Civil Tolerance

444. Note beforehand. That liberty or equality of worships lies greatly in ambush against the Catholic faith, nothing is more evident than this. For through it there is brought into Catholic kingdoms that horrible system, most repugnant even to the natural light of reason itself, "of the indifference of any religion whatsoever, which, after every distinction of truth and error has been taken away, boldly asserts that men can attain eternal salvation in the worship of any religion whatsoever," and thus it casts peoples down into the abyss of incredulity (Pius IX, Enc., November 9, 1846).

445. PRINCIPLES. I. Liberty of worships, considered as doctrine, is a false principle of liberalism, which a Catholic legislator ought to impede by all the ways in which he can. Reason: he who cannot favor lesser vices, how much more ought he to resist those things which tear out the foundations of the commonwealth (St. Alph., de Prohib. lib., c. 1, n. 4; opusc. Fedelta dei vassalli).

Liberalism is a politico-religious system which professes an independence of the State from the Church so complete that the State rules itself, no respect being had to Religion, as if this did not exist, and all religions were in reality equal in themselves.

Moreover, the Supreme Pontiffs have always reprobated this liberty and equality of worships: "What more insane can be devised?" exclaims Pius VI in the Letter to Cardinal La Rochefoucauld (on March 10, 1791). Gregory XVI, in the Encyclical Mirari vos; Pius IX, in the Encyclical Quanta cura (December 8, 1864) and in the Syllabus (propositions 77, 78, and 79); Leo XIII, in the Encyclical Libertas (June 20, 1888), condemned this system by their supreme authority. The same Pontiff spoke thus concerning this doctrine in the Encyclical Immortale Dei: "If it differs from Atheism in name, in reality it differs not at all."

Note. But what kind of sin against faith he commits who professes liberalism was said above at n. 441.

II. Liberty of worships and of conscience can sometimes be tolerated where the prince cannot impede it without graver detriment to the true religion and commonwealth. Thus the Angelic Doctor teaches (2.2, q. 10, a. 11): Human rule is derived from divine rule, and ought to imitate it. But God, although he is omnipotent and supremely good, nevertheless permits some evils to be done in the universe which he could prohibit, lest, by their being removed, greater goods be taken away, or even worse evils follow. St. Alphonsus is plainly consonant with the Angelic Doctor (II, 18). Cf. Zigliara, Summa Phil., p. 247.

III. Liberty of worships, existing in fact, creates a twofold danger for the faithful, both of embracing the theoretical error concerning the equal value of religions, and of confusing political tolerance with dogmatic tolerance (Villada, Casus Consc., I, p. 59).

The matter is clear. From this twofold danger it must always be discerned whether someone in reality has fallen into a sin opposed to faith, or has only undergone the danger of falling into it, and whether the matter is one of doctrinal liberalism, or only of political parties.

446. From these things you will resolve: A. As regards liberalism, as it is doctrine:

In order to determine what sin against faith he commits who professes this liberalism, one must carefully inspect (as Genicot says) what he understands by the sentence to which he gives assent, since among those who have not completely turned aside to atheism or rationalism and who wish to remain Catholics, this word liberalism is taken with manifold variety; then one must see how far, by reason of ignorance and good faith, each one is excused from formal sin.

Hence: 1. He is a heretic who: a) fully embraces the doctrine of liberalism, that is, the full independence of the State from the Church, or (what is worse) the subjection of the Church to the authority of the State. For some subordination of the State to the Church is manifestly contained in the full power with which Christ furnished Peter and his successors; b) the same must be said of those liberals who pertinaciously hold certain particular doctrines which are also adverse to divine faith, for example, that by force of a merely civil contract there is given among Christians a true marriage. Cf. Sarda y Salvani, Le liberalisme est un peche.

2. They are excused from heresy, but expose themselves to danger, who defend these errors on account of ignorance for the most part culpable, and yet do not bear the mind of retaining them when they shall have known them to be reprobated by the Church. Likewise, by defect of religious assent, they sin gravely against prudence or reverence owed to the Church who hold only some secondary error, but one by no means contrary to divine faith, for example the 76th proposition of the Syllabus, concerning progress going to follow for the Church from the abrogation of the civil empire. But here some good faith can easily be admitted.

B. As regards liberalism, as it denotes political parties.

Before all things one must examine whether those who adhere to such parties nevertheless otherwise seem to fulfill the offices of good Catholics. Then it must prudently be explored whether they themselves admit something evil in doctrine or manner of acting, or without sufficient reason cooperate in the evil counsels of others; and according to these things let them be judged.

Concerning cooperation of this kind a question often occurs when there is question of schools, assemblies, and other social works.

The certain rule is that these rites are not to be permitted by Christians to subject infidels without a most grave cause.

The most grave causes, however, are twofold: to avoid greater evils, or lest a greater good be impeded. So the Theologians commonly with St. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 10. art. 11. et St. Bonau. locis allegandis. So Tanner. disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Card. Lugo disp. 19. sect. 2. §. 4.; Bassaeus v. Fides, 2. num. 9.

I assert first, that for the causes adduced, subject infidels can be tolerated by Christian Princes.

It is proved from the Saintly Doctor, opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 7., from that word of Matth. 13., where the Father of the family, expostulated with about eradicating the Zizanias, answered: Non: ne forte eradicetis et triticum. Sinite utraque crescere, etc. — No: lest perhaps you root up the wheat also. Suffer both to grow, etc. For this is the general rule, observed at that time by Pontiffs and Kings, lest seditions and confusions boil up in the Church. For thus God also tolerates certain evils for these causes, as Tanner. notes after St. Bonau. in 1. dist. 47. quaest. 3., where he infers our conclusion, certainly for this reason, because our goods ought to have their exemplars in God.

I assert second, that for this cause also the Jews are tolerated, both because as it were shadows they confirm the truth of our faith, and they exhibit the sacred Books to us for convincing the Pagans. So it is had in can. Qui sincera, dist. 45. et St. August. l 8. de ciuit. cap. 46. The legitimate Books of the old testament are indeed to be received from them, but the truly Talmudic, Cabalistic, and similar ones, vomiting forth insults against Christ, are to be given to the flames, as was long ago decreed by Gregory IX, Innocent IV, Julius III, Paul IV, and recently by Clement VIII.

I assert third, that outside these cases subject infidels are not to be tolerated. So it is defined in the Fourth Council of Carthage, can. 15. Elibertino; cap. 44. et Clem. un. de Iudaeis, et Saracenis, et leg. Nemo, C. de Paganis.

It is proved from Suarez disp. 18 sect. 4.; Tannero disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 2.; Lugo disp. 19 sect. 2. §. 4.; by the argument of St. Bonau ad Psal. 118. cap. 2. vers. 11., expounding that word of Matthaei 20: Principes gentium dominantur eorum — The princes of the nations lord it over them; because they are bound to remove their subjects from the perdition of souls, from scandals, and to promote them to good. For this reason Constantine burned the Temples of the Pagans and forbade the sacrifices; and he is praised by the Saints, Ambr. epist. 30. August. epist. 48. 50. et 104., and Nicephorus lib. 8. cap. 33. et de Iouiniano lib. 10. cap. 39. et Theodosio lib. 12. c. 25. relates it; thus Josias, Ezechias, Iosaphat are praised, who took away the high places, 3. et 4. Reg., and others are blamed who did not take them away, as St. August. epist. 50. notes.

Here they ask: whether a Prince can grant a safe-conduct to infidels without a faculty of the Pontiff.

Hurtadus answers, disp. 79. sect. 5., that it can be granted to unbaptized infidels; not to heretics, who are subjects of the Church.

Therefore, notwithstanding any safe-conduct of the Kings, the Church can punish heretics, as the Council of Constance defines, sess. 19.; yet if she herself has given the safe-conduct, she is bound to keep it: as the Master Joannes Marq., the Augustinian, teaches, lib. 2. de gubernatore Christiano. cap. 24., who on pagina 301. says that faith is to be kept with them, especially when confirmed by oath.

This is a most weighty question, and necessary in our times.

I assert first: it is not lawful for a Christian Prince to make compacts on this matter without most grave causes. The Catholics agree with D. Bonav. in the places to be cited. So D. Thom. quaest. 10. art. 11. Molanus lib 1. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 20. Lenaeus de unica religione servanda. Becanus lib. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 10. Iacobus Simanc. lib. Cathol. Instit. cap. 46. Conradus Brunus de haeret. lib. 3. cap. 15. Petrus Ribadeniera lib. 1. de Inst. Principis, cap. 17. and others cited by Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 3. num. 66.

It is proved first by D. Bonav. on 12. Wisdom, in these words: Those ancient inhabitants of thy holy land, whom thou didst abhor, because they did hateful works to thee by charms, and unjust sacrifices, etc. thou didst will to destroy from the midst of thy Sacrament by the hands of our forefathers.

It is proved secondly by S. Doct. there from Deuter. 7. You shall not make a covenant with them, nor show mercy to them; nor shall you join with them in marriage. You shall not give your daughter to his son, nor take his daughter for your son: for she will lead your son astray, lest he follow me, so that he may serve strange gods rather: and the wrath of the Lord will be kindled, and he will quickly destroy you. The same is commanded Exodus 34. Hence Solomon is reproved for transgressing, 3. Reg. 11. and Josaphat, otherwise pious, 2. Paral. 19. and 20. for that he had imprudently made a covenant with the infidel Kings of Israël.

It is proved thirdly by S. Doct. opusc. de sex alis Seraphim, cap. 7. from cap. 5. ad Galat. A little leaven corrupts the whole mass, etc. But he that troubles you shall bear judgment, etc. would that they were cut off who trouble you. And 1 Corinth. 5. Put away the evil from among yourselves. And Luke 13. Cut it down. Similar things are found 2. Timot. 2. Tit. 3. Ioan. epist. 2. Apocal. 2.

It is proved fourthly by S. Doct. serm. 6. Hexaemer. from the practice of the Church, especially of the supreme Pontiffs, and of Councils, condemning and separating heretics. Likewise of Emperors, especially Constantine, Charlemagne, and Theodosius. For there exists a famous Constitution of Theodosius, Gratian, and Valentinian, and it is found l. Cod. de summa Trinitate, where it is defined: We will that all peoples, whom the clemency of our empire rules, dwell in such a Religion as the divine Peter handed on to the Romans, which the Religion hitherto revealed to us by himself declares, which it is clear the Roman Pontiff follows. Similar is the rescript of the Emperors Gratian, Valentinian, and Theodosius, who impose perpetual silence on all heretics l. 2. C. de haeret. similar things are found l. 3. C. de haeret. and in Eusebius on the life of Constantine lib. 3. cap. 6. et 62.

It is also proved by the reasons brought forward quaest. 6. for these pacts bring grave harm and scandal, and are extorted by force and fraud, as is evident from the compacts with the sectaries of these times, which brought most grave wars and ruins, as Davila relates in the history of Gallia, and Tannerus disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 3. Bassaeus verb. Infidelitas, 10.

I add, however, that for most grave causes it is lawful to make compacts and to tolerate. The reason is that of Tannerus num. 99. for it is lawful to pact concerning those things which it is lawful to tolerate.

I assert secondly. If at any time such pacts are entered into by Kings for grave causes, they are not to be violated. So Molanus lib. 1. cap. 25. et sequent. Becanus disp. de fide haereticis servanda, cap. 7. Letmatius de fide haereticis servanda, and others cited by Tanner. disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 4. This is the opinion of S. Bonav. in the places to be alleged.

It is proved first by S. Doct. in 3. dist. 39. art. 2. quaest. 3. where from the fact, that it is lawful to enter into treaties with infidels, S. Doct. gathers that oaths may be received from them according to their sects, as from Mahometans upon the Alcoran, as I shall show tract. de Relig. disp. de iuramento, quaest. 2.

But he proves that treaties are to be kept, and that they were at times legitimately entered into; first by the example of Iacob Genesis 31. where he made a treaty with Laban the Pagan.

Next he proves it by the example of Iudas, the holy Leader of the Machabees, who made treaties with the Romans 1. Machab. cap. 8. and is not reproved.

It is proved next by S. Doct. in the same dist. art. 3. quaest. 3. by the example of Iosuë, the most holy Leader, who kept the treaty, though imprudently made, with the Gabaonites, and in this he is praised by D. Ambr. lib. de officiis. Abulensis disputes ad 9. Iosue, from quaest. 17. to 27. Whether an oath bound to it: for he asserts that it was not obligatory, Lyranus striving for the opposite. With Tostatus is Tannerus also disp. 1. quaest. 9. dub. 4. num. 119.

S. Bonau. indeed supposes that foundation by which Tostatus chiefly strives: that the Hebrews were obliged simply to kill the Gabaonites, who were Chananaeans; concerning whose killing without mercy the command of God was at hand. Deuter. 20. Num. 33. Nor is any revelation of God dispensing found. From which the whole argumentation of Lyranus collapses.

He brings forward one reason, which is that of D. Ambrosii loc. cit. who says, Iosue judged that the peace which he had given was not to be recalled, because it had been confirmed by the religion of a Sacrament, lest, while he reprehended the perfidy of another, he should dissolve his own faith. Therefore by reason of scandal he seems to intimate that the oath is to be kept.

Abulensis quaest. 22. answers however that no scandal was given, because the Gabaonites, as deceivers, had extorted this oath, feigning that they were not Chananaeans.

The reason by which D. Bonau. asserts that the oath was rightly kept is, that the precept concerning the killing of the Chananaeans was laid down insofar as they were incorrigible: Therefore Iosue 11. it is said: For the sentence of the Lord was, that their hearts should be hardened, and that they should fight against Israël, and fall, and not merit any clemency, and so perish, as the Lord had commanded Moses. Therefore since the Gabaonites were not hardened, but gave themselves to the Hebrews, there was no precept to kill them.

Tostatus quaest. 21. answers first, that the sentence of the Lord was against all the Chananaeans, nor was any exception declared, except afterwards cap. 11. Iosue, which was not then known to the Israelites.

I say that clear evidence is had that this precept was so declared to Iosuë, and to the princes, because two chapters later it is described, not as laid down then only, but as manifest for the just preservation of the Gabaonites. And therefore it is said: As the Lord had commanded Moses, so Moses commanded Iosue, and he accomplished all things: there did not pass from all the mandata, not even one word, which the Lord had commanded Moses: But then he immediately subjoins the exception in the law of killing the Chananaeans: Since therefore Moses at the beginning declared it to Iosuë, and he fulfilled it to the finest point; it follows, that the precept was laid down in this form, in which it is thus related: then it is from Iosue. That certain Chananaeans were afterwards killed, is nothing against me; for they were obstinate, rebellious, just like the rest before the killing. S. Doct. adds that they were punished civilly with perpetual servitude, in which the Princes judged they acted better than by killing them, since they voluntarily subjected themselves to servitude. S. Doct. nevertheless does not accept this reason, because if the oath was valid, they ought not to be punished with the other penalty of perpetual servitude, as Tostatus argues quaest. 24. who excuses their ignorance. And in this alone he adheres to S. Doctor, that it did not tend to an evil outcome, so to receive them unto salvation.

Truly for our purpose it suffices that the holy man Iosue, of whom it is said that he kept the law of the Lord adamussim, entered into treaties with these men, whom he knew to be Pagans, even though from far off.

The reason of D. Bonav. from D. Ambrosio loc. cit. which Tannerus uses num. 104. is, that it is of Divine and Natural Law to keep pacts; otherwise the whole bond of human society will be broken.

The heretics object to us, as holding that no pacts are to be kept.

First the Council of Constance, which did not keep faith with Ioanni Hus, and the Pragensi.

It is answered, that the Council only declared that the safe-conduct of Kings does not avail to the prejudice of the power of the Church over Heretics. But those two were justly condemned. And indeed Hieronymus a Praga had from the Council a safe-conduct, but with the addition, salva semper iustitia. Hus however from the Emperor. Add that heretics have often been perfidious, as the Hugonotti toward Carolus IX. as Davila relates.

They object many Councils, Romanum IV. and Later. III.

These however only absolve subjects from the oath of fidelity to Kings excommunicated, and deprived of their jurisdiction by the Pontiff.

I assert thirdly, these pacts are to be kept, even if imprudently made. So D. Bonav. 3. dist. 39. art. 3. quaest. 3. whom the others commonly follow, cited by Tannerus num. 112.

It is proved by D. Bonav. with the argument of D. Ambrosii loc. cit. because it is a greater evil to break faith than to keep such pacts; for thereby the common good of human society is harmed.

Summary : I.—Nominal description of civil tolerance.— In what sense we make it the exclusive work of the State.—What complete civil tolerance would imply.— There are not two schools, to be called, the one the school of tolerance, the other of intolerance. II.—General views of the subject : its complexity.— Plan and arrangement of this section.

THE effect of religious beliefs and philosophical opinions on the status, the rights, and liberties of citizens, gives rise to the problem of civil tolerance.

Whatever opinion we form on the duties of the State, and the corresponding rights of the Church, it is materially within the discretion of the temporal government to grant or deny to the Church its visible help and support. For this reason, putting aside for the present the question of responsibility, we consider this tolerance as the special work of the civil power.

Civil tolerance may be looked at from many points of view, and lends itself to many divisions.

In regard to its supreme principle or its reasons, civil tolerance asserts itself as a permanent, sacred, inviolable institution, which is dogmatic tolerance ; or it is content to be a concession, a rule of the nature of a compromise, founded on circumstances, which is practical tolerance.

The extension of civil tolerance may be considered as it is shown to the religions permitted in the State, and to the citizens and their liberties.

With reference to religions, civil tolerance may extend to all, or may be restricted to some only—as, for example, to Christian bodies, or religions already established.

It may permit them to make converts, or may simply authorize their existence.

It may grant them public and social life, either in their temples or outside, with liberty to form a hierarchical organization or to possess property ; or it may put certain limitations on that public life by decrees on the subject of associations, processions, and the public exhibition of religious symbols ; or it may even recognize only the individual liberty of conscience of their members.

With reference to citizens, tolerance may leave them free choice to continue in their own religion, or pass from one religion to another, or to no religion at all.

It may place all citizens on a footing of perfect equality, or content itself with punishing no one for his religion, while making certain civil rights depend on the profession of faith.

It grants or refuses them the free manifestation and propagation of their opinions and beliefs. In regard to its practice, tolerance of opinions and creeds may be combined with the recognition of a State religion, with favours reserved to the true religion, or to religion in general ; or it may observe strict neutrality, giving no preference to one religion over another, or to religion over unbelief. Experience tells us that there are two kinds of neutrality—the one sympathetic and trusting, like that of the United States of America ; the other contemptuous and suspicious, like that of the present French Republic or its younger sister, the new Republic of Portugal.

In the opinion of many modern political writers, the complete scheme of civil tolerance implies— The dogma of tolerance.

Perfect equality, civil and political, among believers in any religion whatever, and unbelievers. The free manifestation and diffusion of all opinions and all systems.

The perfect neutrality of the State, and its indifference to religion and irreligion. This description seems to us to err both by excess and by defect.

On the one hand, as we shall see better by-and-by, it is not necessary for the existence of tolerance that it should be raised to a dogma ; and the most liberal tolerance does not require official indifference in religious matters. Moreover, the State, by dissociating itself from religion and from God, does not remain neutral ; it professes practical atheism, and by its very abstention preaches religious indifference, and so, as Sarcey said, men are accustomed to do without religion, and are slowly and gradually drawn away from the faith.

On the other hand, simple individual liberty does not give liberty to religious bodies ; it gives no security to the social form and organization which are essential to all religions. The programme of tolerance, therefore, is not complete, unless it contains some provision guaranteeing the freedom of religious society.

It may be said that complete civil tolerance does not yet exist except as a dream. In many countries the head of the State must belong to some particular religious body. The rulers abandon the position of unstable equilibrium in which they would be placed by abstract neutrality, in order to show themselves either timidly friendly to religion or, more frequently, boldly hostile to it ; and the Church nowhere enjoys perfect freedom. Even in Belgium, where civil tolerance exists to a greater extent than in any other country in Europe, the priority of civil marriage, which is obligatory under the Constitution, is derogatory to the liberty of worship.

In spite of the variety of opinions and systems, neither complete intolerance nor complete tolerance finds any defenders, as we shall proceed to prove. We cannot allow any class of persons to arrogate to themselves the exclusive right to be called tolerant, and to fix the reproach of intolerance on all their opponents ; and this is the less permissible because the specious banner of tolerance often covers the most insidious designs against religion. M. Briand, addressing the extreme Left in the French Parliament, repeated, almost word for word, the statement of Sieyès in the Constituent Assembly of 1791, when he said : “ You have so little idea of liberty that you cannot tolerate it.”¹

¹ Session of October 25, 1910.

Now that we have arrived at civil tolerance, we have reached the heart of our subject, but we are still faced with this difficulty : In the minds of many, if not of most persons, the problem of tolerance is reduced entirely to civil tolerance ; and no one can remain indifferent to a matter in which every practice supposes a theory, in which every speculation leads straight to practical conclusions, in which religion and its rights, the State and its mission, the private individual and the guarantees of his liberty, are all vitally concerned. But this universal interest is mixed up with too many different passions to facilitate clearness of views and harmony of conclusions. Philosophers do not agree upon the principles, nor historians upon the facts, nor politicians in their appreciation of the facts or the lessons they teach.

Moreover, the problem of tolerance varies in its aspect with the centuries ; its Protean form changes with the various doctrines which bear upon tolerance and its fundamental principles, with the political factions which use it as a weapon of party strife, and with the circumstances which increase or diminish the necessity for it. It originated in the day when, thanks principally to the influence of Christianity, men rose in conscientious resistance to a tyrannical law. It was then harmoniously solved in Europe by universal acceptance of the same faith, and was again raised at the time of the disastrous schism which destroyed the religious unity of the civilized world. It spread till the beginning of the nineteenth century, when it was radically modified, as discussions extended to the existence and personality of God, and soon after to morality and social order. An intolerance of an unforeseen character arose at the same time, so violent in its first outbursts that its very exaggeration put an end to it, apparently for ever. But by degrees it reappears, preparing and already renewing its attacks on religion.

The problem of tolerance does not present itself, either theoretically or practically, in the same form to-day as yesterday ; nor was it yesterday the same as it was the day before.

Our task therefore is somewhat complicated, and the order to be followed creates a new difficulty ; we have to state and discuss principles, and to come to a conclusion on controverted facts, and therefore cannot adopt a purely logical or a purely historical method. Considering the unequal manner in which the facts agree with the theories, and also the diversity of the principles appealed to, we have thought it best, for the sake of clearness, to divide the subject into three periods, ending respectively with the Reformation of the sixteenth century, the French Revolution, and the present day.

The first period, in which a great Empire fell and gave place first to barbarous kingdoms and then to the Christian republic of the Middle Ages, is more full of events than theoretical discussions. All interest is concentrated on the explanation of facts, and is finally absorbed in a judicial institution—the Inquisition. This is what, in spite of the multitude and diversity of facts, gives to this period a sufficient unity. The principles are, then, in the acts, and we have only to consider the policy followed and form our judgment upon it. In the course of the second period tolerance is discussed among Christians, or at least among theists ; acts are distinguished from opinions, and are influenced by them. We shall principally occupy ourselves with a rapid review of systems, and with criticisms upon them, without refusing to the facts the consideration they demand. In the third period the ground of the discussion is changed ; it is no longer religious, but legal. The adversaries of religion flatter themselves that they have secured a lasting victory for tolerance. We shall have to test the truth of their assertion. Finally, we shall elect for a theory of tolerance which is in accordance with Catholic principles, and is the only one that can be justified by sound reason.

i. Doctrines of Tolerance.

Summary : On the rights of man an attempt has been made to found an absolute tolerance, which abolishes the crime of opinion.—This theory attracts certain founders of Belgian independence and optimist Liberals like Jules Simon.—How religious liberty is understood.—Catholic Liberalism.

The French Revolution, with its contradictory theories of the individual independence of man and the universal supremacy of the State, was a school of licence and oppression. Its tolerance and its sectarianism have both found admirers and followers. Let us speak first of its tolerance.

There have been men who believed, in good faith, that the Declaration of the Rights of Man was the absolute embodiment of complete and universal tolerance. The true formula which man had vainly sought in God, society, the Church, and the State, he had found at once when he consulted his natural rights and liberty. He had within himself what he had hitherto searched for too high or too far off.

This is what men thought and wrote, and in their joy at the discovery they added : “ Henceforth there is no need to discuss the limits of tolerance or extend its boundaries ; it has no limits, its empire is infinite ; it promises liberty to every opinion, with the serene assurance of a Sovereign who has no fear of being dethroned. The community will be content with regulating outward acts, and will respect the autonomy of opinions; it will even encourage their development in the interests of intellectual progress.

This distinction between acts and opinions¹ was specially attractive to some of the founders of Belgian independence. In a pamphlet which M. Damoiseaux² calls the charter of unionist theories, De Potter declares that the intellect is essentially free, and concludes : “ Everything may be thought, or spoken, or published, or taught; but nothing may be done that the law forbids.”³

¹ M. Jordan, in his articles already quoted insists on the opposition between this modern idea and the old ; and he therefore rejects the explanation which Mgr. Douais offers of the criminal procedure in the matter of heresy (Annales de Phil. Chrét., t. 159, 1909-1910, pp. 22 sqq.).

² La Formation de la Société Politique Belge, p. 20.

³ L’Union des Catholiques et des Libéraux dans les Pays- Bas, June, 1829.

Such was also the language of optimist Liberalism ; these are the words of Jules Simon, who was one of its most distinguished representatives : “ To compel the acceptance of a doctrine by violence or undue influence is to degrade man and to disobey the will of God, who has created us intelligent and free.”⁴ “ But what I think, I have the right to say and to teach. God has given me the power of speech to express my thoughts, and has put into my mind the righteous desire to share with others the treasure of truth.”⁵

⁴ La Liberté de Conscience, Fourth Lesson, p. 254.

⁵ Ibid.

In asserting their right to think and say and write whatever they chose, even in religious matters, the tolerationists tended to substitute liberty for tolerance ; they declared themselves in favour of religious liberty without any restriction. But it must be remarked that their idea of liberty was not the liberty of a religion, but the liberty of individuals to profess any religion or none at all; to practise the religion they professed, or practically to deny the articles of its creed; to speak and work for religion, or to attack and destroy it.

Thus all alike, orthodox and heterodox, believers and unbelievers, were invited to enter into a friendly rivalry, in which truth and merit would have the opportunity to show their pre-eminence.

Dazzled by this unreal vision, struck by the force of the current which had swept away privileges, and disgusted by the annoyances to which the Church had been subjected under the old régime, Catholics also raised with confidence the standard of modern liberties. The Church was to give up her privileges in return for the liberty which was to be secured to her by the common law. This was the plan formulated by Catholic Liberalism, not as being expedient in certain countries, which would have been reasonable, but as generally good—at least, in our own time;¹ and there was its exaggeration and its mistake. One of its favourite maxims was the one which Cavour repeated as he lay dying—A free Church in a free State. We need not give here the whole gamut of its various tones from that of Lamennais, Montalembert, and Lacordaire, which was Catholic first and Liberal afterwards, to that which has so little religion left in it as to be hardly distinguishable from sceptical unbelief.

¹ See Propositions 55, 77, and 80, condemned by the Syllabus.

2. Doctrines of Intolerance.

Summary : Principle of intolerance contained in the French Revolution, and affirmed by Defacqz.—Moderate men are divided between two systems : the separatist system, favourable to the liberty of the Church ; and the jurisdictional or State system, which favours religious indifference rather than liberty of religion.— Opinions of Ruffini and Friedberg.—The sectarians take their motto from Gambetta, Le cléricalisme, voilà l’ennemi.—Meaning of this expression.—War on the Church in the name of tolerance, patriotism, and intellectual liberty.—Troops enrolled for this war.— The religion of unbelief.—Evidence of the persecuting irreligious spirit.

The very tolerance inspired by the French Revolution led to intolerance and persecution. No doubt it gave to the individual full liberty to think and say what he pleased, but that was all: beyond that it recognized nothing as sacred ; it gave up everything else to the civil law, the supreme judge of all that was demanded by the welfare of the community and the coexistence of liberties.

Defacqz said this in so many words in the National Congress of 1830 : “ It is necessary that all forms of worship should be independent, but it is necessary also that the civil law should preserve all its force— nay, more, that the temporal authority should take precedence of the spiritual authority, and to some extent absorb it, because the civil law, being made in the interests of all, must prevail over that which is for the interest of a limited number. . . . Religious liberty is the first necessity of man, but it must be restrained, like all other liberties, for the good of the community.”¹

¹ See Huyttens, Discussions du Congrès, t. 1, pp. 587 and 608.

Since religious worship is organized and practised by the community, since by universal consent the Catholic Church possesses the most admirable and most complete of all social structures, the question at once arises, What attitude will the temporal authority adopt towards religious associations, and especially towards the Church ? Will it be friendly, neutral, or hostile ?

The upholders of the dogma of tolerance are divided into two camps—that of the separatists and that of the jurisdictionals.

The separatist system, which prevails in the United States of North America, insists on separation and self-government. Leaving all religions to themselves, it gives them complete liberty of organization and expansion. As different States rule different territories, while each preserves its own independence, it permits alongside the State the independent existence of a spiritual power, which is called upon to rule in the domain of conscience, into which the secular authority has no right of entrance; and an agreement that mixed questions shall be decided by amicable arrangement appears as equitable and normal as the conclusion of international treaties to settle questions of territory or frontiers.