Defence of others

What one may lawfully do, that, as a rule, another may help him to do; and so I may kill or maim an unjust assailant not only of my own life, limb, chastity, or property, but when any innocent person is similarly threatened I may also do the same in his defence. Although I may lawfully do this, yet there is seldom an obligation of doing it, for the obligation would only arise from charity, and as we saw above, this virtue does not usually bind with such serious inconvenience as would always be involved in taking life in defence of another. Those who have charge of the public peace and security are more strictly bound to perform their duty of protecting life and property even at the sacrifice of the lives of wrongdoers.

Is the aforesaid defense lawful, if it concerns others? - Some private person can defend the life, goods, and modesty of a neighbor, even by the killing of an unjust aggressor. Proof: 1. from the common opinion of theologians. 2. "Because just as the innocent neighbor himself can defend himself by killing the aggressor, so it is lawful to cooperate with him in a lawful thing which he himself can do, and to help him." Lugo de Iust. d. 10, n. 201; C. L. 2368; Struggl 29; L. 389, 391; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 60, a. 6 ad 2.

Note: Some private person; for it is certain that Princes, magistrates, and soldiers, who have been specially hired for the defense of citizens, are bound to this. C. L. 2371. These are bound even with danger of their own life, where the matter concerns turning away a public evil from citizens; but where the matter concerns only the life of some private person, they are not bound to protect it with so great an inconvenience. Can; for it is more probable, at least speaking generally, that he is by no means obligated to such defense of an innocent man with the killing of the unjust aggressor; and this both because the precept of charity does not seem to oblige in that case, since it is rather better to avoid the eternal death of the aggressor himself; and because in the killing of another, a grave inconvenience can never be avoided, for example, because of fear of enmities, or of public justice, or even because of the horror conceived in staining one's own hands with human blood. At least speaking generally; for make exception: 1. If the one invaded would be necessary for the public good, which each one is bound under grave obligation to care for. 2. If he is father, son, wife, or brother, whom piety itself obliges one altogether to protect.

If the matter concerns an invader of another's modesty, understand this provided that the woman does not furnish her consent to the invader, but positively resists him; otherwise to kill the invader would not be to repel force by force, since there is no injury where there is consent. Lessius, Sporer, and others make exception if the one attacked is very closely related to you; then, they say, before the deed you can still kill the invader, although the one attacked consents; for in that case you repel the injury which redounds upon you. L. 389-392.

361. Thesis IV. The killing of an unjust aggressor, at least indirect, is licit for defending life or an equivalent good, with the moderation of blameless defense being observed.

It is said 1) licit, and not obligatory, because generally no one is bound to defend himself in this hard way, but he can, from a motive of virtue, permit his own death, unless he is very necessary to his family or to the common good, or unless he distrusts his own state of grace;⁴

⁴ Let it not be said that he who offers his life for his neighbor is always in the state of grace, because he performs an act of heroic charity; for that is true only if he so acts from the motive of perfect love of God.

2. the killing of an aggressor, that is, of one who actually brings force to bear, or at least in some way has begun the work and morally is already invading, as if he displays signs of an imminent aggression (by drawing a sword, seizing a firearm, etc.), or has altogether determined to attack and is now seeking the occasion of aggression and this is established from some present indication; but in doubt there would be place for caution or for interrogation, not for defense.⁵ For to kill before the aggression would be to forestall it, not to defend oneself against it; and when the aggression has ended, it would no longer be defense, but vengeance;

⁵ Hence Alexander VII condemned proposition 18: "It is licit to kill a false accuser, false witnesses, even a judge, from whom an unjust sentence is certainly imminent, if in no other way can an innocent person avoid harm."

3. unjust; therefore it is illicit to defend oneself against the just action of ministers of justice or of officers, but licit against a materially unjust aggression attempted by a drunken man or a madman, unless that man certainly is in the state of sin and the one attacked is certainly in the state of grace;

4. at least indirect: we say this because some, such as Lugo and Waffelaert, think that in the case the direct killing itself is licit, provided that it is not intended as an end but chosen as a means; nevertheless we judge it more conformable to truth, with St. Thomas, that bloody defense is nothing except indirect killing;

5. for defending life or an equivalent good, whether one's own or another's, so that there is present a good effect proportionate to the death of the aggressor; but an equivalent good is the integrity of members to be preserved, or sensation or the use of reason not to be irreparably lost: whether another good can be judged equivalent is left aside for now;

6. with the moderation of blameless defense, that is, so that no more be done than is necessary for defense; whence it is illicit to kill if it suffices to wound, illicit to wound if it suffices to shout, or if it is possible to flee without dishonor, but not if it would be done with great detriment: a soldier or nobleman cannot always flee without dishonor; a cleric, a man of the common people can; indeed a soldier or nobleman can before a madman or a drunken man.

It is proved: It is licit to posit a cause of a double effect, one good, the other evil, when certain conditions are present (n. 352). But this is verified in the case. For a) the indirect killing of an unjust aggressor is an action not evil, since it is nothing except to repel force by force and just defense; b) from it there equally and immediately arises the good effect, namely the preservation of life, just as the evil: the death of the aggressor; c) the good effect is proportionate to the evil, because the life of the innocent one attacked is worth the life of the guilty aggressor, and it is not otherwise to be preserved; d) only the good effect is intended in itself, not thus the evil, since if it could be done otherwise it would not be inflicted. Therefore it is licit.

This was solemnly consecrated by the Law, as Innocent III relates: "Although all laws and rights permit force to be repelled by force, nevertheless, because this must be done with moderation of blameless defense, not for taking vengeance but for driving away injury..."⁶

⁶ Cf. French Penal Code, a. 328; Belgian, a. 416; German, a. 53; likewise English law.

Let St. Thomas be heard, q. 64, a. 7: "Nothing prohibits there being two effects of one act, of which one only is in the intention, while the other is outside the intention... Therefore from the act of someone defending himself a double effect can follow: one indeed, the preservation of his own life; but the other, the killing of the attacker. Therefore an act of this kind, from the fact that the preservation of one's own life is intended, does not have the character of the illicit, since this is natural to anyone, that he preserve himself in being as much as he can. Yet some act proceeding from a good intention can be rendered illicit if it is not proportionate to the end. And therefore if someone, for defending his own life, uses greater violence than is fitting, it will be illicit. But if he repels violence moderately, the defense will be licit, for according to the laws 'it is licit to repel force by force with the moderation of blameless defense.' Nor is it necessary for salvation that a man omit an act of moderate defense in order to avoid the killing of another, because a man is bound to provide for his own life more than for another's life. But because it is not licit to kill a man except by public authority on account of the common good..., it is illicit that a man intend to kill a man in order to defend himself, unless he is one who has public authority; and he, intending to kill a man for his own defense, refers this to the public good, as is clear in a soldier fighting against enemies, and in a minister of a judge fighting against robbers, although even these sin if they are moved by private passion."

362. For protecting what goods is bloody defense licit? - Theologians have disputed whether such indirect wounding or killing of an aggressor can be licit for defending other lesser goods of oneself or of another: goods of fortune, chastity, reputation and honor. Now:

1. Many have said that it is licit for defending goods of fortune.

But this certainly does not hold a) for goods to be possessed and for a right to the thing, as moreover is established from the condemned proposition 32 by Innocent XI,⁷ but at most for goods actually possessed and for a right in the thing; b) nor for goods of lesser moment, for example, formerly for one or another gold coin,⁸ or now for 500 lire or 1,000 francs, even of gold value, but at most for goods of great value; but a matter of great moment would be to fall from one's state, or to suffer great detriment in it, whence it must be considered not only absolutely but relatively; c) nor for those things which could also be recovered otherwise... For goods of great moment, already possessed, whose loss would probably be irreparable, this can be sustained as probable, because it pertains to public security and to the common good that violent robbers should not be able to snatch goods of this kind with impunity, without incurring danger to life. Yet this is not certain, because, as others say: it is not licit as punishment, because punishment does not belong to private persons; nor as defense, because proportion is lacking between the fortune of the attacked one to be preserved and the very life of the attacker.

⁷ "Not only is it licit to defend by lethal defense the things which we actually possess, but also those to which we have an inchoate right and which we hope that we will possess."

⁸ Proposition 31 condemned by Innocent XI: "Regularly I can kill a thief for the preservation of one gold coin."

2. A fortiori many have held it licit for defending chastity.

But this also is very doubtful. For the integrity of the flesh does not seem of such value that it can be equated with life. But the integrity of the soul can be preserved otherwise, by not consenting to sin.

3. Some also have held it licit for defending reputation and honor, which are esteemed more than goods of fortune, indeed more than life.

But this last is true of the foundation of honor, namely, of virtue, which is worth more than life, not of honor itself, which is a very fragile thing. Moreover reputation and honor cannot be defended by the wounding or killing of one defaming or dishonoring. For after the fact, it would not be defense but vengeance by private authority: for if a nobleman who has unjustly received a slap or an insult strikes back, this certainly does not avail for defending honor thus taken away, but for obtaining from vengeance a new and false honor. But before the fact, it would be prevention, not defense; nor is that necessary, because the loss of honor and reputation is not irreparable, since by other means it can be preserved or at least recovered (for example, by verbal retort, by judicial way, or by goodness of life), and the wounding or killing of the attacker is of itself an inept means for conserving or recovering such a good, since it is rather defamatory. Therefore this was deservedly condemned.⁹ Besides, violent defense of honor or reputation would afford an entrance to countless slaughters and enmities with great detriment to the common good.

⁹ Proposition 30 condemned by Innocent XI: "It is lawful for an honorable man to kill an attacker who endeavors to bring calumny upon him, if otherwise this disgrace cannot be avoided; the same also must be said if someone gives a slap or strikes with a staff, and after the slap has been given or the blow of the staff flees." And proposition 17 condemned by Alexander VII: "It is licit for a religious and a cleric to kill a calumniator threatening to scatter grave crimes about him or about his religion, when another way of defending is not available; as it does not seem to be available if the calumniator is prepared publicly and before very grave men to impute the aforesaid things either to the religious himself or to his religion, unless he is killed."

All the aforesaid things are to be understood of these goods alone; but it would have to be said otherwise if at the same time there were an aggression against the person, especially if bodily integrity came into danger or an aggression against life could deservedly be feared. For someone can defend his own things (or chastity) even by force, and if the aggressor resists and seriously threatens mutilation or death, he can kill him by necessity of defense. And if one attempts to strike with a slap or a staff, the other can impede him by force; and if he who has struck is prepared to continue the injury, the one attacked can repel force by force (if there is no place for flight), even with the killing of the aggressor when he threatens death.