Absolving an accomplice (Can. 2367)

Eamdem excommunicationem non effugit absolvens vel fingens absolvere complicem qui peccatum quidem complicitatis a quo nondum est absolutus non confitetur, sed ideo ita se gerit, quia ad id a complice confessario sive directe sive indirecte inductus est. (One who absolves, or pretends to absolve, an accomplice in a sin of impurity incurs ipso facto an excommunication reserved to the Apostolic See in a most special manner; and this even at the point of death, if another priest, even though not approved for hearing confessions, is available.)

See the comments on this censure above, Penance, Chapter XI.

1. Fabia approaches Caius, with whom she recently sinned, for the sake of making sacramental confession before him. Caius does not dare to repel her from the Sacred Tribunal, nor does he dare to absolve. "I cannot," he says, "absolve you from this sin; I do not have jurisdiction; it is necessary that you go to another." Nevertheless, greatly disturbed, he absolves her from the other sins. Caius, sincerely penitent, manifests this to his confessor, who, anxious, doubts whether Caius has incurred excommunication; and suspending resolution, before he absolves Caius or does anything else, he determines to seek counsel concerning this matter from a pious and learned friend.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. Here first one must note what Cardinal De Lugo has, de Poenit., d. 20, n. 77. Concerning sacramental absolution it must be said that "it cannot be divided or halved, just as neither can confession itself without necessity and urgent cause, since the integrity of confession is of divine law. Whence Suarez adds that even if the superior wished, after the whole confession had been heard, to absolve directly from only the reserved sins, he could not validly do this; but either he must absolve from all sins heard, or from none, because Christ did not give such a power. Yet this does not lack difficulty, nor will it easily be proved that a priest cannot validly, although not licitly, will to absolve from these and not apply the absolution directly to the others, but to hold himself as if he had not heard them." But whatever may be of this, there is no doubt that in the Case Caius could not absolve from the sins of complicity, since in that whole matter he lacked jurisdiction. As regards the other sins, Caius did not lack jurisdiction, but it does not seem that, in the Case, Fabia was truly absolved from the other sins. For since Caius told her that he did not have jurisdiction for absolving her, Fabia in fact received absolution in bad faith, and therefore sacrilegiously. But as regards excommunication, there is no doubt that Caius incurred it in the Case. For first, although he was greatly disturbed, nevertheless since he absolved, and absolved from other sins, therefore he well adverted to what he was doing, and so well that by acting thus he surely wished to avoid excommunication. But he did not avoid excommunication, for he truly absolved an accomplice. And if that man incurs excommunication who even feigns and simulates absolving, how much more he who simply absolves an accomplice.

2. "Titianus, a priest, a slippery occasion having been given, by an unhappy fall lapsed with Anna into grave sin against the sixth precept of the Decalogue. Soon each accomplice repented of this shameful fault. Since no other priest was present there, Titianus immediately went to another place for the sake of confessing. But Anna, detained by some infirmity, could not go to another confessor. Therefore, sad and sorrowful, she earnestly begs Titianus that he hear her confession. He, doubtful and uncertain, first hesitates; on the one side he is restrained by the law of the Church prohibiting the absolving of an accomplice; but on the other side he would like to help the miserable woman, who otherwise will be without a confessor for a long time. Finally, moved by mercy, he hears Anna in confession and absolves her, thinking that the prohibition of the Church does not press in this difficult Case.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. Titianus absolved Anna, his accomplice, altogether invalidly, since he wholly lacked jurisdiction over her. Nor did the law cease in that Case, because an invalidating law does not cease on account of any particular inconvenience whatever. From the law itself only the case of extreme necessity is excepted. Therefore Titianus incurs excommunication, unless he was excused from it by good faith. But he must warn Anna that the absolution imparted by him is null and void, so that she may repeat the confession before another." Thus P. Gury 614.

That the absolution of Titianus was altogether void is denied not without merit. For although in the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae it is said to be altogether void, nevertheless in the same Constitution jurisdiction is taken away from the confessor as regards a sin of this sort. Wherefore, if the penitent is in good faith, as she seems to be in the Case, it is indeed altogether void as regards the sins of complicity, but by no means as regards the others. S. Poenit., May 16, 1877; I. M. 1291, 1293; Comment. in Const. Sacram. Poenit. n. 71, ed. 5.

But it is most true that an invalidating law, as is the law of Benedict XIV in the Case, does not cease on account of any particular inconvenience whatever. For "it is, as it were, contrary to the nature of an absolute incapacity introduced without restriction, and contrary to the custom of laws simply inducing incapacity, which do not receive interpretation from equity and goodness; because a law invalidating acts does not attend to particular cases and reasons, but precisely to the common reason and uniformity, to the common and necessary good and utility." Suarez, de Leg., l. 5, c. 23, n. 3.

But what is said in the resolution of the Case, namely that Titianus incurred excommunication unless he was excused from it by good faith, is precisely that which must be resolved from the proposed Case, as a matter often occurring in practice. Nor indeed would the Case be conveniently resolved practically if, to the penitent asking in the case set forth whether he incurred excommunication, the confessor were to respond thus conditionally: affirmatively, unless you acted in good faith. Now there seems no doubt that Titianus cannot be excused by good faith. For he seems to labor in this matter under an altogether crass and supine error, which does not excuse from incurring this censure. S. O., Jan. 13, 1892.

3. Fulberius and Arcontius, priests, converse among themselves about shameful matters with mutual and scandalous complacency. Wherefore both sin by deed, but without any complicity. After these committed sins, they institute confession to each other and absolve each other. Then they have a doubt whether they have incurred excommunication. For they thought that shameful speech was not certainly comprehended under the prohibition of absolving an accomplice in a sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue. They did indeed doubt, but if they had known certainly that shameful speech also was comprehended, they would have abstained from that mutual confession and absolution. Moreover, they were ignorant of the Decree of the Holy Office of May 28, 1873; when afterward they came to know it by consulting Moral Institutions, they began to be troubled by still graver anxiety.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. It seems one must say that Fulberius and Arcontius incurred excommunication. For they were not ignorant of the ecclesiastical law and the censure. They also had a doubt in the particular Case, and they acted in bad faith, and indeed in altogether vincible and crass ignorance, by absolving each other. For with such a doubt standing, they ought at least to have asked others beforehand. Nor indeed was there need to have knowledge of that Decree. For it is a question not of a new law, but of a simple Declaration of a pre-existing law, already known to them. Moreover, ignorance in the Case, if there is any, is certainly not ignorance of fact, but of law. But ignorance of law is scarcely admitted in the external forum, and censures are above all penalties of the external forum. Wherefore there is no doubt that, the matter in the Case being brought before a judge, Fulberius and Arcontius would be declared excommunicated. Cf. Commentar. in C. Sacramentum Poenitentiae n. 69, ed. 5; I. M. 1289.

4. Titius, hearing the confession of Berta, with whom, amid consolations, he had exercised touches, although not gravely shameful, recognizes that she had sinned lethally because of the interior pleasure of soul in receiving them, and nevertheless absolves her. Similarly he conducts himself with a friend, with whom he had had dishonest conversations, and together with whom, mutual solicitation having been given, he had gone to visit a bad woman. Finally he absolves Caia, his accomplice in a shameful matter, who was laboring under a long-lasting, although not dangerous, sickness; nor, with Easter time approaching and her relatives exhorting her to be refreshed by the sacred banquet, could she omit communion. No other priest was at hand, nor was there hope that another would come shortly. To this was added that therefore Titius also could not abstain from hearing her confession, lest perhaps Caia's husband be confirmed in suspicion concerning his wife's adultery with Titius himself. Indeed another time Titius, earnestly asked, absolved the same Caia, because she seemed seized by an unexpected sickness, although in the middle of confession it was learned that it was a fainting fit, and meanwhile before she was absolved another priest happened to arrive.

It is asked: 1.º What is a shameful sin, and in what sense is complicity in this sin to be understood according to the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum poenitentiae? - 2.º Whether absolution given to an accomplice is illicit only, or also invalid; and what penalties the confessor absolving an accomplice incurs? - 3.º Whether and what exception concerning absolution to be furnished to an accomplice is assigned in the same Constitution? - 4.º What is to be judged concerning the manner of acting of Titius as regards each thing, as in the Case?

R. To the 1st. A shameful sin, as regards the absolution of an accomplice, is a sin certainly grave, consummated exteriorly, against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, even if it is only touch, sight, or conversation. This is clear from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, and from the Holy Office, May 28, 1873. But complicity is to be taken in the Case thus: that one is to the other a companion of the crime, as is had in the other Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris. A companion, and therefore one knowing and willing with another knowing and willing. Of the crime, that is, a companion in the same exterior work gravely dishonest.

To the 2nd. Absolution given to an accomplice is illicit and at the same time invalid, as is established in each Constitution of Benedict XIV just praised. But the confessor absolving an accomplice incurs excommunication reserved in the most special mode to the Supreme Pontiff, as is had in the same Constitutions of Benedict XIV, and in the Constitution of Pius IX Apostolicae Sedis concerning censures, and also from the Declaration of the Holy Office, Apr. 4, 1871.

To the 3rd. An exception is indeed had, and it is altogether the only one, and in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae it is expressed thus: namely, that the accomplice not absolve the accomplice "outside the case of extreme necessity, namely at the very article of death, and then with any other priest who can perform the office of confessor being lacking." But from the other Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris, any other priest who can perform the office of confessor is judged lacking if "another priest cannot be called or cannot approach without some grave infamy or scandal that would arise." But by this same Constitution it is declared that, if the priest who is an accomplice nevertheless absolves the accomplice at the article of death without the aforesaid necessity, the absolution is valid, although illicit, and the same priest incurs reserved excommunication.

To the 4th. Titius, absolving Berta, does not incur the aforesaid excommunication. For the sin was not grave in the notion of an external act, as is openly said in the Case. He incurs it by absolving the friend; for with him, as is drawn from the whole tenor of the Case, he had gravely dishonest conversations, whence then together, mutual solicitation having been given, they had gone to visit a bad woman. He also incurs the same excommunication by absolving Caia the first time. For although Caia labored under a long-lasting sickness, nevertheless it was not dangerous. Wherefore Caia was neither at the article nor in the danger of death. Nor indeed did Easter time constitute Caia in the aforesaid article or danger of death. Wherefore the necessity of Easter communion did not excuse Titius. From whatever source the obligation of Easter communion is had, from ecclesiastical Law only or also from divine Law, it is certain that Benedict XIV, who knew this obligation, positively excluded this case, since he excepted only the case of extreme necessity, and that at the article of death. Nor is it valid to insist that, on the one hand, Caia's relatives were exhorting her to communion, whence if she had abstained there would have been infamy for her; and that Titius, on the other hand, was pressed to hear the confession by fear of a suspicion of adultery that would arise in Caia's husband. For this twofold inconvenience of infamy does not constitute Titius and Caia in the aforesaid case of extreme necessity and at the article of death. Concerning the article of death the matter is clear. But infamy can easily be avoided. For Titius, from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, has himself as any other priest deprived of jurisdiction. Now any other simple priest, not yet approved, lacking jurisdiction, certainly would not acquire it in the aforesaid case. Therefore neither does Titius. Besides, if another priest lacking jurisdiction were present, then Caia, with a true danger of infamy standing, could, after eliciting an act of contrition, receive Communion. Therefore she can do the same with only Titius present. Moreover, in order that the suspicion of adultery may be avoided, it is not necessary that Titius truly hear Caia's confession and absolve her; but, having been called to hear Caia's confession, if another confessor truly cannot either meanwhile or afterward be called without scandal or infamy, he himself can then, instead of hearing Caia's confession and absolving her, exhort and excite her to elicit an act of perfect contrition, and declare to her that in straits of this sort she can well receive Communion without Confession and Absolution, by the act of perfect contrition alone, lest perhaps she sin from an erroneous conscience. But Titius, absolving Caia a second time, incurs no excommunication. For her confession truly was in danger of death, although only an apparent one. Real and apparent danger of death are the same here, provided nevertheless, as in the Case, that danger was prudently judged; for otherwise there would be danger to the salvation of souls. Besides, no other confessor was present at that moment. Wherefore Titius could then well hear the confession. The confession having been begun, although afterward both that danger vanishes and another confessor is present, he can by right complete it and absolve Caia. The reason is that the jurisdiction which is had at the beginning of the act perseveres until the same act is completed. "Where judgment has once been accepted, there also it ought to receive its end." L. Ubi 30, de Iudiciis, Dig., lib. 5, tit. 1.

I. To avoid lest confessors be able to abuse their power for sinning more freely, Benedict XIV established that every confessor outside danger of death lacks the faculty of absolving his own accomplice in a base sin, and prohibited absolution of this person, outside a case of extreme necessity, under pain of excommunication.

"We interdict and prohibit each and every priest, secular as well as regular... lest any of them outside a case of extreme necessity, namely in the very article of death and then also with another priest lacking who could undertake the function of confessor, dare to receive the sacramental confession of a person who is an accomplice in a base and dishonorable sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, for that reason any authority and jurisdiction whatsoever over any person whatever for absolving from a fault of this kind having been taken away from him; so indeed that the absolution, if he imparts any, is altogether null and void, as imparted by a priest who exists deprived of the jurisdiction and faculty necessary for absolving validly, which by these our presents we intend to take away from him. And nevertheless, if any confessor has dared to act otherwise, by that very fact let him incur also the penalty of major excommunication, the power of absolving from which we reserve only to Ourselves and to our successors."

Thus in the Bull Sacramentum Poenitentiae, 1 June 1741; which he confirmed and explained more in the Constitutions Apostolici Muneris, 28 February 1745, and Inter praeteritos, 28 November 1749.¹ Moreover the Code of Law ratified this, can. 884:

¹ These documents, as also other responses of the Holy See to be attended to in the present and following question, can be read in De Smet: On the Absolution of an Accomplice and Solicitation.

"The absolution of an accomplice in a base sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions and by name of the constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, 1 June 1741"; - and can. 2367:

"1) One absolving or feigning to absolve an accomplice in a base sin incurs by that very fact an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, can receive the confession of the dying person, except the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.

"2) He does not escape the same excommunication who absolves or feigns to absolve an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity, from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice confessor either directly or indirectly."

VIII. The established penalty is excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Supreme Pontiff, from which irregularity follows (can. 2261, § 1). For contracting the penalty there are required:

a) on the part of the delict: true or fictive absolution of one who accused the sin of complicity not yet directly remitted, or who keeps it silent while he was induced to this by the accomplice priest;

b) on the part of the delinquent: consciousness of grave sin, and knowledge of the censure, yet in such a way that crass or supine ignorance does not excuse from it (Holy Office, 13 January 1892, ad 3; can. 2229). Ignorance as to the existence of the censure can scarcely be given; more easily as to its extension, insofar as in good faith it can be judged that a case is present in which to absolve an accomplice is licit.

From the said excommunication regularly only the Apostolic See absolves; but in danger of death and in the more urgent case even a simple confessor can absolve, but only with the burden, under pain of reincidence, of having recourse at least within a month to the Holy See, even if recourse is here and now impossible (can. 2252, 2254, 2367). Hence the case is treated more rigorously than sins reserved on account of censure.

IX. Corollaries. - From the things said it follows:

1. A priest who at the beginning of confession does not know the accomplice, but nevertheless before absolution recognizes him, must admonish him concerning the defect of jurisdiction and dismiss him; for by this he himself incurs no defamation.

2. He who in the article of death illegitimately, that is, with another priest not impeded, began to receive the confession of an accomplice, is bound to yield place to the other priest and to abstain from absolving; indeed even if he began legitimately, with another confessor lacking, and such a one supervenes or the danger of death has now passed, he must cease, provided that this can be done without graver inconvenience.

3. He who absolves an accomplice in danger of death, when necessity urges, cannot, once the danger has passed, receive confession for completing the accusation, if the sin of complicity still remains to be accused.

4. He who doubts whether the penitent is an accomplice must inquire and question insofar as prudence permits; but if he does nothing to solve the doubt, he invalidly absolves the accomplice, and does not escape excommunication, because the ignorance is crass and supine (Holy Office, 13 January 1892).

X. A priest who unduly absolves an accomplice must have recourse, by himself or through another, for example, a confessor, to the Sacred Penitentiary.

For this, under a fictive name, let the case be set forth with all the circumstances which bear upon the matter, namely how many accomplice persons and how many times the priest attempted to absolve; whether he is a pastor, or having care of souls, or a mere confessor; whether he has contracted one or several irregularities from violation of censure by celebration of Mass or solemn exercise of sacred Order; whether at another time he has already received a rescript of grace for absolution from a crime of this kind; whether he has already been absolved in an urgent case.

Moreover the Sacred Penitentiary will prescribe:

1. that every occasion, as much as possible, of sinning with the accomplice be removed;

2. that the accomplice confessor, as far as he can without grave scandal, abstain from hearing the confessions of the accomplice person;

3. that, if the penitent accomplice again approaches him, he send him to another confessor and admonish him concerning the nullity of past confessions;

4. that besides sacramental penance, he fulfill another grave or also long juridical penance, imposed in the rescript itself or to be imposed by the confessor; and sometimes, also that he perform spiritual exercises;

5. finally, sometimes that he lay aside the office of confessor within a predefined time; not however always.

631. Dispositions of canon law concerning the absolution of an accomplice. - According to can. 884: "The absolution of an accomplice in a shameful sin is invalid, except in danger of death; and even in danger of death, outside the case of necessity, it is illicit on the part of the confessor, according to the norm of the apostolic constitutions and especially of the Constitution of Benedict XIV, Sacramentum Poenitentiae, June 1, 1741."

This law is also sanctioned by penalties, from can. 2367:

"§ 1. One absolving or pretending to absolve an accomplice in a shameful sin incurs by that very fact an excommunication reserved in a most special manner to the Apostolic See; and this even in the article of death, if another priest, although not approved for confessions, can hear the confession of the dying person without some grave infamy and scandal about to arise, except in the case in which the dying person refuses to confess to another.

"§ 2. He who absolves or pretends to absolve an accomplice who indeed does not confess the sin of complicity from which he has not yet been absolved, but conducts himself thus because he has been induced to this by the accomplice-confessor either directly or indirectly, does not escape the same excommunication."

632. An accomplice is a partner and one as it were entangled in sin. This is to be understood without restriction, of whatever sex, age, and condition: anyone, whether male or female, whether pubescent or impubescent, provided he is capable of grave sin; indeed even the person with whom the priest had sinned before receiving the priesthood, as the Holy Office declared, January 22, 1879. And therefore he invalidly absolves here the accomplice who makes a general confession of sins, if the previous confessions were certainly sacrilegious, or even simply invalid.

But for complicity there is required:

1. Mutual sin, namely, that each one internally and externally committed the same grave sin; or the consent of two persons in the same grave and external shameful sin, whether each cooperates, as in mutual conversations and embraces, or one only acts, e.g., by touch, provided the other consents externally and internally at the same time; which consent is sufficiently presumed to be present if he resists in no way. Hence there does not fall under the law: a) an act which is mortal on one side, only venial on the other; b) nor an externally light act, although internally grave on both sides; c) nor an act, however grave, to which the other does not consent, indeed to which he has not furnished external consent, although he consents internally.

2. Formal complicity: a) at the same time of the sin; for in the case of sin with one sleeping, unwilling, totally drunk, insane, or ignorant of the shamefulness of the sin from erroneous conscience, or not attending to it in good faith, even if he was induced into error by the confessor, complicity is not present; - b) at the time of absolution; for 1. if the confessor during absolution inculpably does not recognize his accomplice, or 2. if he doubts and, by prudently questioning as much as he can without danger of his own infamy or scandal to the penitent, cannot remove the doubt, or 3. if the priest in no way (neither in the act of sin nor afterward) is known as a priest, but the penitent is altogether ignorant that his accomplice is a priest, the absolution is valid and licit. Namely, then the abuse of power which the Church prohibits is not present.

Yet it makes no difference if the confessor, as accomplice, was not known by the penitent in confession, provided it is verified that he truly is an accomplice, and the confessor knows him as such, and nevertheless absolves him: in this case the absolution is invalid.

633. Shameful sin is to be understood without restriction: any sin whatever of lust, i.e., against chastity and the sixth precept, not only perfect and consummated, but also imperfect and begun, such as touches, kisses, embraces, indeed shameful speech and looks, as the Holy Office declared, May 28, 1873, provided they are strictly lustful and import complicity; - not, however, sins against other virtues and precepts. Hence to absolve an accomplice in a sin of injustice, e.g., in homicide or in theft, is not specially prohibited; although even such an absolution is unbecoming.

But it is necessary that the sin of lust be grave, - external, - mutual, - not directly remitted, - and certain.

1. Grave, both objectively and subjectively, namely materially and formally. Therefore light sins are excluded, whether from imperfection of the act, or from erroneous conscience, or from lightness of matter, when there is question of lust voluntary only in its cause. Hence if a boy from erroneous conscience certainly judges that touches immodestly perpetrated by a priest are not a grave sin, he could be absolved by this priest.

2. External, so that both the internal and the external sin is grave, and also so that it as such, namely in the notion of an external act, is gravely sinful. For this reason sins merely internal, of morose delectation and desire, are excluded, as are external sins under every respect venial, and also grave sins whose grave malice is not fully manifested exteriorly. Hence if kisses or touches had from an internal lustful affection, as external acts, are not in themselves gravely evil, and the libidinous affection from which they are done is not fully manifested exteriorly, they can be absolved.

3. Mutual, so that each accomplice internally and externally committed the same grave sin against chastity, or consented in the same grave and external shameful sin, as was explained in the preceding number.

4. Not directly remitted. Hence if the sin has already been duly accused and validly remitted by direct absolution, so that it is now free matter of confession, the priest can absolve from it (Holy Office, May 29, 1867), although nevertheless it is altogether to be advised that he never hear the confession of his accomplice unless necessity compels, on account of the danger of temptation or irreverence toward the sacrament.

5. Certain, so that every founded doubt of law and of fact is excluded; otherwise the rule must be applied: in doubt, odious things are to be restricted. Therefore it is required that the shameful sin be certain, certainly grave, as such certainly external, certainly mutual, and that the complicity in it be certain.

Hence the case of complicity in a shameful sin probably is not present:

a) If it is doubtful whether the penitent sinned gravely.

b) If there was simple connivance from the fact that the other did not impede a sin which from office he ought not to impede, or approval of a heard shameful conversation which did not stir up other shameful conversations.

c) If the accomplice is not a partner immediately in the shameful act itself or in a sin libidinous according to itself, but only in a shameful agreement about seducing a woman who in reality is not seduced, or only in a shameful permission or invitation to sin with a spouse or offspring who nevertheless is not corrupted. Namely, mere cooperation in the shameful sin of another does not suffice.

d) If the accomplices are in an external act venial from its object (such as pressure of the hand, a light kiss, a momentary touch, or an embrace in an honorable part), although on both sides internally it is done from a shameful affection or intention, provided it has no externally immodest adjunct circumstance, or manifestation by which the affection or intention of immodesty sufficiently becomes known externally.

634. The absolution of an accomplice is radically invalid because of the privation of all jurisdiction. Therefore it is not, as some thought, a case of reserved sin, because there is not restriction but removal of power; for the incapacitating law makes the confessor lack all jurisdiction toward an accomplice accusing a shameful sin (or culpably concealing it), and the very absolution of the accomplice as such, and not only of the sin of complicity, is void, so that there is not given a valid absolution either direct of the other sins, nor consequently indirect of the sin of complicity.

Thus not only according to the tenor of can. 884, but also expressly according to the Benedictine Constitutions and the instruction of the Holy Office, February 20, 1867.1 Hence also in the instructions given by the Sacred Penitentiary for priests to be absolved from censure because of absolution of an accomplice, there occurs the clause that the accomplice-confessor should admonish the penitent "about the nullity of past confessions," and indeed without any restriction or distinction between the case of good or bad faith on the part of the penitent; indeed, from the fact that the penitent is said to be admonished, good faith is rather supposed.

Against this do not stand the words of the Sacred Penitentiary, May 16, 1877, affirming that the privation of jurisdiction "is in order to the shameful sin itself in which the confessor was an accomplice." For there the privation of jurisdiction is not denied but affirmed; it is not said that the privation of jurisdiction affects only the sin of complicity, but the absolution of the accomplice in order to the sin of complicity, so that the confessor is deprived of all jurisdiction and toward every sin, but uniquely in view of and by reason of complicity, i.e., when that sin is accused. Moreover the Sacred Penitentiary could not temper by its own authority and without special intervention of the Supreme Pontiff the law of the Holy Office or of the Benedictine Constitution, concerning which in the case nothing is reported.

Hence, if in urgent necessity an accomplice-penitent could not omit holy communion without grave scandal or infamy, nor could approach another confessor, content with a simple act of perfect contrition, he would have to approach holy communion, nor could he be absolved by the accomplice-priest.

635. An exception is given in the case of extreme necessity, i.e., in the article of death, - and also in a grave danger of proximate death prudently judged, which in law is equated with the article,2 - if another priest is lacking, even one not approved, who can be called or can approach without some grave infamy or scandal about to arise, and to whom the penitent wishes to confess: for then it is the same as if another priest were truly lacking, says Benedict XIV in the constitution Apostolici muneris, February 28, 1745.

A. Therefore in this danger absolution is always valid lest someone perish on this occasion; - but on the part of the confessor it is not licit, nor is the penalty of excommunication avoided, unless another priest is lacking who can be called without great inconvenience, and who does not refuse to hear the confession of the dying person (e.g., because of excessive familiarity with the penitent who is his blood-relative or maidservant), and to whom the penitent does not refuse to confess.

There will be a cause of excuse:

1. if the sick person publicly asks the confessor, while he is bringing Viaticum to him, that he would hear his confession, because the confessor, without scandal and danger of infamy, especially if he were pastor, could not refuse this;

2. if the dying person, without any fault of the accomplice-confessor, altogether refuses to confess before another priest;

3. if without danger of infamy or scandal, or of a sacrilegious confession, the accomplice-priest could not depart, or another could not be called or approach;

4. also probably, if there is present only a priest notoriously suspended or excommunicated: for such a one does not seem to be one who can discharge the office of confessor; and moreover he would not easily be called without infamy or scandal.

On the contrary, absolution is illicit, and excommunication is incurred:

1. if, while another priest is present who is not impeded or can easily be called, the accomplice-priest absolves;

2. if another priest can be called, but the accomplice-priest invents a danger of infamy or scandal where there is none;

3. if the accomplice-priest, as much as is in him, does not employ opportune means so that danger of infamy or scandal does not follow and so that room for confession lies open to another priest, e.g., by not coming under some pretext, or by departing from the house, feigning illness, forewarning the penitent, sending another priest to the sick person, etc.;

4. if there is present a priest who would not himself be exposed to his own infamy, but before whom the accomplice-priest would be defamed: with respect to one person, either there is no infamy, or the accomplice ought to bear it to some extent on account of the fault committed; otherwise it could scarcely happen that, when a priest is present, the accomplice-confessor could not absolve.

B. Danger of death is any gravely dangerous case, whether from within, from illness or childbirth, or from without, from very dangerous sailing, imminent battle, or an inflicted blow. To those in danger can be equated, by a quasi-privilege conceded by extensive interpretation, soldiers who are constituted in a state of military calling-up or mobilization (Sacred Penitentiary, May 29, 1915); likewise from the nature of the thing, those who are in danger of perpetual insanity.

But now many, having gone farther, from epikeia wish to equate with danger of death the case of a penitent who in a remote region, e.g., of the Missions, would greatly fear that he could never, or only after a very long time, have a confessor, unless he confessed to the accomplice. But in the Constitutions of Benedict XIV and in the Code of Law only the case of danger of death is excepted; although nevertheless occurrences in mission regions could not have been unknown to them: "absolution is invalid except in danger of death," says the code; what is clearer?

Therefore the exception does not seem to be extended to other cases, except those which are commonly judged equivalent to death. Interpretation, even if it were of many theologians or canonists, does not suffice to restrict or extend the sense of the law, but only authentic interpretation can do this; especially because a place is not usually given to epikeia in invalidating laws on account of the common good. Therefore no foundation is present for the more indulgent opinion, which consequently is not solidly probable. Indeed, it is altogether important for the common good that missionaries who, because of special circumstances, are exposed to greater danger, should not know for themselves an excessive facility of absolving an accomplice and escaping the consequences of their sin.1