Abstinence (the Virtue)

I. Notion of Abstinence. Abstinence is a moral virtue inclining man to moderate the pleasure of touch and taste in the use of food and non-intoxicating drink. It is said:

1. The pleasure of touch and taste, that is, as we indicated above, the pleasure which flows either from the use of food and drink as such, or from the special flavor of this food or drink.

2. In the use of food and non-intoxicating drink. By these words abstinence is distinguished from sobriety, since sobriety is given for overcoming the special difficulty in the use of intoxicating drink.

II. Object of Abstinence. 1. The remote material object is constituted by foods themselves and non-intoxicating drinks; but the proximate object is the pleasures of touch and taste which arise in their use.

2. The remote formal object is the reason of debt of preserving the mean of right reason in the use of these things; but the proximate formal object is the special moral goodness shining forth in moderating the pleasure of touch and taste in the use of food and non-intoxicating drink.

III. Opposed Vices. By defect there is opposed gluttony strictly so called, or surfeiting, by which someone uses food and non-intoxicating drink beyond the measure of right reason; by excess there is opposed excessive abstinence, by which someone abstains from their use against right reason (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 148).

Abstemiousness.—Abstemiousness is a virtue that moderates according to reason the desire and enjoyment of the pleasures of the table.

(a) It is a special virtue, because the appetite it curbs is very powerful, and on account of the body’s need of nourishment is often tempted.

(b) It moderates by avoiding both defect and excess in meals as to time, place, quantity, quality, etc. There is not, then, one standard amount of food for all, since the needs and duties of all are not the same, and hence he who takes more or less than is normal or usual cannot from that alone be accused of being unabstemious. Neither is the mean for an individual so rigidly fixed as not to permit some latitude within certain limits. It should be noted here too that abstemiousness is not the same thing as abstinence. Thus, a person who is immoderately abstinent, denying himself the food necessary for life or for duty or for optional works better than his abstinence, is not abstemious, since he is not guided by prudence or obligation.

(c) It moderates according to reason; that is, it decides what is proper for an individual, not merely from the viewpoint of bodily health, vigor, and longevity, as is done by the arts of medicine and hygiene, but also and chiefly from the viewpoints of higher goods, such as mental power, control of passion, austerity.

(d) It moderates the pleasures of the table, that is, the desire for and actual enjoyment of food and non-intoxicating beverages. Moderation in intoxicants is the special virtue of sobriety, which will be discussed later. Hence, a person who drinks too much ginger ale or water, tea or coffee, sins against abstemiousness; he who drinks too much whisky, beer, or wine sins against sobriety.

Degrees of Abstemiousness.—(a) The lower degree practises temperance, taking sufficient food and drink for the preservation, not only of life and health, but also of the very pink of physical condition, yet so as to avoid all excess.

(b) The higher degree practises austerity, taking less than is necessary for the best condition, or strength or comfort of the body, but sufficient for life and health. The austere person eats less than he could reasonably take, but not less than his health and work demand. The subtraction he makes in his food will more likely benefit his health in the long run and promote longevity, for, in the wise words of old Galen, “abstemiousness is the best medicine.” But even though this austerity be slightly detrimental to health, or may slightly abbreviate life, it is still lawful, since the higher goods of the mind and of virtue may always be secured at such reasonable sacrifice of corporal goods (see 1164 sqq., 1561 sqq.).

What is temperance, what are its parts, and what vices are opposed to it? - R. To the first. Temperance is the virtue which moderates concupiscence and delight of sensible goods, especially in the delights of taste and touch, of which some regard conserving the individual, others conserving the species. Insensibility and intemperance are opposed to temperance. The former consists in this, that someone flees delight so much that he therefore omits even those things which are necessary for the conservation of nature. But the latter is the sin of excessive concupiscence. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 141 seqq.; Quodl. 12, a. 22.

R. To the second and third. The integral parts of temperance are shamefacedness and honorableness. Through shamefacedness someone flees shamefulness contrary to temperance. Through honorableness someone loves the beauty of temperance. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143; q. 144; q. 145.

The subjective parts of temperance are: Abstinence, which moderates delight in the use of foods and non-intoxicating drink; and gluttony is opposed to it, cf. 329. - Sobriety, which moderates delight in the use of drink able to intoxicate; and drunkenness is opposed to it, cf. 332. - Chastity, which moderates according to right reason the principal delight of coitus itself; and lust is opposed to it, cf. 325. Modesty, which moderates surrounding delights, for instance in kisses, touches, embraces, looks. Sometimes, however, one is put for the other. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 146 seqq.

The potential parts of temperance are: Continence, which contains man in the good of reason against the pleasures of touch, especially venereal pleasures; and incontinence is opposed to it, which impels toward those delights and yields to them. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 155, 156. Meekness, which moderates the passion of anger according to right reason; and anger is opposed to it by excess, cf. n. 341 seq.; by defect, lack of anger, which does not stir up anger when it is required by charity or justice, by correcting and punishing. It does not have malice diverse from that of the omitted office to be fulfilled from charity or justice. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 158. Clemency, which is proper to Superiors, inclines one to impose lesser punishments than by right he could, because of kindness toward neighbor and the decorum of a Superior. Cruelty is opposed to it by excess, which from harshness of soul exacts punishments beyond measure; but by defect, excessive lenity, which mitigates punishments beyond measure or remits them altogether. Cruelty is distinguished from savagery, according to which someone in inflicting punishments does not consider any fault of the one who is punished, but only this, that he delights in the torment of men. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 157, 159.

Modesty, by which someone moderates his internal and external motions and the arrangement of his things, by a measure fitting to him. Hence under modesty the following four virtues are numbered. Humility, which moderates the motions of the soul toward lofty things, and inclines us to profess our lowliness by internal and external signs. To humility is opposed by excess pride, cf. n. 321 seq.; and by defect excessive abjection of self, which inclines to immoderate self-abjection. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 143, 160 seqq. Studiousness, which moderates the zeal of knowing according to the dictate of right reason. To it by excess is opposed curiosity, by which someone is impelled to applying superfluous diligence of knowing, from affection for knowledge alone. But by defect negligence is opposed to it, by which someone omits to acquire owed knowledge. Curiosity and negligence per se are light, per accidens grave, for instance if the former impels you to extort a secret from another, the latter incites a confessor to omit the study of Moral Theology. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 166 seqq.

Modesty of manners, which moderates the external gestures and motions of the body according to the norm of reason, so that namely they agree with the person, both in himself and considered with all circumstances of things. To modesty of manners is opposed by excess petulance, by which a foreign mode is assumed, not agreeing with one's own condition, or an overly common mode is shown; but by defect rusticity of manners, which does not preserve a fitting mode. Each is per se light. A species of modesty of manners is eutrapelia, which imposes due mode on games and places. By excess and by defect one can also sin in play, by scurrility and excessive austerity. - S. Th. 2. 2. q. 168. Modesty of dress moderates the arrangement of external things according to the prescription of reason. For it is fitting that in human society each one wear clothing convenient to his own condition. Likewise by excess and by defect one can sin in this matter, which per se is only light. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 169.

The end of the precept is charity, through which we are induced to loving God and neighbor. Among the vices opposed to temperance, adultery seems especially to be opposed to love of neighbor, and therefore it is chiefly prohibited by the precepts of the Decalogue not only in deed, but also in heart, the sixth and ninth. - But virtues annexed to the virtue of temperance, as to their effects, can likewise rightly regard charity toward God and neighbor; as, for example, from anger, which is opposed to meekness, someone proceeds to blaspheming God, or to killing a man. And thus a precept is also present concerning these virtues, implicitly in the Decalogue, explicitly in other places of Scripture. As to the integral parts of temperance, shamefacedness and honorableness, cf. 1 Cor. 14:40; 1 Tim. 2:9. As to the subjective parts, abstinence, sobriety, chastity, cf. Num. 6:3; 1 Pet. 5:8; Col. 3:5. As to the potential parts, continence, clemency, meekness, modesty, humility, cf. Ecclus. 10:31; 30:24; Col. 3:12; 2 Tim. 2:24. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 170. Therefore the various precepts of the Decalogue contain precepts of moral virtues. But in the first precept, I am the Lord thy God, the precepts of the theological virtues, faith, hope, charity, are also presuppositively and implicitly contained.

649. Notion. Abstinence taken generally signifies the withdrawal of food. In this general sense it is not a virtue, but something indifferent, which from circumstances can become good or evil. Thus he who abstains from foods from vanity commits an evil act; but he who abstains from foods on account of the right dictate of reason and virtue performs a good act.¹¹⁹⁵ The moderate use of foods is prescribed not only by the virtue of abstinence, but also by the medical art, but in different ways. For medicine demands this moderate use principally in order to bodily health, whereas the virtue of abstinence commands the same moderation in order to man's moral good.

It is to be observed that, although abstinence is said to concern the moderate use of foods, it also moderates the use of drink, insofar as drink serves for nourishment; but not the use of intoxicating drink, the moderation of which pertains to the virtue of sobriety. Hence, if someone drinks milk immoderately, he does not sin against sobriety but against abstinence; but if he drinks wine immoderately, he sins against sobriety, not against abstinence.

Definition. Abstinence is a moral virtue inclining one to the moderate use of foods, according as right reason (or faith) shall have determined for the moral good.

If natural right reason is applied as the sole rule of abstinence, there is the natural acquired virtue of abstinence; but if reason illuminated by the virtue of faith is the directing rule, there is the supernatural virtue of abstinence. That abstinence understood in this manner is a true and special virtue is evident, since it rightly orders a special object, namely, the pleasures of foods, which not rarely withdraw man from the good of reason.¹¹⁹⁶

The act of the virtue of abstinence is fasting and abstinence strictly so called, namely, abstinence from certain determined foods. For the sake of clarity we distribute all things which must be said concerning the virtue of abstinence into four sections: 1. on fasting in general; 2. on the extent of the ecclesiastical law of fasting; 3. on the ecclesiastical law of abstinence; 4. on causes excusing from the law of fasting and of abstinence from meat.

¹¹⁹⁵ Cf. S. theol. 2, 2, q. 146, a. 1.

¹¹⁹⁶ Ib., a. 2.

S. Th. II-II, q. 146.

947. Abstinence sometimes signifies the mere withdrawal of food, and thus it is something indifferent, which from circumstance can become good or evil, for example, if it is done from vanity; but here it is taken insofar as it is regulated by reason, and thus it is a virtue moderating according to the dictate of reason the concupiscences and pleasures, or the affection and use, of foods, that is, of common food and drink, "so that man abstains from foods as he ought according to the fittingness of the men with whom he lives, and of his own person, and according to the necessity of his health" (a. 1).

It is a virtue, because it conserves the good of reason against the impetus of passions, namely, against the pleasures of foods. To moderate foods solely on account of health belongs to the art of medicine; to moderate the passions and pleasures of foods on account of the good of reason or the moral good belongs to temperance. - It is a special virtue: for where there is a special impediment to the good of reason, there must be a special virtue for conserving it. But the pleasures of foods are apt to draw man away from the good of reason, both on account of their greatness and on account of the necessity of foods, which man needs for the preservation of life, which man most greatly desires. - It is one virtue, because it has one object: the pleasures of foods to be moderated by reason, with due measure preserved. It can be defined: a moral virtue inclining to the moderated use of foods according as right reason has determined for the moral good.

948. The act of abstinence is threefold, diverse in degree:

1. moderate use of foods, or abstinence from excess: this is altogether due and of precept, by which it comes about that pleasure in the use of foods does not repugn to reason, and therefore it rather retains the general name of temperance;

2. greater but partial abstinence, from a motive of virtue, by which man's appetite inclines less toward food and deprives itself of a certain quality of food, for example, meats, either always or for a time: it is abstinence in a determined degree, greater than moral abstinence demands, which degree nevertheless can be prescribed by positive law: it is called abstinence in the strict sense (abstinence; onthouding);

3. perfect or total abstinence according to quantity, namely, from all food, but for a time: it is called fasting (jeune; vasten).

Hence we shall speak: 1. on fasting according to itself; 2. on the precept of ecclesiastical fasting; 3. on the precept of abstinence from meats; 4. on the subject of fasting; 5. on the violation of fasting; 6. on gluttony.

I ASSERT first, that Abstinence is a special virtue. It is proved from the first of the second of Peter chapter 1, where in that science which virtue is, he commands abstinence to be observed.

IT IS PROVED secondly, for it has a special honesty in moderating the appetite concerning food, as St. Bonaventure teaches in the places alleged in the preceding questions.

IT IS PROVED thirdly. That which is consonant with reason in a special manner, and consists in a mean, is a virtue; such is abstinence; for it is a special mode of temperance, contributing very much to perfection; see St. Thomas ad 3.

Hence God commanded abstinence to those whom he destined for undertaking arduous things; thus of St. John the Baptist it is said Lucae 1: He shall be great before the Lord; wine and strong drink he shall not drink. By the name of sicera, moreover, is understood every kind of liquor by which drunkenness can be incurred, as the Holy Doctor notes in Apologia Pauper. cap. 2. resp. 2, where he gives the reason of this precept; for it befits a vessel enslaved to heavenly grace to abstain from the enticements of the world; which reason can be applied to all men in praise of this virtue, since all are vessels capable of divine grace, and destined to receive it.

I pass over many examples of saints who applied themselves with particular study to abstinence; you have them adorned with various reasons and festive discourses in the Seraphic Doctor in the place cited. But since the principal reason of abstinence stands in fasting, I shall now treat of it; and having briefly finished this capital question, I shall the better weigh the great doubts it contains.