Chapter V: The Theory of Right Civil Tolerance

Summary : Two false doctrines opposed : absolute tolerance and absolute intolerance.—Principles and facts to be considered to arrive at a just solution.—The right of God, the revealer of truth, and the right of universal revealed religion.—Essential freedom of the act of faith. —The intolerance which would convert by force is bad. —The right and duty of every man and of mankind in general towards religious truth.—Office and competence of the civil power.—Positive duties which flow from it.—Practical rules.—Reasonable causes of exception.—Another explanation suggested by the present form of societies : is the State still competent ? —The thesis and the hypothesis.—Why speak of a thesis ?—The Encyclical Immortale Dei.—Proofs and advantages of the theory suggested.—It professes a principle of less intolerance than the ideal of Montesquieu and Bara.—No fear of a return to the severity of former times.—Paradox of M. Bouche-Leclercq.—The real fact: constant tolerance of Catholics and frequent intolerance of their adversaries.

The good government of a nation, which is an art rather than a science, is not regulated by abstract ideas. It has to reckon both with rights, the violation of which is always productive of evil effects, and with existing circumstances, which indicate what is possible and expedient, and its conduct must be regulated by principles and facts. The dogma of absolute tolerance or intolerance does not fulfil either condition. By what primary right of man, by what commandment of God, by what per-manent necessity, can absolute tolerance justify its unchanging neutrality or its cold indifference ? And what right does the State possess in itself or derive from God to proscribe always and a priori persons holding different opinions ? The two dogmas, which are equally unmindful of concrete realities, are socially demoralizing—the former by a scandalous indifference or a disastrous weakness, the latter by an inflexibility which is sometimes unjust and often tyrannical. Dogmatic intolerance, caring more for unity than truth, results only too easily in the forcible imposition of false doctrines. On the other hand, absolute tolerance leads to disorder and confusion, and the dogma of this tolerance is not only fatal to social peace, but fails to keep its promises of liberty.

It is not by denying the rights of God, or exaggerating the independence of man, or misrepresenting the functions of the State, that we arrive at the right formula of civil tolerance. The true solution is in a harmonious combination of rights, duties, and facts ; and in order to combine them, we must first see clearly what they are.

We first see that above man there is God, with His imprescriptible right to enrich created intelligence with useful or necessary truths, and to institute a religion which shall be obligatory on the whole human race. Next, we remark the fact of a religion which calls itself Catholic—that is to say, intended for the whole world—and which produces its credentials, not to put in evidence truths which we cannot know by intuition, but to make them acceptable to our reason ; not to force them on our intelligence, but to obtain a free interior act of faith in those truths. And this religion tells us that God must give the assistance of His grace to the will and intelligence of man in order that man may arrive at that absolute conviction which is expressed by the act of faith.¹ It is impossible for man to force an entry into a soul in order to implant the faith in it, and religion tells us that it would be criminal also, for God desires that His Church shall be composed of willing believers.

¹ See Rousselot, Les Yeux de la Foi (Recherches de Science Religieuse, 1910, i., pp. 241 sqq.).

It is an entire misunderstanding of Catholic intolerance to suppose that it desires to obtain conversions by force ; and when the partisans of the dogma of tolerance appeal to the inviolability of the conscience and the impossibility of producing faith by threats, they attack another kind of intolerance, which is not Catholic at all. Nay, more, they reason as Catholics do, and repeat the arguments which Catholic tradition always used against forced conversions.

The number of the faithful on whom the gift of faith has been bestowed varies with time and place. In some places there are only isolated Catholics or Christians, and there are—or, at least, there have been—communities entirely Catholic or Christian without exception.

Man has a corresponding duty and right to seek the true faith, to embrace it and keep it. He owes this duty to God, out of submission and gratitude; he owes it to himself, for to him it is the principle of all good ; he owes it to his fellow-men, for his profession of faith is helpful to others. But for this per-sonal duty he is not responsible to any human or social authority, since God does not desire that men should be forced to the faith, and the mysterious difficulties which keep men from the faith or lead them astray from it are not under the control of men.

Men who are united in possession of the faith, are bound by the same obligations; religious truth is a gift which they may not cast away, a common inheritance which it is their duty to preserve, a principle of excellent charity which they must practise towards all men. But as all men do not receive the faith, so also all men do not keep it. Apostasies may be individual or collective. Men may simply lose their faith or profess new doctrines. Sometimes it is done quietly, and sometimes it causes scandal and commotion ; but we generally find that these defections are contagious, and that a reformer, even when he starts independently and without any mission, may seduce the masses, especially if the relaxation of discipline or the appearance of abuses in the Church furnishes a specious pretext for his denunciations.

The civil power, in its turn, represents the community for the fulfilment of its duties and the promotion of its interests. It cannot enforce intellectual and moral unity, for the only unity that is a blessing is unity in the truth ;¹ nor religious truth, for God has made that a matter of free acceptance. But it is the duty, as it is the interest, of the community to protect religious truth and to encourage its diffusion. For this twofold reason, and in the measure of its competence, the civil power ought, as the organ of society, to give to the true religion all the help and support possible. As the natural protector of the weak, it is bound to save them from being led away by want of thought.

¹ Unity always brings a certain peace ; but unity in error deprives society of all the blessings which result from truth, and is by nature as precarious as error itself. As we have already said, a long and peaceful reign of error may be explained by accidental causes, such as the lethargy of the people, or the truth mixed with the error.

And the interest due to religious truth attaches, in fact, to the Church, the spiritual society divinely established to teach and spread that truth, and to gather the faithful together. In giving this assistance to the Church, the State can neither absorb the Church nor be absorbed by it.

From these preliminary considerations there flows a moderate doctrine—tolerant or intolerant, as may be. This doctrine may be called Catholic, because it is based on the principles of true religion, and it may also be called practical, not in the sense in which we speak of a practical man, as distinguished from an imaginative man, but because, without neglecting any right or duty, it satisfies real practical necessities, making man as free as is expedient, and society as united, prosperous, and happy, as can be hoped for in the circumstances.

The rules of application of this doctrine may be formulated as follows :

The Sovereign who has the faith will encourage religion, without going beyond his powers or failing in justice, and will keep all the promises by which he is bound.

In a Catholic society the true religion will be publicly honoured and protected. The precautions which justice permits, which are expedient in con-sideration of times and places and persons, will be taken to preserve to the community the blessing of unity in the true faith. For this purpose, the civil power may declare that any public contradiction of the faith or the propagation of heterodox doctrines is an offence, and may inflict reasonable punishment for it.

But no violence may be used, and no acquired right may be interfered with, to impose religious unity on a society which does not possess it, or which, having possessed it, has lost it.

The favour which it owes to the true religion is a positive duty of the State, and requires action on its part. Grave and adequate reasons may dispense from positive duties, and sometimes circumstances render the protection of religion morally impossible. Even the interests of true religion itself may suggest a prudent forbearance. It may be that the liberty granted to error may give greater freedom to truth, or that in the divided state of public opinion on religious subjects it is better for true religion to enter into competition with error on common ground, rather than shelter itself behind privileges.

Such reasons justify the neutrality of the civil power, and it may also be explained by the provision in the positive constitution of many contemporary States which forbids any other attitude. The system of political organizations tends more and more to insist on express stipulations inserted in what is called the fundamental pact of the country. When a charter of this kind, peacefully accepted by the nation, has laid down that the Government shall not interfere in religious questions, are we not justified in holding that differences of opinion, regrettable though they may be, have led the citizens to a tacit understanding not to put their religious interests in common ? Agreeing to be left to themselves and their own devices, they adopt towards religion an attitude which shows they are no longer one body. Their social union has ceased to be complete, and the representatives of the State have no official obligation to protect or defend religion, but also they have no right to oppress it.

This abnormal situation, in which the State to a greater or less extent gives up one part of its functions, is called the hypothesis. The thesis, then, is verified in a society that is wholly Christian. Does this mean that it takes place oftener than the hypothesis ? By no means ; it does not necessarily follow. We may compare the thesis to an ideal, the perfect realization of which is not possible in this world. Why, then, speak of thesis and hypothesis, and not say simply that we must leave it to circumstances to decide on the attitude to be adopted towards religion ? That would not express our meaning, because we cannot accept with equal satisfaction unity in religious truth, and a division which puts so many of our brethren out of the way of salvation; because no compromise can have the value or advantages of peace based on true concord ; because communion in the truth is an object for which we must always strive, prudently, no doubt, and without violence, but constantly. And even where complete realization cannot be obtained, it is a great blessing to come near it, and to possess in the ideal that we cherish and the reality that we accept with resignation an end of our efforts, and a rule by which we may measure our social progress. We cannot regard with indifference the two situations or the two official attitudes which may be adopted without falling into a listless and enervating scepticism.

The sight of a Protestant steeple rising alongside a Catholic bell-tower in one of the smiling landscapes on the banks of the Rhine awakens the thought of a sad and painful division ; the insolent emblems displayed on a Masonic temple, with all they suggest of human pride, disturb the peace and serenity produced by the contemplation of a majestic cathedral. A religious procession is soothing and edifying, while an atheistic demonstration is irritating and offensive ; and this pain, this annoyance, this irritation, show that man, when he follows his natural inclination, does not look on all things as indifferent in religious matters. They tell us where is the order we long for and the necessity to which we must submit. But, however acutely he may feel these things, the sincere Christian does not harbour any thought of violence or persecution ; his suffering only produces a desire to spread the knowledge of the truth.

Leo XIII. wrote on the Christian constitution of States a memorable Encyclical—Immortale Dei (November 1, 1885)—and a careful perusal of that document will reveal therein the principles from which we started, and the practical rules we have here formulated. The following short extract sums up the most important of our assertions : “ The Church, indeed, deems it unlawful to place the different forms of worship on the same footing as the true religion. But it does not on that account condemn those rulers who, for the sake of securing some great good, and hindering some great evil, patiently allow custom or usage to be a kind of sanction for each religion having its place in the State. And the Church is wont to take great care that no person shall be forced to embrace the Catholic faith against his will. For Augustine wisely reminds us, ‘ Man cannot believe otherwise than of his own free will.’ ”¹

¹ Tract 26 in Joann., n. 2.

This doctrine, derived from the true mission and duties of man, sacrifices no duty, human or Divine; it conceals no truth, either of principle or of fact. It takes man as he is, with his present life and his future destiny ; it does not isolate him from the community, or allow him to be oppressed by it; it takes account of the body, without forgetting the soul.

True theoretically by all that it asserts of God, religion, civil society, authority, and liberty, it shows itself practically true by its consideration of existing circumstances. It recognizes and deplores the seductions and perversions that result from certain liberties, but it knows that if we try to remove all the ills that trouble us, we run a risk of falling into worse misfortune.

Nevertheless, it does not forget that man and society are capable of being made perfect, in order to preserve its ideal without seeking to enforce it inopportunely.

This doctrine, which is thus in harmony with the personal dignity of man, his social nature, and his desire for improvement, and which takes proper account of existing circumstances and the possibilities of the future, possesses in the very clearness of its rules, and the simplicity of the reasons which support it, a new confirmation of its truth.¹

¹ See Laurentius, S.J., in Stimmen, t. 68, p. 27.

Victor Jacobs, in his remarkable article in the Revue Générale,² wrote thus : “ These rules of the government of the world must not make us forget the ideal for which some Liberal writers showed a preference ”; and he went on to quote Montesquieu and Bara : “ It would be a very good law, when the State is satisfied with the religion already established, not to permit the establishment of another. . . . This, then, is the fundamental principle of political laws in matters of religion : when there is a choice of admitting or not admitting a new religion into the State, it should not be established ; but when it is established, it should be tolerated.”³ This is the opinion of Montesquieu, and Bara declares that “ in theory, the theocratic form of government is the true one. . . . The ideal is the supremacy of one single religion, and its identification with the governing power. . . . The system of the complete separation of the State and religions is only a last resource.”⁴

² Les Droits Naturels de l’Homme, 1880.

³ Esprit des Lois, lxxv., chap. x.

⁴ Essai sur les Rapports entre l’État et les Religions au Point de Vue Constitutionnel, pp. 9, 12.

In Montesquieu we find the thesis and the hypothesis. Bara declares for the hypothesis ; but both exaggerate it, and give it a scope which we consider inadmissible and dangerous to liberty. The former, an advocate of one single religion approved by the State, would logically justify all the old persecu-tions without regard for the truth; the latter similarly cares too little for the true religion, and he has nothing to substitute for the radical separation, which we agree with him in describing as a last resource, but theocracy, an identification of religion with government, in which we denounce the principle of absolute and unrestrained despotism.

Everywhere and always we insist on the distinction between the domain of religion and the domain of civil authority. We maintain that above each of these there is an independent and sovereign authority, in order by this very distinction and this balance of power to set up a bulwark against tyranny and provide a refuge for liberty.

Will anyone venture, in spite of all that has been said, to evoke the punishments and tortures of former times, to dissuade men from accepting our theory and our ideal ? We answer with Victor Jacobs : “ If ever religious unity comes back to life, it will be reflected in the laws, but the spirit of the age will be reflected in them no less.”¹

¹ Art. cit., p. 672.

What is called civil intolerance has many shades, and does not necessarily mean persecution. The intolerance which the thesis demands is not aggressive. It does not impose a faith or a conviction, but it defends the weak and the welfare of the community.

What is there to be afraid of ? Is it not a fact that our formula, derived from the duties of men and society, more modest and much less dogmatic, has given much more real liberty than the pompous but profitless Declaration of the Rights of Man ? In the beginning, in the first years of schism and separation, the necessity of accommodating the political system to a situation so new and strange was lost sight of by Catholics and their theologians —they erred by an excess of conservatism ; but since the necessity became evident, these same Catholics have been, and always will be, themselves most scrupulous in their observance of the treaties concluded and the liberties granted. This fact is self-evident. Our adversaries themselves, however difficult they find it to get rid of their prejudices, bear witness to our moderation. During the eighty years of its freedom and independence, Belgium has presented this remarkable contrast in the conduct of political parties: When the Catholics have been in power, even with an enormous majority, they have left all constitutional liberties intact, and maintained them with scrupulous loyalty to their promises; whereas the Liberals or Anticlericals, even when in a minority, have attacked these liberties, treated the Constitution as a fraud, and contemplated measures of persecution and confiscation. The paradox of M. Bouché-Leclercq¹ might be expressed in this form : The champions of what are called intolerant doctrines guard and defend liberty ; their adversaries deny and attack it—nay, more, they violate it already by the intolerant conception of their tolerance itself.

¹ “ The champions of intolerant doctrines declaring for liberty, and their adversaries seeking to impose tolerance upon them by force ” (L’Intolérance Religieuse et la Politique, p. 362).