Doubt — Bontempi, Palladium Theologicum V · from Schola Thomistica
Doubt VII: On the other things that are reduced to lying
To lying are reduced simulation, Hypocrisy, Boasting, and Irony. Simulation is defined by St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 25, from the holy Fathers: It is a showing, in deed alien from the things that truly are.
De aliis, quae ad Mendacium reducuntur.
Ad mendacium reducuntur simulatio, Hypocrisis, Iactantia, et Ironia. Simulatio definitur a S. Bonavent. lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 25. ex sanctis Patribus: Est ostensio, aliena in facto ab his, quae vere sunt.
Hypocrisy, however, is defined by the holy Doctor there, and in the Centil., sect. 18: It is the will simulating itself fallaciously under the species of sanctity in the open, and acting vilely in secret. Therefore hypocrisy is simulation in a certain matter, namely virtue. See St. Bonaventure, in the cited place of the Pharetra, discoursing most excellently with the Fathers.
Hypocrisis vero definitur a S. Doctore ibi, et p. p. Centil. sect. 18. Est voluntas per speciem sanctitatis, se simulans fallaciter in aperto, et viliter agens in occulto. Itaque hypocrisis est simulatio in certa materia, nempe virtutis. Vide S. Bonavent. loco cit. Pharetrae, praeclare cum Patribus disserentem.
Irony is defined by St. Bonaventure in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 1: It is a detestation of another by way of the contrary; but this is reduced to pride.
Ironia definitur a D. Bonavent. in speculo animae, cap. 1. Est alterius detestatio per contrarium, sed haec ad superbiam reducitur.
Boasting, however, is said of that by which one enumerates his own goods, that he may appear praiseworthy, as St. Bonaventure says, in the cited place of the Centil. and lib. 3 of the Compend. of Theological Truth, cap. 15. Wherefore it is reduced rather to pride, although when it exalts itself above what is, it has a certain injustice.
Iactantia vero dicitur, qua quis enumerat bona sua, ut laudabilis appareat, ut ait S. Bonavent. loco cit. Centil. et lib. 3. Compend. Theol. verit. cap. 15. Quare ad superbiam potius reducitur, tametsi, quando effert super id, quod est, iniustitiam quandam habeat.
These vices are opposed to truth, and have the character of a lie, and accordingly can be both mortal and venial.
Haec vitia opponuntur veritati, et habent rationem mendacii, atque adeo possunt esse et mortalia, et venialia.
From the end, however, as St. Bonaventure says (question above on man), and with him Tannerus (disp. 6, quaest. 2, dub. 1, num. 18), it is gathered when they are grave; for if the end be gravely contrary to Charity, or justice, etc., they will be mortal; if, for example, someone feign sanctity in order to deceive in faith, or chastity, or to steal. But if the end is not opposed to Charity, etc., they will be venial, for instance the mere pleasure in the fiction, of which Aristotle speaks, 4 Ethics, cap. 7.
Ex fine autem, ut ait S. Bonavent. quaest. superius viri, et cum eo Tannerus disp. 6. quaest. 2. dub. 1. num. 18. colligitur quando sint gravia; si enim finis sit graviter contrarius Charitati, aut iustitiae, etc. Erunt mortalia; si aliquis exempli causa fingat sanctitatem, ut decipiat in fide, vel castitate, vel furetur. Si vero finis non opponatur Charitati, etc. erunt venialia, puta sola libidine in fictione, de quibus Aristoteles 4. Eth. cap. 7.
For to deceive someone precisely is not grave, unless either a bad end, or a grave harm, follows.
Decipere enim aliquem praecise non est grave, nisi aut finis malus, aut damnum sequatur grave.
So also Boasting from the root of pride is mortal, if it be born of mortal pride, for instance gravely exalting oneself, as is said of the King of Tyre, Ezech. 28: Thy heart was lifted up, and thou saidst: I am God. Or if, in boasting himself, he bursts into the insults of others, like that Pharisee, Luke 18: I am not as the rest of men, rapacious, etc., even as this one.
Sic etiam Iactantia ex radice superbiae est mortalis, si ex mortali superbia nascatur, puta efferendi se graviter, sicuti dicitur de Rege Tyri Ezech. 28. Elevatum est cor tuum, et dixisti: Deus ego sum. Vel si iactando se, erumpit in aliorum contumelias, veluti Pharisaeus ille, Lucae 18. Non sum, sicuti caeteri homines, raptores, etc. velut etiam hic.
Irony, by which one preaches lesser things of himself against the truth, is a lie, yet lighter than Boasting, as St. Thomas teaches, quaest. 113, art. 1 and 2, after Aristotle, lib. 4 of the Ethics, cap. 7.
Ironia, qua quis de se ipso contra veritatem minora praedicat, est mendacium, leuius tamen quam Iactantia, ut docet D. Thom. quaest. 113. art. 1. et 2. post Aristotelem lib. 4. Eth. cap. 7.
The reason is, because Boasting arises, for the most part, from a baser motive, namely from the appetite of gain, or honor; but Irony from the fact that one shuns, though inordinately, being burdensome to others by self-exaltation; yet if one humbles himself in order to deceive deceitfully, it can be grave, of which Eccl. 19: There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior is full of deceit.
Ratio est, quia Iactantia oritur, ut plurimum, e turpiori motiuo, scilicet ex appetitu lucri, vel honoris; Ironia vero ex eo, quod refugit, licet inordinate, aliis per elationem gravis esse; si tamen ad dolose decipiendum se humiliet, potest esse gravis, de quo Eccl 19. Est qui nequiter se humiliat, et interiora eius plena sunt dolo.
Boasting and irony can also concur in the same act, if one casts himself down with false humility, that he may be esteemed, as Christ says, Matth. 6: For they disfigure their faces, that they may appear unto men to fast, as the holy Doctor observes in the Diaeta, tit. 2, cap. 6, where he assails them, saying that these feed a double adversary.
Potest etiam in eodem actu concurrere iactantia, et ironia, si quis falsa humilitate se deiiciat, ut aestimetur, ut ait Christus, Matth. 6. Exterminant enim facies suas, ut appareant hominibus ieiunantes, ut observat S. Doctor in Diaeta tit. 2. cap. 6. ubi eos carpit dicens, hos pascere duplicem adversarium.
It is also usually doubted concerning figurative words. It is answered that these are free of lying, as St. Augustine teaches, On Lying, cap. 2, and lib. against Lying, cap. 10. For they have truth in their own genus, according to the institutions of the Rhetoricians.
Dubitari solet etiam de verbis figuratis. Respondetur, haec carere mendacio, ut docet D. Augustinus de mendacio, cap. 2. et lib. cont. mendacium, cap. 10. Habent enim in suo genere veritatem, iuxta Rhetorum instituta.
Likewise amphibological enunciations are without the note of a lie, if the speaker does not intend to deceive, as Tannerus notes, disput. 6, quaest. 2, number 25.
Itidem enunciationes amphibologicae sunt absque nota mendacii, si loquens fallere non intendat, ut notat Tannerus disput. 6. quaest. 2. numero 25.
It is also doubted concerning mixed speeches, namely those which have their sense partly in the voice, partly in the mind, as when to one asking 100 florins you say: I will give them to you; but understanding, if I owe them.
Dubitatur etiam de orationibus mixtis, quae scilicet habent partim in voce, partim in mente sensum, ut dum petenti 100. florenos dicis: dabo eos tibi; sed intelligens, si debeo.
The first opinion is that these are lies. So Sotus, lib. 8 de Iust., quaest. 1, art. 7; Cajetan, quaest. 89, art. 7; Azor, tract. 1, lib. 11, cap. 4, question 5; Aragon there, and others. The reason is, because that speech, taken as a whole as uttered, is false.
Prima opinio est, haec esse mendacia. Ita Sotus lib. 8. de Iust. quaest. 1. art. 7. Caietanus quaest. 89. art. 7. Azor tract. 1. lib. 11. cap. 4. quaestio 5. Aragon ibi, et alii. Ratio est, quia oratio illa ex toto prolata, est falsa.
The OPPOSITE others teach; whom Valencia follows, disput. 5, quaest. 15, point 2, and disput. 6, quaest. 7, point 4; Toletus, lib. 4, cap. 21, and lib. 5, cap. 58.
OPPOSITUM docent alii; quos sequuntur Valentia disput. 5. quaest. 15. puncto 2. et disput. 6. quaest. 7. puncto 4. Toletus lib. 4. cap. 21. et lib. 5. cap. 58.
The TRUE opinion, therefore, admits equivocations in this sense, when we are illicitly asked to say something, as Tanner notes, num. 31. For thus Christ, Mark 13, according to the truer sense of the Fathers, says: But of that day or hour no man knoweth, neither the Angels in heaven, neither the Son, namely that he reveals it to others, or knows not, that is, makes not to know; or knows not so as to reveal, as St. Bonaventure teaches, in 4, dist. 48, quaest. 4, and with him Tanner, num. 31. So the holy Doctor expounds it with Chrysostom, homil. 47, on John 7: Go you up to this festival day, but I go not up, understanding, not now with you; for afterwards he went up. Similar is that of John 11: Lazarus sleepeth, when he was dead, and that of Luke 8: The girl is not dead, but sleepeth, as the holy Doctor observes in his commentaries, and with him Tannerus in the place cited.
VERA igitur sententia hoc sensu admittit aequivoca, cum illicite rogamur ad aliquid dicendum, ut notat Tanner. num. 31. Sic enim Christus Marc. 13. iuxta veriorem Patrum sensum ait: De die autem illo, vel hora, nemo scit, neque Angeli in caelo, neque Filius, nempe ut aliis revelet, vel nescit, hoc est nescire facit; vel nescit ad revelandum, ut docet D. Bonavent. in 4. dist. 48. quaest. 4. et cum eo Tanner. num. 31. Sic explicat S. Doctor cum Chrysostomo homil. 47. ad Ioannis 7. Vos ascendite ad diem festum hunc, ego autem non ascendam, intelligens nunc vobiscum; nam postea ascendit. Simile est id Ioan. 11. Lazarus dormit, cum esset mortuus, et id Lucae 8. Non est mortua puella, sed dormit, ut observat S. Doctor in commentariis, et cum eo Tannerus loco cit.
We HAVE also the example of the holy Father Francis, at Navarrus, cap. Humanae aures, Tanner, num. 32; for being asked whether a certain man had passed that way, the holy Father, holding his hand in his sleeve, said: He did not pass this way. And although Sotus, on concealing a secret, memb. 3, quaest. 3, says that St. Francis was deceived in that opinion, yet he is to be esteemed of more worth than Sotus, as Tanner warns, num. 32.
HABEMUS etiam exemplum S. P. Francisci apud Navar. cap. Humanae aures, Tanner. num. 32. nam quaesitus, an quidam illuc transiisset, tenens S. Pater manum in manica ait: Huc non transiit. et quamvis Soto de secreto tegendo, memb. 3. quaest. 3. dicat, S. Franciscum fuisse deceptum in ea opinione, tamen pluris est aestimandus, quam Sotus, ut monet Tanner. num. 32.
So also Samuel, 1 Kings 16, said: I am come to sacrifice to the Lord, when he had come to anoint David king. Which equivocations St. Gregory praises there, for warding off the violence of the tyrant.
Sic et Samuel primo Reg. 16. dixit: Ad immolandum Domino veni, cum venisset ad regem ungendum Davidem. Quae aequivoca laudat D. Gregorius ibi ad Tyranni vim declinandam.
EXCLUDING, however, a grave cause, it is not lawful to use equivocations; for by the remaining truth we are bound, otherwise all human society would be done away, as St. Thomas argues, quaest. 114, art. 2, ad 1, and St. Bonaventure, lib. 3 of the Pharetra, cap. 3, § De mendacio. Therefore the holy Fathers there alleged assail it gravely. So St. Isidore in the Synonyma, cap. 11: Beware of a lie in all things, for by a lie faith is taken away; and St. Augustine in the Enchiridion, cap. 22: Assuredly words were instituted not that men might deceive one another by them; but that each one might by them convey his thoughts into another's knowledge; and lib. 1 of Christian Doctrine, cap. 36: No one lying keeps faith in that wherein he lies. For this he assuredly wishes, that he to whom he lies should believe him, which faith he nevertheless does not keep by lying to him. Tanner, in the Mirror of the Soul, cap. 2. St. Bonaventure condemns suspect and equivocal locutions in contracts. On these, with an oath added, I treated in disp. on Oaths, quaest. 10.
SECLUSA tamen gravi causa, non licet aequivocis uti; sic enim tenemur reliqua veritate, alioqui omnis societas humana tolleretur, ut arguit S. Thom. quaest. 114. art. 2. ad 1. et D. Bonavent. lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 3. §. De mendacio. Ideo SS. Patres, ibi allegati, graviter carpunt. Sic D. Isidorus in Synon. cap. 11. Cave mendacium in omnibus, mendacio enim fides tollitur, et D. Augustinus in Enchir. cap. 22. Utique verba propterea sunt instituta, non per quae invicem se homines fallant; sed per quae in alterius quisque notitiam cogitationes suas perferat, et lib. primo de doctrina Christi, cap. 36. Nemo mentiens, in eo quod mentitur, servat fidem. Nam hoc vult utique, ut cui mentitur, sibi fidem adhibeat, quam tamen ei mentiendo non servat. Tanner in speculo animae, cap. 2. S. Bonavent. suspectas, et aequivocas locutiones in contractibus vituperat. De his, addito iuramento, egi disp. de Iuram. quaest. 10.