should do all he can for the propagation of true doctrine and the extinction of error, without doing violence to consciences or depriving subjects of their natural or civil rights.”¹ Joseph II. similarly declared in 1777 that he did not intend to treat the religion of his subjects as a matter of indifference ; but he refused to consider that religion in purely civil or temporal relations.² The Protestant pastor Philipot refused to allow Dissenters to have temples or schools or the right of meeting.³ Puffendorf did not recognize in those who differed from him the right to propagate their religion; he wished to have a sort of fundamental religion made obligatory on all persons, according to a [a public formula of faith].⁴ In his Edict of Wollmer (July 9, 1788), Frederic William II. forbade proselytism by non-recognized bodies. The Peace of Westphalia (1648) guaranteed liberty to three Christian bodies only—Catholics, Lutherans, and the Reformed Church. But, according to the maxim [Whose is the realm, his also is the religion], the Prince was at liberty to adopt any one of these as the religion of the State, and order the banishment of the other two, provided he adopted all the formalities necessary to take away the ignominious or penal character of the measure. The jurisconsults of Germany thus came to distinguish between a qualified tolerance—a tolerance by right, which the Princes could not refuse to religions protected by international agreement—and a simple or precarious tolerance, which depended on their good pleasure.¹ The edict of tolerance granted by Henry IV. similarly limited its operation to the Huguenots and to certain parts of France.

¹ Op. cit., sec. 5, p. 684.

² Letter of July 20, 1777, to his mother : “ I would give all I possess to see all the Protestants of the States [of Maria Theresa] become Catholics ” (édit. Von Arneth, l. 264, t. 2, pp. 151, 152).

³ Les Justes Bornes de la Tolérance, pp. 30-32.

⁴ De Habitu Religionis ad Vitam Civilem, sec. 49.

¹ E.g., Fuhrmann, De Tolerantiæ Religiosæ effectibus Civilibus, sec. 4, p. 19.

So much for official acts.

Nor are the authors who emblazon on their banner the dogma of tolerance any more agreed either on the sects to be protected by that banner, or on the place to be reserved for the true or privileged religion.

In the course of the centuries of which we are treating, few writers, philosophical or political, preach tolerance of all religions ; many confine their attention to Christian bodies, and require an agreement on fundamental points, or, at least, on those articles which are necessary for the good of the State.² The tolerance shown to the Socinians and Anabaptists was much opposed from this point of view,¹ and the exclusion of atheists was generally insisted on.² Some writers even threatened them with most severe penalties,³ and no one thought of allowing the preaching of revolutionary or immoral doctrines.⁴

² Jeremy Taylor, op. cit., sec. 19.—Trautmansdorff, De Tolerantia Ecclesiastica et Civili, pp. 146-149.

¹ Philipot, op. cit., p. 26 ; Taylor, op. cit., sec. 18.

² Fuhrmann, op. cit., p. 38; Pufendorf, De Habitu Re- ligionis Christiana ad Vitam Civilem, sec. 7 ; Philipot, op. cit., p. 52 ; Joseph II., who thus laid down the conditions of his tolerance : “ Provided that the service of the State is properly performed . . . that your Supreme Being is not dishonoured, but reverenced and worshipped ” (edit. Von Arneth, t. 2, letter 260, of June, 1777) ; Bartolotti, op. cit., c. 4, p. 194.

³ Saurin would have legalized capital punishment to exclude irreligion and atheism (Réflexions, etc., pp. 510- 514).

⁴ E.g., Noodt, De Religione ab Imperio, etc., pp. 40, 41; Taylor, op. cit., secs. 15, 16 ; Thomasius, Problema Juridi- cum, etc., n. 12 ; Milton, Areopagitica, p. 68.

According to some, tolerance should be restricted to the private exercise of the religion, or be extended only to outward acts commanded by religious sentiment.⁵ Philipot distinguished three things in religion, and his distinction was generally accepted— the three things being “ the soul, the body, and the habit. The soul of religion is the faith of the heart ; the body is the confession by the lips ; the habit is the public profession of such a religion.”⁶ The magistrate has no power over the soul or the body— he would be usurping a prerogative of God—but he has power over the habit. Others were inclined to grant a wider liberty, not excluding public preaching and proselytism ; some were willing to permit changes of religion.¹

⁵ Saurin, op. cit., p. 495, pp. 502 sqq.

⁶ Les Justes Bornes de la Tolérance, pp. 30-32. Bayle himself excluded the diffusion of atheism. The atheist, he reasoned, has no positive conviction ; he cannot, then, say that he is entitled to spread his errors, and his atheist propaganda attacks the fundamental principles of the State (Commentary, p. 431).

¹ Fuhrmann, op. cit., p. 53, sec. 15.

Most authors defend themselves against the charge of professing or favouring religious indifference. Blasphemy continues to be forbidden.² Their system of tolerance may be reconciled with a privileged religion, which obliges the Prince to be just towards all, but permits him to reserve his favours and all public offices to the members of his own communion ;³ or an official religion, alone subsidized and encouraged.⁴ Others, however, granted to the religion they considered the best nothing but the example of the Prince and his private encouragement.⁵

² Pufendorf, op. cit., n. 48. Thomasius is more liberal (Problema, etc., n. 12).

³ Fuhrmann, op. cit., p. 83, sec. 31 ; Saurin, op. cit., pp. 506 sqq.

⁴ Pufendorf, op. cit., n. 41 ; Philipot, op. cit., c. 3, p. 127.

⁵ Williams, The Bloody Tenent.

Many jurists are at the same time tolerantists and upholders of the supremacy of the State.⁶

⁶ Pufendorf, op. cit., nn. 44-48 ; Grotius, op. cit., t. 2, c. 8. Joseph II.’s edicts of tolerance gave rise to a whole Court literature. See Vollständige Sammlung aller Schriften die durch Veranlassung der Allerhöchsten Kaiserl. Toleranz und Reformations-Edikten . . . grössten theils zu Wien erschienen, 5 vols., Vienna, 1782-1783; vol. vi., Strasbourg, 1786.

One point strikes us as worthy of notice—namely, the almost unanimous agreement of Protestant and rationalist professors of tolerance in refusing liberty to Catholics. Thus, Locke, Milton, the later English thinkers, the German Thomasius, and even Bayle himself, showed themselves in their theory opposed to the emancipation of “ Papists.” The charge against the latter was sometimes that they considered an excommunicated Sovereign as deposed, sometimes that they professed intolerance.¹ Milton and many Germans repudiated the Catholic religion as infected with idolatry,² and Saurin described Catholics as enemies of the human race.³

¹ Bayle, Commentary, Supplement, c. 31, pp. 559, 560.

² Milton, Of True Religion, etc., and many others, both in Germany and in England. Taylor, in England, is more moderate, and Williams in America much more liberal.

³ Therefore, he says, “ we have full right to banish them from the world, and cut them off from the land of the living” (op. cit., p. 661). Charity alone counsels greater moderation.

3. Criticism of Doctrines of Tolerance.

Summary : The incomplete tolerance favoured by these systems varies in its claims : great confusion caused by this.—Their advocates are mistaken as to the intolerance they attack and its principles, as to our convictions (false intellectualism), and as to the practical advantages of their own system.—The question of the reprisals to be dreaded.—Whatever practical wisdom there is in their conclusions does not infer the dogma of tolerance.

We have now fairly stated the arguments adduced during more than three centuries in favour of the dogma of tolerance ; a detailed criticism of them all would be long and tedious, and considering our purpose, our readers will easily dispense with it ; a few remarks will suffice.

One illusion disappears as soon as we glance at the opinions expressed. There is not one theory of tolerance only; the multitude of such theories would make it difficult to choose between them, and in the period under consideration no theory is absolute, either in its principles or in its conclusion.

This tolerance, limited to certain forms of positive religion, professes to preserve to the community a small inheritance of moral and religious truths, and it does not always grant to the religion which is simply tolerated the right to propagate its doctrines.

The arguments are directed against one form of intolerance only — the aggressive or violent form, which claims to make conversions by force, and to extirpate by violent means heresies already widely diffused. They therefore do not touch the Catholic doctrine, or attack the preventive action taken for prudential reasons, which, without bloodshed or persecution, secures to a kingdom or a republic the great blessing of unity in the possession of religious truth.

Many systems refuse to sanction official indifference, and discuss only the lawfulness or expediency of a certain amount of civil constraint.

While we cannot approve of all the forms of civil intolerance which have appeared in modern times, and are entirely opposed to such intolerance as has for its direct design the eradication of a conscientious conviction, or the imposition of a Credo by force, we admit the justice of more than one criticism directed against the system formerly prevailing, or to the treatises written to defend it. Moreover, tolerance, as we shall define it, comprehends a wider liberty than that advocated by many of the tolerationists whose names and doctrines we have mentioned. But, on the other hand, the religious error of syncretism or scepticism, and the social and political error of the omnipotence of the State, and of the social uselessness of true religion, vitiate many of the systems enumerated.

The champions of the dogma of tolerance misunderstand equally the nature of our convictions. They consider them as purely intellectual; but is it not the fact that man is influenced by his passions and his pride, as well as by his virtuous inclinations, in forming the opinions that will henceforth remain fixed in his mind ? A purely intellectual affair, they argued : they should rather have said a human affair, and therefore in great measure a question of good or evil will. What are we to think of the practical considerations ? They are more specious than real. Social trouble and disturbance does not arise always from coercion, but much more frequently from heresy, which is far from being the gentle, patient creature that the advocates of tolerance are so fond of describing. Thus, that good simple man, Jules Simon, showed that he had misunderstood the teachings of history when he wrote in these terms of the conduct of the Christian Empire : “ The same judges, who had just condemned the Christians in the name of the gods of the Empire, now condemned the Donatists in the name of the Councils and the orthodox faith. It was the same intolerance in the service of another dogma.”¹ Not at all; a glance at the picture of the crimes and excesses of the Donatists, which at last wore out the patience of the magistrates, is enough to prove conclusively that it was not the same intolerance. Moreover, as we shall have occasion to see again, pagan intolerance was not in the service of any dogma.

¹ La Liberté de Conscience, p. 73.

The other arguments of expediency are no more conclusive : stress is everywhere laid on the reprisals which intolerant truth would logically have to expect from error, when error got the upper hand.

We do not deny that in a particular case toleration might be promised on condition of reciprocity ;¹ but are heterodox or infidel Princes in the habit of regulating their consciences or their policies according to our arguments or our opinions ?

¹ Thus, in 1751, Maria Theresa obtained the construction of a Catholic church at Copenhagen, in exchange for a Danish Lutheran church, which she allowed to be opened at Vienna.

Has the idea of retaliation often had anything to do with the persecutions from which Catholics have suffered ? On the contrary, that Protestant was perfectly right who declared that for the dominant religion to admit another religion to share its rights would be a very bad bargain, so little could it count on reciprocity.² We cannot talk of retaliation as logical, for error and doubt are logically tolerant while a reasonable intolerance is the logical consequence of true and assured faith. The only religion that has the right to be intolerant is that which is revealed by God, and is binding on all. Inasmuch as it is revealed by God, it places God alone, and not the teaching of any fallible teacher, above all human opinions, on which it imposes silence ; as binding upon all, it finds in its necessity a motive of charity for all its demands. No form of unbelief or free thought has, even logically, the right to be intolerant ; moreover, certitude is the natural accompaniment of truth, not of error; the opinion of a man who is in error is accidental and changeable, and the grace of God is always present to help sincere and honest souls to discover the true religion. No thought of possible consequences then requires the truth to give up its privileges, for its adversaries are not people who fight with moderation or courtesy : a certain intolerance may give them a pretext or an occasion for war, but it does not give them any real justification.

² Die Toleranz, in ihre rechtmässigen Grenzen zurückgewiesen, p. 21 ; Leipzig, 1887. See also Saurin, op. cit., p. 693, and Jurieu, op. cit., pp. 284 sqq.

Heresy, it may be objected, has its providential purpose. Who doubts it ? Every evil has its purpose, but heresy does not expect truth to call it in to fulfil its purpose. It waits for the opportunity to insinuate itself into the favour of careless or negligent persons, just as diseases attack an enfeebled body, or as in fine weather the growing heaviness of the air announces the approach of a thunderstorm. Why, then, should we open the door to heresy, and so take away from men the happiness or the hope of passing their days in peace ?

Has civil tolerance kept the promises which its sponsors made in its name ? Has it brought back the golden age ? The fight has changed its ground ; unbelief has taken the place of misbelief, and sectarian animosity turns with greater violence and insolence against a religion that has laid down its arms.

What, then, does the apology for tolerance, the apology which preceded the French Revolution, really prove ? It proves that ill-timed and tyrannical intolerance may do more harm than good ; but it proves also that the object of legitimate intolerance is not so much forced conversions as the repression of a crime and the preservation of social peace—it proves, in short, that every practical Government must take times and circumstances into consideration.

But we need no sophistical reasoning to bring us to this conclusion, and the dogma of tolerance finds in it no corroboration.

What, then, are the sources from which the arguments offered for the dogma of tolerance are derived ? With the more moderate and more honest men, the dominant consideration is that of practical necessity ; they seek to justify existing facts. With the rest it is a mere question of religious indifference. But these are discreditable sources, and we cannot pay much respect to ex post facto arguments, or those which are prompted by indifferent and contemptuous scepticism.