Question Two: On the Killing of Oneself

S. Th. II-II, q. 64, a. 5.

349. The killing of oneself is an action or omission apt to cause death; one kind is direct, another indirect. Direct is that which is intended in itself as an end or means, whether explicitly or implicitly, as when an action or omission can tend immediately to no other end; indirect is that which is not intended in itself, but is foreseen as likely to follow from some action or omission: thus a soldier about to fight foresees that death will probably follow from battle. Certainly one thing is to kill oneself or to inflict death on oneself; another is only to expose oneself to death or to its danger, or to do something else with danger of death, which, namely, can draw death along with itself. Now that indirect killing of oneself is licit, certain conditions being given and from a proportionately grave cause, there is no one who doubts; but there also have been those who have tried to legitimate direct killing of oneself or suicide itself properly so called, not only among the Greek philosophers, especially Stoics or Epicureans, considering it as an act of virtue, or as a means of fleeing the bitternesses of life, but also among more recent men, especially among positivists and materialists. From this it has happened that, faith decreasing, suicide has grown stronger day by day, the more so because in books and theaters its apology is undertaken. Catholic doctrine contradicts this.

350. Thesis I. Direct killing of oneself, intended in itself and by one's own authority, is a sin of itself grave from the whole genus, as being harmful not only to the individual, but also to society, and injurious to God.

It is said: a) by one's own authority, so that the case may be excluded both of him who, with God inspiring him, would kill himself, which certainly is licit, and of him who would do this because of a crime committed, with public authority commanding it, which we would not dare to condemn as certainly illicit;

b) grave of itself, because per accidens it can happen that someone in good faith judges there to be certain motives on account of which it would be licit to take away his own life;

c) from the whole genus, as being...: for by its nature it is always grave on account of a threefold motive, because it is harmful not only to the suicide himself, but also to society, and moreover injurious to the right of God. Under the first aspect it is not against justice but against charity toward oneself, under the second directly against legal justice, under the third against commutative justice.

But it is most strictly prohibited not only by natural law, but also by divine and ecclesiastical law.

It is proved directly: 1) It is against the natural law.

a) For it is harmful to the individual. Life is the greatest temporal good and the condition of all other goods, not only natural but also supernatural: the condition of merit for eternal life, the condition of progress in charity, the condition of penitence, the condition of progress and evolution in the moral and spiritual life; whence he who kills himself acts against love of self and against the natural inclination by which every being tends to the conservation of itself.

b) It is also harmful to society, which does not have dominion over our life but custody of it for its own utility. A part belongs to the whole, and every part, that which it is, is of the whole; but every man is part of society, into which he is inserted as a useful member, and thus that which he is, is of society; therefore he who kills himself deprives society of this utility of himself, while it is unwilling, and thus inflicts injury upon it.

c) Finally and especially it injures the right of God. For God is the author and therefore the owner of our life and body, and He has reserved this dominion to Himself, and has conceded to us only the use, after the manner of a deposit, according to His will, with the burden of guarding and preserving life. Therefore life is a certain good divinely given and subject to the power and judgment of God. Whence he who kills himself injures the right of God.

2. It is against divine law, which a) explicitly decrees: You shall not kill, which is to be understood not only of the killing of one's neighbor but also of the killing of oneself, since man ought to love his neighbor as himself. Whence Augustine, book I De Civ. Dei, c. 20: "It remains that we understand of man that which was said: You shall not kill. Not another, therefore not yourself. For he who kills himself kills nothing other than a man"; b) it also indicates the foundation of the precept, Deut. XXXII, 39: I will kill and I will make alive; and Wis. XVI, 13: You are, O Lord, who have power of life and death; hence c) it concludes: because as to life and death we are under the dominion of God, we must live and die for the Lord, according to that of the Apostle, Rom. XIV, 7-8: "For none of us lives to himself, and no one dies to himself. For whether we live, we live to the Lord; whether we die, we die to the Lord. Therefore whether we live or whether we die, we are the Lord's."

3. It is against ecclesiastical law, according to which suicides are deprived of sacred burial and liturgical suffrages (can. 1240, 3°); yet these penalties are not incurred if sufficient use of reason was lacking in them or perhaps was lacking, if they gave signs of repentance, if there is doubt whether death arose from suicide, if the crime was entirely hidden, lest the reputation of survivors be violated. But those who have attempted suicide are irregular from delict (can. 985, 5°), are barred from legitimate ecclesiastical acts, and incur other penalties if they are clerics (can. 2350, § 2).

351. There is no assignable cause on account of which it is licit to kill oneself, but all the excuses which are brought forward are vain pretexts.

For a) the misery of this present life does not hold: the happiness for which we are destined is to be obtained only in the future life, for which the misery of the present age provides an occasion of greater merit or penitence; and it would be irrational, in order to avoid lesser miseries, to inflict on oneself the greatest, namely death. Nor b) intolerable disgrace to be undergone: killing is not a suitable means of recovering reputation or honor, and because of evil unjustly inflicted by another, it is not fitting to inflict a greater punishment on oneself. Nor c) virtue, especially chastity, to be preserved: the integrity of the flesh surely is not a good proportioned to death; but the integrity of the soul can be provided for otherwise, since, as temptation increases, resistance from the grace of God can increase. Besides, evils are not to be done so that goods may come about. Nor d) a useless life or one burdensome to others to be ended: everyone can be useful to others by laboring, helping, building up by good examples, or praying; but if he has been harmful to a private person or to society, he ought by the honesty of life to repair scandals or injustices.

These things St. Thomas already refuted in his own time, q. 64, a. 5, ad 3: "Man is constituted master of himself through free will; and therefore man can licitly dispose concerning himself as to those things which pertain to this life, which is ruled by man's free will. But the passage from this life to another happier one is not subject to man's free will, but to divine power; and therefore 1) it is not licit for man to kill himself, so that he may pass to a happier life. 2) Similarly also not so that he may escape any miseries of the present life, because the ultimate and most terrible of the evils of this life is death... And therefore to inflict death on oneself in order to escape other miseries of this life is to assume a greater evil for the avoidance of a lesser evil. 3) Similarly also it is not licit to kill oneself because of some sin committed, both because in this he harms himself most of all, because he takes away from himself the necessary time of penitence, and also because it is not licit to kill a malefactor except through the judgment of public power. 4) Similarly also it is not licit for a woman to kill herself lest she be corrupted by another, because she ought not to commit in herself the greatest crime, which is the killing of herself, in order to avoid the lesser crime of another: for it is not a crime of a woman violated by violence if consent is not present... But it is established that fornication or adultery is a lesser sin than homicide, and especially homicide of oneself, which is most grave, because it harms oneself, to whom one owes the greatest love; it is also most dangerous, because no time remains that it may be expiated through penitence. 5) Similarly also it is not licit for anyone to kill himself because of fear lest he consent to sin, because evils are not to be done so that goods may come, or so that evils may be avoided, especially lesser and less certain evils; for it is uncertain whether someone in the future will consent to sin: for God is able to free man from sin in whatever temptation supervenes."

From these things again the Catholic thesis is indirectly confirmed.

352. Thesis II. Indirect killing of oneself is illicit, unless there accedes a just and proportionate cause, that is, a greater good which follows immediately from the action itself and not by means of the killing.

It is proved. For it is illicit by one's action or omission to cause an evil effect, unless four conditions are verified: a) that the action or omission in itself is not evil; b) that equally immediately from it there follows also a good effect, and that this is not obtained by means of the evil; c) that the good effect is proportionate to the evil; d) that only the good effect, not the evil, is intended. Therefore indirect killing of oneself will not be licit unless 1) the action or omission from which it follows is not evil in itself; 2) another effect, a good one, follows equally immediately, and this is not procured by means of the killing; 3) the good effect is greater than or equal to the danger of life and thus compensates it; whence it must be greater in proportion as that danger is greater, more certain, nearer; 4) death is not intended, but only the good effect.

The proportionate compensating good is threefold:

1. A public good, for the common good is preferable to a private good.

Thus even with proximate danger of death priests, physicians, and others upon whom it is incumbent can take care for the salvation, life, or security of others; soldiers can refuse to desert the assigned place, or burn a ship or blow up a citadel for submerging or destroying enemies, or lest the enemy obtain it with grave detriment of the republic; but not for avoiding captivity, since the public good does not require this.

2. The spiritual good of virtue, or of science and art, or the progress of culture.

Thus aviators or navigators with danger of life seeking new routes or exploring unknown regions. Likewise for the sake of faith, missionaries, even with danger of life, can preach the Gospel, if utility is hoped therefrom; and the faithful can not only bear death bravely, but even not flee, indeed present themselves before judges, if this is judged useful for confirming others in the faith, unless, however, greater evils are feared. Likewise from charity someone can expose himself to danger of death or offer himself to the blow of an assailant, or not take care for his own safety (for example, yield a plank in shipwreck), or not defend himself, in order to preserve, if it is hoped, the life of parents, spouse, friend, neighbor, a fortiori for their eternal salvation (indeed this can be a precept); but not cast himself into the sea or a river even for baptizing an infant, because evils are not to be done so that goods may come. Likewise from love of justice malefactors can offer themselves to be condemned and killed: for death is not from the omission of flight but from the sentence of the judge. And for protecting chastity a virgin, upon whom violence is actually being inflicted, can by fleeing throw herself down from a high rock or from a window with only danger of death, while there is some hope of escape; but not with certain death, because then it would be direct killing, which would be chosen as a means for avoiding another evil. But she can permit herself to be killed rather than violated, although she is not bound to this.

3. A bodily good resulting from the fact that a more certain danger of death or a more cruel kind is avoided.

Thus it is licit to cast oneself down from a tower for fleeing, not indeed captivity, but a certain capital sentence or a more atrocious death which malefactors are actually about to inflict; or to leap from a window for fleeing flames actually burning: provided, however, that there is hope of escape; otherwise it would be direct killing which would be chosen as a means for avoiding a greater evil, in the same way as the taking of poison. Namely, one thing is to expose oneself to certain danger of death, even proximate, another to incur certain death.

353. Corollaries. - From the doctrine set forth it is concluded:

1. for incurring a danger of death not certain, but probable or remote, a lesser cause suffices, yet always a grave one, especially if necessity is present; for example, it is licit to serve those laboring under a contagious disease, indeed from charity to visit them, even with great danger of contracting the plague, likewise to exercise a dangerous art (for example, to climb roofs) for the support of oneself and one's own or the utility of others;

2. for incurring a danger of indirectly shortening life even by several years, a less grave reason suffices: thus for the sake of exercising virtue it is licit to do moderate penances by fasts, vigils, mortifications; for the restraint of concupiscence presents compensation; likewise for one's own support or for the progress of an industrial or mechanical thing, it is licit for workers to blow glass, gild metals, handle fire daily, and exercise other arts shortening life, although as far as possible one must try that works committed to craftsmen be rendered less dangerous;

3. nevertheless, for incurring a danger of death a futile reason does not suffice, for example, to fight because of vain glory, bear extraordinary burdens, let oneself down, or prolong a very long fast for the sake of a wager alone;

4. a fortiori it is not licit to procure the utility of others or one's own gain from a sought-out danger of death, but only to expose oneself to danger, by doing an act useful otherwise and of itself.

Hence they sin gravely a) who for light causes throw themselves into danger of death, as any rash tightrope walkers, gladiators, body-tumblers, bullfighters, showmen who tame wild beasts or take poisons, unless by long experience or suitable preparation they are certain concerning their dexterity or the efficacy of the remedies;

b) who gravely harm health or notably hasten death for themselves by gluttony, drunkenness, immoderate passion of lust, by abuse of morphine, cocaine, opium, or by immoderate penances;

c) who refuse to take ordinary means for recovering health or preserving life safe; but not those who are unwilling to employ extraordinary, refined, unusual, more costly, very difficult means, as to leave one's country and seek a healthier region, to undergo a very laborious or dangerous operation, or a notable amputation: for the law of prolonging life does not obligate with so great an inconvenience. Today, however, several operations which formerly were considered difficult and dangerous are accomplished very easily and safely, and thus have already become ordinary means;

d) a fortiori those who abstain from taking necessary foods, even for an excellent end, for example, the liberation of the fatherland. For this is direct killing, for, as St. Thomas says, q. 69, a. 4, ad 2: "not to take food... would be to kill oneself." And the good is hoped for from an evil means; but evils are not to be done so that goods may come.

354. Observations. - 1) The principles are clear and there is no difficulty in them; but in fact, in the application of principles, namely, whether in a case such killing is direct or indirect, there can be room for doubt or even subtle consideration, because a priori it is not always easy to determine this. But the various modes indicated among authors (cf. Tanquerey, n. 304 sq.; Billuart, diss. X, a. 3) can be held as only indirect killing, or at least are not certainly proved to be direct killing; and consequently in practice they can be considered as licit, because probably and from the common apprehension of men they are only indirect killing. But if to someone they evidently seem to be direct killing, from this he could not extend the principles and say that direct killing is licit also in other similar cases; but he could only conclude that the application of principles is not being made rightly, and in the case the killing action is also direct and therefore illicit.

2. The desire of one's own death is not necessarily unjust toward God, because he who wishes death for himself can await it as to be inflicted on him by God. Indeed such a desire can be ordered and in conformity with reason, if it arises from a motive of obtaining a good which is better than life, or of escaping an evil which is worse than death. Hence the desire:

a) is licit if it arises from the motive of a better good, for example, of desiring conjunction with God, of loving God more perfectly, of sinning no more, etc., as in the Apostle, Phil. I, 23;

b) is illicit if it arises from a wicked motive, for example, because with rebellion against the divine will someone wishes death or from impatience does not wish to tolerate the ordinary troubles of the present life. This of itself is gravely evil if it is done from perfect deliberation; often, however, it is not sufficiently deliberate because of disturbance or anger, or is not seriously willed;

c) of itself it is not sinful if someone so abhors a grave earthly evil, for example, grave disease, hard imprisonment, a very hard state of life, troublesome vexations and snares, that he would prefer death, because, as Scripture says (Ecclus. XXX, 17), death is better than bitter life; nevertheless it is imperfect, because man, by patiently tolerating most grave evils, will obtain a precious reward which by premature death he loses.