Conditions for incurring a censure

The cause of censure is crime: for censure is brought upon the delinquent; but the crime because of which censure is inflicted must be grave, external, consummated, and committed with contumacy, in order that censure be incurred.

19. Grave with respect to the internal and external act. a. For penalty supposes fault, and grave penalty supposes grave fault; but censures (at least excommunication, suspension from order, and general interdict) are grave penalties. Nevertheless light censures, such as suspension and interdict which are inflicted for a short time and prohibit only one or another act, can be inflicted even because of light fault.

a. Therefore a censure would be invalid by which restitution of a slight thing was commanded under excommunication. Nevertheless if a thing light in itself becomes grave by reason of scandal, danger, or end, it can be commanded or prohibited under grave obligation and under censure. Thus one incurs excommunication who violates enclosure only for a very little while.

b. Therefore whatever excuses a delinquent from grave sin, such as smallness of matter, imperfection of the act, material cooperation offered from a grave cause, also excuses him from incurring censure, at least before God and in conscience.

b. For censures are immediately inflicted because of an external sin; wherefore excommunication is not incurred because of a light striking of a cleric, even if he is struck with the intention of gravely injuring him.

One who commits an action prohibited under excommunication in such a way that it is a grave sin only because of a gravely evil intention or from an erroneous conscience does not incur censure, as one who reads a book which he falsely thinks is prohibited under excommunication.

20. External. For a merely internal sin cannot be punished by a censure of a sentence to be passed, because it cannot be proved in judgment; it could indeed be punished by a censure to be incurred by the very fact, but the usage is not in force in the Church of punishing internal sins with censures of a sentence already passed: no one suffers penalty for thought.¹

An internal sin is one thing, an occult sin, of which only the delinquent has knowledge, is another. The Church can punish occult sins and in fact does punish them, as when, for example, she strikes occult heresy with excommunication; but one who commits merely internal heresy does not fall into excommunication.

¹ C. Cogitationis 14, d. 1, De poenit.

21. Consummated, i.e. an attempted act (der Versuch) does not suffice, but the act prohibited under penalty must be truly posited and completed in its own genus by the effect following: for penal laws are of strict interpretation; wherefore they are restricted to consummated acts, unless the law itself decrees otherwise.

a. Hence where the violent laying on of hands upon a cleric is prohibited under excommunication, he does not incur the censure who shoots at a cleric without hitting him, because the action prohibited under censure is not posited. Where incest is prohibited under censure, the penalty is not incurred except because of perfect intercourse with a blood-relative or relative by affinity, because by the name incest is signified carnal intercourse with a blood-relative or relative by affinity. Where homicide is prohibited under penalty, he does not incur the censure who inflicts a lethal wound unless death follows, whatever be the cause which prevents death, whether a natural remedy or a miracle, because properly only he commits homicide who brings about death itself.

b. Thus the law itself prohibits under censure not only a duel, but also acts preparatory for a duel, namely provocation and acceptance. These acts, however, must be completed in their own genus in order to induce censure; therefore censure is not incurred if, for example, the provocation from any cause whatever does not reach the offender.

c. One who, after a culpable action has been posited, repents of it before the effect follows, incurs censure and irregularity, because repentance does not prevent the effect which afterward follows from being voluntary. Nor should it be said with St. Alphonsus (n. 40) that he is not punished unless contumacious, and that one is not contumacious who has retracted his evil will through repentance: for the delict which is punished by the Church was truly committed with contumacy, even if it was afterward retracted. Indeed, he is called contumacious who, knowing the penal law of the Church, voluntarily transgresses it; nevertheless he does not incur the censure in fact before the effect has followed. Therefore it can happen that someone through contrition or confession is already immune from the sin because of which he is punished by the Church, when he in fact incurs the penalty itself or censure.¹

d. Whether the effect which is intended to be prohibited under censure must be completed, if the censure is carried against those mandating or counseling, e.g. homicide or abortion, must be gathered from the very words of the law: for if the words of the law chiefly prohibit the effect (homicide, abortion) and only accessorily the mandate or counsel, those mandating or counseling do not incur censure when the effect has not followed; but if the words of the law chiefly prohibit also the mandate itself and counsel, they incur censure even when the effect has not followed, because by the very mandate or counsel the action prohibited under penalty is already posited.

Note. One who doubts whether he has contracted censure can regard himself as immune from it, and the confessor can absolve him. If, for example, someone has given an efficacious remedy for procuring abortion and afterward does not know whether the effect followed or not, he is burdened by censure or immune from it according as the effect in fact followed or did not. Nevertheless the confessor can absolve a penitent of this kind from the sin and from the censure, if it were present in fact, without enjoining the obligation of declaring this sin again if he learns that the effect followed, because in doubt, even of fact, concerning the existence of censure, the Church supplies power.

¹ Cf. Lugo, who with Suarez defends this opinion (De poenit., disp. 16, n. 445); likewise Ballerini-Palmieri III, n. 350; VII, n. 95.

22. Committed with contumacy: for censures have been instituted for breaking contumacy against the power of the Church threatening the penalty. But he is judged to be contumacious who knows that something is prohibited by the Church under penalty and nevertheless dares to act against the prohibition.

A twofold contumacy against the Church, or contempt of the Church, is distinguished: special, which is committed by a proper and formal act of contempt against the power of the Church and constitutes a special sin; and general, which is implicitly contained in the transgression of ecclesiastical law committed by one who knew that the matter was commanded or prohibited by the Church under penalty. General contumacy suffices for incurring censure, nor is it required that the delinquent in the act of sin, e.g. while he commits a duel, think about the censure, provided he knows it habitually.

Note. These conditions are required in order that censure be present in the internal forum; in order that it also be incurred in the external forum, it is further required that the delict be notorious, and that not only with respect to the fact in itself, but also with respect to the conditions which are necessary for incurring censure. But since the conditions which by their nature are internal, such as knowledge and consent required for grave sin, are rarely notorious by fact, in the external forum someone would rarely have to be considered as bound by censure without a declaratory sentence of the judge, unless the conditions were presumed. But where the delict itself prohibited under censure is notorious, the required conditions, especially knowledge and contumacy, are presumed in the external forum until it is juridically established that the delinquent did not incur the censure, unless only those acting knowingly and rashly are bound by censure by the law: for in this case knowledge of the law and contumacy must be proved even for the external forum.

Hence it can happen that a censure is incurred in the external forum, but is not present in the internal forum. Thus Catholics who, ignorant of the censure, entered marriage before a heretical minister need absolution for the external forum,¹ because knowledge of the censure is presumed in this forum until ignorance is proved before the judge; but in the internal forum they are immune from the censure because of ignorance of it.

¹ Holy Office, May 18, 1892.

Certain conditions must be fulfilled in order that a censure may be incurred:

(a) As it is a serious penalty, and a serious penalty can only be inflicted for a grave fault, a censure can only be incurred by one who has committed a mortal sin.

(b) ‘The Church does not judge of what is merely internal, and so the fault which is punished by censure must be grave externally as well as internally. A slight blow given to a cleric, which does not constitute a serious injury, does not involve excommunication incurred by those who violate the privilege of the canon, even though the act were accompanied with mortal hatred.

(c) Penalties must be interpreted strictly, and therefore the crime which is punished by censures must be completed, not merely attempted.

(d) Inasmuch as a censure is remedial and inflicted on the delinquent for his correction and amendment, it cannot be incurred for a crime which is altogether past, and which has left no traces behind it. Sometimes suspension or interdict may be inflicted in punishment of such crimes, but then they are inflicted for a definite period, or for ever, and become pure penalties, not censures, (e) ‘There must be contumacy in order that a censure may be incurred, or, in other words, the delinquent must be conscious at the time that he is committing a crime which is punished by the Church by censure. It follows from this: that a censure cannot be inflicted ab homine by a particular sentence without previous admonition, and this should ordinarily be in writing so as to be capable of proof. In censures inflicted a jure or ab homine by a general precept which is of the nature of a law, no special admonition is required, as the law itself is a sufficient admonition. Nor is an admonition necessary when suspension or interdict are inflicted by way of mere penalty (Can. 2242).

It is of faith that the Church has the power of inflicting censures. It is contained in the general power of binding and loosing granted to the Church by her divine Founder. This power is exercised by all ecclesiastical prelates who have jurisdiction in the external forum, unless their authority has been restricted. The Pope and a general council have jurisdiction over the whole Church, and they can bind all the faithful by their laws and censures. A bishop can inflict censures on his subjects, as can regular prelates on theirs.

A parish priest has no jurisdiction in the external forum, and cannot as such impose censures, nor can laymen, nor women.

A bishop cannot lawfully exercise contentious jurisdiction outside his diocese, and consequently he cannot inflict censures outside his diocese when the case requires a judicial process. If the case does not require any judicial process, he may impose a censure on a guilty subject even when he is outside his diocese.

A bishop within his diocese may punish with censure a subject who is now outside the diocese on account of a crime which was committed within the diocese, and even on account of a crime which has been committed outside if it had reference to the diocese. And so a parish priest who is absent from the diocese and refuses to come to synod, or who is taking too long a holiday, may be punished by censure. The more probable opinion holds that a subject who violates a precept imposed under censure while he is outside the diocese incurs the censure, though St Alphonsus admits that the opposite is probable. The jurisdiction of superiors over regulars is personal, and these certainly incur censures imposed on them wherever they may be at the time when it is imposed. Regulars belonging to mendicant orders and members of the Society of Jesus have a special privilege granted by the Holy See, by which they cannot be put under censure by any bishop, even when they do wrong in matters in which their general exemption is of no avail, and in which they are subject to the bishop. In three cases, however, these religious may be punished by episcopal censure, notwithstanding their special privilege. Gregory XV permitted this in case they preach in churches not their own without the bishop’s licence, or in their own without asking for his blessing, or against his command; Innocent X added to this the case of disobedience with reference to hearing confessions; and Urban VIII added the case of hanging sacred pictures painted in an unusual or scandalous manner.

In order to incur a censure, the delinquent must be subject to the authority which imposes it. Strangers, therefore, do not incur the particular censures which bind in the place where they are staying for a short time. If strangers, however, violate some provision of the common law which for such violation imposes a censure ferendae sententiae, the bishop of the place may inflict this on them, Even when they offend in other matters, the local ordinary may punish them by other penalties, and if they prove contumacious, they may be put under censure by him.

A censure latae sententiae is multiplied: (1) If different crimes of which each is punished by censure are committed by the same or distinct actions.

(2) If the same crime punished by censure is often repeated so that there are several distinct crimes.

(3) If a crime punished by different censures by distinct superiors is committed once or several times (Can. 2244).

What is required on the part of sin for incurring censures? It is required that it be mortal, for censure is a very grave penalty which consequently presupposes mortal fault. Hence they must be imposed soberly and with great circumspection. Council of Trent, sess. 25, chap. 3, de Ref.; Benedict XIV, De Synodo, book 10, chap. 2. Therefore, unless there is question of some light censure, or at least one for a brief time, which is imposed because of light fault, censures of excommunication, suspension, and interdict, as they are ordinarily imposed, can in no way be imposed for light faults. L. 30; Schmalzgrueber, book 5, title 39, n. 59; Suarez, disp. 4, sec. 6, n. 12; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 16, n. 61; Lessius, book 2, chap. 12, n. 54; Sanchez, in Decal., book 7, chap. 21, nn. 28, 29.

The sin must be external; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain, not in the internal forum. Not only must the sin be exterior, but also grave in the nature of the external act. Therefore one who is excused from grave fault either as regards the internal act or at least as regards the external act is also excused from censure. It must be a sin consummated by deed, because penal laws are of strict interpretation. Namely, the sin must be complete in its own genus according to the proper meaning of the words which are contained in the precept or law. Schmalzgrueber, l.c., n. 64. It is required that the sin not be merely past, because censure is a medicinal penalty, which therefore cannot be imposed on those who have already returned to better fruit. Merely past; for if a past delict, such as theft, detraction, etc., has a successive continuance, censure can be imposed because of it, once it has first been denounced to the guilty person, unless he obeys the mandate to restore what was taken away, to repair reputation, etc., within a definite time. Merely past: namely, if the censure is truly imposed by way of censure, or medicinal penalty, and not by way of mere vindictive penalty. Therefore a superior who wishes to punish some sin with censure must first threaten this censure. L. 54. Finally contumacy is required. For by censures contumacy against the law of the Church is punished, and indeed against the Church threatening censure to the contumacious. C. Pia 1, de Except., in VI; C. Statuimus 3, de Sent. exc., in VI. Contumacy is from despising; hence it is contempt of censure. Therefore for incurring censure it is necessary that the censure first have already been imposed, either by way of general law, or by particular precept at least denounced as to be incurred unless the precept is obeyed. Hence if someone withdraws from contumacy before he actually incurs the censure to be incurred once the effect has followed, he by no means incurs it afterwards when the effect follows. Withdraws from contumacy, namely by confession, or sorrow, or retraction of the will, and in the way in which he can he tries to impede the effect, although the revocation cannot become known to him to whom perhaps he gave the command or counsel. L. 31, 39, 40; book 7, nn. 368, 373; book 6, n. 600.

Is warning required beforehand for incurring censure? R. Affirmatively. The reason is that censure is imposed because of actual contumacy and disobedience. But one who has not been warned by the one imposing the censure is not rebellious and disobedient to him. Therefore. Hence among the doctors it is commonly received that a censure with no warning at all first given is regularly null. Now as regards a censure issued by law by way of law, or issued by man by way of mandate, the law itself and the mandate itself warn. Yet if the delict is occult, for declaring a censure incurred, citation of the guilty person is certainly needed; otherwise the sentence will be null and void. But if the censure is not contained in a law or mandate, then it is necessary to threaten it, or it is necessary to warn the guilty person, and indeed a threefold warning is needed, although this does not pertain to validity; or one for three, with the space of at least two days observed between them, or between this and the sentence the space of at least six days. But warning must be made to the guilty person before witnesses, and it is customarily and must be done in writing, but it is valid by living voice. Although a censure imposed without writing is valid, nevertheless, because this is grave, if it has been imposed orally, it is presumed to be penalty rather than censure.

If the censure has already been threatened by law, if indeed there is question of a censure ferendae sententiae, whether a new warning is needed is disputed: some affirm it, and it is more equitable, because censures of this kind are for the most part unknown; others deny it, and it is more probable, because the law itself warns sufficiently. C. Reprehensibilis 26, de Appellationib., etc.; C. Cum medicinalis 1, de Sent. excomm., in VI; L. 22, 51, 65, 317; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 3.

Is one to be judged to have incurred censure who doubts whether he has incurred it? In a doubt of fact and in a doubt about the existence of the law, one is excused from incurring censure; not likewise in a doubt about the justice of the law, namely whether the censure is just. The first reason is that in doubt the condition of the possessor is better. But one who doubts whether by his act he has incurred censure possesses the right of using spiritual goods. Therefore he is not to be deprived of his right. Therefore. The second reason is that favors are to be enlarged and odious things restricted. Therefore a law inducing a doubtful penalty is to be taken in the more benign part; for penalty is odious. Therefore. The third reason is that in a doubt of justice, presumption favors the superior. When someone doubts whether he has been absolved from a censure which he incurred, in the external forum judgment must be made in favor of the censure, or bond, from C. Sicut 39, de Sent. exc., and therefore absolution must be sought. Likewise in the internal forum absolution must be sought, lest perhaps one become deprived of the goods of the Church. Lugo, De Poenit., disp. 20, n. 18; Sanchez, in Decal., book 1, chap. 10, nn. 55, 56; St. Thomas, Quodlibet 4, a. 14; L. 32, 39, 67, 68.

Is one bound by censure who knows it to be manifestly unjust? One is not bound by censure who knows it to be certainly unjust, whether because of a false presumption of fact, or because legal forms were omitted, or because the limits of jurisdiction were exceeded. Therefore he is not bound to observe it publicly, except by reason of scandal, if this is present. L. 68; St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 21, a. 4; Laymann, chap. 6, nn. 2-4; Schmalzgrueber, nn. 89-94; Engel, nn. 103-113; Lugo, De Iustitia et Iure, disp. 37, n. 188.

Can someone be bound by several censures at the same time? Because of one and the same delict only one censure is incurred out of several perhaps imposed by one and the same legislator, namely that by which the others are eminently comprehended. Thus, e.g., those usurping goods pertaining to ecclesiastical persons by reason of their churches are bound only by the excommunication reserved to the Roman Pontiff, and not also by the Tridentine excommunication. Because of one and the same delict someone can indeed incur several censures imposed by different legislators, by the Bishop of the benefice and by the Bishop of domicile, by the Roman Pontiff and by the Ordinary of the place; e.g., if clerics violating the enclosure of nuns are punished by suspension in an episcopal Statute, they would also be liable to the excommunication simply reserved to the Roman Pontiff through the constitution Apostolicae Sedis. Because of the same delict repeated, and because of diverse delicts, someone can incur several censures, namely the same one several times, and several diverse ones, of the same or of a different nature. And here it must be noted that if the censure is reserved to the Pontiff, through this reservation the faculty of reserving the same censure to themselves then seems to have been taken away from inferior Prelates.

934. • For the validity of a censure it is required that the sin upon which it is inflicted be mortal, external, consummated, not merely past, and joined with contumacy.

1. Mortal; for a censure, since it is a most grave penalty, requires mortal fault ⁴.

⁴ It is the common opinion of the Doctors, as can be seen in St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 30) and Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 59), that some light censure, for example, minor excommunication, some light suspension, or some light personal interdict, can be imposed on account of light fault. St. Alphonsus adds, if the censure is imposed for a brief time; but then it will not properly be a censure, but a certain disqualification, as was said above, no. 932. Moreover, the Author speaks of major excommunication and of suspension and interdict as they are commonly imposed, namely, from every use; these, according to the common opinion of all, cannot be imposed on account of light fault. Nevertheless, a fault must be understood as light when it is such both in itself and by reason of the end; for the character or end gravely intended, or scandal or danger, can cause a thing light of itself nevertheless to be capable of a grave precept. See Suarez (On Censures, disputation 4, section 6, no. 12), Lugo (On Justice and Right, disputation 16, no. 61), Lessius (book 2, chapter 12, no. 54), Sanchez (On the Decalogue, book 7, chapter 21, nos. 28, 29).

2. External; for the Church judges in the external forum, to which censures pertain, and not concerning merely internal things ⁵.

⁵ Not only must the sin be external, but also grave by reason of the external act.

3. Consummated in deed, in its own genus ⁶; because penal laws are to be interpreted strictly according to the rule of Law: It is fitting that odious things be restricted and favors amplified. - Except where the legislator expresses the contrary. external sin on account of which the censure is to be contracted must be complete in its own genus according to the proper meaning of the words which are contained in the precept or law. To this pertains the rule that, for a censure to be incurred, that effect which the legislator intends to prohibit under censure must be complete. Therefore, if the words, carefully inspected, signify that the ultimate effect is prohibited, for example, homicide, the censure is not incurred unless that final effect follows, namely, death. But when the action itself or the attempt is principally prohibited under censure, then, when it has been posited, the censure is immediately incurred even if the effect does not follow. See Bonacina (On Censures, disputation 1, question 1, point 4, nos. 12, 13) and Croix (book 7, no. 59).

⁶ Schmalzgrueber (book 5, title 39, no. 64) proposes this condition more clearly, so that it needs no exceptions: In order that a censure be incurred, the sin

But according to the more probable opinion, one who has revoked counsel or a mandate before execution does not incur the censure (Suarez, On Censures, disputation 44, section 5, no. 13; St. Alphonsus, book 7, no. 40). But regarding one who, although he wished and attempted, was unable to signify the revocation of the counsel or mandate to the mandatary or executor, or who repents after the cause, for example of death, has been posited but before the effect which he could not impede has followed, according to the opinion of Cardinal de Lugo (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 453) and Suarez (On Sins, disputation 3, section 4, nos. 3, 7, 8), it is certain that he incurs the censure; nor does there appear to be any force in the reason which St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 40, and book 4, no. 149) brings to the contrary from the Salmanticenses.

** 1. Against this Note the VV. write fourteen columns (pages 841-848), and they contend two things (pages 846, 847), namely: 1. that Suarez in no way holds the opposite opinion and is in no way opposed to St. Alphonsus; 2. that Lugo hands down an entirely singular doctrine.

2. And as regards the first point, the VV. restrict the question to those things which Suarez discusses (On I-II, tract 5, On Sins, disputation 3, section 4), where he asks at what time someone is judged to sin by a sin of omission; and the VV. transcribe almost that entire disputation throughout four columns (pages 844-846). But there are two things upon which they insist. First, when Suarez (no. 7) premises: You will ask whether it can happen that the will which is the cause of the omission as such is a fault, and yet the omission which afterward follows is in no way a sin; for example, if someone, before the omission follows, repents of the prior fault and of the cause given, but nevertheless cannot impede the effect; he replies to this question (no. 8) that each manner of speaking is probable. Hence the VV. (page 846) conclude, as it appears, that the opinion of St. Alphonsus was probable to Suarez. Second, the VV. observe (page 846) that although Suarez affirms that the guilty person, however penitent, can justly be punished, nevertheless this is said only concerning irregularity and not concerning excommunication. For thus Suarez says (loc. cit., no. 7): However much that man afterward repents, he is justly punished on account of that act and remains irregular; therefore that exterior act has the character of sin. But the VV. there give this reason for the distinction which they devise for the present matter between irregularity and censure: that irregularity is a vindicative penalty ..., but the penalty of excommunication is medicinal. And concerning this latter they subjoin: If (the penitent guilty person) did what he could and was unable to impede the execution, he does not incur excommunication, because contumacy, which is necessarily required for incurring every censure, is absent.

3. Reply to the first. That Suarez says each manner of speaking is probable concludes nothing at all for the case of the VV. For the question concerns a mere denomination; and, as the same Suarez (no. 3) had said, perhaps the disagreement concerns the name. But otherwise, as the VV. themselves acknowledge, whether that omission of which there is question is called a sin or is not called a sin, the opinion of Suarez is certain that the guilty person is justly punished for that omission. Therefore, the VV. insist in vain upon these probable manners of speaking when the penalty is inflicted not probably but certainly.

4. Reply to the second. That Suarez, when he says that the guilty person is nevertheless justly punished, ought to be understood concerning irregularity alone and not concerning the penalty of excommunication is manifestly false. For in the preceding things (no. 3) Suarez openly indicates that, in the case, if the omission had truly followed and if the penalty of excommunication or irregularity had been imposed upon such omission, the guilty person would incur it. Therefore, when he afterward (no. 7) names only irregularity, he does this merely by way of example and not to the exclusion of other penalties and consequently of censures, if any have been imposed upon an omission of this kind.

5. But the reason on account of which the VV. say that in the case the guilty person, if he repents of the cause posited, indeed incurs irregularity but not excommunication, finally rests only upon a preposterous notion of the contumacy necessary for incurring censures, which notion they then gratuitously fasten upon Suarez. For contumacy in the present question does not consist in this, that after violating a law commanding under censure someone perseveres in the same evil will, but entirely in this, that someone knowingly and willingly has contemned the law and the censure by disobeying. Reiffenstuel aptly says (book 5, title 39, no. 14): When it is said that contumacy is required for incurring a censure, it is not to be understood as though express and formal contumacy were required; for virtual contumacy and interpretative contempt of the Church suffice, CONSISTING IN THIS: THAT SOMEONE KNOWS THAT SOMETHING IS PROHIBITED UNDER CENSURE BY A LAW OR BY A LEGITIMATE ECCLESIASTICAL SUPERIOR, AND NEVERTHELESS PRESUMES TO DO IT. Nor does Suarez speak otherwise (On Censures, disputation 4, section 3, no. 10): If the law commands absolutely and imposes a censure against transgressors, then that voluntariness which suffices for sinning deliberately and in a human manner against that law and for contumacy toward the censure is sufficient for incurring such a penalty imposed by the law itself. This rule appears manifest from the terms; because just as that law absolutely prohibits such an offense, so it absolutely pronounces the censure; therefore by force of such a law no more, nor another mode, of voluntariness is required for incurring the censure than for sinning against the law itself. Therefore, just as it does not pertain to the character of sin that the sinner afterward persevere in the evil will, so neither is anything more required for incurring the censure than contumacious disobedience in transgressing the law itself.

6. But there is no need to dwell upon more things when we have the present question resolved by Suarez no less than by Lugo and others. For, discussing (On Censures, disputation 20, section 3, no. 16) one who has an obligation to pay a pension within a month, and is now at the beginning of the month able to pay but, caring nothing about payment of the pension, spends everything and thus becomes unable to pay, he establishes these things: I say, therefore, that this man is not excused from incurring excommunication if, after the prescribed term has elapsed, he does not pay the required pension. The reason a priori is that he truly acts against the precept and consequently is contumacious; just as one who renders himself unable to recite acts against the precept concerning reciting the office.

7. But that he is not excused from incurring the censure however much he repents, Suarez continues and explains thus (no. 17): But it must be recalled that in cases of this kind one time is that at which the offense is committed before God, and another that at which excommunication is incurred. For someone commits the offense at the

time at which he becomes unable to pay according to the appointed term; but he does not incur excommunication until that term itself actually ends with the obligation unfulfilled, because the censure is not contracted until the omission of the precept has been externally consummated. But although the cause of the omission was posited earlier, and therefore the offense was then especially committed, nevertheless the omission itself was not consummated until the appointed term; and therefore until that time excommunication is not incurred, from which inability cannot then excuse him; because, since this inability was voluntary, it does not render the omission involuntary, but LEAVES IT SINFUL AND CONTUMACIOUS BY FORCE OF THE PRIOR CAUSE, EVEN IF PERHAPS IT NOW DISPLEASES HIM, WHICH IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO IMPEDE EXCOMMUNICATION.

8. But Suarez had explained in the place cited above (On I-II, On Sins, disputation 3, section 4, no. 8) how it can happen that even by the penalty of excommunication one is punished as guilty who has already been touched by sorrow for his sin, where he establishes that an omission culpable in its cause is better called a sin, even if the guilty person, before the omission itself follows, has so repented that he is now constituted in grace, as certain persons (ibid., no. 7) objected to the contrary: It ought to be said, says Suarez, that the PENALTY is imposed upon the external action not only because it is a sin when it occurs, but because it is culpable of itself and has an evil will as its cause, even if accidentally it should happen not to be a sin on account of a change of will; but perhaps those things would more properly be called sins because they proceed from a free and defective cause insofar as one is bound to avoid them. Nor does the subsequent will matter, because it is not the principle of the omission which follows, but another prior will which preceded. But the external action or omission is denominated a sin from the will from which it proceeds; hence at the same time the same omission both is willed as an effect by the will which is its cause and is unwilled after the manner of an object; and the first will is "I will"; the second is "I would not will the effect to follow." To the confirmation I reply that this omission has a twofold relation: one to the preceding depraved will, of which it is the effect; the other to the present circumstances and will; and as such it receives diverse denominations. Nor is it unfitting that the same external act be denominated good and evil from diverse wills. But the penalty concerning which Suarez speaks here is not irregularity alone, as the VV. said, but also censure, as was shown above.

9. Therefore, let it be concluded that the VV. did not rightly assert that Suarez in no way holds the opposite opinion and is in no way contrary to St. Alphonsus. Let us come to Cardinal de Lugo.

How consonant his doctrine is with those things which we have just reported from Suarez is apparent from the things which he replies (On Penance, disputation 16, no. 445) to those objecting (no. 442) that it can happen that a man is already justified through contrition or confession when the effect of the prior evil will is posited DE NOVO; therefore that effect does not suffice for giving a new denomination of sinner. Lugo therefore replies thus: However much the past will is in fact retracted, nevertheless, if the effect of death afterward follows, he who gave the poison will no less incur irregularity or excommunication, ACCORDING TO THE COMMON OPINION OF ALMOST ALL, than if the will had not been retracted; because through that retraction it is not removed that the effect which followed was voluntary, as proceeding from the will.

10. And a little afterward (no. 446) he adds a clearer explanation thus: That effect (namely, the death which followed from the poison) is voluntary and free denominatively insofar as it had its origin from a prior free will, not insofar as it now depends upon a will not retracted. And the reason is clear:

because denial of retraction does not cause the will now to influence the effect more, nor does retraction cause the will to influence less; for the whole influence on the part of the will was to posit the cause, which it now cannot remove. Therefore, since retraction does not diminish the positing of the cause, nor does the absence of retraction add strength to the cause already posited, it follows that the will influences the subsequent effect in the same manner whether it retracts or does not retract; because it influences in no way according to the present state, but only according to the past state, as it is past.

Hence it is permissible to conclude two things. For: 1. Lugo, as is apparent, testifies that in the case excommunication is incurred according to the common opinion of almost all. What, then, is this which the VV. affirm (page 847), that Lugo here hands down an entirely singular doctrine? 2. Therefore empty is the reason of those who excuse the penitent guilty person from incurring a censure because the effect is not imputable after the cause has been retracted. This reason would indeed prove, contrary to what even St. Alphonsus after others teaches, that not even irregularity is incurred.

11. And this is what Lessius also observes, where he writes (book 2, chapter 13, no. 17): If the revocation of the mandate does not become known to the mandatary, the one mandating is bound, when the effect follows, no less than if he had not revoked; because by force of the mandate the harm was done. Hence he also incurs censures and irregularity if perhaps these have been imposed upon the one mandating. Nor does it matter that he is now in the state of grace; because although such a censure is not contracted except through mortal sin, nevertheless it is not necessary that the fault of that sin then be committed, but it suffices that it has been committed and that its effect or the external work then occur by force of it, as happens in the proposed case.

12. But Coninck (disputation 14, no. 183) had already answered the little reason which the VV. appear to esteem greatly, namely, that the guilty person, employing every diligence to impede the effect, has put off contumacy. Even when, says Coninck, after all diligence of this kind has been employed it nevertheless remains established that the other (the mandatary) was still truly moved by the authority or reasons of the one mandating or counseling to perpetrate the crime ..., in that case, I say, he would truly incur the penalties established for those mandating or counseling such a work; because such penalties are generally established for those who mandate or counsel such a crime when the effect follows; but in this case such persons would truly have done this; therefore they would incur those penalties. Nor does it matter that the one mandating is now truly penitent for having mandated this, or that through contrition or confession he is in the state of grace ...; because, notwithstanding all these things, just as in that case he will truly be the cause of the injury, so he will incur those penalties; just as one who had mandated that a cleric existing elsewhere be mutilated, and afterward, penitent for the deed, contrite and confessed, seasonably sent even twenty messengers to revoke the mandate and impede the crime by any means, however much diligence he employed for this, if nevertheless those messengers, even from pure malice and fraud, failed to notify the revocation to the mandatary, when the effect followed the one mandating would incur excommunication, irregularity, and the obligation of restoring the harm which the cleric suffered, as all acknowledge. Note this: AS ALL ACKNOWLEDGE. How, then, do the VV. write that Lugo here hands down an entirely singular opinion?

13. But the VV. appear to have wished by these words not indeed to deny that the doctrine of Lugo set forth thus far was common to others, but to have ascribed to Lugo another certain portent of doctrine which everyone would truly call altogether singular and at the same time would vehemently marvel at. For they attribute to Lugo that he asserts that excommunication is incurred when the mandate is given; but that the one mandating is freed from excommunication when he repents before the effect follows, and then afterward falls again into excommunication when the effect follows!!! Thus they write (page 847): According to his

(Lugo's) opinion, the one mandating or counseling homicide, at the time at which he gives the mandate or counsel, would incur excommunication but not the penalties annexed to excommunication, because the Church does not will to punish him unless the condition of the effect following has been posited. But if meanwhile he performed true penance for the offense committed, he would be freed from the bond of excommunication; nevertheless, when the effect followed, he would incur excommunication DE NOVO, and indeed this time with the annexed penalties. Thus they write.

14. But indeed you will ask: where in Lugo's books did the VV. espy this new monster of doctrine? Yet at hand is the passage of Lugo which the VV. themselves report from disputation 16, On Penance, no. 453. Thus Lugo there: They object secondly: Because the censure is incurred now when the effect is posited, and not before; but this is not incurred except on account of sin; therefore a sin is also posited now. - It is replied by denying the consequent; for the censure is incurred now on account of a past sin which the Church nevertheless does not will to punish unless the condition of the effect following has been posited. Hence it can also happen that a censure is incurred by one who has already been justified from the past sin through contrition or through attrition with the Sacrament, because a censure is a penalty by which the Church can still justly punish a man on account of a past sin. And just as one excommunicated, although justified through contrition, still remains excommunicated until he is absolved, so one who is now contrite can incur excommunication DE NOVO on account of a past sin. And indeed, on account of the censure or reservation, it will sometimes be necessary in confession, only after the effect has followed, to explain also the effect which followed. Thus far Lugo.

How the VV. saw those portents in these words can scarcely be divined. For: 1. Lugo, when he concedes the antecedent of the objection and denies the consequent, thereby affirms that excommunication is not incurred before the effect has followed; how then do the VV. fasten upon Lugo that the censure is incurred when the mandate is given? 2. Lugo expressly says here that excommunication is not removed except through absolution, however much the guilty person has already been justified through contrition; how then do the VV. fasten upon Lugo that through penance the guilty person is freed from that imaginary excommunication and afterward incurs another excommunication when the effect follows? 3. Lugo recalls no other penalty here by which the guilty person is justly punished by the Church except the penalty of censure; how then do the VV. invent penalties annexed to excommunication which Lugo asserts are not incurred when the mandate is given but only after the effect has followed?

But the VV. themselves candidly disclose the origin of these phantasms. For after premising the words above (no. 13), they subjoin: We do not see how this opinion (of Lugo) can be explained otherwise, since he expressly says DE NOVO; namely, the VV. explain that phrase de novo as though it there signifies again. But everyone knows that de novo is also used for newly or anew (see the lexicon under Nove), that is, to designate that which had not occurred before. And indeed one could see that this phrase de novo was employed in this sense in Lugo himself a little before the text adduced (see above, no. 9), where he writes: When the effect of the prior will is posited DE NOVO; for it cannot be understood of an effect posited again, but of an effect newly or only now finally posited. Against these portentous phantasms let it suffice to remember that saying: What can excessive fervor in disputing not do?

15. I would not wish to omit here that those words of the Note under discussion, nor does there appear to be any force in the reason which St. Alphonsus brings to the contrary from the Salmanticenses, are not, I say, our words, but those of John de Dicastillo. He himself wrote thus concerning this question (On Censures, disputation 1, no. 291): But if, before (the revocation by the one mandating) comes to the knowledge of the mandatary, the latter perpetrates the offense, the one mandating incurs the censures.... Nor does it matter that perhaps he is now

in the state of grace; because although a censure and irregularity are not contracted except on account of mortal sin, nevertheless it is not necessary that the fault endure when they are contracted; but it suffices that it has been committed and that the effect or external work then occur by force of that fault, as we said concerning one who wounds unto death, etc. And again (disputation 2, no. 344), where he recalls the opposite opinion: Filliuccius adds that one is excused from a censure to be imposed who, when the appointed term arrives, is sorry for the fault committed. This limitation rightly displeases others; for it matters little that someone is now sorry, provided that he previously gave a sufficient voluntary cause for the omission. For a censure is often incurred even if, at the time of incurring it, someone has already been contrite for the sin and constituted in grace. Thus one who cast a missile at a cleric or administered poison to him, even if he becomes contrite for the sin before the effect follows, incurs excommunication and irregularity, because he voluntarily gave cause for such killing and striking. Let Suarez, etc., be read. But concerning the opposite opinion of Filliuccius, at the end he says most expressly that IT IS PROVED BY NO SUITABLE FOUNDATION.

4. Not merely past; because a censure is a medicinal penalty and therefore cannot be imposed upon those who have already returned to better conduct. Therefore, for a sin to be called merely past in the case, it is necessary that it cease so entirely that it is in no way joined with any present disobedience and contumacy. See St. Alphonsus (book 7, no. 54).

5. Joined with contumacy against a law or precept. The reason is that the principal end of a censure is to break obstinacy. - See St. Alphonsus, no. 30 and following ⁷.

⁷ Therefore, it is not sufficient that the sin be contrary to natural or divine law unless it is also contrary to some law of the Church. For through censures contumacy against a law of the Church is punished, and indeed against a Church threatening a censure upon the contumacious.

480. For the imposing of censures, it is required on the part of the one imposing them:

1. That he be baptized; because one who is not himself a member of the Church is not capable of ecclesiastical jurisdiction.⁵⁷

2. That he be possessed of reason and have the will of imposing a true censure. This is evident of itself.

3. That he act freely and not under compulsion. It is not certain whether a censure imposed from grave fear is invalid,⁵⁸ since the Code, c. 103, § 2, establishes by a general rule: "Acts placed from grave fear unjustly inflicted are valid, unless something else is provided by law."

4. That he have jurisdiction unimpeded as regards its use.⁵⁹

5. That a warning precede.

For a censure is a medicinal penalty which is not imposed except upon the contumacious. But no one is considered contumacious unless he has first been warned of the penalty to be incurred in the event of transgression of a law or precept. Concerning this warning, the following matters are to be noted briefly: A twofold warning is distinguished, one legal or solemn, the other canonical. A legal warning is made by the law itself and has place in all censures imposed by law. For a known law which threatens transgressors with a censure is considered continually to warn subjects and to deter them from transgression. But if a subject nevertheless transgresses such a law, he is deservedly considered contumacious. - A canonical warning is made ab homine and has place in censures or penalties to be imposed ab homine; for example, such a warning is necessary before a bishop can suspend a disobedient and delinquent cleric. It is strongly counseled that an ecclesiastical superior, before proceeding to a canonical warning (which is already the beginning of a judicial process), endeavor to amend the subject through the so-called paternal warning. For it is fitting that a superior, imitating the example of the meek Christ, correct the delicts of his subjects first and preferably by paternal love rather than by strict justice. But because all untimely warnings do more harm than good, the superior should not make even a paternal warning unless he has first known with moral certainty the existence of the delict. But if the paternal warning has remained fruitless, one must proceed to the canonical warning, which ought to have the following qualities:

1. it ought to be made personally to the delinquent, or at least by letter;

2. it ought ordinarily to be threefold, with an interval of three days or at least two days, or one peremptory warning;

3. it ought to be registered in the chancery of the bishop or superior.⁶⁰

Note. The Holy Office observes:⁶¹ "Let the Ordinaries be altogether cautious and as sparing as possible with regard to penal sanctions, especially excommunications; for, as the Sacred Council of Trent wisely admonishes (sess. 25, de ref., c. 3): 'Although the sword of excommunication is the sinew of ecclesiastical discipline and is very salutary for containing the people in their duty, nevertheless it is to be employed soberly and with great circumspection, since experience teaches that, if it is inflicted rashly or for light matters, it is more despised than feared and produces ruin rather than salvation.'"

⁵⁷ Cf. St. Alphonsus, loc. cit.

⁵⁸ Cf. ibid., n. 12.

⁵⁹ Cf. what was said above in n. 473 concerning the author of ecclesiastical penalties.

⁶⁰ Cf. concerning all these matters the Code of Canon Law, cc. 2143; 2233, § 2; 2309; and the Pontifical Commission, July 14, 1922.

⁶¹ Instruction of July 13, 1916 (Act. Ap. Sed. VIII, 314).

Censure is commonly defined: A spiritual and medicinal penalty, by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived by ecclesiastical power of the use of certain spiritual goods. It is called 1°. a penalty, because it supposes fault; 2°. spiritual, both because it is brought by spiritual power for the spiritual utility of Christians, and because it takes away spiritual goods primarily and immediately, temporal goods only secondarily and mediately; 3°. medicinal, because regularly it is brought and ought to be brought for this end, that the soul may bring itself back to better fruit; nevertheless accidentally, when this is expedient, it is brought even against him of whose conversion there is despair; for although it is a medicine, it is also a penalty, and therefore, when the primary end of correction ceases, secondary ends are still obtained, namely that the guilty person be chastised and fear be instilled into others; 4°. a baptized man, because those who have not been baptized are not subject to the power of the Church; but power is exercised over subjects; 5°. delinquent and contumacious, because a penalty is inflicted only on a delinquent, but medicine ought not to be offered except to those whose contumacy needs such a remedy; 6°. he is deprived of the use of certain spiritual goods, namely of goods which fall under the power of the Church, such as public prayers, sacraments, etc. - Hence censure differs 1°. from deposition and degradation, which are not medicinal nor for a time, but only penal and perpetual; 2°. from irregularity, which can be contracted also on account of a mere defect of mind or body without any fault, and therefore of itself is not a penalty, but only a canonical impediment.

The Code gives nearly the same definition.

§ 1. Censure is a penalty by which a baptized man, delinquent and contumacious, is deprived of certain spiritual goods, or goods annexed to spiritual goods, until, withdrawing from contumacy, he is absolved.

§ 2. Let censures, especially latae sententiae, above all excommunication, not be inflicted except soberly and with great circumspection (Can. 2241).

Censures are distinguished in many ways, namely:

1°. Excommunication, suspension, interdict, concerning which we shall treat specifically. - Nevertheless it must be noted that excommunication is always a censure; but suspension and interdict take on the nature sometimes of a censure, sometimes of a vindicative penalty. But you will recognize that they are vindicative penalties both if they are brought on account of a merely past delict, and if they are inflicted perpetually, or even for a determinate time, for example for two or three months; for these things are a certain indication that not the amendment of the guilty person, but his punishment, is intended.

2°. § 1. Some censures are reserved, others non-reserved.

§ 2. A censure ab homine is reserved to him who inflicted the censure or pronounced the sentence, and to his competent Superior, or successor, or delegate; but of censures reserved a iure some are reserved to the Ordinary, others to the Apostolic See.

§ 3. Of those reserved to the Apostolic See, some are reserved simply, others in a special mode, others in a most special mode.

§ 4. A censure latae sententiae is not reserved unless this is expressly said in the law or precept; and in doubt whether of law or of fact, the reservation does not press (Can. 2245).

3°. Notorious or occult censures, according as it is publicly established that someone has incurred them on account of a fact which is so known that now it cannot any longer be concealed; or otherwise.

4°. Just or unjust censures; valid or invalid; according as the superior has consulted justice, truth, and law, or not, in imposing the censure.

The conditions required for the validity of censures are that the sin, on account of which it is inflicted, be mortal, external, consummated, not merely past, and that it be conjoined with contumacy.

§ 1. By censure only an external, grave, consummated delict, conjoined with contumacy, is punished; but censure can also be brought against unknown delinquents.

§ 2. If there is question of censures ferendae sententiae, he is contumacious who, notwithstanding the admonitions of which in can. 2233, § 2, does not desist from the delict or refuses to do penance for the perpetrated delict with due reparation of damages and scandal; but for incurring a censure latae sententiae the transgression of the law or precept to which a penalty latae sententiae is attached suffices, unless the guilty person is excused from this by a legitimate cause.

§ 3. Contumacy must be said to have ceased when the guilty person has truly repented of the committed delict and at the same time has given congruous satisfaction for damages and scandal, or at least has seriously promised it; but to judge whether the penance is true, whether the satisfaction is congruous or the promise of the same serious, or not, belongs to him from whom absolution from the censure is sought (Can. 2242).

Question 1. In what way is a censure latae sententiae discerned from a censure ferendae sententiae?

Resp. Generally a censure will be latae sententiae: 1°. if the words by which it is expressed exclude the action or ministry of any other, for example, if it is brought by these words: by the fact itself - by the law itself - by that very thing - without any other sentence; 2°. if the words are of the present or past time, for example, we excommunicate - we have excommunicated, etc.; 3°. if the words are of the imperative mode, for example, let him fall into excommunication - let him remain suspended - interdicted, etc.

But a censure must be held as ferendae sententiae: 1°. if the words by which it is brought demand the work and ministry of another, for example, let him be excommunicated by the Bishop; 2°. if they are only threatening, for example, we prescribe under threat of anathema, unless something else is gathered from the adjuncts; 3°. if they express future time, for example, he will be excommunicated - he will be excommunicated, etc. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 7 and 8.

Question 2. Must he be judged to have incurred a censure who doubts whether he has incurred it?

Resp. Negatively, whether he doubts whether he has gravely offended, or whether the case falls under the censure.

§ 1. In penalties the more benign interpretation must be made.

§ 2. But if it is doubted whether a penalty, inflicted by a competent Superior, is just or not, the penalty must be observed in both forums, except the case of an appeal in suspensive effect (Can. 2219).

Question 3. Is someone bound by a censure which he knows to be manifestly unjust?

Resp. Negatively, whether the superior, relying on a false presumption, has condemned an innocent man as guilty, or whether he has omitted legal forms, or has exceeded the limits of jurisdiction. Nevertheless the danger of hallucination in one's own cause must be carefully avoided; and if it is not publicly established that the censure is null, this must altogether be observed in order to avoid scandal. - Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 68.

Question 4. Does ignorance excuse from censure?

Resp. Ignorance of fact certainly excuses, namely when someone does not know that he is placing an act prohibited under censure. Thus, for example, if someone strikes a priest, thinking him to be a layman, he does not incur the censure brought against strikers of clerics, and the reason is that the censure ought to be known to the sinner, so that he may be contumacious. - Ignorance of ecclesiastical law prescribing or prohibiting something under censure also excuses. This is clear from the same reason just given; for he cannot be called contumacious against the Church who does not know her law, as is clear from canon law, in VI°, lib. 1, tit. 2, de Constit., cap. 2, where it is said: "We do not will the ignorant to be bound, provided nevertheless that the ignorance was not crass or supine." - Cf. St. Alphonsus, nn. 43 and following; Can. 2242, § 2.

Question 5. Does vincible ignorance excuse from censure?

Resp. Affected ignorance excuses from none. If the law has the words: has presumed, has dared, any diminishment of imputability excuses. If the law does not have those words, crass or supine ignorance does not excuse; but that which is not crass or supine excuses. - Cf. Can. 2229.

Question 6. Does grave fear excuse from censure?

Resp. Affirmatively, speaking generally, and the reason is that ecclesiastical penal laws do not seem to press with such rigor; for since ecclesiastical laws themselves, if very grave fear presses, cease to oblige, the penalty itself annexed to them must necessarily fall.

§ 3. Grave fear, if the delict inclines toward contempt of the faith or of ecclesiastical authority or toward public harm of souls, in no way exempts from penalties latae sententiae (Can. 2229, n. 3). - Cf. Can. 2205.

Question 7. Is it required that admonition of the delinquent precede the censure?

Resp. No admonition is required for censures brought a iure, because the law itself, brought and known, sufficiently admonishes subjects.

§ 1. No penalty can be inflicted unless it is certainly established that the delict has been committed and has not been legitimately prescribed.

§ 2. Although this is legitimately established, if there is question of inflicting a censure, let the guilty person be reprehended and admonished to withdraw from contumacy according to the norm of can. 2242, § 3, with a congruous time for returning to his right mind being given, if in the prudent judgment of the same judge or Superior the case bears this; if contumacy persists, the censure can be inflicted (Can. 2233).¹

¹ Cf. Addenda, p. 1106, n. 48.

Question 8. Does he incur a censure if it repents him of the fact which he placed before the consummation, or before the effect follows?

Resp. He does not incur it if he was able to prevent the effect and did prevent it. But if he was not able to prevent the effect, although he tried, it is controverted: those affirming say that contumacy is in this, that someone knowingly and willingly violated the law, nor does contrition impede the effect. But others deny it, because the censure is brought against the contumacious; but this man, when the effect actually follows, is not contumacious; therefore censure cannot be brought upon him; concerning which opinion D'Annibale, n. 333, says: "Which either is the truer, for to what purpose is medicine when the disease has been healed? Or it is the more equitable." And in a note, applying this opinion, which from St. Alphonsus he made his own, he says: "As, behold, if he gave an abortive to a girl, or to someone counsel, a mandate of killing; and before she expelled, or this one killed, it repented him of the fact." - Cf. Ferreres, 8°, n. 1189, 3°.

I. QUESTION I. Whether for the passing of a censure a proper fault and contumacy be required? ANSWER. A censure is an ecclesiastical penalty; therefore it supposes a fault against the precepts of the Church. Wherefore delicts against natural or divine right, unless they be at the same time forbidden by the Church, do not lie subject to censures. Because censures are passed for the repressing of contumacy against the Church. Hence a censure cannot be inflicted for a sin altogether past or present, unless it have a successive course, by force of which someone can be called contumacious. No one can be bound with censures for another's fault. A general interdict does not touch the innocent immediately, save inasmuch as they have a connexion with the guilty.

II. The lesser excommunication can be passed for a venial fault, and in fact is inflicted for civil communication with an excommunicate to be shunned, which unless it be done in contempt, or in the crime for which the censure has been contracted, or in sacred matters, does not exceed a light fault. But the greater excommunication, suspension, and interdict, since they are most grave penalties, cannot be inflicted save for a mortal fault. A fault can be light in itself, but grave in order to the end. It is the part of superiors to judge whether such an action, the circumstances being regarded, be grave in respect of the end. Wherefore when superiors forbid something by an express precept, a censure being added, the transgression is mortal, and the censure is incurred. For an internal act a censure cannot be passed. Wherefore for a merely internal heresy excommunication cannot be passed, unless it be manifested by an external sign; but it suffices that a man alone in his chamber manifest it, because then it is external, though occult. On the contrary, if anyone exercise an external act of heresy or of idolatry without an interior act, he does not incur excommunication in the interior forum; although in the exterior forum he would be held as excommunicated, if it became known. When an internal act is connected with an external action, as attention of mind with vocal prayer, then he who should omit the internal act, although he posited the external, would be obnoxious to the censure: since although the Church lacks direct power over interior acts, yet while she commands external ones, she indirectly enjoins the internal which are necessarily conjoined with the external. By this reason the Church punishes interior simony connected with an exterior largess; she excommunicates Inquisitors who out of hatred or love of gain do or omit anything, provided this hatred or love break forth into external acts. The exterior sin on account of which a censure is inflicted ought in its own kind to be consummated: as if stuprum be forbidden under a censure, consummated copulation is understood, unless the law express the attempt also.

III. QUESTION II. Whether a censure passed against the executors of a crime comprehends also those commanding and counselling? ANSWER. The common opinion denies that those commanding and counselling are comprehended, unless in some clause they be expressly or implicitly included, because in merely penal matters odious things are to be restricted. When a censure is passed against those counselling or commanding homicide, even if the man be prepared for the homicide, those who counsel or command incur the censure, whatever some say to the contrary.

IV. What if the counsellor revoke his counsel, and the one commanding his mandate, before the execution of the work? Some distinguish between a counsellor and a mandatary. Others reject this distinction in this business. But they dispute whether they incur the censure when the revocation becomes known to the mandatary or counsellor, made with a sincere mind, not languid but efficacious and valid, by the one commanding and counselling. The first opinion denies it. The other affirms it; and the arguments of this second opinion seem the more urgent. What if the revocation, efficacious and validly made, do not become known to the mandatary or counsellor? That even then the revokers incur the censure the Salmanticenses with very many others defend. But this opinion is false.

V. QUESTION III. What conditions are required that anyone can be entangled in censures? ANSWER. Several. 1. That he be a wayfarer; 2. That he be a subject; 3. That he be baptized; 4. That he be endowed with reason; 5. That he be a determinate person. This last condition is understood of excommunication, which cannot be passed against a community, city, college, and so forth, as is gathered from chapter Romana on sentences of excommunication, in the Sixth. One person can be struck with several censures, as all teach. He who is excommunicated can be interdicted and suspended. A man can be excommunicated by diverse judges for the same delict — namely by the bishop of origin, of domicile, and by the Pontiff. In practice nevertheless no guilty party is excommunicated for one delict save by a single excommunication.

VI. Authors dispute whether censures are multiplied as often as transgressions against a precept to which a censure is annexed are repeated. And they commonly answer that if the transgressions be formally interrupted — as if someone today should strike a cleric, and after a week again strike the same or another cleric — the censure would be multiplied according to the formal multiplication of the transgressions. When one man strikes three clerics at once, just as he perpetrates three crimes, so he incurs a threefold penalty of censure, as seems the more probable.

VII. QUESTION IV. What causes excuse from censures? ANSWER. Several. 1. Necessity of acting against a precept, just as it excuses from sin, so it excuses from a censure. An excommunication has been passed against those labouring on a feast day. That necessity which renders the work lawful on such a day likewise exempts from the censure. 2. The nullity of the censure; 3. The innocence of the man; 4. Ignorance; 5. Impotence; 6. Fear; 7. The injustice of the cause.

VIII. Ignorance, as has been said elsewhere, is of one kind of right, of another of fact, of another of penalty. One is invincible, another vincible; another gross, affected, or supine. He labours under ignorance of right who is ignorant of a law forbidding or commanding. He labours under ignorance of fact who is ignorant that he whom he beats is a cleric. Ignorance of penalty is when someone is ignorant that a penalty has been appended to such a crime. You know that the beating of a cleric is forbidden; you know that he whom you beat is a cleric; but you know not that a penalty has been appended to this unlawful beating of a cleric. That is invincible which cannot be overcome by human industry; and vincible which can be overcome.

IX. Fr. Viva, question 1 on censures, article 6, no. 7, with the Probabilists distinguishes vincible ignorance into inculpable and culpable. He calls culpably vincible that which a man can overcome, and believes himself bound to employ the diligence by which he may overcome it and acquire the knowledge of the truth. He calls inculpably vincible that which a man can overcome, diligence being employed, but believes himself not bound to employ this diligence, that he may attain the truth. This vincible ignorance void of malice, new and unheard-of, burst into the light after the birthdays of Probabilism, which in Vol. II of the Apparatus I have utterly routed. This vincible ignorance, which is always noxious, is of one kind called affected, when a man studiously wills to be ignorant of what he is bound to know. Another is gross, when from a certain torpor a man neglects the inquiry into truth. Another is called supine, when a man, distracted by various businesses, omits to investigate what he is bound to know. Lastly another is antecedent, which is the cause of the act. Another is concomitant, which is not the cause of the act, but without it the act would be done — as when someone burns so with hatred against a man that, killing him who is truly a cleric but is in fact unknown by him to be so, he would kill the same if he did know it.

X. Ignorance truly invincible, whether of right or of fact, just as it excuses from fault, so it exempts from censure. Ignorance venially vincible excuses from a censure for the incurring of which a mortal fault is required. Ignorance nevertheless is not presumed in the exterior forum unless it be proved, as is said in chapter Ignorantia on the rules of law in the Sixth. Ignorance of fact excuses, but not of law. He who knows that homicide is forbidden by divine right, but is invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law forbidding it under a censure, does not according to very many incur the censure, although he sin against natural and divine right: because, they say, for the contracting of a censure contumacy is necessary, which an admonition ought to precede. For the penalty of censure differs from those penalties passed either by the civil forum or by the ecclesiastical forum, which are contracted even if they be ignored, when the law is known. Wherefore a homicide, from whom the law forbidding it is not hidden, is obnoxious to capital punishment even if he be ignorant of this penalty. Similarly he who knows the ecclesiastical law forbidding such an act would incur irregularity from a delict, although he were ignorant of such a penalty. On the contrary, if he were invincibly ignorant of the ecclesiastical law, just as he would be immune from fault, so he would be free from irregularity from a delict.

XI. Very many and grave theologians teach that invincible ignorance of a censure alone, passed by a universal law of the Church or a universal canon, does not excuse from incurring it him who knows the same law. Fr. Antoine turns over this question at large. I settle the matter in few words. The hypothesis being admitted that the ignorance of the censure were utterly invincible, it would not be contracted, although passed by a universal law or canon. But because it does not so easily happen that ignorance of a censure annexed to a universal law be truly invincible, therefore transgressors of the same law are not easily to be judged exempt from it. Who would judge that man immune from a censure who should commit a duel, knowing it to be forbidden by the Church, because he is ignorant that a censure has been annexed to this prohibition?

XII. When in a law it is said, he who shall knowingly do this, he who shall presume to do it, he who shall rashly do it, then by reason of clauses of this kind authors commonly teach that vincible ignorance excuses from the censure: because by such clauses the law requires a greater knowledge than other laws destitute of these clauses. The Salmanticenses with others contend that even affected ignorance itself excuses from the censure. But this opinion to me is false, because affected ignorance is equivalent to knowledge.

XIII. Grave fear falling upon a constant man excuses from a censure, even from a sin forbidden only by ecclesiastical right. If the thing forbidden be of divine right, under an ecclesiastical censure, it does not excuse from the sin, but from the censure only. He who, struck by grave fear, should kill a cleric, would sin against natural and divine right, but would not incur the censure.

XIV. He who doubts whether a judge has passed a sentence of censure or not, ought to judge that it has not been passed, because in merely penal matters the milder part is to be embraced. He who is certain that a censure has been passed, whether from law or from man, but doubts whether he has contracted it, ought to bear himself as if he were entangled in the censure, until either he lay aside the doubt, or be absolved from the censure.

XV. An innocent man who in the exterior forum is excommunicated according to what is alleged and proved is before God not excommunicated. But in the presence of those who are conscious of the excommunication, if they be uncertain of his innocence, he ought to bear himself as entangled in the censure: because a judge's sentence, valid and lawful although in fact unjust, is to be obeyed, both for the avoiding of scandal and in obedience to the supreme authority. Wherefore it is the more probable that this innocent man ought to abstain from the reception and from the administration of his own Order, even privately, and from external communication with the faithful: whence Clement XI by right disapproved theses 90, 91, and 92 of Paschasius Quesnel.

Caia came for confession to Paul, a missionary priest in England, to whom she disclosed that in the preceding year in Italy she had stood by at a duel in order to encourage a friend fighting a duel. Caia further said that she had not been able to obtain absolution from the parish priest in Italy, since he affirmed that the case was reserved to the Pope. In answer also to Paul’s question, Caia replied that she knew the Church forbids every participation in a duel under penalties, but that she had performed a work of charity which it would have been inhuman to refuse; indeed, that she would do the same thing again in the same circumstances. Paul, however, wishes to know what he can and ought to do in the case. Hence it is asked:

1. What is a censure, and what conditions are required in order that it be incurred?

2. How does a censure cease?

3. What is persistence in a censure, and what effects does it produce?

4. What is to be said of the case?

1. What is a censure and what conditions are required for incurring it?

The first part of the question was answered above, p. 349.

The conditions required that a censure may be incurred are: a sin grave internally and externally, completed, not altogether past, and committed with contumacy.¹

1 Manual of Moral Theology, vol. ii, 369.

The second question was answered above, p. 353.

3. What is insordescence in a censure and what effects does it produce?

Insordescence is the obstinate remaining of an excommunicated person in his excommunication for a whole year without absolution. The Council of Trent decreed (Sess. XXV, c. 3 de Ref.) that such a person might be proceeded against as suspect of heresy. If he does not purge his heresy he should be declared a heretic after the lapse of another year.²

4. The case. The third of the excommunications reserved to the Pope by the Constitution Apostolicae Sedis is couched in these terms:

“ Those who commit duels, or simply provoke them, or accept them, or assist any of them in any way or give them favor, and those who watch them with intent, or allow them, or to the extent that they are able do not prevent them, of whatever dignity they may be, even royal or imperial.

It is obvious, therefore, that Caia had incurred this censure by being a spectator of the duel with the intention of giving courage to her champion. She seems also to have had sufficient knowledge that she was doing something prohibited under censure by the Church. She is. not yet penitent, and Paul’s first task will be to try to make her see the gravity of her sin and express her sorrow and repentance for it. When she is disposed he will be able to absolve

< Lehmkuhl, vol. ii, n. 1148.

her by virtue of the special faculties which confessors in England receive through their bishop from the Holy See. She does not seem to have fallen into insordescence, for she tried to get absolution before, and the case does not state that she remained a whole year under excommunication.