Braggadocio and Irony

Self-Glorification and Self-Depreciation.—Two forms of lying about self are self-glorification and self-depreciation.

(a) Braggadocio is untruthful self-glorification, as when one pretends to be of royal descent, or makes a display of wealth beyond one’s means, or poses as an authority on matters of which one is ignorant, or tries by bluff to make one’s defects seem perfections. This sin is mortal when the lie is seriously injurious to God or others (Ezech., xxviii. 2, Luke, xviii. 11), or when the motive is gravely sinful, such as grave arrogance, ambition, or avarice.

(b) Feigning of defects (irony) is untruthful self-depreciation, as when one falsely denies a good quality which one possesses (e.g., an excessively humble man denies the good deeds that others ascribe to him, though he knows they are real), or when one falsely admits a bad quality which one lacks (e.g., a person who wishes to curry favor accuses himself of misdeeds which he knows never happened). This sin is usually less than braggadocio, since as a rule its purpose is to avoid offense to others; but it may be serious sin on account of some circumstance, as when one speaks ill of self in order to scandalize or seduce another. At times the feigning of defects is a concealed braggadocio, as when one dresses in rags, hoping by this expedient to acquire repute as a person of great spirituality (Prov., xxvi, 25; Matt., vi. 16; Ecclus., xix. 23).

S. Th. II-II, q. 109, a. 4; q. 111, 112 and 113.

864. Diverse species of lying. - On the part of the act by which it is committed, lying is divided into lying strictly so called, which is made by spoken or written words, or equivalent signs, and simulation, which is made by deeds, of which hypocrisy is a species. - On the part of the very account of lying, it is divided into boasting, or a lie which transcends truth toward the greater and is opposed by excess on the part of the object, and irony, or a lie which falls short of truth toward the lesser and is opposed to truth by defect. Of these we must now speak specifically.

865. Simulation (veinzerij) properly so called or formal, is lying by deeds, by which someone through external actions intends to signify something other than what he has in mind, for example if someone displays signs of friendship from a hostile mind, as Judas did; from it is distinguished simulation improperly so called and material: it is dissimulation, or an ambiguous action for concealing the truth, which is licit from a just cause, whenever others can gather the mind of the one dissimulating from the circumstances. Thus Christ (Luke XXIV, 28) feigned that He was going farther, in order to excite the disciples to exercising hospitality.

Therefore not every fiction is simulation, but conversely every simulation is fiction.

866. Hypocrisy (huichelarij) is the simulation of another person, especially if a sinner simulates the person of a just man, and thus it is taken in the New Testament (Luke XIII, 15) and in theological speech, as the simulation of holiness which someone does not have (schijnheiligheid); from which differs the hiding of sin (or silence about it) by which someone, for example, is silent about it lest scandal be generated therefrom.

Hypocrisy is a mortal sin 1) when holiness is contemned, as in the Pharisees: for thus "that man is called a hypocrite whose intention is borne toward both, namely, that he does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy" (q. 111, a. 4); therefore he contemns holiness, not wishing to acquire it but wishing to persevere in sin, and yet at the same time he strives to please men by simulating it; 2) also when it proceeds from a mortally evil end, for example, to dissemble or spread heresy, to acquire a benefice unjustly, to obtain seduction and fornication, etc.

But if the intended end is light, not repugnant to charity, it will be a venial sin, for example, when someone delights in the fiction itself, or if he simulates greater holiness.

Of itself hypocrisy is directly opposed to truth, yet indirectly and accidentally it can be contrary to many virtues according to the remote end, or according to the instrument or means of the act, or something else of this sort.

867. Boasting (snoeverij, grootspraak) is a lie by excess, by which someone through words extols himself above that which he really is. It is mortal if it is done with injury to God (Ezek. XXVIII, 2) or great injury or contumely of the neighbor (Luke XVIII, 11); hence 1. boasting about a good work is a sin of itself venial (IV Kings XVIII; Ezek. XXVIII, 15); 2. about an evil work (Prov. II), if it includes approval of it (which often happens if the deed was done), it is mortal or venial according as the approved work is; hence there is a twofold sin: one of boasting (Jer. XLVIII), another of delight in evil, to which a third, scandal, is often added; 3. but if it includes only approval of a circumstance, for example dexterity, which often happens if the matter concerns a fictitious work, of itself it does not exceed venial sin.

868. Irony (zelfkleinering) is not taken here for the figurative speech by which something is said mockingly by the contrary, but is a lie by defect, by which someone asserts about himself some vile thing which he does not acknowledge in himself, or by which he denies about himself something great which nevertheless he perceives in himself. Although by reason of the matter they are equal, because they are concerned with the same thing, namely, with the condition of the person, nevertheless irony ordinarily is a lesser evil than boasting, which is accustomed to proceed from a baser motive, namely, from appetite for gain or honor; yet it is graver if it is done to deceive craftily with notable detriment.

To lying are reduced simulation, Hypocrisy, Boasting, and Irony. Simulation is defined by St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 25, from the holy Fathers: It is a showing, in deed alien from the things that truly are.

Hypocrisy, however, is defined by the holy Doctor there, and in the Centil., sect. 18: It is the will simulating itself fallaciously under the species of sanctity in the open, and acting vilely in secret. Therefore hypocrisy is simulation in a certain matter, namely virtue. See St. Bonaventure, in the cited place of the Pharetra, discoursing most excellently with the Fathers.

Irony is defined by St. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 1: It is a detestation of another by way of the contrary; but this is reduced to pride.

Boasting, however, is said of that by which one enumerates his own goods, that he may appear praiseworthy, as St. Bonaventure says, in the cited place of the Centil. and lib. 3 of the Compend. of Theological Truth, cap. 15. Wherefore it is reduced rather to pride, although when it exalts itself above what is, it has a certain injustice.

These vices are opposed to truth, and have the character of a lie, and accordingly can be both mortal and venial.

From the end, however, as St. Bonaventure says (question above on man), and with him Tannerus (disp. 6, quaest. 2, dub. 1, num. 18), it is gathered when they are grave; for if the end be gravely contrary to Charity, or justice, etc., they will be mortal; if, for example, someone feign sanctity in order to deceive in faith, or chastity, or to steal. But if the end is not opposed to Charity, etc., they will be venial, for instance the mere pleasure in the fiction, of which Aristotle speaks, 4 Ethics, cap. 7.

For to deceive someone precisely is not grave, unless either a bad end, or a grave harm, follows.

So also Boasting from the root of pride is mortal, if it be born of mortal pride, for instance gravely exalting oneself, as is said of the King of Tyre, Ezech. 28: Thy heart was lifted up, and thou saidst: I am God. Or if, in boasting himself, he bursts into the insults of others, like that Pharisee, Luke 18: I am not as the rest of men, rapacious, etc., even as this one.

Irony, by which one preaches lesser things of himself against the truth, is a lie, yet lighter than Boasting, as St. Thomas teaches, quaest. 113, art. 1 and 2, after Aristotle, lib. 4 of the Ethics, cap. 7.

The reason is, because Boasting arises, for the most part, from a baser motive, namely from the appetite of gain, or honor; but Irony from the fact that one shuns, though inordinately, being burdensome to others by self-exaltation; yet if one humbles himself in order to deceive deceitfully, it can be grave, of which Eccl. 19: There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit.

Boasting and irony can also concur in the same act, if one casts himself down with false humility, that he may be esteemed, as Christ says, Matth. 6: For they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast, as the holy Doctor observes in the Diaeta, tit. 2, cap. 6, where he assails them, saying that these feed a double adversary.

It is also usually doubted concerning figurative words. It is answered that these are free of lying, as St. Augustine teaches, On Lying, cap. 2, and lib. against Lying, cap. 10. For they have truth in their own genus, according to the institutions of the Rhetoricians.

Likewise amphibological enunciations are without the note of a lie, if the speaker does not intend to deceive, as Tannerus notes, disput. 6, quaest. 2, number 25.

It is also doubted concerning mixed speeches, namely those which have their sense partly in the voice, partly in the mind, as when to one asking 100 florins you say: I will give them to you; but understanding, if I owe them.

The first opinion is that these are lies. So Sotus, lib. 8 de Iust., quaest. 1, art. 7; Cajetan, quaest. 89, art. 7; Azor, tract. 1, lib. 11, cap. 4, question 5; Aragon there, and others. The reason is, because that speech, taken as a whole as uttered, is false.

The OPPOSITE others teach; whom Valencia follows, disput. 5, quaest. 15, point 2, and disput. 6, quaest. 7, point 4; Toletus, lib. 4, cap. 21, and lib. 5, cap. 58.

The TRUE opinion, therefore, admits equivocations in this sense, when we are illicitly asked to say something, as Tanner notes, num. 31. For thus Christ, Mark 13, according to the truer sense of the Fathers, says: But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the Angels in heaven, neither the Son, namely that he reveals it to others, or knows not, that is, makes not to know; or knows not so as to reveal, as St. Bonaventure teaches, in 4, dist. 48, quaest. 4, and with him Tanner, num. 31. So the holy Doctor expounds it with Chrysostom, homil. 47, on John 7: Go you up to this festival day, but I go not up, understanding, not now with you; for afterwards he went up. Similar is that of John 11: Lazarus sleepeth, when he was dead, and that of Luke 8: The girl is not dead, but sleepeth, as the holy Doctor observes in his commentaries, and with him Tannerus in the place cited.

We HAVE also the example of the holy Father Francis, at Navarrus, cap. Humanae aures, Tanner, num. 32; for being asked whether a certain man had passed that way, the holy Father, holding his hand in his sleeve, said: He did not pass this way. And although Sotus, on concealing a secret, memb. 3, quaest. 3, says that St. Francis was deceived in that opinion, yet he is to be esteemed of more worth than Sotus, as Tanner warns, num. 32.

So also Samuel, 1 Kings 16, said: I am come to sacrifice to the Lord, when he had come to anoint David king. Which equivocations St. Gregory praises there, for warding off the violence of the tyrant.

EXCLUDING, however, a grave cause, it is not lawful to use equivocations; for by the remaining truth we are bound, otherwise all human society would be done away, as St. Thomas argues, quaest. 114, art. 2, ad 1, and St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 3, § De mendacio. Therefore the holy Fathers there alleged assail it gravely. So St. Isidore in the Synonyma, cap. 11: Beware of a lie in all things, for by a lie faith is taken away; and St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 22: Assuredly words were instituted not that men might deceive one another by them; but that each one might by them convey his thoughts into another's knowledge; and lib. 1 of Christian Doctrine, cap. 36: No one lying keeps faith in that wherein he lies. For this he assuredly wishes, that he to whom he lies should believe him, which faith he nevertheless does not keep by lying to him. Tanner, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 2. St. Bonaventure condemns suspect and equivocal locutions in contracts. On these, with an oath added, I treated in disp. on Oaths, quaest. 10.