162. On the Absolution of an Accomplice

1. Fabia approaches Caius, with whom she recently sinned, for the sake of making sacramental confession before him. Caius does not dare to repel her from the Sacred Tribunal, nor does he dare to absolve. "I cannot," he says, "absolve you from this sin; I do not have jurisdiction; it is necessary that you go to another." Nevertheless, greatly disturbed, he absolves her from the other sins. Caius, sincerely penitent, manifests this to his confessor, who, anxious, doubts whether Caius has incurred excommunication; and suspending resolution, before he absolves Caius or does anything else, he determines to seek counsel concerning this matter from a pious and learned friend.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. Here first one must note what Cardinal De Lugo has, de Poenit., d. 20, n. 77. Concerning sacramental absolution it must be said that "it cannot be divided or halved, just as neither can confession itself without necessity and urgent cause, since the integrity of confession is of divine law. Whence Suarez adds that even if the superior wished, after the whole confession had been heard, to absolve directly from only the reserved sins, he could not validly do this; but either he must absolve from all sins heard, or from none, because Christ did not give such a power. Yet this does not lack difficulty, nor will it easily be proved that a priest cannot validly, although not licitly, will to absolve from these and not apply the absolution directly to the others, but to hold himself as if he had not heard them." But whatever may be of this, there is no doubt that in the Case Caius could not absolve from the sins of complicity, since in that whole matter he lacked jurisdiction. As regards the other sins, Caius did not lack jurisdiction, but it does not seem that, in the Case, Fabia was truly absolved from the other sins. For since Caius told her that he did not have jurisdiction for absolving her, Fabia in fact received absolution in bad faith, and therefore sacrilegiously. But as regards excommunication, there is no doubt that Caius incurred it in the Case. For first, although he was greatly disturbed, nevertheless since he absolved, and absolved from other sins, therefore he well adverted to what he was doing, and so well that by acting thus he surely wished to avoid excommunication. But he did not avoid excommunication, for he truly absolved an accomplice. And if that man incurs excommunication who even feigns and simulates absolving, how much more he who simply absolves an accomplice.

2. "Titianus, a priest, a slippery occasion having been given, by an unhappy fall lapsed with Anna into grave sin against the sixth precept of the Decalogue. Soon each accomplice repented of this shameful fault. Since no other priest was present there, Titianus immediately went to another place for the sake of confessing. But Anna, detained by some infirmity, could not go to another confessor. Therefore, sad and sorrowful, she earnestly begs Titianus that he hear her confession. He, doubtful and uncertain, first hesitates; on the one side he is restrained by the law of the Church prohibiting the absolving of an accomplice; but on the other side he would like to help the miserable woman, who otherwise will be without a confessor for a long time. Finally, moved by mercy, he hears Anna in confession and absolves her, thinking that the prohibition of the Church does not press in this difficult Case.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. Titianus absolved Anna, his accomplice, altogether invalidly, since he wholly lacked jurisdiction over her. Nor did the law cease in that Case, because an invalidating law does not cease on account of any particular inconvenience whatever. From the law itself only the case of extreme necessity is excepted. Therefore Titianus incurs excommunication, unless he was excused from it by good faith. But he must warn Anna that the absolution imparted by him is null and void, so that she may repeat the confession before another." Thus P. Gury 614.

That the absolution of Titianus was altogether void is denied not without merit. For although in the Constitution Sacramentum Poenitentiae it is said to be altogether void, nevertheless in the same Constitution jurisdiction is taken away from the confessor as regards a sin of this sort. Wherefore, if the penitent is in good faith, as she seems to be in the Case, it is indeed altogether void as regards the sins of complicity, but by no means as regards the others. S. Poenit., May 16, 1877; I. M. 1291, 1293; Comment. in Const. Sacram. Poenit. n. 71, ed. 5.

But it is most true that an invalidating law, as is the law of Benedict XIV in the Case, does not cease on account of any particular inconvenience whatever. For "it is, as it were, contrary to the nature of an absolute incapacity introduced without restriction, and contrary to the custom of laws simply inducing incapacity, which do not receive interpretation from equity and goodness; because a law invalidating acts does not attend to particular cases and reasons, but precisely to the common reason and uniformity, to the common and necessary good and utility." Suarez, de Leg., l. 5, c. 23, n. 3.

But what is said in the resolution of the Case, namely that Titianus incurred excommunication unless he was excused from it by good faith, is precisely that which must be resolved from the proposed Case, as a matter often occurring in practice. Nor indeed would the Case be conveniently resolved practically if, to the penitent asking in the case set forth whether he incurred excommunication, the confessor were to respond thus conditionally: affirmatively, unless you acted in good faith. Now there seems no doubt that Titianus cannot be excused by good faith. For he seems to labor in this matter under an altogether crass and supine error, which does not excuse from incurring this censure. S. O., Jan. 13, 1892.

3. Fulberius and Arcontius, priests, converse among themselves about shameful matters with mutual and scandalous complacency. Wherefore both sin by deed, but without any complicity. After these committed sins, they institute confession to each other and absolve each other. Then they have a doubt whether they have incurred excommunication. For they thought that shameful speech was not certainly comprehended under the prohibition of absolving an accomplice in a sin committed against the sixth precept of the Decalogue. They did indeed doubt, but if they had known certainly that shameful speech also was comprehended, they would have abstained from that mutual confession and absolution. Moreover, they were ignorant of the Decree of the Holy Office of May 28, 1873; when afterward they came to know it by consulting Moral Institutions, they began to be troubled by still graver anxiety.

It is asked: What to the Case?

R. It seems one must say that Fulberius and Arcontius incurred excommunication. For they were not ignorant of the ecclesiastical law and the censure. They also had a doubt in the particular Case, and they acted in bad faith, and indeed in altogether vincible and crass ignorance, by absolving each other. For with such a doubt standing, they ought at least to have asked others beforehand. Nor indeed was there need to have knowledge of that Decree. For it is a question not of a new law, but of a simple Declaration of a pre-existing law, already known to them. Moreover, ignorance in the Case, if there is any, is certainly not ignorance of fact, but of law. But ignorance of law is scarcely admitted in the external forum, and censures are above all penalties of the external forum. Wherefore there is no doubt that, the matter in the Case being brought before a judge, Fulberius and Arcontius would be declared excommunicated. Cf. Commentar. in C. Sacramentum Poenitentiae n. 69, ed. 5; I. M. 1289.

4. Titius, hearing the confession of Berta, with whom, amid consolations, he had exercised touches, although not gravely shameful, recognizes that she had sinned lethally because of the interior pleasure of soul in receiving them, and nevertheless absolves her. Similarly he conducts himself with a friend, with whom he had had dishonest conversations, and together with whom, mutual solicitation having been given, he had gone to visit a bad woman. Finally he absolves Caia, his accomplice in a shameful matter, who was laboring under a long-lasting, although not dangerous, sickness; nor, with Easter time approaching and her relatives exhorting her to be refreshed by the sacred banquet, could she omit communion. No other priest was at hand, nor was there hope that another would come shortly. To this was added that therefore Titius also could not abstain from hearing her confession, lest perhaps Caia's husband be confirmed in suspicion concerning his wife's adultery with Titius himself. Indeed another time Titius, earnestly asked, absolved the same Caia, because she seemed seized by an unexpected sickness, although in the middle of confession it was learned that it was a fainting fit, and meanwhile before she was absolved another priest happened to arrive.

It is asked: 1.º What is a shameful sin, and in what sense is complicity in this sin to be understood according to the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum poenitentiae? - 2.º Whether absolution given to an accomplice is illicit only, or also invalid; and what penalties the confessor absolving an accomplice incurs? - 3.º Whether and what exception concerning absolution to be furnished to an accomplice is assigned in the same Constitution? - 4.º What is to be judged concerning the manner of acting of Titius as regards each thing, as in the Case?

R. To the 1st. A shameful sin, as regards the absolution of an accomplice, is a sin certainly grave, consummated exteriorly, against the sixth precept of the Decalogue, even if it is only touch, sight, or conversation. This is clear from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, and from the Holy Office, May 28, 1873. But complicity is to be taken in the Case thus: that one is to the other a companion of the crime, as is had in the other Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris. A companion, and therefore one knowing and willing with another knowing and willing. Of the crime, that is, a companion in the same exterior work gravely dishonest.

To the 2nd. Absolution given to an accomplice is illicit and at the same time invalid, as is established in each Constitution of Benedict XIV just praised. But the confessor absolving an accomplice incurs excommunication reserved in the most special mode to the Supreme Pontiff, as is had in the same Constitutions of Benedict XIV, and in the Constitution of Pius IX Apostolicae Sedis concerning censures, and also from the Declaration of the Holy Office, Apr. 4, 1871.

To the 3rd. An exception is indeed had, and it is altogether the only one, and in the cited Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae it is expressed thus: namely, that the accomplice not absolve the accomplice "outside the case of extreme necessity, namely at the very article of death, and then with any other priest who can perform the office of confessor being lacking." But from the other Constitution of Benedict XIV Apostolici muneris, any other priest who can perform the office of confessor is judged lacking if "another priest cannot be called or cannot approach without some grave infamy or scandal that would arise." But by this same Constitution it is declared that, if the priest who is an accomplice nevertheless absolves the accomplice at the article of death without the aforesaid necessity, the absolution is valid, although illicit, and the same priest incurs reserved excommunication.

To the 4th. Titius, absolving Berta, does not incur the aforesaid excommunication. For the sin was not grave in the notion of an external act, as is openly said in the Case. He incurs it by absolving the friend; for with him, as is drawn from the whole tenor of the Case, he had gravely dishonest conversations, whence then together, mutual solicitation having been given, they had gone to visit a bad woman. He also incurs the same excommunication by absolving Caia the first time. For although Caia labored under a long-lasting sickness, nevertheless it was not dangerous. Wherefore Caia was neither at the article nor in the danger of death. Nor indeed did Easter time constitute Caia in the aforesaid article or danger of death. Wherefore the necessity of Easter communion did not excuse Titius. From whatever source the obligation of Easter communion is had, from ecclesiastical Law only or also from divine Law, it is certain that Benedict XIV, who knew this obligation, positively excluded this case, since he excepted only the case of extreme necessity, and that at the article of death. Nor is it valid to insist that, on the one hand, Caia's relatives were exhorting her to communion, whence if she had abstained there would have been infamy for her; and that Titius, on the other hand, was pressed to hear the confession by fear of a suspicion of adultery that would arise in Caia's husband. For this twofold inconvenience of infamy does not constitute Titius and Caia in the aforesaid case of extreme necessity and at the article of death. Concerning the article of death the matter is clear. But infamy can easily be avoided. For Titius, from the Constitution of Benedict XIV Sacramentum Poenitentiae, has himself as any other priest deprived of jurisdiction. Now any other simple priest, not yet approved, lacking jurisdiction, certainly would not acquire it in the aforesaid case. Therefore neither does Titius. Besides, if another priest lacking jurisdiction were present, then Caia, with a true danger of infamy standing, could, after eliciting an act of contrition, receive Communion. Therefore she can do the same with only Titius present. Moreover, in order that the suspicion of adultery may be avoided, it is not necessary that Titius truly hear Caia's confession and absolve her; but, having been called to hear Caia's confession, if another confessor truly cannot either meanwhile or afterward be called without scandal or infamy, he himself can then, instead of hearing Caia's confession and absolving her, exhort and excite her to elicit an act of perfect contrition, and declare to her that in straits of this sort she can well receive Communion without Confession and Absolution, by the act of perfect contrition alone, lest perhaps she sin from an erroneous conscience. But Titius, absolving Caia a second time, incurs no excommunication. For her confession truly was in danger of death, although only an apparent one. Real and apparent danger of death are the same here, provided nevertheless, as in the Case, that danger was prudently judged; for otherwise there would be danger to the salvation of souls. Besides, no other confessor was present at that moment. Wherefore Titius could then well hear the confession. The confession having been begun, although afterward both that danger vanishes and another confessor is present, he can by right complete it and absolve Caia. The reason is that the jurisdiction which is had at the beginning of the act perseveres until the same act is completed. "Where judgment has once been accepted, there also it ought to receive its end." L. Ubi 30, de Iudiciis, Dig., lib. 5, tit. 1.