Contention

III. Contention is discord in words or altercation among several persons, disordered from the fact that truth is attacked or defended in an undue manner. Contention which occurs by attacking truth is a grave sin from its genus, that is, grave or light according as a truth of very great or lesser importance is attacked. Contention which occurs by defending truth in an undue manner is of itself a venial sin; nevertheless a species of grave sin can be joined to it (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 38, a. 1).

Contention.—Contention is discord carried into words or equivalent signs, (i.e., a dispute or altercation), in which one denies what the other affirms. It is divided as follows: (a) by reason of the intention, it is either an investigation of the truth, a defense of the truth, or an attack on the truth; (b) by reason of the manner in which it is conducted, it is either suitable or unsuitable to the persons and the matter in question.

Contention whose aim is the discovery of the truth is lawful as follows. (a) Such contention is lawful and useful in itself, for it is a means of acquiring useful knowledge, of seeing both sides of a question, and of sharpening the mind for the refutation of error. Hence, a contest in a court of justice, a controversy in a scientific journal, a public debate on some important matter, and a theological disputation are according to their nature lawful, and may be necessary. Even to argue against the truth, for the sake of practice in discussion or to bring out the truth more clearly and forcibly, is, apart from danger, scandal, or prohibition, not unuseful.

(b) Debate is unlawful in its manner when a disputant does not argue according to the rules, appeals to prejudice or ignorance, uses an insulting tone or unparliamentary language, etc.

The Sin of Contention.—Contention is a sin when its aim is the concealment or discomfiture of the truth. (a) From its nature this kind of contention is a mortal sin, for it is the external expression of internal discord in matters about which charity requires concord and the same speech. Hence, the Apostle numbers contention among the works of the flesh that exclude from the kingdom of God (Gal, v. 20). (b) From the lightness of the matter or the imperfection of the consent, this kind of contention is very often, if not usually, only a venial sin, or no sin at all. Examples: A person argues against what he knows is true, but the matter is trivial (e.g., his weight); or he is distracted by the heat of dispute or the tactics of the other party.

Mortal sin is not committed by contention, therefore, unless the truths against which one contends are of a serious kind. Such truths are: (a) truths of a religious or moral character, such as the doctrines of faith and the commandments of God; (b) natural truths of a universal character, the knowledge of which pertains to the perfection of the intellect, such as first principles; (c) natural truths of a particular character in which important rights are involved. Example: An historian who writes against some deservedly revered person of the past, or a lawyer who attempts to prove against an accused what he knows is not a fact, are guilty of the sin of contention.

Hence, one may be defending one kind of truth and contending against another kind of truth at the same time. St. Paul, accordingly, makes the distinction between announcement of the truth out of charity and announcement of the truth out of contention (Philip, i, 15 sqq.). (a) The truth is defended out of charity when one does not use truth as a means for the defense of error; (b) it is defended out of contention when one makes use of it as a means for the propagation of error. Thus, while St. Paul was imprisoned at Rome in 61, certain personal enemies preached Christ, but at the same time spoke or hinted falsehoods against St. Paul in order to undermine his authority or add to the bitterness of his captivity. Similarly, if one defends the truth to make oneself appear different or better than one is, one speaks from contention.

Ways in which one is guilty of the mortal sin of contention: (a) when one contends formally against the truth, that is, when one knows the truth and intends to overcome it or suppress it; (b) when one contends virtually against the truth, that is, when one is so bent on carrying one’s point that one does not care whether it is true or false. Thus, the Sophists aimed to win, right or wrong.

When the aim of contention is the overthrow of error: (a) in itself, such contention is good and praiseworthy, and at times necessary; (b) by reason of circumstances, it may be a venial or a mortal sin. Examples: A dispute on a matter that is unbecoming, such as which of the disputants is greater (Luke, xxii. 24); dispute with greater warmth than the case requires; a dispute that leads to scandal or other evil consequences, as in religious controversies (I Tim., ii. 14).

The Causes of Sinful Contention.—(a) The cause of that which is principal in contention—namely, the departure from the truth held by another and the stand made for error—is envy, pride and vainglory, as said above (see 1854) concerning discord. (b) The cause of that which is secondary in contention—namely, the wrangling or bawling manner and the shouts or screams of the contenders—is anger.

What are the daughters of pride and vainglory? "Those vices which of themselves are apt to be ordered to the end of some capital vice are called its daughters." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. The daughters of pride are three: 1. Presumption, which is an inordinate appetite of undertaking something above one's powers. It is commonly only venial. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 130, a. 1; q. 134, a. 2 ad 4; q. 21, a. 4. Nevertheless it becomes mortal if it brings grave harm, e.g., if someone presumes to obtain ecclesiastical jurisdiction, the office of physician, etc., without due knowledge. But insofar as presumption is a special sin, opposed to theological hope, it is always a mortal sin, unless imperfection of act excuses. 2. Ambition, which is the inordinate appetite of dignity and honor not owed, or in an undue way and by an undue means. It is per se a venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 131, a. 1. But it becomes mortal by reason of the matter from which; or by reason of the means by which; or by reason of the end for which honor is sought; or by reason of the harm which is inflicted on one's neighbor. 3. Vainglory, namely the desire of empty glory, whose end is the inordinate manifestation of one's own excellence, whether true or fictitious. It is per se a venial sin. It is often mortal per accidens, as was just said concerning ambition. But to perform even sacred things on account of vainglory, e.g., to preach, does not exceed venial sin. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 132, aa. 3, 4; q. 162, a. 7; L. 66. Pusillanimity corresponds by opposition to the three daughters of pride, by which someone, distrusting himself too much, refuses honors, glory, or an office for which he is worthy. It is venial from its genus; and it becomes mortal if you refuse that to which you are bound under mortal sin. L. 67.

Moreover, the daughters of vainglory, which St. Thomas constitutes as a capital vice, are assigned thus by the same Holy Doctor, 2. 2. q. 132, a. 5. A man can tend to the manifestation of his own excellence in two ways: "in one way directly, either by words, and thus there is boasting; or by deeds, and thus, if they are true things having some admiration, there is presumption of novelties, which men are accustomed to admire more; but if they are false, thus there is hypocrisy. In another way someone strives to manifest his own excellence indirectly, by showing himself not to be less than another, and this in four ways. First indeed as to the intellect, and thus there is pertinacity, by which a man cleaves too much to his own opinion, being unwilling to believe a better opinion. Second as to the will, and thus there is discord, while he does not wish to depart from his own will so that he may agree with others. Third as to speech, and thus there is contention, when another by words quarrels noisily against another. Fourth as to deed, and thus there is disobedience, namely while someone does not wish to execute the precept of a superior." And thus these vices are fittingly called the daughters of vainglory.

Boasting is a certain vain proclamation of one's own excellence, and is per se venial if it is concerning good things; and it can be grave per accidens. If it is concerning lightly evil things, it is likewise per se light, grave per accidens, if, for example, it proceeds from a grave cause against God or neighbor. But if it is concerning gravely evil things, it is grave, because the approval of a work has the same species as the work, which therefore must be expressed in confession, at least when complacency concerning the same sin was joined with the boasting. At least when, etc.; because, if it was without that complacency, many hold that it is not necessarily to be explained. For any boasting concerning mortal sin, abstraction made from complacency in it, is of the same species, namely that someone glories in this, that he has offended God. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 112; L. 26, 66, 67; l. 3, n. 426; Lugo, de Poenit., d. 16, n. 266 seqq.

Presumption of novelties, which is also called ostentation, if those deeds have nothing of admiration, is also per se venial. And thus it is light to be dressed in foreign garments, or to adorn oneself too much from lightness of mind, vanity, etc.; but grave if it is such as notably to corrupt morals. L. 66, 67. Presumption of novelties can be in opinions, in a mode of speaking, in a mode of acting, etc.

Hypocrisy, by which someone "does not care to have holiness, but only to appear holy... is a mortal sin.... To simulate holiness from which one is deficient through mortal sin... is not always a mortal sin, but sometimes venial," according as it happens to oppose charity or not. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 111, a. 4. Likewise to simulate improbitity is a sin, and can be mortal. S. Th. ibid., a. 1; L. 66, 67.

Pertinacity. "Someone is called pertinacious who is imprudently holding, as if wholly tenacious." Hence pertinacity is opposed to perseverance; for the persevering person persists in his own opinion "according as he ought"; but the pertinacious person perseveres in it "more than he ought." And therefore it is a sin because of excess. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 138, a. 2.

Discord is a dissent of wills concerning the good which we ought to will from charity. Moreover, since certain goods can be owed to one's neighbor not only from charity, but also from justice, discord and dissent from the rendering of similar goods is opposed both to charity and to justice. Discord is per se from its genus a mortal sin. For it directly repugns to charity. But per accidens it can become venial, from the smallness of the owed good in the rendering of which we do not wish to consent. Indeed, sometimes it will be no sin, if it arises, namely, from a probable judgment, from which one person judges this, another that, for the honor of God and the utility of neighbor, and if the mode of dissenting is not opposed to charity. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 38; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 37.

Contention is the impugnation of truth with confidence of shouting. Contention is from its genus a mortal sin. The reason: because by charity we ought to will and communicate to others truth necessary or useful for the salvation of the soul, or even of the body; and therefore to impugn it, and to wish to defeat it, is opposed to the virtue of charity, and is from its genus a mortal sin. - Struggl, tr. 4, q. 5, n. 39; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 38.

Disobedience, properly and speaking per se, or formal disobedience, is had only when "someone contemns a precept, because moral acts have their species from the end. But when he does something against a precept, not on account of contempt of the precept, it is disobedience only materially, but formally pertains to another species of sin," according to various motives, e.g., to the species of theft, homicide, etc. Therefore disobedience by its nature is a grave sin. For not to obey the precepts of God and of Superiors is contrary to charity. S. Th. 2. 2. q. 105, a. 1.

What intention is required in adults for receiving the individual sacraments? - In baptism and order there is required at least a habitual explicit will. The reason is that sacraments of this kind impose grave obligations to be fulfilled. But no one is judged to receive a grave obligation; rather, his positive will must be altogether clear. Lugo d. 9, n. 119, 127; L. 81, 82. The sacrament of baptism and of order is indeed invalidly conferred on those having only interpretative intention. Nevertheless Coninck, Sporer, Dicastillo, etc., apud Croix l. 6, p. 1, n. 168, and others judge that for receiving baptism an implicit intention contained in contrition or attrition had by the recipient suffices, or, as Lugo d. 9, n. 130 says, in the will of giving one's name to the Christian Religion, or, if he is ignorant of this, of doing whatever things are necessary for salvation, as La Croix has it, l.c. Cf. L. 82. This indeed can have place in urgent necessity, but baptism must then be conferred conditionally, and therefore repeated conditionally if time allows, unless there is certainty concerning a true and explicit intention not retracted. Cf. S. C. de P. F., March 30, 1898.

In confirmation, extreme unction, and the Eucharist, a habitual implicit will suffices, which is less rightly called interpretative, and which consists in this, that someone has had a general intention, and has not retracted it, of applying those things which are necessary and useful for his salvation; or of living and dying in the Catholic religion, with the helps of the same religion; or, a fortiori, of receiving all the sacraments in life and at death. The reason is that these sacraments bring many advantages and no disadvantage. But all are judged to wish to receive advantages. Hence both confirmation and extreme unction can be conferred conditionally on a dying person deprived of his senses. Ritual, de Extr. unct. § 6; L. 82. But if he in reality had never thought of receiving them, they would have to be altogether repeated.

For penance there is required either actual or at least virtual intention; nor therefore does habitual intention suffice. The reason is that in this sacrament the acts of the penitent are required for the matter, and these indeed cannot be had without at least virtual will of receiving the sacrament.

L. 82. - Likewise for matrimony at least virtual intention is required. For "since each spouse is not only receiving, but also minister of the sacrament, in each of them there is certainly required that intention which is demanded in the ministers of the other sacraments." L. 82.

Fr. Lehmkuhl, ed. 11, n. 66, requires for the Eucharist, besides the case of viaticum, an expressed habitual intention. Yet ordinarily it is not only virtual, but even actual. The reason, he says, is that "in the general will of living a Christian life there is in no way contained the will of receiving the sacred Eucharist so many times and at such a time." - But if, besides the case of viaticum, it is a question of the Eucharist to be received from obligation, certainly that general will also implicitly contains this. And if that general will is conceived more determinately, namely of applying all the means constituted by God as necessary and useful for salvation, certainly this will would also implicitly include the Eucharist to be received from mere devotion. Finally, if the general will of dying in a Christian manner includes the will of receiving the sacraments of the Church at the point of death, why does the general will of living a Christian life not include the will of receiving Christ's sacraments during life? "Wherefore," the same Fr. Lehmkuhl concludes, "an adult to whom, besides the case of viaticum, the Holy Eucharist were given without his knowledge, would indeed receive it materially, but not with fruit." - But consequently to the things which have just been noted: if in the case of Viaticum the aforesaid adult would receive the sacred Eucharist sacramentally and with fruit, also outside that case he would receive it sacramentally and with fruit, if namely, as was said, he has its will at least implicitly.

S. Th. II-II, q. 37-42.

954. Sins against private peace. - To peace, which is an effect of charity, several sins are opposed. To private peace there is opposed:

1. In the heart, discord, which is directly contrary to concord or union of wills, and is a dissension of wills (not only of intellects) concerning the good of God or neighbor which from charity we ought to will, namely, concerning a necessary good about which we are bound to consent.

Discord happens in two ways: a) in itself, when someone knowingly and from intention dissents from the good of God or neighbor in which he ought to consent, and thus it is a mortal sin from its genus because it is contrary to charity; b) accidentally, when the intention of some persons is toward a good which pertains to the honor of God or the utility of neighbor, but one judges this to be good, while another has a contrary opinion, and such discord, which is rather of opinions and intellects than of wills, is not against charity nor a sin, unless it is with error concerning those things which are of the necessity of salvation, or exceeds the limits of moderation so that pertinacity is unduly applied. - Discord arises from vainglory, because we love our own will and our own judgment more than is right.

2. From discord often is born contention, which is an altercation of words by which one contradicts another inordinately, either by attacking the truth, or by defending it in an undue mode, for example, with too much acrimony. In the first case it is a mortal sin from its genus, namely, in matter of great moment: of faith, morals, justice, etc.; in the second case it is only venial, unless it generates grave scandal. It likewise arises from vainglory, by which each of those contending strives to carry off victory over the other.

3. From discord and contention sometimes is born strife, which is a fight of hands among private persons, by which, with souls inflamed by anger, one strives to strike or injure another. It is a mortal sin from its genus in the aggressor; yet if it does not exceed measure, as also a very light fight, it is venial. In one defending himself there is no sin, if he does not exceed the limits of moderation; if he exceeds a little, it is venial; if much, mortal, for example, if without necessity someone rises up to injure another gravely. - It arises from anger.

955. Sins against public peace. - To public peace, or peace of a multitude, there are opposed:

1. To the peace of the Church, schism, which is the voluntary separation of oneself from the unity of the Church, the profession of faith being retained, or the voluntary separation of a baptized person from the Catholic Church. It is committed in two ways, for "the unity of the Church is attended in two things, namely, a) in the connection of the members of the Church with one another..., and b) again in the order of all the members to one head... And therefore they are called schismatics 1. (perfectly) who refuse to be subject to the Supreme Pontiff (with rebellion, so that they pertinaciously refuse to obey precepts), and 2. who refuse to communicate with the members of the Church subject to him" (in doctrine, worship, sacraments). From this it is clear that it is a most grave and mortal sin from its whole genus. Nevertheless it is less grave than infidelity, which is against God himself according as he is in himself the first truth upon which faith rests, while schism is against the unity of the Church, which is a participated good and less than God himself. And although charity is nobler than faith, the sin which is opposed against the secondary good of charity, namely, the good of neighbor, is less than infidelity, because the good of neighbor is less than the object of faith, which is God himself.

2. To the peace of a civil multitude, both a) illicit war; and b) sedition, which is a tumult or aggressive war by which one part of the commonwealth unjustly rises up against another, or against the legitimate prince, in which latter case it is called rebellion. It is a sin so much graver as the common good (namely, the peace and unity of society) excels a private good; whence it is mortal from its whole genus.

These sins are also against justice, and are better considered in the treatise on Justice.

956. Observation. - External heretics are also schismatics, but not conversely, although nevertheless schism leads to heresy. Schismatics also are punished by the same ecclesiastical penalties as heretics. Moreover, concerning communication with schismatics and concerning cooperation with schism, one must speak similarly as for heresy (cf. treatise on Faith).

CONTENTION is a certain altercation of words against the truth, aimed at attacking it. Therefore it is a sin contrary to the peace of Charity, as St. Bonaventure teaches in explicatione terminorum Theologiae, and in primo sent. dub. 7. Prol., where, drawing on St. Ambrose in the Gloss on Rom. 1. Contention, etc., he says: Contention is an attack upon the truth with the confidence of clamor.

WHEREFORE it is mortal of its genus, as St. Thomas shows, art. 2., drawing on St. Gregory, 31. moral. cap. 31. Hence in Scripture it is numbered among the other mortal sins, Galatians 5., Romans 1., 1 Corinthians 1., as St. Bonaventure notes in speculo animae, cap. 1.

FURTHERMORE, truth is assailed by Contention: First, by one who formally attacks a truth acknowledged, as Cajetan and Valencia note. Second, one who attacks the proposed matter in such a way that he does not care whether it is true or false. Third, one who can and ought to know that the proposed matter which he attacks is true; in this way heretics attack the truth of faith, as Valencia notes, question 14.

Of this you have much from the Holy Fathers as gathered by St. Bonaventure, Lib. 3. Pharetrae, cap. 3. §. 9. St. Gregory in 26. moral. cap. 2.: Those who begin contentions are usually more culpable than those who answer; and in Past. part. 3. admon. 24.: Whoever in sowing quarrels destroys the love of neighbors serves a familiar enemy; and Lib. 31. moral. cap. 8.: Hypocrisy, having assumed the habit of holy religion, abandons the care of her children, and seeks to defend temporal things even with quarrels.

ST. AUGUSTINE in regula 3. cap. 37.: But you should have no quarrels, or finish them as quickly as possible, lest anger grow into hatred, and make a beam out of a straw, and make the soul a murderer. For as you have read: He that hateth his brother is a murderer. And cap. 39.: Refrain from harsher words; and if they have issued from your mouth, do not be ashamed to bring forth from that same mouth the remedies from which the wounds were made.

ISIDORE in Synon. cap. 9.: Contention kindles the torches of hatred; contention extinguishes the peace of the heart; contention breaks concord.

SENECA in the first letter: The first contention is among rivals.

The Angelic Doctor notes, however, in the place cited in speculo animae, that Contention is to be judged by its root; for if it arises from grave hatred, or grave anger, or a will to oppress or confound holy truth, it is mortal. And on Luke 22, at the words: And there was also a contention among them, which of them should seem to be the greater, the Angelic Doctor says: What was the occasion of this contention is not known. Yet contention is a sign of the love of one's own private good. Hence James 4: From whence are wars and contentions among you? Are they not from your concupiscences, which war in your members? But contention over primacy is a sign of the love of excellence and dominion: this was repressed by Christ; and it is dissuaded by the Apostle Paul, 1 Cor. 11.: If anyone among you seems to be contentious, we have no such custom, nor the Church of God. Because Proverbs 11: honor is the man's who separates himself from contentions. But this conflict has withdrawn from the court. Nay, just as at the approach of Christ's passion they contended over primacy, so at the approach of a prelate's death contention arises among the Canons over who ought to be placed first.

I append the splendid teaching of the Angelic Doctor, from speculo disciplinae ad novitios, cap. 20.: It is wholly unworthy of the servants of God to contend in the manner of little women; if words of resistance fall in, one must yield at once to the resister. Honor is the man's who separates himself from contentions. They never quarrel for the sake, as it is said, of learning, knowing that contentions of words henceforth in no way pertain to them. It cannot be that contention will not extort something that is given against conscience. It is perverse, above all if with damnable audacity the mouth of a religious man be opened to injurious or maledictive words, which according to the Apostle, 1 Corinthians 10., are excluded from the kingdom of God. So the Seraphic Doctor.