Second Section: Historical View

I. The Past.

1. General Conclusions.

Summary : Danger of books which treat of one particular point—for instance, the Inquisition.—Ill-informed and partial authors.—Reasoned appreciation of the past in general, of heresy, the procedure against heresy, and its severe repression.—The principles were just, the intentions generally honest.—Testimony of Paulsen as to the probable necessity of this severity.—Indulgence necessary for our own age.

It is difficult to get a true impression of facts from works which treat of one special point only in a long controverted subject, especially if this subject embraces facts and theories in which human passions and weakness are concerned. The difficulty arises from the specialism of the authors, who confine their attention to one period and one country, and therefore can only give a very brief account of anterior events and the circumstances of neighbouring countries. The opinions and practices they describe are too much detached from the events which led up to them, and which explain and perhaps justify them. Facts scattered through different centuries and countries are crowded together as if they belonged to the same time and place, and the appeal to general custom does not sufficiently explain the use of methods and procedure adopted for one special purpose. We have a realistic picture of which the details, taken singly, are true, but the general effect is false and misleading. To correct these optical errors, impartial authors have en-deavoured to use a kind of perspective, with the result that their readers have distrusted the accuracy of their recital. In short, as the wars of a monarch do not show the real character of his reign, in the same way we cannot judge of the Church’s tolerance by the Inquisition alone.

What shall we say of authors who write without any qualification for the task ; of ignorant persons who, for want of complete information, cannot form an accurate judgment; of prejudiced persons who exploit the past only for the purpose of exciting hatred ; of “ pragmatists ” who, by their concessions and admissions, seek to create for themselves a reputation for impartiality, and to give the Church the benefit of extenuating circumstances ?¹

¹ See G. Sorel, Réflexions sur la Violence, p. 393.

The wide scope of our inquiry saves us from any danger of this kind, and as in our review of events and doctrines facts and theories have been presented in their proper historical order, we naturally have a true picture of the long struggle of the Church and the civil powers against heresy ; and without any need of accidental and imperfect excuses, suggested by the personality of the heretics or the acts of intolerance laid to their charge, the Catholic doctrine and the action of the Church are shown in a more favourable light than would have seemed possible without the study and examination that is now brought to a close.

To sum up the results of our inquiry. No preconceived idea impelled the Church to demand the punishment of heretics, or to have recourse to any but ecclesiastical penalties ; but little by little the violent conduct of certain sects, and the force used by them to retain their disciples, led to special repressions which prepared the way for a more general proscription.

Heresy in our Western countries did not present itself merely as a platonic or speculative contradiction of doctrine ; it set up a revolutionary principle in opposition to the Church. Theoretical discussion, if there was any, was a secondary weapon, which served it to support a movement subversive of ecclesiastical authority and often of social order.¹ We need not, then, imagine a new theological controversy, cut short by the sword ; the retractation of error was insisted upon less for its own sake than as an indication of submission to lawful authority. The Church did not desire so much to attack men’s convictions as to organize her own defence.

¹ M. Jordan, in his articles frequently quoted, quoting M. Giraud, admits this for the end of the Middle Ages. “ In a time when human thought was most commonly expressed under a theological form, doctrines of socialism, communism, and anarchy, were preached under the form of heresy. . . . The great heresies of the end of the Middle Ages, such as those of the Fraticelli, the Lollards, Hussites, and Anabaptists, were social or national revolts almost as much as religious innovations, and were the cause of trouble and bloodshed.”

Laws of exceptional severity may be meant simply to terrify, and the most elementary honesty obliges us to judge of legislation, not only by the text of the laws, but also by their application. As we have seen, this was the object of the terrible laws of Theodosius ; and M. Pirenne, speaking of the cruel proclamations of Charles V., tells us that “ most of them [the echevins] regarded the proclamations as mere bugbears designed to frighten the people, but that they were to be applied with discretion, the punishment being made proportionate to the crime ”;¹ and, according to the testimony of Lea,² the Inquisition did not take proceedings against all persons who were liable to prosecution under the laws then in force.

¹ Histoire de Belgique, t. 3, p. 355.

² “ There was one class of offenders who would have afforded the Inquisition an ample field for its authority had it been disposed to take cognizance of them. By the Canons anyone who had endured excommunication for a year without submission and seeking absolution was pronounced suspect of heresy. In 1301 the Council of Rheims directed that proceedings should be commenced, when it next should meet, against all who had been under excommunication for two years, as being suspect of heresy, and in 1303 it called on all such to come forward and purge themselves of the suspicion ; but the Court in which this was to be done was that of the Bishops, and not of the Inquisition ” (op. cit., t. 2, p. 122).

In short, the repression of heresy was not signalized by any increase of judicial severity, but, on the contrary, its influence on the penal system was rather favourable than otherwise.³ In occupying itself with the reformation of the criminal, it drew an attention to one object of punishment which was at that time very little considered ; and in introducing the practice of imprisonment,⁴ it made possible all the humanitarian reforms of criminal legislation. But, for all that, we cannot reconcile the institutions of the past with our present ideas : these ideas require to be enlarged. In order to understand thoroughly the severe punishments prescribed and sometimes inflicted for heresy, we need to have the lively faith of the Middle Ages, and to attach the same importance as the men of that time to religious unity for the good of civil society. We need to take careful account, on the one hand, of the revolutionary conduct and language of many heretics, and, on the other hand, of the disorder and agitation produced by heresy in the whole community. In short, we need to put ourselves in the place of men whose thoughts and sentiments and judgments were suggested by a civilization ruder than our own, and, above all, infinitely more cruel in its measures of repression.

³ On this subject see the pamphlet of M. Labrocquière already quoted, De l’Influence de la Législation Canonique sur la Législation Criminelle; Bastia, 1877.

⁴ This punishment was then called emmuraillement, or walling in ; and sectarian misrepresentation has not failed to make use of this unfortunate word for the purpose of showing that prisoners were buried alive with walls built round them.

Our own conclusions—even those which are most reasonable and just, and practically true, though based on unchangeable principles—are, at the same time, influenced to some extent by accidental circumstances, by which posterity will not be affected. Thus it is that, because they cannot make allowance for circumstances, men condemn without reserve the public opinion which called for the death of heretics, the laws which sanctioned it, and the magistrates who administered the law. They judge the past and lay down the law for the future as if the past, the present, and the future, occupied the same plane on the scene of history ; as if political and social problems presented themselves at different times in the same conditions.

This irresponsible criticism of the past is just as absurd as the infatuation of some people who see absolute perfection in our existing institutions, as if no further progress were possible. But it is easy to declaim against the prejudices of the past ; would it not be more practicable to be on our guard against the prejudices of the present ?

We take so much account nowadays of the relativity of knowledge that we ought to make a double allowance for our ancestors. Let us explain. We consider our own convictions and environment, and we condemn such-and-such a method or system of former days, such-and-such a law or decision, and are quite ready to express an opinion as to what ought to have been done. Perhaps our advice may be the best to-day ; but would it have been the best in the former circumstances ? And if the answer is not already negative, let us ask ourselves a further question: Would the advice have been possible or practicable, regard being had to the opinions prevalent at the time ? The principles of justice are absolute, but we learn by experience how to apply them better and better ; and can we blame our predecessors for not having learned the lessons taught by subsequent events ? At this rate the physicians of former days deserved to be criminally prosecuted, and our magistrates ought to be ashamed to occupy a bench disgraced by the bloodthirsty judges of old times.

If we wish to be fair in our estimate of past legislation and jurisprudence, let us look at the principles that were applied, and the intentions of those who applied them. Were those principles just ? Were those intentions honest ? Men may have been mistaken, but they cannot be condemned for their mistakes.

We must be careful not to say lightly, or without a sufficient consideration of their circumstances, that they were mistaken. As we have seen, the repression of heresy cannot be better described, from its dominant character, than as a political and social defence organized according to the science and art of the time for the preservation of institutions which were esteemed essential—religion, family, property—and more especially to establish the principle of authority in the Church and the State. We may regret the severity of this defence, and condemn its excesses and abuses, but we cannot blame the principle or deny the inevitable necessity.

The following remarks of the Protestant moralist Paulsen supply us with matter for reflection :¹ “ The Middle Ages are blamed for having burned heretics and sorcerers, for having put accused persons to the question, and for having put to death thousands of criminals. It must be admitted that such manners are wanting in elegance and refinement, but it does not follow that a ruder age than our own was wrong in adopting such measures. It may be that frequent abuses occurred, but it may also be true— though the nature of things renders it difficult to prove—that the methods employed were appropriate to the times, and therefore necessary. Perhaps in the disciplinary formation of character the Church² fulfils such an indispensable condition of progress towards a higher civilization that history will justify the Middle Ages in having resisted, in the most resolute manner, all attempts to escape from that discipline ; and that was the object to which every heretical movement was most generally directed. The whole criminal procedure of the period, with its cruel methods, was, perhaps, temporarily necessary, to permit the transition to the complicated social life of the cities of the Middle Ages. We may congratulate ourselves that the organization of our law-courts and our police has been made perfect, and that they succeed in obtaining as good, or better results by more humane methods ; but that does not prove that our methods would have been able to preserve the peace in the Middle Ages. The Middle Ages might well reply to our criticism : ‘ If such mild repression is enough for you, you are indebted to us for the fact ; our labours, continued through several centuries, destroyed the elements which were incompatible with social order. It was not an agreeable task, but it is hardly fair to make it a grievance against us, and, moreover, no one knows how long your own procedure will suffice to save you from trouble.’ ”

¹ System der Ethik, fifth edition, p. 21. Paulsen died in 1909, while a professor in Berlin.

² It must be remembered that the most rigorous part of the education was not the work of the Church.

If we remember also that heresies had for their declared adversaries saints and men whom even Lea¹ describes as “ men of the kindliest tempers, the pro- foundest intelligence, the noblest associations, the purest zeal for righteousness, professing a religion founded on love and charity,” shall we not see in their attitude a new and grave reason for being very careful before we absolutely condemn what they practised and approved ?

¹ Op. cit., t. 1, p. 234.

We might, moreover, pay dearly in the future for a too inflexible severity of judgment. The Bulls and Edicts issued against heresy, and the courts and tribunals established to exterminate it,¹ were machines which may be compared to those tremendous armaments which different nations of modern Europe find necessary to insure peace and order within and respect to their frontiers from without. If those laws and tribunals are comparable to our engines of war by their object, they were much less destructive of human life, and were even capable of preventing greater bloodshed. A day will perhaps come when wars will seem absurd and criminal, and when countless tears will be shed over the millions of innocent men who have fallen on the battle-field for some national cause. Let us show the wisdom we should wish our descendants to possess if ever tribunals of arbitration succeed in bringing back a sort of golden age ; let us judge of past deeds by the light of former days ; let us appreciate present necessities by the light we now possess. Thus, without doing injustice to those who have gone before us, we may adopt new practical rules for new situations, and apply our unchanging principles to changing circumstances. The wave of events has swept away the Inquisition and extinguished the fires of the stake. We may bid farewell to them without regret, and without any desire to see them rekindled, but we must not assume that their use was to be entirely condemned.

¹ This is another word which has been much misused. Exterminare means literally to drive out, to expel, to banish. The Fourth Council of the Lateran obliged Sovereigns to exterminare heretics ; but if we translate the Latin word by the English exterminate, we make it appear that the Council and Pope Innocent III. wished to make a bloody sacrifice of all heretics. 22

2. The Inquisition in Particular.

Summary : Points to be remembered in connection with the nature of the institution and the number of the victims.

Many persons speak and even write of the Inquisition who would find very great difficulty in stating exactly what it was.

On this subject it is important to remember— That there were several Inquisitions, greatly differing in their constitution, their character, and their severity.

That, as a full and impartial history of the tribunals of the Inquisition has not yet been written, their action, especially since the sixteenth century, still remains wrapped in obscurity.

That the Inquisition did not introduce either capital punishment or the stake,¹ but that it regularized the procedure against heresy. The stake is an invention of the secular power, a legacy of the Pagan Empire, and of customs resumed in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. This legacy was first accepted by an enemy of the Papacy, a Prince who has the reputation of having been a freethinker—Frederic II.

¹ “ We might thus write all the history of penal legislation against heretics . . . almost without referring to the Canons which instituted the Inquisition. Certainly these Canons kept close to the penal laws, and sometimes even encroached upon them ; but their object was different, and their history should remain distinct ” (Maillet-Hanquet, op. cit., p. 87).

That the use of torture revived with the revival of the popularity of Roman law, and any Pope who ventured to reject this means of investigation would most probably have been taxed with bigotry and narrowmindedness.¹

¹ “ The use of torture is evidently derived from the Roman law. It was first employed by the secular authority, and later was applied by the subordinate agents of the Inquisitors, under the orders of the latter ” (Hinschius, System der Kath. Kirchenrechts, t. 5, p. 485).

That the executions of heretics were ordered from the point of view that such persons were a source of danger to the community.

The number of persons condemned to death cannot be exactly stated, but it is interesting to observe how remarkably the figures are reduced when we turn from the works of prejudiced writers to those that are more impartial and better supported by evidence.

Take one remarkable example with reference to the Spanish Inquisition. A French school reader, bearing the signature of “ Primaire ” (a pseudonym), attributes to this Inquisition two millions of victims in ten years. A. Rambaud, in his Histoire de la Civilisation Française (t. 1, p. 327), gives the number as three hundred thousand for three centuries and a half. Llorente, who was very ill-disposed to the Inquisition, brings it down for the same period to thirty thousand.² According to Mgr. Landrieux,³ recent German investigations reduce this still further to ten thousand ; and, finally, Gams puts it at four thousand only.⁴

² T. 4, p. 271. Exactly 31,912, to which he adds 17,659 persons burned in effigy.

³ L’Inquisition, etc., p. 147. We have taken from this author the quotation from “Primaire.”

⁴ Die Kirchengeschichte von Spanien, vol. iii., sec. 2, l. 13, p. 76. The figures are disputed after p. 68.

II. The Present and the Future,

i. The Present.

Summary : Tolerant unbelievers and fanatical unbelievers.— Testimony of Balmès, of MM. Barrès, Piou, and Picard. —Moderation of Catholics in their acts, their speeches, and their writings.

Balmès¹ well divides into two classes those men who follow no religious banner.

¹ Le Protestantisme, etc., t. 1, p. 167.

Some simply have no faith ; they are sceptical rather than irreligious, and freely admit the services that religion has rendered, and still renders, to society ; and the Church receives from their lips honourable testimony, which we gladly use in her defence. Tolerance is easy and natural to them, though there is little merit in it.

Others, on the contrary, profess a hatred of religion, or, rather, as they say, a hatred of the Church. “ These men,” says Balmès, “ are intolerant in the extreme, and their intolerance is the worst of all, for it is not accompanied by any moral principle capable of restraining it.” Certainly, they pride themselves on being preachers of tolerance, and make that the pretext of their war against the Church. But, as we have known liberalism which was merely another name for religious indifference, so in the mouths of these men “ tolerance ” may be translated as “ free-thought,” and of this free-thought they make a dogma, the only one they recognize—a dogma which they impose on others by all the means that the modern State places at their dis-posal: the dispersion of religious associations, pressure put upon an army of office-holders, official teaching rendered practically obligatory by a monopoly, in fact, if not by law.¹ “You are now on the way,” said M. Barrès to the freethinkers who now tyrannize over France—“ you are now on the way to try a new kind of religion—a haphazard religion, which you wish to raise to the dignity of a religion of State, of which the schoolmasters are to be the beneficiaries ; and you exact penal laws against the heretics who venture to criticize your school manuals and the propositions of your schoolmasters.”² Another representative of unbigoted unbelief, a Belgian, formulated his judgment in these terms : “ They call this ‘ government,’ but it ought rather to be called ‘ tyranny,’ and that the worst and most odious kind of all—not tyranny by a stranger, but by compatriots ; half the nation seizing the other half by the throat, and hustling it off to the lock-up. Oh, what an abominable crew are these fanatics ! It is, I will not say a freethinker, but a thinker free from unreasoning prejudice, who cannot help proclaiming the truth.”³

¹ Even in Belgium M. Janson proposed to reserve all public offices for those who had made their studies in the State schools. And will not liberty be made so onerous to Catholics that the poor children in the cities will have no other but the official schools at their disposal ?

² Educational debate in the French Chamber, January, 1910.

³ Picard, weekly article in the Chronique, March 4, 1911.

To anyone who will keep his eyes and ears open, it must be evident that, since the French Revolution, or, rather, since the advent of rationalism, and even since the legists, true Catholics have not been on the side of the persecutors, but of the persecuted. It is not for the power of oppression, but for freedom, that they have fought—at one time against the despotism of Cæsar, at another against that of the sects and the Masonic lodges. The attitude they adopt everywhere to-day is described by this eloquent peroration of M. Piou : “ We challenge you to fight on the field of liberty ; for if the stronger party insists on using the State, the budget, the administration of government, all public authority, merely to secure its own advantage, to crush its adversaries, and persecute them even in their consciences —this is tyranny of the most odious description. There are issues between us on which we are irreconcilably divided ; but at least let us come to an understanding, and live at liberty and peace together.”¹

¹ Educational debate in the French Chamber, 1910.

Such appeals, unfortunately, are made to no purpose, when a Catholic minority finds itself opposed to an irreligious majority ; and, on the other hand, when Catholics are in the majority, according to the famous saying, “ they astonish the world by their moderation.” “ It is time,” wrote M. Goyau, “ that the hateful and lying accusation should, once for all, be withdrawn—viz., that Catholics in power would refuse to others that liberty which Catholics in the minority ask of others for themselves. Belgium bears witness to the contrary.”²

² L’Œuvre du parti Catholique Belge, in Correspondant of September 10, 1911. The expression was attributed to Louis Veuillot, who always denied having used it.

These acts, which speak more strongly than words, only confirm the unanimous declarations made by all Catholics who have taken part in public affairs in any position whatever. If some Catholic treatise, published for the use of theological students, contains a platonic dissertation on the theoretical power which the Church possesses over heretics, and contains statements which the enemies of religion seize upon with avidity,¹ no Catholic author, even in Latin, ever thinks nowadays of suggesting such persecuting measures as the enemies of religion would not hesitate to employ, however loudly they may protest their hatred of persecution.² Neither in Pontifical encyclicals,³ nor in parliamentary speeches, nor books, reviews, or newspapers published by Catholics, can we find a suggestion of oppressive measures. In this matter the German Centre party is at one with the French Catholic parties and the Belgian Right. “ I have said over and over again,” said M. Woeste,¹ “ that Belgium needs to become more Christian. Can this end be attained by oppression ? No; it is by liberty that we hope to reach it.” Catholic University teaching is on the same lines. The Rector of the Catholic faculties at Toulouse, Mgr. Breton, wrote recently : “ Montalembert believed, and we may believe with him, that liberty of worship, as at present established in modern nations, is a necessary consequence of the division of opinions on the subject of religion, and that the interests of the Church make tolerance a duty.”² He had previously quoted these other words from the same author : “ Accept the free fight of error against truth ; there is no life henceforth except in complete liberty for all, the same for all.”³

¹ How eager they are to find an opportunity of declaring that they are in fear of their lives ! A literary man, Dr. Demade, proposed in a review to erect a statue to the Duke of Alva, for having placed at the service of Catholicism a sword which so many other men had turned against it. What an excitement there was in the Press of the Left! “ These Catholics want to cut our heads off !” And yet the enemies of religion will name one of the streets in Brussels after Ferrer, one of the ringleaders of the odious and bloody revolt at Barcelona ; and Catholics are told they have no right to protest against the proceedings of Ferrer’s admirers. The intentions of the man himself may be gathered from the following words : “ In order to show my contempt for the prejudices of religion, patriotism, and authority, I refuse to show any respect for the dead. I will not attend any funeral, or take off my hat before a dead body.” (Huelga General, November 25, 1901 ; words quoted by L’Anarchiste, November, 1911).

² For instance, in reference to the persecutions in France and Portugal.

³ See Encyclical Immortale Dei.

¹ Belgian Chamber, December 1, 1910.

² See Bulletin de Toulouse, 1910, p. 422.

³ Ibid., p. 414.

2. The Future.

Summary : Objection against Catholics: their moderation is only impotence.—Reply.—Catholics have no persecuting principle.—What they would do if they had a majority ; what they would do if religious unity were once more a fact.—Words of Lamennais.—Notorious defect of our existing institutions.—They cannot last for ever.—Conjectures as to the distant future are idle. —At present, as in the near future, tolerance is not called in question except by the Jacobins of the twentieth century.

There was once a reformer who thought himself a philanthropist. His reflections on the evil consequences of brawls and contentions led him to invent and disseminate a doctrine which absolutely forbade the use of force on any pretext whatever, even in legitimate self-defence. One day, when walking on the highroad, he met someone who contradicted him. Being the stronger of the two, and having no hope of convincing the other man, he rushed upon him and knocked him down. When his victim, who was utterly amazed at his behaviour, ventured to protest, he explained : “ I knock you down because I am sure that, so long as you do not share my opinions, you will some day try to knock me down.” In this way the professor of forbearance parried by real blows in the present the problematical blows of the future, and it must be admitted that in substituting his own system for the old rules on the subject of self-defence, our philanthropist did not lose much by the exchange.

This little fable serves to illustrate the position and conduct of Catholics and the anti-Church party respectively. On the subject of tolerance the latter professes absolute ideas which the former do not share, and do not intend to share at any price ; the anti-Church party therefore claims the right to exclude them from the general truce, of which it is the self-constituted herald, and it starts against them a relentless campaign, which stops at nothing. As this anti-Church party has no other adversaries but the Catholics, it earns a very cheap reputation for magnanimity ; its tolerance, which is universal in theory, is in practice reserved for its friends.

Has this party any right to put forward its alleged fear for the future as an excuse for its violence in the present ? Has it any justification for the suggestion that the generosity of Catholics is the generosity of impotence ? If we were masters, would our principles compel us to become persecutors ?

We may put out of question the torture and the stake, for the more honest of our opponents are quite willing to admit that they do not suspect us of any bloodthirsty intentions. But there may be persecution without bloodshed ; it is persecution when men are punished for professing any particular form of religious belief, and that is what Catholics are accused of wishing to introduce. The charge is false, as we can easily prove from Catholic doctrine.

Pagan or Jacobin reasons of State permitted violence and oppression, but what reason of Church can exist for the same ? The Catholic statesman can have but one point of view—that of the public good, which demands respect for all rights, fidelity to all promises, and the Gospel in which he believes is not to be preached by violence.

Let us suppose the Catholic party with a political majority, by which we mean such a crushing majority as to make them secure against all attacks. They have in opposition a coalition of Protestants and unbelievers, whom they are bound to protect in the enjoyment of all their civil rights equally with all the citizens of the State. These non-Catholics have not, as such, committed any offence which permits them to be deprived of it; they have not failed in any social obligation. Therefore their personal liberty is unassailable ; their rights must remain intact.

But let us go farther. What would Catholics do if the whole country returned to the true faith ? They would certainly endeavour to preserve the immense blessing of religious unity. But would it be their duty for this purpose to make heresy a crime, to punish it by fire and imprisonment ? There is nothing to prove it. We have already quoted the admirable words of Victor Jacobs : “ If ever religious unity returns, it will be reflected in the laws ; but it will be equally reflected in the spirit of the age.”¹ Lamennais was right when he said : “ It is not given to any man to foresee what will be the exact relations between Church and State when the time comes ; but it is certain that there will be a close alliance, spiritual and political, between the two societies, though we cannot tell what form it will take ”²

¹ Article quoted, p. 672.

² Des Progrès de la Révolution, ch. 3.

We have no absurd dream of a return to the past. The true Catholic is not the reactionary that he is represented to be ; he recognizes the providentially destructive influence of time, which swept away the Inquisition, as it swept away feudalism and the old Roman Empire. If he believes in the resurrection, he knows it will only give him back his body transfigured. Every age receives from the preceding ages some good which it is bound to add to and hand on to the age that succeeds. The good is handed on like a jewel in its setting ; the setting, indeed, wears out, and is replaced by a new one, which, in its turn, is also discarded. Such is the law of progress, which forbids us to look too much behind us, but at the same time warns us against believing in the permanence of our existing institutions. And certainly an end must be put to that unrestricted licence of misrepresentation,¹ still permitted to the corrupters of the multitude, while truth possesses no practical means of stopping the mouths of the liars.

¹ Many persons besides Catholics see the impossible situation into which we are drifting. The opinion of a former French Minister, published in the Action of October, 1911, is worthy of note : “ The evil which is destroying our fleet is the same which is devouring our army, our public administration, our public services, our system of parliamentary government, our whole society. This evil is anarchy—that is to say, such a disordered condition of minds and affairs that nothing is done as reason demands that it should be done, and no man behaves in accordance with the dictates of his professional or moral duty.”

In this we see the one disadvantage under which the Church labours to-day. She has nothing to fear from honest controversy, but she has to be always on her guard against a shameless calumny which misrepresents her doctrine, travesties her worship, and throws an unmerited discredit on her ministers. But even for the preservation of religious unity it is not necessary to make heresy an offence punishable under the penal code. Catholics have only, as we think, to hope for the disappearance of that hateful and immoral habit of lying, which common sense and the instinct of social self-preservation will be forced by events to repudiate and destroy.

We think we have said more than enough to dispose of the objection, and reply to the question. The latter is only serious when it takes this form: in modern society, in the situations which we are able to understand and appreciate, would Catholics in power suppress a single one of the liberties which are so dear to the present generation ? A categorical negative is the answer given by their acts, their words, and their very principles.

If in the course of time new social necessities arose, they would be guided by circumstances. We need not here explain what measures would then be adopted; but we may be sure that they would be such as would be necessary for the public welfare, and would be generally approved, and would not then, any more than they can now, give any reason for attack or complaint. And why should we be afraid of what would satisfy everyone ?

We may add, however, that, unlike the principles of their opponents, Catholic principles contain nothing suggestive of tyranny or persecution, nothing which need alarm the most convinced advocate of reasonable liberty.

Let us have done with hypocrisy and shams. The opposition to tolerance comes, not from Catholics, but from their enemies. The Church has no desire to persecute, but she has good reason to fear persecution.¹

¹ Probably not bloody persecution ; the stake is not in fashion nowadays, though others have very gloomy views of the future. According to Dr. Gustave Le Bon, “ M. Georges Sorel very reasonably prophesies that the first proceeding of triumphant Socialism would be to massacre all its adversaries without mercy” (Les Opinions et les Croyances, p. 236).