Abduction as an impediment

582. Nature of the Impediment. 1. The impediment of abduction consists in this, that matrimony between a man who abducts an unwilling woman for the sake of entering matrimony, and the abducted woman, so long as she exists in the power of the abductor, is null.¹

a. Abduction, insofar as it is a diriment impediment of matrimony, is defined: the abduction of an unwilling woman for the sake of entering matrimony.

b. Although grave fear is most often joined with abduction, nevertheless the impediment of abduction does not dirimently impede matrimony by reason of fear unjustly inflicted, but is a special impediment distinct from fear.

2. This impediment exists only between the abductor and the abducted woman, but not between the abducted woman and other men who, e.g., carried out the abduction in favor of another.

If someone, thinking that by abducting a certain woman he will do something pleasing for his friend, abducts her without the friend's knowledge and brings her into his own house, the friend can validly contract with her, because he is not the abductor.

3. The impediment exists so long as the woman is under the power of the abductor, even if after the abduction she freely consents to matrimony; but as soon as she has been endowed with liberty, the impediment ceases without dispensation. Hence if, placed outside the power of the abductor, she freely consents, the abductor can have her as wife. It makes no difference whether the abductor by himself or through others detains the abducted woman in his power.

4. The impediment of abduction is of ecclesiastical law only, and it was established lest an abducted woman consent to matrimony from fear, and therefore for protecting the liberty of matrimonial consent.²

In the impediment of abduction the Church is not accustomed to dispense. Nevertheless, if the abducted woman freely consents to matrimony, it sometimes permits matrimony by dispensing, although the woman has not yet been restored to a safe place.³

¹ Council of Trent, sess. 24, c. 6, De reform. matr. Cn. 1074: 1. Between an abducting man and a woman abducted with a view to matrimony, so long as she has remained in the power of the abductor, no matrimony can exist. 2. But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and constituted in a safe and free place, has consented to have him as husband, the impediment ceases.

² Cf. Instruction of the Holy Office to the bishops of Albania, February 15, 1901.

³ Cf. the cited instruction to the bishops of Albania.

583. Declaration. In order that abduction dirimently impede matrimony, the following conditions are required:

1. That there be abduction of a woman, not of a man: for the law speaks only of the abduction of a woman, which is done by a man. Therefore matrimony between an abducting woman and an abducted man is not invalid. Moreover, it makes no difference whether the woman who is abducted is honorable or dishonorable, virgin or widow, betrothed or free, of greater or lesser age.

The question whether one incurs the impediment of abduction who abducts a betrothed woman or a girl of minor age is resolved by the new Code. For it uses the generic word woman (Weibsperson). Moreover, where women of minor age are to be excepted, this is expressly noted, as in Cn. 2353.

2. That there be a. either abduction, by which a woman is transferred from one place to another morally diverse place, whether by the abductor himself or in his name by another; b. or detention, by which a man violently detains a woman in the place where she is staying or to which she freely came, with a view to matrimony.¹

Therefore the question about a morally diverse place becomes superfluous, whether there is true abduction if a woman is transferred from one chamber to another contiguous chamber of the same house, or from a public road apart into a field: for the impediment of abduction is always present either by reason of abduction or by reason of violent detention.

3. That the abduction be violent, namely, one which is done while the woman is unwilling and resisting. If therefore the woman consents to the abduction and to the matrimony, it is rather flight than abduction; this does not dirimently impede matrimony, even if it is done against the will of the parents. For the law intends nothing else than to protect the liberty of matrimony, which is not injured if the woman consents to the matrimony.

Now abduction is judged violent if it is done by physical force or by grave fear unjustly inflicted; if it is done by fraud and deceitful solicitation, even with the woman's consent; but it is not violent if the woman is induced to flee by prayers, blandishments, gifts, or promises.

4. That it be done for the sake of entering matrimony: for the Church, in establishing this impediment, chiefly intends this, that the liberty of matrimonial consent be preserved. If therefore she is abducted for another reason, e.g., only for the sake of satisfying lust, no impediment of matrimony arises.

Note. Abduction (Entfuhrung) is a crime which is committed if someone with a view to matrimony or for the sake of satisfying lust carries off an unwilling woman by force or deceit, or a woman of minor age who indeed consents, but without the knowledge or against the will of her parents or guardians. The crime of abduction is always punished in the ecclesiastical forum (Cn. 2353), but a diriment impediment of matrimony does not always follow from it, as is clear from the things set forth above.

¹ Cn. 1074, 3. Since this canon establishes that violent detention of a woman is held equal to abduction, the former impediment, by which abduction alone invalidated matrimony, is extended also to violent detention of a woman, even one not carried off or abducted.

The Council of Trent¹ made the following law: ‘“‘ The Holy Synod ordains that no marriage can subsist between the abductor and her who is abducted so long as she shall remain in the power of the abductor. But if she that has been abducted, being separated from the abductor and being in a safe and free place, shall consent to have him for her husband, the abductor may have her for his wife.”” This decree made abduction a diriment impediment of marriage, and in keeping with its tenor the impediment may be defined as the violent abduction of a woman from a place of safety to another place where she is detained in the power of the abductor for the purpose of marriage. In order to constitute the impediment the abduction must be against the will of the woman, whether it be effected by open violence, or threats, or fraud; for if she freely consent both to the abduction and to marriage, we have elopement, not abduction. Consent to both abduction and marriage is required, for the Council made an abducted woman incapable of contracting a valid marriage, as long as she is in the power of the abductor. The woman, too, must be the abducted party; if a man were forcibly carried off by the orders of a woman who wished to marry him, this impediment would not arise. It is a disputed point among Doctors as to whether the impediment would arise if a man carried off his betrothed by violence in order to marry her. The better opinion is that the impediment would hinder the marriage, for although betrothal gave the man a right to marry the woman at the proper time, still it gave him no right to use violence for the purpose.

¹ Sess. xxiv, c. 6, de ref. Matr.

The words in the definition “ from a place of safety” signify a place where the woman is not.in the power of the abductor, so that to give rise to the impediment the woman must be taken from one place to another which is morally distinct, and where she is under the control of the abductor. The forcible detention of a woman in a place where she is in the man’s power but to which she came of her own accord is equivalent to abduction (Can. 1074, sec. 3). The abductor’s aim must be to contract marriage, not merely to satisfy his lust.

The impediment is of ecclesiastical law and lasts as long as the person abducted remains in the power of the abductor, for, as the Council says, if the woman be restored to her liberty and then freely chooses to have the abductor for her husband, the impediment ceases (Can. 1074, sec. 2).

The Council imposed the penalty of excommunication on the abductor and on all who aid and abet him, besides obliging him to give the woman a sufficient dower whether he marry her or not. Other penalties are assigned by Canon 2353.

1. Antonius, the father of a family, greatly desired that his son Ioannes should marry a certain Ioanna, daughter of Antoninus, who was living in another city, and whose old and very useful friendship to himself he wished to preserve and strengthen. Therefore Antonius proposed the matter to his son; but he, who did not know Antoninus nor Ioanna, responded to his father: Allow me to think over and weigh this business well. But when the son Ioannes was weaving delays and meanwhile gave no response to his father, the father, insisting on the same matter, said to the son that there was in that city, which he named, a certain Ioanna, very rich and beautiful, indeed more beautiful than all the other girls of that city. Then the son consented to the marriage, and immediately, permission having been obtained, the marriage was celebrated by proxy in the city of Ioanna. After a few days the bride, with great solemnity, was led into the house of Antonius to her bridegroom Ioannes. But he, seeing her and finding that, although she was in reality very rich, nevertheless she was notably deformed, immediately fled from the paternal home and married another girl.

It is asked: 1. What concerning consent and concerning error as regards marriage? - 2. What is to be said to the case?

R. To the 1st. Consent to marriage is essentially required; so that without consent there is no marriage. The reason is that marriage is a contract; and without consent a contract cannot be had.

But, excepting error of servile condition by reason of the diriment impediment positively established by the Church, no error invalidates marriage unless it is substantial. The reason is the very firmness of this state, which both the private good and the public good altogether require. Hence, according to the opinion which St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 1012, calls common and more true, not even error concerning a quality giving cause to the marriage invalidates marriage: here also this error is accidental, not substantial, since it neither removes consent nor removes the object of this contract.

Therefore, in order that error of quality invalidate marriage, it is necessary that it be a substantial error. This is verified 1. when the quality is a condition without which there is no consent; for then, the condition not having been verified, consent is not had, which is altogether substantial in marriage, as in any other contract. It is verified 2. when the quality is determinative of the person; for then another person is had, which is altogether substantial in marriage, as its proper object. St. Alphonsus, l. c., n. 1016, adds another third case, namely when the quality is principally intended and the person secondarily. But this third case practically induces great confusion, and speculatively is not true, or it falls back into the preceding two enumerated cases. For first, in marriage, as in any other contract, its object is always that which is principally intended in it; any other intention added over and above is extrinsic to that contract, and neither removes consent nor removes the object; and therefore the marriage is valid. Besides, that principally intended quality is either principally intended because it gives cause to the contract, or it is principally intended because it is the condition of consent, or it is principally intended because it falls back into the object or person, insofar namely as it is determinative of the person; for otherwise it cannot fall back into the person. The first is to be excluded, because, as has already been said, error of a quality giving cause to the contract does not invalidate marriage. Therefore only the second and third remain, and thus we fall back into the two cases already proposed.

To the 2nd. In order that the case may be resolved, it is necessary to see how the father proposed that bride to his son the second time. If this second time the father was proposing to his son a certain girl of that town, by the name Ioanna, the richest and most beautiful of all the girls of that town, the marriage was evidently null, because those accidental qualities determining the individual person induced substantial error, namely concerning the person itself. But if the father, the second time, was proposing to his son that same Ioanna whom he proposed the first time, namely he proposed Ioanna the daughter of Antonius, the only daughter of Antonius, or the firstborn, or the secondborn, etc., the most beautiful and richest of all the other girls of that town, then the marriage is valid. For then the error certainly is not substantial; since that accidental quality of beauty remains accidental in the case. For a person is an individual substance of rational nature: this individual substance is altogether designated by that expression, Ioanna, firstborn daughter, for example, of Antonius. Now from the whole tenor of the case it must be concluded that the father proposed the marriage to his son in this second way. But if in a practical case there were doubt, Antonius and his son would have to be carefully questioned concerning the manner in which that person was proposed to him in marriage, when finally the son furnished his consent to his marriage.

2. Pantaleo entered betrothals in Spain with Leocadia, she herself and her parents consenting. But when afterward Leocadia's parents opposed the marriage, Pantaleo abducted Leocadia by night, led her into England, and there contracted marriage with her.

It is asked: Was the impediment of abduction present in the case?

R. The resolution of the case depends on the question whether he incurs the impediment of abduction who abducts a girl previously duly betrothed to himself. It seems that one must respond: 1. Affirmatively, if the bride has a just cause for receding from the betrothals. For in such a case a true injury is done to the bride, and it is the same as if betrothals had not preceded. - 2. But if the bride has no just cause for receding from the betrothals, there is controversy. Sanchez, de Matr., l. 7, d. 13, n. 15, and others affirm from c. pen. de Rapt., where it is said: "That man ought not to be called an abductor, since he had the consent of the woman; and he betrothed her before he knew her, although the parents protested." Therefore "the marriage is null if the woman is taken away unwilling, otherwise if willing, even if the parents are unwilling; and in the beginning of the text it is not said that abduction does not intervene because betrothals preceded, but because the woman consenting was abducted." St. Alphonsus, l. 6, n. 1109. - La-Croix, l. 6, p. 2, n. 636, and others deny it, because the bride is compelled to this which she was bound to do; and thus it is said in cited c. 6, de Raptoribus: "That man ought not to be called an abductor, since he had the consent of the woman, and he had betrothed her before." - Schmalzgr., l. 5, tit. 17, § 1, n. 37 seqq.; Lessius, de Iust. et Iur., l. 4, c. 3, dub. 8. - But as regards excommunication, cf. here the treatise de Censur.

3. Celerinus abducted Laura, and led her by force into the house of Paternus. After Laura remained in that house for a long time, and she herself now consents spontaneously to the marriage, both Celerinus and Paternus wish to marry her.

It is asked: Who in the case can marry Laura?

R. If Celerinus, by his own will, with no mandate received, abducted Laura so that she might marry Paternus, each of the two can marry her, although she is in the power of each. For Paternus then did not abduct her, and Celerinus did not abduct her for the sake of contracting marriage with her. But if Celerinus abducted her for this end, of contracting marriage with her, he cannot marry her so long as she remains in his power, even if Laura now of her own accord and most freely enters marriage. In order that Celerinus may be able to marry her, it is necessary that she first be restored to a safe place, outside his power. Finally, if Celerinus abducted Laura by the mandate of Paternus, then the latter is understood as the abductor, and consequently cannot marry Laura in the case. For what one does through another is reckoned as done through oneself. But then Celerinus can marry Laura. For the impediment of abduction is not had between the abducted woman and an abductor who abducts the woman for another, not for himself, so that namely she may be joined in marriage with another, not with the abductor himself. The reason is "because the penalty of that Decree is that between the abductor and the abducted woman marriage cannot stand so long as the abducted woman is under the power of the abductor; and therefore it supposes that the abduction is destined to this, that the abductor may marry the abducted woman; therefore there will be no place for those penalties when the abduction is done for the sake of entering marriage with another." Sanchez, de Matr., l. 7, d. 13, n. 6; I. M. 1024.

857. • Abduction is the violent carrying away of a woman from a safe place to another place where she is detained under the power of the abductor ¹, for the purpose of entering matrimony.

¹ It is the same whether the abductor carries out the abduction himself or through others, and likewise whether he retains the abducted person in his power by himself and in his own custody or through others and in their custody. This is gathered from a Declaration of the Sacred Congregation of the Council of June 25, 1864, which can be seen in the Roman Acts, volume 1, pages 15-25. But one who abducts for himself incurs the impediment, not those who abduct for another, although the latter can otherwise incur penalties decreed against abductors both by civil and Canon law. See Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 17, no. 20.

Abduction invalidates matrimony by ecclesiastical law between the abductor and the abducted woman. This is established from the Council of Trent, session 24, chapter 6.

Three conditions are required for incurring that impediment, namely: 1. that the abducted woman be carried away from one place to another; 2. that the woman be abducted solely for the purpose of matrimony; 3. that the abduction occur while the woman resists ², or is altogether unwilling. This is gathered from the text of the Council of Trent ³. - St. Ligorius, no. 1107.

² It makes no difference whether the woman is carried away from her own home by force or, led about by deceit, unknowingly comes into the power of the one plotting the abduction; likewise, whether she is carried away from her own dwelling or, having been led from it through fraud, is thereafter prevented from being able to return to it freely. For free consent is equally absent both if through open force and if through fraud she is no longer permitted to be in her own power. See the Declaration of the Sacred Congregation cited in the preceding note.

³ The text of the Council of Trent cited by the Author does not in fact add this condition, that the woman be carried away altogether resisting and unwilling. The Doctors, however, are commonly accustomed to infer it from the fact that the Council speaks of that abduction by which the liberty of matrimony is injured. See Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 17, no. 35. But liberty of consent appears sufficiently present when the woman consents to her abduction.

Nevertheless, this doctrine can easily be reconciled with the opposite opinion if a suitable distinction is employed. For the abduction of a woman consenting to her own carrying away can occur in two ways: first, when negotiations concerning nuptials with the abductor preceded and the woman consents to her own carrying away so that the marriage which otherwise was impeded can be entered. Then no impediment arises, since it ought rather to be called flight with the man for freely contracting matrimony than abduction. Second, when no negotiation concerning nuptials had preceded; and then the woman's consent to her own carrying away is presumed to have been extorted through deceit. Since consent to matrimony cannot be inferred from consent to the abduction, the abduction of the woman, although willing, is included in the decree of the Council. See Riganti on Rule 49 of the Chancery, no. 79 and following.

These things are brilliantly confirmed from Declarations of the Sacred Congregation which you have collected in the Appendix inserted in the first volume of the Roman Acts, beginning at page 54. From these the Author of the Appendix draws the following conclusions: I. an abduction which falls under the decree of the Council is not present when negotiations concluding the matrimony to be entered precede the abduction. For in this case the man has a right to have the woman espoused to him, and the woman is bound to consent to the matrimony. II. Nor is this abduction verified if, without deceit, the man carries away the woman by agreement because negotiations concerning the matrimony could not be concluded on account of the opposition of the parents. III. Nor is abduction verified if not the man but the woman solicited the man to carry her away. In these two cases it must rather be called the flight of the woman with the man so that they may more freely contract matrimony than abduction. IV. On the contrary, abduction is verified if the woman is carried away through snares and deceitful solicitations by one planning abduction, so that afterward under the influence of the abductor she is compelled to consent to matrimony.

And the same Author deservedly concludes that whenever the woman appears to have consented to the abduction, the resolution must be taken from the circumstances considered. For if the woman consents to the carrying away so that she may contract matrimony more freely, and uses this means of carrying away to remove obstacles, it does not appear to be abduction but mere flight, although some injury is inflicted upon the dissenting parents. But if the man cannot obtain the woman's consent to matrimony by a direct way and, therefore meditating the seizure or theft of the girl, begins to circumvent the inexperienced woman by snares, deceitful solicitations, etc., so that by these arts he may extort some compliance from the fickle girl, and, having obtained it, carry her away in contempt of her parents, everyone sees that the man indeed intends to compel the girl into matrimony, while the girl, through the man's snares, in some manner adheres to the circumvention without herself seriously perceiving that she is being driven to enter a marriage which perhaps she would never have entered willingly and against the will of her parents.

And in these things there is contained that by which the following question of the Author concerning abduction by seduction may also be resolved.

858. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Does ABDUCTION BY SEDUCTION, or when a woman is induced by gifts, flatteries, etc., to follow the abductor, introduce an impediment?

Reply. No. The reason is that through the impediment of abduction the Church intends only to provide for perfect liberty of matrimony, which is not injured when a consenting woman is carried away, even against the will of her parents. - Thus commonly, according to St. Ligorius, no. 1107. Sanchez, Bonacina, the Salmanticenses, Scavini, etc., agree.

And indeed not a few French theologians contend that, at least in France, abduction by seduction invalidates matrimony by prescribed custom. But this must not be admitted, for a custom which rests only upon a false interpretation of the law cannot bind. - Compare Gousset, no. 797.

But the Declarations of the Sacred Congregation of the Council which are cited for that opinion cited in the Analecta of Pontifical Law, volume IV, page 1848 and following, concern altogether particular cases, and the circumstances are not sufficiently established, so that it can be asserted that a violent carrying away of the woman was absent. In France itself, Scavini says, the opinion teaching that abduction by seduction introduces a diriment impediment of matrimony, which had long been in force, is everywhere rejected.

859. • QUESTION 2. Are betrothals contracted while the abducted woman is under the power of the abductor valid?

Reply. A twofold probable opinion is given:

The first opinion denies it, because betrothals require liberty just as matrimony itself does; for a penal law is extended where the same reason applies. - Sanchez. - The Salmanticenses, etc.

The second opinion affirms it, and St. Ligorius with La Croix, etc., calls this the more probable. The reason for this opinion is that betrothals, since they are always rescindable, require less liberty than matrimony ⁴.

⁴ Nevertheless, since this obligation is doubtful, the Confessor cannot urge it.

860. Resolutions. - 1. The impediment is not contracted if the woman is carried away only from one room to another room in the same house, because in this manner she is not properly placed under the power of the abductor; rather, she must be carried away from one house to another.

2. The impediment is not contracted if the woman is abducted for another cause besides the end of entering matrimony, for example, for the end of satisfying lust, etc.; because the Council intends nothing else through this impediment except to favor the liberty of matrimony.

3. The impediment is not incurred if the woman abducts the man, because the Council speaks only of a man as abductor.

4. The impediment is not incurred if matrimony is contracted between the abductor and the abducted woman after she has been freed from the power of the abductor. This is clearly evident from the text of the Council of Trent. - St. Ligorius, no. 1032. But St. Ligorius rightly notes, ibid., that this impediment endures so long as the abducted woman is in the power of the abductor, even if she consents freely ⁵.

⁵ The Church renders the abducted woman incapable of contracting so long as she is in the power of the abductor; therefore her consent, however free it may be supposed, will always remain without effect.

821. Cessation of the impediment. Although the impediment of abduction (insofar as it is not joined with the impediment of force and fear) is constituted by ecclesiastical law alone and therefore does not bind unbelievers among themselves,¹⁵⁹ nor did it exist before the Council of Trent, nevertheless the Supreme Pontiff most rarely dispenses from it, because a) it is so intimately connected with the impediment of force and fear, b) there is a great danger that the woman, existing under the power of the abductor, may furnish matrimonial consent that is not altogether free but merely feigned.

For this reason, the Holy Office, in an Instruction directed to the bishops of Albania on February 15, 1901, was unwilling to delegate the faculty of dispensing to the bishops. These are the words: "Nothing prevents assistance from being given to the abducted woman by a dispensation if, in whatever manner, it is certainly established that her consent is truly free and sufficient motives for dispensing are present. But in a matter of such moment, especially lest the most holy Tridentine law become cheapened through excessive facility in obtaining a dispensation of this kind, it is fitting that judgment be altogether reserved to the Holy See."¹⁶⁰

Indeed, in every concession of a matrimonial dispensation the clause is wont to be added: "provided that the woman was not abducted, and if she was abducted, that she does not exist under the power of the abductor." This clause imports a true condition without which the dispensation is not valid. - But in the most ample faculty of dispensing from impediments, however public, conceded by the Code of Canon Law, cann. 1043-1045, for imminent danger of death and for a case in which matrimony cannot be deferred without grave danger, there is also included the faculty of dispensing from the impediment of abduction. But care must then be taken that the abducted woman furnishes true and free consent.

The impediment of abduction ceases by that very fact when the abducted woman has been separated from the abductor and restored to a safe place. This is evident from the words of the Code cited. But it belongs not to the parish priest but to the bishop to judge whether the abduction has truly been purged, that is, has ceased;¹⁶¹ nevertheless, even after the abduction has been purged, there remain not only the penalties imposed against abductors of women (concerning which below), but also, if some other impediment obstructed the matrimony, mention of the abduction previously committed would have to be made in the petition for a dispensation. When it is necessary to convalidate a matrimony invalid because of the impediment of abduction, the spouses must first be separated, and both must express marital consent before the parish priest and two witnesses according to the legal norms. For this impediment is held to be of public law. Only a dispensation conceded in danger of death is excepted.

¹⁵⁹ If the abductor is a member of the faithful but the abducted woman an unbeliever, and likewise conversely, if the abductor is an unbeliever but the abducted woman a member of the faithful, the impediment of abduction seems to bind each: the member of the faithful directly, but the unbeliever indirectly. Cf. Cappello, De sacr. III, n. 472; Wernz-Vidal, Ius can. V, n. 310.

¹⁶⁰ Collect. de Prop. Fide, n. 2101.

¹⁶¹ Cf. Gasparri, De matrim., n. 559; Feije, De imped. et dispens. matrim., 4th ed., n. 186; Van de Burgt-Schaepman, Tract. de matrim., n. 115. - Wernz-Vidal, Ius can. V, n. 313, and Vogt, loc. cit., § 43, teach that the judgment of the bishop is not required, at least by common law.

136. • I. Notion.

Raptus, as it is an impediment of matrimony, is defined: "the abduction or detention of an unwilling woman, for the sake of entering matrimony with her."

137. • II. Existence of the impediment.

That impediment is of ecclesiastical law, established for protecting the liberty of matrimony.

"§ 1. Between a man who abducts and a woman abducted with a view to matrimony, so long as she remains in the power of the abductor, no matrimony can stand.

§ 3. As regards the nullity of matrimony, violent retention of the woman is held equal to raptus, namely when a man violently detains a woman with a view to matrimony in the place where she is staying or to which she freely came." (Can. 1074.)

138. • III. What conditions are necessary that the impediment be present.

a) Abduction is required, i.e., removal from a place in which the woman is free from the power of the abductor to a morally diverse place in which she is under his power; or detention, i.e., custody of the person in some place from which she is impeded from departing and where she is under the power of the one detaining her.

b) Force done to the woman is required. But it matters little whether the woman is unwilling as to the abduction or detention, or only as to entering matrimony.

c) It is necessary that a woman be abducted or detained. The law does not concern itself with the unusual case of the raptus of a man by a woman.

d) It is necessary that raptus have matrimony as its end. If it is done for another end, even a most wicked one, the impediment is not present.

139. • IV. Cessation of the impediment.

a) It ceases by the fact itself, once the woman has been separated from the abductor and placed in a safe and free place, and consents to have the abductor as husband. (Can. 1074, § 2.)

Nevertheless let the pastor not assist at the matrimony without consulting the Ordinary, whose part it will be to judge whether the raptus has truly ceased and the woman freely consents to matrimony.

b) The Church dispenses very rarely in this impediment, on account of the danger of consent that is not free.

But it is not excluded from the faculty granted by cc. 1043-1045. Then, however, care must be taken that the woman give free consent.

895. Abduction (enlevement; gewelddadige ontvoering, schaking), as it is an impediment of matrimony, is defined: The violent abduction of an unwilling woman under the power of another, for the sake of entering matrimony. It is said:

1° Abduction under the power of another, under which name comes not only a transfer from place to place morally different, but also detention under the power of another, which is morally equivalent to abduction.

What formerly could be disputed is now certain from can. 1074, § 3: "As regards the nullity of matrimony, violent retention of a woman is held equal to abduction, namely when a man violently detains a woman, with a view to matrimony, in the place where she stays or to which she has freely gone."

2° Of an unwilling woman, not of a man, because the law regards that which happens commonly, not that which happens rarely and exceptionally, and because the liberty of a woman, as of the weaker one, is more to be protected.

Moreover, woman is understood as any woman whatever, whether virgin or corrupted, whether of minor or major age, whether betrothed or widow, whether honorable or dishonorable or infamous.

3° Violent, namely by physical force, or moral force as by threats and grave fear, the woman, namely, being unwilling and resisting.

It is necessary that violence be inflicted on the woman herself in order to matrimony; hence a) force inflicted on parents does not suffice; b) nor does it suffice that the woman, induced by flatteries, importunate prayers, gifts, or false promises, voluntarily follows, which is called abduction of seduction, because it is more flight than abduction; c) nevertheless it does not matter whether the abductor by himself or through another violently abducts the woman, or whether with himself or with another he retains her in his power: in which case the one commanding contracts the impediment, but not the mandatory; on the contrary, if someone without mandate acts for another, there is no impediment; d) it is not required that the woman be unwilling as regards the abduction itself or detention; it suffices that she is so as regards only the matrimony to be entered.

4° For the sake of entering matrimony, but not some other end, even the worst, as revenge, or even satisfying lust: thus abduction, as it is an impediment of matrimony, differs from abduction which is a species of lust.

Nevertheless, the impediment is present if a woman who first was abducted on account of the cause of lust is afterward detained unwillingly by force with a view to matrimony.

896. Principle I. Between a male abductor and a woman abducted with a view to matrimony, as long as she remains in the power of the abductor, no matrimony can stand. - Thus can. 1074, § 1, confirming the Council of Trent, l. c.

A threefold condition is required for contracting the impediment: violence, abduction or detention in a place under the power of the abductor, and the intention of entering matrimony. Once these have been fulfilled, the impediment exists only between the abductor and the abducted woman, and indeed as long as she is in the abductor's power; for by the very fact that the woman is endowed with liberty the impediment ceases, whence can. 1074, § 2: "But if the abducted woman, separated from the abductor and constituted in a safe and free place, has consented to have him as husband, the impediment ceases."

The impediment is of ecclesiastical law: for although grave fear is for the most part joined with abduction, nevertheless the impediment of abduction does not diriment matrimony by reason of fear, but is a distinct impediment, which exists as long as the woman is constituted under the power of the abductor, although she consents to the union spontaneously and freely.