Doubtful sins

The solution of questions about the obligation of confessing doubtful sins largely depends on what system of moral theology is followed. The following principles are generally approved by probabilists:

(a) When the penitent doubts whether he has been guilty of some sinful act or not, he is not bound to confess it, for he cannot be said to be conscious of sin, and a certain obligation cannot arise from an uncertain source.

(b) When the doubt is as to whether full consent was given to what would have been a grave sin if that were the case, the question should be settled by recourse to presumptions. If in other cases consent has usually been given, the presumption is against the penitent, and he should confess the sin as it is in his conscience; otherwise there will be no obligation to do so, (c) If the doubt is whether the sin were mortal or venial, there is no obligation to confess it, for the penitent is not conscious of mortal sin; and only such are bound to confess.

(d) If the doubt is whether a mortal sin which was certainly committed has ever been confessed, we must distinguish; if there be no good ground for thinking that it has been confessed, the obligation will still remain; if, on the contrary, there be good ground for thinking that the sin has been confessed, there will be no obligation of confessing it again.

(e) It is generally better for penitents, unless they are scrupulous, to confess doubtful sins, as it conduces to peace of conscience, and is a meritorious act of humility.

When a doubtful sin has once been confessed as such there will be no obligation to confess it again, even though subsequently the penitent becomes sure that he committed the sin.

The sin was confessed as it was on the penitent’s conscience, and it was absolved directly.

According to the common opinion, although there is no strict obligation to confess a mortal sin which is doubtful, or which has probably been confessed, yet one should not go to Holy Communion in such a state of doubt without either going to confession and confessing at least some sin, or making an act of contrition. For a man should prove himself before receiving Holy Communion, and have a well-grounded belief that he is in a state of grace.

If a penitent mentions only doubtful matter for absolution, the confessor should secure certain matter before giving absolution. Although a penitent may confess only optional matter, yet he has a right to absolution founded on the tacit contract which the confessor entered into with him when he admitted him to confession.

I. Since venial sins indeed can be declared (n. 294), but do not necessarily have to be declared, there is no obligation of declaring them according to species and number. Nevertheless, that they be manifested at least according to species is greatly to be advised because of the reasons alleged in n. 310. Indeed, it can happen that the confessor must ask about species and number, namely so that he may judge concerning the disposition of the penitent, or so that he may know whether, because of coalescing matter, a grave sin has been committed or a grave obligation of restoring has arisen. But the penitent, rightly questioned, is bound to respond.

II. A penitent who confesses only doubtful matter or doubtful mortal sins, after certain and more or less determined matter has been sought, is absolved absolutely. If matter more or less determined cannot be obtained, let the penitent, after a generic confession of all sins has been sought, be given absolution (n. 310).

Doubt here can chiefly concern: 1. the act of sin, or a sin committed; 2. the gravity of the sin, both on the part of the matter and on the part of consent; 3. the confession of a sin certainly committed.

477. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Must mortal sins doubtfully committed necessarily be accused?

Reply. More probably, negative, if the doubt persists after a diligent examination has first been made; and this holds even if the doubt is truly positive, or there is a true probability that the sin was committed. The reason is that a doubtful law is at issue here, which consequently does not bind. And indeed, according to Trent, mortal sins of which one has consciousness must be accused; but one does not have consciousness of doubtful sins; for to have consciousness implies certain knowledge of the sin, since conscience is nothing other than knowledge of the heart and a judgment concerning a sin committed. Therefore. - St. Lig., no. 473; Sporer, no. 389; Roncaglia, ch. 2, De Integritate Confessionis, q. 7; Reuter, no. 305; and many others. - See St. Lig., no. 473.

Others nevertheless contradict this; because, as they say, it is gathered from the words of the Council of Trent that all mortal sins must be accused as they are in the conscience; and consequently, if they are doubtful in the conscience, they are also to be confessed as doubtful. - But it must be replied that the Council of Trent does not say that sins are to be accused as they are in the conscience, but those of which we have consciousness. In practice, however, an accusation of this kind is to be counseled, says St. Lig., no. 476.

Certain Theologians teach that negatively doubtful sins must be accused; but this is false; for no obligation can be given of confessing negatively doubtful sins, since a doubt of this kind rests upon no solid foundation and arises only from an empty suspicion or fear that a sin was committed, as frequently happens to the scrupulous or to timorous consciences.

478. QUESTION 2. Must sins of doubtful gravity be accused?

Reply. More probably, negative of itself, at least speculatively, even given a true probability of the gravity of the sin. The reason is the same as for the preceding question: for it is not established that a grave sin was committed, and consequently the obligation of confession cannot be established. - Thus the same authors against the same authors.

In practice, however, a twofold rule is to be followed: First Rule. In doubt whether the matter of the sin is grave, uneducated penitents ordinarily ought to accuse doubtful sins: 1. because they generally cannot form their conscience by themselves;

2. because they generally do not know how to distinguish venial sins from mortal sins. Nevertheless, except the scrupulous, who are not accustomed to commit mortal sins frequently. But instructed penitents are not bound to accuse sins of doubtful gravity, because they can form their conscience by themselves; nevertheless, they are ordinarily to be gently exhorted to accuse these also ¹.

¹ It is useful to have explained these things, so that the Confessor, observing the dangers in which the penitent is placed, may both admonish him and be able to remove them.

Second Rule. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence: 1. if penitents are of a timorous conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are in no way bound to confess doubtful sins, because the presumption derived from things ordinarily occurring favors them; indeed, they are often to be prevented from making this accusation if they seem prone to scruples ²; 2. if penitents hold the middle way between a timorous and a lax conscience, they are indeed not to be obliged, but certainly are to be induced to declare the doubtful consent, because this profits the tranquility of conscience, etc.; 3. if penitents are of a lax conscience, they generally ought to declare doubtful sins, because the presumption is against them. - See St. Lig., no. 476.

² This observation seems to pertain to the doubt whether any fault was present rather than to the doubt whether the fault which intervened was mortal or only venial. For otherwise the scrupulous are not to be prevented from confessing venial sins when they are certainly established.

479. QUESTION 3. Must grave sins certainly committed, concerning which you nevertheless doubt whether you confessed them, necessarily be accused?

Reply 1. Affirmative, if the doubt is negative, namely, when no prudent reason is at hand for thinking that you have already confessed them. The reason is that the law of confessing is certain, nor does any reason suggest that this law has been satisfied, according to what was said concerning Conscience, vol. I, no. 41.

Reply 2. It is controverted, however, if the doubt is positive, that is, if a positive and grave reason suggests that the sin has already been declared. Some say that a sin of this kind must be declared, because the obligation of confession is certain but its fulfillment is doubtful. - Thus St. Lig., no. 477 ³. - Others, however, very commonly deny it with Suarez, Lugo,

³ The VV. object this passage of the holy Doctor (p. 936, no. 113), and add that in the Note placed thereunder St. Alphonsus wrote these things in Quaestiones Recentiores Reformatae, no. 16: Whether the penitent is bound to confess a mortal sin certainly committed if he only probably thinks that he has confessed it, Suarez, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and others deny. But I say with Concina and others that he is bound to subject that sin to the keys, since the confession is doubtful and the obligation of Confession is certain.

Reply. Let it suffice to have summoned here also those things which Lugo writes (De Poenitentia, disp. 16, no. 58): ALL COMMONLY TEACH that someone is not bound to confess that sin which he probably judges that he... has already confessed. And again (ibid., no. 59): Nothing is more frequent among theologians than to excuse from repeating a confession one who has confessed... according to some probable opinion concerning its validity. Who, therefore, would be angry with him who prefers to follow the common doctrine of the Theologians?

Indeed, since St. Alphonsus also (bk. 6, no. 477), in the Roman edition of the year 1757 dedicated to Benedict XIV, released a penitent of this kind from repeating confession, as Suarez, Sanchez, Navarrus, Bonacina, Filliuccius, Roncaglia, Viva, Tamburini, Croix, Lugo, Escobar, Granadus, Fagundez, the Salmanticenses with Sylvester, Henriquez, etc., also COMMONLY say, who indeed would not adhere to St. Alphonsus when he follows those lights of theology, rather than adhere to St. Alphonsus when he follows Concina? For did Concina bring forward anything new? Indeed, since the matter concerns a certain general principle, shall we set aside the common sense of so many theologians in order to attribute to the judgment of the most rigorous Concina the privilege of a clearer understanding?

Lacroix, Bonacina, etc. - Recall what was said in the Treatise on Conscience, vol. I, no. 80, where the reason for the former opinion is shown to be both weak and also productive of grave inconveniences ⁴.

⁴ Thus indeed as regards the obligation; for as regards practice no one will deny that it contributes very greatly to peace of conscience if the anxiety consequent upon doubts of this kind is laid aside through confession; unless, however, the contrary occurs, so that in this way anxiety is added to anxiety. This indeed sometimes happens to those who, after a general confession diligently made according to their capacity, begin to doubt whether they declared this or that sin. For after the Confessor has patiently heard them twice, three times, or four times, it is fitting that he forbid them to think back in any way upon their past life or add anything unless they are most certain that they never rightly confessed some grave sin. - See St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 477.

480. QUESTION 4. Must one who has confessed some sin as doubtful repeat it if he afterward knows it as certain?

Reply. It is controverted. The FIRST OPINION, more probable and common ⁵, affirms. The reason is: 1. because we must accuse all certain sins of which we have consciousness; 2. because that sin was not accused as to its substance, for a certain accusation is not included in a doubtful one. - St. Lig., no. 478.

⁵ This opinion could once have been called common, when, as Lugo writes (De Poenitentia, disp. 16, no. 92), certain learned men judged it probable that the penitent was not bound afterward to confess as certain what he had previously confessed as doubtful.... Among these was the Most Reverend Father Nicholas Ricchardius, Master of the Sacred Palace, with whom I discussed this matter privately; and he himself also replied privately that it seemed very probable to him that such an obligation was not present; which others also judged.

But it must be said otherwise concerning the following age, so much so that St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 478) alleges more Doctors for the opposite opinion than for his own, which he calls common. And indeed, as Cardenas, a man perhaps more attached than was fair to his own tenets, says sorrowfully and almost indignantly (disp. 51, no. 4): Scarcely had our Lugo opened this little crevice when the more recent authors, advancing in a body, regarded it as a most ample door through which they might safely enter into that opinion. And he immediately adds a catalogue of these Doctors, in which seven appear who were omitted by St. Alphonsus, who otherwise names ten others.

Moreover, to solve the arguments of Cardinal De Lugo, Cardenas was compelled, against the opinion of St. Alphonsus and indeed the common opinion, to affirm that even he who, uncertain about the number, had said that he sinned about ten times, more or less, is bound afterward to confess the certain number if it is discovered. Moreover, the reason brought forward by him for his opinion, namely that according to Trent that gravity of guilt must be expressed from which the punishment to be imposed according to equity may be judged, would already overthrow the doctrine which St. Alphonsus (in the same no. 478, at the end) calls most probable and most common, namely, that someone is not bound to confess again a sin which he now knows to be grave when nevertheless neither did the Confessor himself know it as grave when the confession was made.

** The VV. detain the reader for fourteen columns and more concerning this Note (pp. 472-479), and contend for two things: 1. that the affirmative opinion of the holy Doctor Alphonsus must truly be called common (p. 479); 2. that the strongest reasons militate for it (p. 478).

As regards the first, I reply that a twofold question must be distinguished here: one, namely, of law, and the other of fact. And as regards the question of law, it must be diligently noted that the validity of the Sacrament is not at issue here, but only material integrity. Therefore let the words of St. Alphonsus be recalled here (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 29): No one is bound to doubtful laws.... Nor does it stand in the way to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow opinions which are only probable; because this proceeds when the validity of the Sacrament is at issue; it is otherwise concerning integrity. Hence the conclusion: since probability suffices to exempt from the obligation of confession in the case, but even a greater probability than the opposite does not suffice for imposing this obligation (see the opinion of St. Alphonsus in the Note to nos. 71-73, vol. 1), therefore in reality there stand against the affirmative opinion of St. Alphonsus not only all who depart from it, but also all who concede that the opinion which denies the aforesaid obligation is at least probable; and, on the contrary, those who call the affirmative opinion merely more probable do not sufficiently support it; indeed, these also will have to be said to stand for the negative if the argument which the VV. employ elsewhere, as we have seen, has any force, namely, that whoever admits some opinion to be merely more probable thereby concedes that the opposite is probable; which, nevertheless, we have said is not always true.

With these things premised, let us now approach the question of fact. Having counted the Authors both whom the holy Doctor Alphonsus alleges for his affirmative opinion and whom the VV. afterward added (pp. 474-478), we have thirty-seven. Having counted again those who are related for the opposite negative opinion by St. Alphonsus, Cardenas, Mendo, Giribaldi, etc., we have thirty-eight, and indeed with those omitted whom Lugo (disp. 16, no. 92) affirms that he consulted. Moreover, even if no account is taken of those whom the VV. produce for themselves, since nevertheless they judge that opinion only as more probable and thus rather stand against themselves, it may now be asked: Can an opinion be called common which has thirty-seven for itself but thirty-eight against itself? Is it not better to say with Wagemann (pt. 3, tr. 2, ch. 5, no. 58): It is debated with equal probability on each side? Nevertheless, an immense distinction (which must never be consigned to oblivion) stands out between the two opinions; namely, according even to the certain suffrage of St. Alphonsus, the probability of the negative opinion suffices for denying absolutely the obligation of Confession in the case; but St. Alphonsus also absolutely denies that the probability of the affirmative suffices for asserting the obligation. Therefore, if we judge this controversy by employing the extrinsic argument of authority, we must conclude, according to the certain principles of the holy Doctor Alphonsus, A doubtful law does not bind, etc., that the opinion of the same holy Doctor which says that the obligation of Confession is to be imposed in the case is no otherwise safe than it is safe to oblige the faithful to observe doubtful laws. It will be safe to offer counsel; it will not be safe to impose a precept. But, you will say, how then do so many call the affirmative opinion common, and indeed most common, as, for example, Voit, Scavini, and Frassinetti have it?

Reply. This phenomenon can be explained without difficulty. For although Lugo (disp. 16, no. 52) wrote that few had touched upon this question, Cardenas (disp. 51, no. 3) was nevertheless able to call these few all theologians; and from this Illsung, for example (De Sacramento Poenitentiae, q. 4, art. 5, no. 116), was able to call that opinion common. Several afterward copied this, paying less attention to what Cardenas (loc. cit., no. 4) had warned, namely that the more recent authors, as though advancing in a body, entered the little crevice opened by Lugo as if it were a most ample door. Nor, again, is it surprising that others, after Cardenas had said that all theologians thought thus, judged the same opinion even most common; which we then see copied by others also.

But let us come to the intrinsic reasons. The VV., as we have already premised, prefix this title to the second article (p. 478): The strongest reasons militating for the affirmative opinion are weighed.

Reply. Where are those strongest reasons if you omit that title? You will finally find this single one: Just as Cardenas, Billuart, and Cuniliati urge the obligation of repeating the confession, because by the precept of the Council we are bound to confess all sins of which we have consciousness, so also does St. Alphonsus. In the proposed case, the penitent now has consciousness of the sin which he formerly held as doubtful. Therefore he is bound to confess the same sin as certain. But Lugo had already replied to this reason (loc. cit., no. 87): We have seen that this argument proves that even a twenty-first sin afterward known as certain must be confessed by the penitent who confessed twenty, more or less, because that sin is now certain in the conscience of the penitent.

And in fact this is the rock upon which all the reasons customarily adduced for the same matter finally strike. Hence Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 9, no. 141), after weighing at great length the arguments on each side, concludes: Because of the efficacious argument by which it is proved that the same reasoning applies to a doubtful sin and to an uncertain number, I judge it more consonant with reason that such a number also must be explained if it is afterward known with certainty how great it determinately was, etc. But, says Lugo (loc. cit., no. 78), when a penitent unable to determine the certain number of sins confesses the likely number, for example, I committed perjury ten times, more or less: if he afterward remembers that he committed perjury twelve times, several and weighty Authors commonly teach that he need not confess it...; and St. Alphonsus also approves this doctrine (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 34). And nevertheless, behold, Gobat (tr. 6, no. 443) protests that he could not find a difference between the two cases: Neither do I, he says, although I wearied myself long and greatly in investigating the difference, find any. Therefore, this reason, as they say, the strongest, proves either too much or nothing.

The VV. assume further (loc. cit.) that, according to St. Alphonsus, the reasoning is different because in the one case the error is not concerning the substance (but concerning the number), whereas in the other it is concerning the substance. - Lugo replies that, when you say, I committed perjury ten times, more or less, concerning the ninth, tenth, and eleventh perjury the error concerns the substance in precisely the same manner, namely, the fact.

The VV. object, moreover (loc. cit.), that the reason adduced by Cardenas is firm, because a greater number of sins increases liability and requires a greater punishment. - Reply. Against the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, this would prove that the number also which someone previously confessed as likely and afterward discovered as certain must be expressed in a repeated confession. But Illsung (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 4, no. 116) adds against this reason of Cardenas: This reason seems to me to suppose something false, namely, that for this reason alone a negatively doubtful sin of a different species, or more than one or two of the same species, stated under negative doubt and afterward known, would have to be repeated, because a greater penance would have been enjoined for them. Notwithstanding this reason, many deny, and I

with them (as also the holy Doctor Alphonsus), that merely aggravating circumstances are to be explained.

Finally, to what some object, that the negative opinion has against it both the doctrine of the ancients and the practice of the faithful, Wagemann replies (loc. cit.): The ancients did not examine the opinion expressly; they did not have before them the instruction of Trent; they relied upon the false principle: in doubt the safer part is to be chosen. The practice generally concerns a doubt improperly so called, or what is better, since in this way scruples also are disclosed; and a universal practice can scarcely be discovered.

The SECOND OPINION, sufficiently probable, denies it. The reason is deduced from what was said in no. 472: for just as, once a doubtful number of sins has been set forth with the word about, you are no longer bound to declare in confession the certain number which you afterward discovered, provided the excess is not notable; so neither are you bound to repeat in confession a sin which you accused as doubtful and afterward learned to be certain: for there is no difference between the two cases, since even in a doubtful number certain sins are declared as doubtful; nor must the species be disclosed more than the number of sins. Moreover, the doubtful sin was directly remitted, since it was remitted by virtue of the absolution to which, as it existed in the conscience, it was subjected. Therefore, it is not necessary to subject it again to the keys. - Thus Lugo, disp. 16, no. 78; Sporer, no. 397; Elbel, no. 274; Reuter, no. 332, etc.

481. • QUESTION 5. Can anyone, without confession first being made, approach Holy Communion with a doubtful or probable mortal sin?

Reply. Affirmative, rigorously speaking. The reason is that the Council of Trent requires confession before Communion only for those who are conscious of mortal sin. Hence a Priest who doubts whether he consented to an evil thought, or who judges probably that he did not consent to it, can celebrate, after first making an act of contrition, but without confession, even though he has access to a Confessor. - St. Lig., no. 475. - In practice, however, confession is to be counseled.

285. For the perfect sincerity of confession it is certainly to be desired that sins be accused as they are known: certain things as certain, doubtful things as doubtful. According to all, this is to be recommended to all, except the scrupulous, for tranquility of conscience and for receiving richer fruits from the sacrament. - But theologians further ask whether there is a strict obligation of declaring doubtful sins.

286. Principle: When a sin is truly doubtful, or doubtfully mortal,² after diligent examination, there is no strict obligation of confessing it. Thus commonly.

² A sin is truly doubtful when it is seriously doubted whether it was committed, for example, whether someone gave consent to a depraved thought; doubtfully mortal, when it was certainly committed, but there is serious doubt concerning its gravity, for example, on account of lightness of matter, or on account of imperfection of advertence or consent.

For the law of material integrity in confession regards the licit, but not the valid, administration of the sacrament, and consequently the principles of probabilism explained in the Treatise on Conscience can be applied here. According to probabilists, a doubtful law does not oblige; but in this case the law of confessing is doubtful, since there is doubt either about the very existence of the sin, or about its gravity. This can be confirmed from Trent, where it declares that mortal sins must be accused of which, after diligent examination, consciousness is had; but consciousness supposes knowledge, or morally certain knowledge: and therefore consciousness is not had of sins doubtfully committed; but if sins were certainly committed and are doubtfully mortal, consciousness of their gravity is not had. According to equiprobabilists, in the conflict of two opinions equally or almost equally probable, better is the condition of the possessor; moreover in this case liberty possesses, not the law, since the law cannot bind unless it is clear that the sin was committed and at the same time is grave.

Yet equiprobabilists and probabiliorists contend that sins of this kind must be accused if it is more probable that they were committed and at the same time are grave.

287. Practical conclusion. In practice the accusation of doubtful sins is generally to be recommended. But if the doubt turns upon the gravity of a sin certainly committed, a distinction must be made: (a) if it is doubted whether the matter is grave, the uneducated and ignorant are to be admonished to confess doubtful sins, unless they are scrupulous, because they can scarcely discern mortal sins from venial ones; but the learned can indeed form a conscience for themselves, yet are gently to be exhorted to declare doubts.

(b) If it is doubted whether there was full advertence or full consent, the timid can abstain from accusing doubts, because it is presumed that they did not consent gravely; the scrupulous must altogether abstain from this accusation; the lax, or those frequently falling into mortal sins, are to be induced to confess doubts, because, from things commonly occurring, these are judged to have given full consent.¹

¹ Cf. St. Alphonsus, n. 476; Lacroix, n. 612.

288. Disputed questions. (A) If the sin was certainly committed and mortal, but it is doubted whether it was accused: (a) according to all, it must be declared if the doubt is merely negative, i.e., if there is no positive reason at least probable that such a sin was already accused; for a merely negative doubt does not destroy the morally certain obligation of submitting such a sin to the keys.

(b) But if the doubt is truly positive and seriously probable (which is verified when someone is accustomed diligently to make examination and confession), there is controversy. According to probabilists, the law of confessing in this case is doubtful and consequently does not oblige; according to equiprobabilists, the obligation of confessing such a sin remains; for in doubt better is the condition of the possessor: moreover the obligation of confessing in this case possesses, since grave sin certainly was committed. Yet St. Alphonsus moderates this opinion, adding (n. 477) that he who was diligent in confessing his sins is not bound to confess, if he doubts whether he omitted some mortal sin, after much time has elapsed from the time when he committed it, since in this case he can believe with moral certitude that he has already confessed it.

In practice we think the penitent is not to be compelled, but only gently induced, to confess sins certainly committed and probably accused.

289. (B) If a sin was accused as doubtful and afterward is known as certain, it is controverted whether there is an obligation of accusing it again as certain.

(a) Many theologians more probably affirm with St. Alphonsus (n. 478), because a doubtful accusation differs substantially from a certain accusation; when therefore the error is recognized, it must be repaired.

(b) Some, however, probably deny this with Lugo and Lehmkuhl,¹ since this sin has already been directly remitted; for the confessor, on hearing it, implicitly said: if you have truly committed the sin, I absolve you; but the sin in fact had been truly committed; therefore it was directly remitted; now a sin directly remitted need not necessarily be subjected again to the keys. - This is confirmed by analogy; he who said that he had sinned about ten times is not bound to repeat the accusation if afterward he becomes more certain that he sinned eleven times, although the eleventh sin was declared as doubtful in the formula about; therefore by parity he who accused a sin as doubtful is not bound afterward to manifest the same as certain.

¹ Lugo, disp. XVI, n. 78-83; Lehmkuhl, n. 318; Ballerini-Palmieri, n. 381; Genicot, n. 291.

This reason seems altogether solid, and therefore the faithful who have neglected to accuse a sin of this kind again are not to be disturbed. - For the rest, St. Alphonsus grants (l. c.) that a penitent is not bound to repeat the accusation who confessed a sin which neither he nor the confessor knew to be mortal, although afterward he knows it to be mortal from its kind; for example, one who in good faith had accused pollution as a slight sin of touch: for he declared the sin as it was then in his conscience, and as it now is, and nothing new occurs except that he now knows the matter of this sin to be grave.

375. 6. Doubtful sins need not necessarily be accused if the doubt concerning the existence of a mortal sin or concerning its confession not yet having been made is negative or little founded. Thus all authors. The reason is that otherwise a broad way would be prepared for innumerable scruples and anxieties. On the contrary, doubtful sins which are much more probably mortal and not yet confessed are to be accused, although some slight reason exists that they are not mortal or have already been accused. The reason is that so slight a reason does not excuse from confession, and otherwise the reins would be given to laxism.

But if the doubt is positive and truly founded, then one must act otherwise. The doubt can concern: a) the very act of sin; b) the gravity of an act certainly committed; c) the confession of a certainly grave sin. Therefore a threefold question can be proposed:

Must sins necessarily be accused which are: a) doubtfully committed, b) doubtfully mortal, c) doubtfully confessed?

There are authors, such as Ballerini,²¹⁰ Noldin,²¹¹ Génicot,²¹² and Tanquerey,²¹³ who answer all three questions simply in the negative, or deny that there is a strict obligation of confessing them; but these authors and all theologians also counsel the confession of doubtful sins unless the penitent is scrupulous. For the sake of clarity, each question must be answered separately:

a) If there is question of a sin doubtfully committed, there is not per se a strict obligation of confession. Thus the more common and more probable opinion.²¹⁴ The reason is that a sin doubtfully committed is not even sufficient matter for absolution, since absolution cannot be given, at least absolutely, concerning a sin doubtfully committed. Therefore, a fortiori, such a sin is not necessary matter of confession. Moreover, the Council of Trent requires only the confession of mortal sins of which the penitent has consciousness. But it cannot be said absolutely that the penitent has consciousness of a sin if a true doubt exists.

Nor does St. Thomas seem to be opposed to this opinion, although this is said by its adversaries. Behold the words of the Angelic Doctor:²¹⁵ "When someone doubts concerning some sin whether it is mortal, he is bound to confess it while the doubt remains. For he who commits or omits something concerning which he doubts whether it is a mortal sin sins mortally by exposing himself to danger. And likewise he exposes himself to danger who neglects to confess that which he doubts to be mortal; nevertheless, he should not assert that it is mortal, but should speak doubtfully and await the judgment of the priest, whose office it is to discern between leprosy and leprosy." For the Angelic Doctor does not seem here to speak of a sin doubtfully committed, but of a sin certainly committed yet doubtfully grave, because a sin doubtfully committed is not certainly leprosy; nor does the confessor then discern between leprosy and leprosy, but between leprosy and non-leprosy.

Per accidens, however, sins doubtfully committed must be manifested: a) at the point of death, and an act of contrition does not seem to suffice if there is then an available confessor,²¹⁶ for a man is then bound to choose that which is safer; b) in a practical doubt, in order to seek counsel for the future.

²¹⁰ In the notes to Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. II, 477 sqq.

²¹¹ De sacr.¹⁷, n. 280.

²¹² Theol. mor. II, 290.

²¹³ Synopsis Theol. mor., De poenit., n. 289.

²¹⁴ Cf. Gury, Comp. Theol. mor. II, n. 477.

²¹⁵ Suppl., q. 6, a. 4 ad 3.

²¹⁶ St. Alphonsus (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 473) thinks that an act of contrition alone then suffices.

376. b) If there is question of a sin certainly committed but doubtfully grave, the following practical rules are to be observed, according as there is question either of doubtfully grave matter or of perfect consent doubtfully given. For this doubt cannot arise except from this twofold source; for example, someone took 5 francs and doubts whether this matter of theft is grave; or someone lingered for some time in morose delectation and doubts whether he gave full consent.

Rule 1. In doubt concerning the gravity of the matter, penitents, especially the uninstructed, must declare sins of this kind. For it is almost impossible for the penitent alone then to form a right conscience for himself.

Rule 2. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence, the principle admitted by all is to be employed: "One must stand for that for which the presumption stands."²¹⁷ If the penitent is of a timorous conscience and is not accustomed to sin gravely, the presumption stands for him, and therefore he is not bound to confess a sin to which he did not certainly give consent. But if the penitent is of a lax conscience and often falls into mortal sins, the presumption stands against him, and therefore he is bound to confess that doubtful sin. Finally, if the penitent keeps a middle way between scrupulosity and laxity, then, unless it is much more probable that sufficient consent or advertence was lacking, the doubtfully grave sin must be manifested, "because this seems to be the universal and inveterate practice of the faithful, and therefore it is supposed to have emanated from the institution of Christ and to have been observed through tradition until now."²¹⁸

²¹⁷ St. Alphonsus very well observes: "Likewise, those who are of a timorous conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely and deliberately must be exempted from the obligation of confessing doubtful mortal sins. For these, in doubt, can reasonably, indeed with moral certainty, believe that they did not consent, because the presumption is taken from things which commonly occur.... The a priori reason for this is that he who habitually adheres to God and greatly fears lest he be deprived of divine grace, if it happens at some time that he turns away from Him, must inflict great violence upon himself in order to despise the remorse of conscience and cast himself deliberately into sin. But he cannot do this unless he certainly adverts to the evil which he embraces, for, as the most learned Father Alvarez says: Full consent in mortal sin is such iniquity that it cannot be hidden or unknown, but while recent it is easily recognized. Hence the Lord said to St. Teresa: No one loses Me unless he certainly knows it.... Conversely, the opposite is to be judged concerning one who is accustomed easily to fall into mortal sins, because in doubt this man is presumed to have consented; for if he had resisted, he would certainly remember that effort which he made to repel the temptation. Hence Croix rightly concludes that scarcely ever in men of this kind, of both the first and the second class, is there a merely negative doubt. For the presumption establishes the probability of consent given or dissent" (Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 476).

²¹⁸ St. Alphonsus, Theol. mor. l. 6, n. 474.

377. c) If there is question of a mortal sin certainly committed but doubtfully confessed, it must be accused, unless, however, the doubt concerning the confession having been made is very slight. The reason is that, since the mortal sin is certain, the obligation of confessing it is also certain. But a certain obligation cannot be satisfied by a doubtful fulfillment.

Thus authors commonly teach who are not pure probabilists, with St. Alphonsus,²¹⁹ who nevertheless adds: "Nor do I reject ... that one who was diligent in confessing his sins, if afterward he doubts whether he omitted some sin after much time has elapsed since he committed it, is not bound to confess it, since in that case he can believe with moral certainty that he has already confessed it. And Father Concina adds that if someone previously fell into many sins from a depraved habit and afterward was truly converted through constant integrity of life; if he then doubts whether in a general or particular confession made with due diligence he omitted some sin or circumstance, the confessor should forbid him even to think again about his past life, but rather should command him to spend his time in pious meditations." Therefore, in practice, a penitent who seriously and with foundation doubts whether he omitted a mortal sin or a specific circumstance in his last confession, made not so long before, must declare this sin or circumstance in the following confession. But if the penitent doubts about the confession of some sin committed a long time ago and always had the custom of confessing well, he is not bound to manifest this doubtfully confessed sin. The confessor should not permit scrupulous penitents to accuse again sins doubtfully confessed, because otherwise their scruples are customarily increased still further.

²¹⁹ Ibid., n. 477.

S. Th. III, q. 84, a. 2.

432. Remote matter is that about which penance itself is concerned; whence it is all and only sins committed after Baptism that are to be removed, and therefore by some it is called matter to be removed. A distinction is made by theologians between necessary and free matter, or between sins which, in order that they be remitted, must necessarily be subjected to the power of the keys and to the sacrament, and sins which are not necessarily to be subjected, yet are validly subjected.

433. Thesis I. Necessary remote matter is all mortal sins, committed after Baptism, not yet duly subjected to the power of the Church, as things to be detested and destroyed. - This is of faith from the Council of Trent, sess. 14, can. 7.

It is said:

1° necessary matter, not to be brought for the validity or constitution of the sacrament, but to be subjected to the sacrament for obtaining the remission of sin and justification;

2° mortal sins committed after Baptism, to exclude both original sin, concerning which there is not penance properly so called, and actual sins committed before Baptism, because they are blotted out through Baptism, and because the power of the keys extends itself only to those who are already subjected to the Church through Baptism; whence the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 1, declares that this sacrament was instituted for reconciling the faithful fallen after Baptism;

3° not yet duly subjected, but not: not yet remitted, because if they are subjected to the keys in a sacrilegious or null confession, they must again be subjected to the sacrament, even if they had already been remitted by perfect contrition or by indirect absolution;

4° as things to be detested and destroyed, because sins are not matter from which the sacrament of Penance is constituted, but about which it is concerned, just as disease is the matter of medicine. And thus they could be called proximate matter, insofar as penance immediately acts upon them; nevertheless, in opposition to the quasi-material parts by which the sacrament of Penance is integrated, they are remote matter.

It is proved: a) From the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7.

b) From the words of Christ, John XX, 23, from which it is clear that independently of the power of the Church no mortal sin can be remitted:

1° not a sin retained by her, otherwise it would be true that some sin had been retained by the Church and remitted by God, and thus the proposition of Christ would be false: whose sins you shall retain, they are retained;

2° nor a sin which has not yet been subjected to the keys of the Church: for then all sins could be remitted directly by God independently of the power of the Church, since it would suffice never to subject sins to her; and thus the power of remitting given by Christ to the Church would be vain.

Whence if mortal sin could be remitted without the authority of the Church, either the power of retaining granted by Christ would be false, or the power of remitting would be vain; neither can be; therefore all mortal sins committed after Baptism are necessary matter of the sacrament of Penance.

Nor is it an obstacle that they are remitted by perfect contrition before the actual reception of the sacrament, because they are not remitted except with the will of subjecting them to the sacrament of Penance, and therefore with intentional subjection to the power of the Church.

434. Thesis II. Free but sufficient remote matter is both a venial sin not yet subjected to the keys, and any actual sin whatever duly subjected and remitted. - This is certain.

It is said: free matter, because for remission and justification it is not to be subjected to the sacrament, although it can validly be subjected.

The first part is proved, concerning venial sin:

a) From the words of Christ, who gave the Church the power of remitting any remissible sin whatever; and venial sin is true sin and remissible; therefore.

b) From the Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5, can. 7: "if anyone shall say that it is not lawful to confess venial sins... let him be anathema"; but it would not be lawful if it were not sufficient matter: for then there would be no sacrament.

The second part is proved, concerning sin already remitted:

a) From the testimony of Benedict XI declaring this practice salutary (Const. Inter cunctas, 1304, in extrav. com., l. 5, t. 7, c. 1).

b) From the universal practice of the Church and of all upright persons, who not only in general confession, but quite often at other times, subject already forgiven sins to absolution (Council of Trent, sess. 14, c. 5).

c) By reason: Sin, from the fact that it was once committed and truly offended God and made for Him a right to aversion from the sinner and to chastisement by punishment, always remains an object about which God's power of forgiving or renouncing His right can be concerned; this forgiveness on the part of God is made through the infusion of new grace destructive of sin of itself.

To remit sin is to bind oneself (through renunciation of right) not to use the right acquired through offense, in order to aversion from the sinner, and moreover to chastising by punishment. But such renunciation can be made repeatedly, because by repeated renunciation there is signified a repeated will not to use the right which was once possessed, whether it is still actually possessed, or whether it has already been renounced: in the same way as religious who have once emitted profession quite often repeat it, and tribunals again judge the same cause, and sinners themselves again grieve and seek pardon for a sin already remitted, and offended men are often accustomed to remit the same offense to themselves. Therefore God too can quite often remit sin already forgiven.

Namely, in each single instance in which absolution is given, a new motive or new title is placed impeding God from making use of that right which He had, a new title and cause for liberation from sin and for the reintegration of divine friendship. But since in the New Law repeated remission or renunciation is made sacramentally, i.e., through the infusion of grace ex opere operato, in each single instance grace is infused, of itself destructive of sin, and which of itself takes away sin if it actually exists, and which per accidens does not take it away if it does not actually exist.¹

¹ St. Thomas, Suppl., q. 18, a. 2, ad 4. - "There is added from St. Thomas, l.c.," says Haine (Th. M. III, on Penance, q. 13), "that great goods come from the confession of such sins; for by repeated contrition and confession the soul is removed farther from them; by repeated absolution a fuller remission of punishment is obtained and the penitent is more strengthened against relapse."

435. It is objected: The power of remitting mortal and venial sins is handed down by Christ in the same way. Whence either mortal sins can be remitted independently of the power of the Church, or also venial sins are necessary matter of the sacrament.

Resp. I deny the consequence. The power is handed down in the same way, but it does not extend itself to mortal and venial sin in the same way, but in a diverse way according to the diversity of the matter. Sins in the full sense are mortal, because they totally turn away from God, whom they fully offend, and therefore the remission of them could per se be denied by God forever; venial sins offend God in a qualified way, because they do not take away friendship with God nor the right to beatitude, and therefore per se they are at some time to be taken away and remitted by God. Whence the power of retaining mortal sin is such that, when remission has been denied by the Church, it is denied perpetually and by God Himself; the power toward venial sin is not such, because this is incapable of perpetual retention. But God gave to the Church the power of remitting and retaining sins to be exercised reasonably, just as He Himself would exercise it, and therefore mortal sin can be retained perpetually; venial sin can be retained perpetually neither by God nor by the Church. Therefore the power granted is altogether universal, but according to the nature of the matter: God gave the power of remitting whatever is remissible and of retaining whatever is capable of retention. But venial sin, although it is remissible, is not capable of perpetual retention.²

² Billuart illustrates this thus, on Penance, diss. 5, art. 2: "The disparity is that from the fact that someone can remove a greater impediment, it is rightly inferred that he can remove a lesser one of the same order; and one who has authority to forgive greater injuries, a fortiori can forgive lesser ones also. But it does not follow that from the fact that someone can place an impediment for a grave matter, he can do so for a lesser one; that one who has from a superior the power of retaining or not remitting grave injuries can retain light ones: for a greater authority is required for retaining light injuries than grave ones. Let there be an example in human affairs: legates sent by a king to reconcile or condemn his enemies inquire into grave causes from which they became enemies; they remit them or retain them according to the disposition of the guilty; but light injuries which did not cause enmity they can indeed remit, since they can remit graver ones; but they cannot retain them, because they were not specially sent for retaining these light things, which were not the cause of enmity, and can be remitted in other ways independently of them."

436. Corollaries. - 1) Indeliberate acts of man are not matter of the sacrament of Penance; - nor per se are deliberate imperfections or transgressions of counsel (as if you did not respond to a divine inspiration or did not do the good which you could have done), unless per accidens insofar as they include venial sin, which is their cause or effect, as easily happens if they proceed from a not-right intention or from a certain levity. Whence penitents are not precisely to be impeded from declaring such imperfections, but rather are to be exhorted that they also say from what motive they placed these acts.

2. The valid but sinful reception of Baptism is matter of Penance: for although that sin of sacrilege is committed in time simultaneously with the reception of Baptism, nevertheless it is posterior in nature, since it is the profanation of Baptism, and does not impede its value but only some effect, namely grace. After the impression of the character, namely, it persevered at least for one instant, and thus was an obstacle to receiving grace, and therefore must be accused as committed after Baptism, or at least continued by a Christian man. For the character is infused prior in nature to grace, so that, when a man through sacrilege places an obstacle to baptismal grace, he is already a Christian, and for this reason already subject to the sacrament of Penance as regards that sacrilege.

523. Question: What is to be done in doubt whether something must be declared? - Here it is necessary to recall, from the treatise on prudent conscience: A) that doubt can concern three things: 1) whether a sin was committed, 2) whether a sin certainly committed was grave, 3) whether a sin certainly committed and grave was confessed; B) that one doubt is a) negative, founded on no or slight reason, and another b) positive, founded on a grave and solid, although not certain, reason.

Now A. Negative doubt, because it is founded on a slight reason, is judged not to be present and to be nothing. Hence if there is no or slight reason for thinking that a sin was committed, or that a sin committed was grave, there is no obligation of confessing. On the contrary, if there is no or slight reason for thinking that a grave sin committed was confessed, the obligation of confessing remains. Thus according to the principle: better is the condition of the one possessing.

B. In positive doubt 1) concerning the commission of a grave sin, of itself there is no obligation to confess it, both because the Council of Trent says that there is an obligation of confessing sins of which we have consciousness, i.e., certain knowledge, and not: according as they are in conscience; and because absolution regularly cannot be given concerning a doubtful sin, whence it is not necessary matter of the sacrament. Accidentally there can be an obligation, namely for asking counsel in a practical doubt whether something is licit, lest afterward by acting uncertainly someone sin; likewise also in the article of death, if perfect contrition is lacking, confession should be made at least by declaring some certain sin.

2. In doubt concerning the gravity of a sin committed, Probabilists deny the obligation of confessing because an uncertain law does not oblige, even if more probable; Probabiliorists and Equiprobabilists affirm it if it is more probable that the sin is grave, because in doubt the more likely must be done. And this is the common usage among the faithful, approved by St. Thomas, q. 6, a. 4, ad 3.

3. In doubt concerning the confession of a grave sin committed, Probabilists deny the obligation of confession, because the obligation becomes uncertain and therefore in practice is null; recent Probabiliorists and Equiprobabilists affirm it if it is not more probable that the sin has already been confessed, because a certain law is not satisfied by doubtful fulfillment; in other words, the obligation remains until it is more likely that it has been fulfilled.

Thus speculatively; but in practice each one should follow his own system, yet not impose it on others. Moreover, the categories, qualities, and circumstances of penitents are also to be considered, by which, as by conjectures, doubt can often be solved from presumption; namely:

a) in the first doubt: if those habituated in sin doubt that they committed it, the presumption is that they did commit it and that the obligation is present; on the contrary, if the timorous doubt, they are judged not to have committed it and are not obliged to confession;

b) in the second doubt: if the rude or ignorant doubt about grave matter, they are bound to confess because they do not know how to form conscience by saying that they are not obliged; indeed they can scarcely discern what is mortal. On the contrary, the learned are not bound. Likewise, if the scrupulous and timorous doubt about full advertence and consent, they are judged not to have sinned gravely; on the contrary, if the lax doubt, they are judged to have sinned gravely;

c) in the third doubt: those who are accustomed to make diligent examination, if after much time a doubt occurs, are not bound, because it is morally certain that the sin was confessed;

d) moreover, accidentally there is an obligation, as was said under B, in the first point;

e) finally, to confess doubtful sins is always to be advised to all, except the scrupulous.

Question 3. Whether sins certainly committed and certainly also grave, but only probably confessed, must necessarily be accused? Resp. It is greatly controverted: some, among whom is St. Alphonsus, say that sins of this kind must be declared, because the obligation of confession is certain, but its fulfillment doubtful. But several other Doctors deny it, so that Lugo could affirm: "All commonly teach that [someone] is not bound to confess a sin which he probably judges that he has already confessed." But the reason is that a law to which satisfaction has probably already been made, since it is no longer certain and entire, cannot claim entire obedience for itself and bring forth a certain obligation. Thus indeed as to obligation; for in practice the repetition of confession is to be advised for procuring peace of conscience and removing anxieties of soul: unless, however, it happens that in this way anxiety is added to anxiety. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, nn. 58 and seq. - Baller. note (c) p. 367; and note (a) p. 368. - St. Alphonsus, n. 477.

Question 4. Whether one who has confessed some sin as doubtful must repeat it if afterward he knows it as certain? Resp. Formerly the Doctors commonly affirmed; but today it is greatly controverted, and the negative opinion appears solidly probable. The reason is deduced from those things which were said above about declaring the number of sins; for just as, after the doubtful number of sins has once been exposed with the particle about, you are no longer bound to declare in confession the certain number which you afterward discovered, provided the excess is not notable; so neither are you bound to repeat in confession a sin which you accused as doubtful, afterward known as certain. For there is no difference between either case, since also in a doubtful number certain sins are declared as doubtful; nor must the species be opened more than the number of sins. Besides, the doubtful sin was directly remitted, since it was remitted by force of absolution, to which, as it was in conscience, it was subjected. Therefore it is not necessary to subject it again to the keys. - Cf. Lugo, disp. 16, n. 78. - Sporer, n. 397. - Elbel, n. 274. - Reuter, n. 332. - Baller. note (b) p. 368.

XXV. Fr. La Croix asks, Book 6, part 2, no. 973, whether those things which from a mortally evil habit are afterwards done inadvertently are to be confessed? He answers at no. 974: “If we suppose that when those things are done there is present no advertence at all to the malice, such things will not have any new malice, as is established from what is said in Book 5 from no. 16. And consequently, since these things are not in themselves sins, nor externally complete any internal sin, but are merely effects of sin according to what is said at no. 944, there is no obligation of confessing them … which is true, according to many with Dicastillo, although that habit be not retracted.”

XXXVIII. Fr. Viva, question 2, article 2, no. 3: “Whether he who is certain of a mortal sin committed, but doubts positively whether he confessed it, so that he has a probable reason that he confessed it, and probable also, nay more probable, reasons that he did not confess it, is bound to confess it? I answer likewise negatively with the common opinion of the Doctors whom Martin Perez cites against Coninck, in Diana.”

LXI. The same, Vol. I, Sum, tract 4, disputation 4, section 1, chapter 5, no. 17, folio 418: “Sins under doubt, even if strictly such, positive or negative, are not necessarily to be confessed.”

I. In a threefold manner you can doubt. First, you doubt whether you have sinned mortally in this or that matter otherwise mortal. Second, you know that you have sinned, but you doubt whether the sin be mortal or venial. Third, you know certainly that you have sinned mortally, but you doubt whether you have confessed it.

II. Doubt, as St. Thomas teaches, On Truth, question 24, is when the intellect, between reasons which occur equally on either side, both for affirming and for denying, is uncertain, suspended, and hesitates, assenting to neither part. Some have devised a negative doubt, when on neither part do reasons for doubting occur; but this is mere nescience, or ignorance. The first therefore is a true and proper doubt, which is called positive, concerning which we must dispute.

III. QUESTION I. What is to be said of the opinion teaching that one is not bound to confess sins certainly committed, if he doubt whether he confessed them? ANSWER. Fr. Dominic Viva in his Course, question 2, article 2, no. 3, proposes this question: “Whether he who is CERTAIN of a mortal sin committed, but doubts positively whether he confessed it, so that he has a probable reason that he confessed it, and probable also, nay MORE PROBABLE, reasons that he did not confess it, is bound to confess it? I answer likewise negatively, with the common opinion of the Doctors whom Martin Perez cites against Coninck, in Diana.”

IV. What is this community of Doctors? What do you seek? See in Diana. It pleases me to refute the opinion of Fr. Viva by the testimony of the probabilists themselves. The Salmanticenses Scholastici, Vol. XII, part 2, tract 24, doubt 6, § 1, no. 178, page 173, write these things: “We think that he who certainly knows that he has committed some mortal sin, but doubts whether he confessed it, is obliged to its confession. So Navarrus, Suárez, Sánchez, and others commonly. … Whence even Caramuel himself, who in these matters is reckoned laxer or freer than others, when he had learned that certain JESUITS at Vienna had defended a thesis contrary to this common doctrine, and had alleged Caramuel for themselves, refused it, openly excused himself, and asserted that he philosophized otherwise of a doubtful sin, otherwise of a sin certainly committed but doubtfully confessed.”

V. Behold a new and indeed clear argument of Probabilism. In a twofold manner Fr. Viva imposes upon his readers, when he says that the Doctors commonly defend his doctrine. Since even if all the probabilists defended it, these do not constitute a community of Doctors. Secondly, because even the freer casuists themselves, who are undeservedly called Doctors, disapprove the doctrine of Fr. Viva. If this doctrine were preached from a public pulpit, Christians would be moved and would suffer scandal, as it seems to me.

VI. What? You certainly know that you have drunk a deadly poison, but you doubt whether you have applied the antidote — and do you refuse to employ the antidote? Is a certain debt satisfied by a doubtful payment? It is of faith that a certain sin is to be subjected to confession. But by a doubtful confession this most certain debt is not satisfied. Therefore you are bound to confess it.

VII. The sophisms dug out of the mine of Probabilism which Fr. Viva adduces are vain. The use of Probabilism was condemned in the civil forum by Innocent XI: I think it more probable that a judge can judge according to the less probable opinion. Therefore it is far more severely disapproved in the sacred forum. What of this, that Fr. Viva defends that you when doubting are not bound to confession, even if he have more probable reasons that he did not confess? The doctrine of Fr. Viva Fr. La Croix also teaches, Book 6, part 2, no. 602, and cites for the same Gobat, Sioz, Bosco, and other like Doctors.

VIII. QUESTION II. Whether he who doubts whether he committed some sin is bound to confess it? ANSWER. Fr. Dominic Viva in the place cited, no. 2, proposes this question: Whether he who positively doubts whether he committed a sin, so that he has probable reasons that he did not sin, although he have equally probable, nay perchance MORE PROBABLE, reasons that he did sin, is bound to confess that sin? He offers this answer: I answer with the common opinion of the Doctors, NEGATIVELY.

IX. Do the probabilists alone constitute the community of Doctors? It is certain that the more celebrated theologians of the illustrious Gallican nation, of the Dominican and Augustinian Religion, and Jesuit Doctors, and the most learned men of every Institute whatsoever, keenly disapprove the aforesaid doctrine of Fr. Viva. Are those men not Doctors? Are the probabilists alone Doctors in the Catholic Church? By what daring therefore does Fr. Viva write with the common opinion of the Doctors? Who are these Doctors whom Fr. Viva cites? Are they Sánchez, Alcover, Bizozer, Burgaber, Sporer, Stoz, Razemberger, Leander, Escobar, Caramuel, Gormaz, Busembaum, La Croix, La Cruz, Veracruz, Zanardi, and other like men? So many parish priests, so many less skilled confessors, when they read in Fr. Viva or another probabilist So the Doctors commonly teach, believe in good faith that the Doctors of the Church commonly teach this, and therefore with closed eyes adopt lax opinions and reduce them to execution. Hence it follows that the probabilists for the most part cite no Doctors save their own probabilists. Whether this be to deceive unskilled confessors, and whether this manner of writing savours of sincerity, humility, and a prudent form of writing, let the wise judge. The described doctrine is false.

X. QUESTION III. Ought we to confess a doubtful mortal sin as doubtful? ANSWER. All the ancient theologians commonly affirm it, especially St. Thomas in Book 4, distinction 21, article 3, reply 3. The Salmanticenses, both scholastic and moral, testify that this is the common opinion of all theologians, even of the probabilists.

XI. Although the probabilists themselves, as the Salmanticenses say, defend the common doctrine of the Church, very many of them nevertheless implicate it with the paints of Probabilism. They distinguish a twofold doubt. When the intellect is altogether uncertain, because on account of the equal weights of reasons it cannot decline to either part, they say that the intellect doubts; and this doubt they call negative. And all the probabilists commonly affirm that a Christian so doubting that he has sinned mortally is bound to confession. But when the intellect has for one part more probable reasons which show that he has sinned, and for the other part probable reasons proving that he has not sinned, then, they say, the doubt is positive, which by force of reflex Probabilism can according to them be laid aside, and the obligation of confession ceases.

XII. Hitherto I have refuted the doctrine of Fr. Viva and of others excusing Christians positively doubting from the duty of confession, and have indicated that this distinction is futile, and the figment of a positive and negative doubt vain. But that you may more clearly behold how Probabilism daily enlarges its jurisdiction, it pleases me to transcribe what very many younger probabilists teach against the common doctrine of the Church concerning negative doubt.

XIII. Fr. Dominic Viva, question 2, article 2, no. 6, writes these things concerning the obligation of confessing negatively doubtful sins: “I answer that it was almost the MOST COMMON opinion of the ancient Doctors that a man is bound to subject negatively doubtful sins to the keys; and Thomas Sánchez reputes this altogether certain. … For these causes Fr. Matthew de Moya of our Society, who was confessor to Mary Anne Queen of Spain, in his Select Questions on the Sacrament of Penance, after he had asserted that he had taught the contrary opinion for thirty years even in the Schools, disputation 1, question 5, has these things: "Nevertheless, the matter being maturely considered, I judge that we must stand for the contrary and common opinion asserting the obligation of a doubtful sin: to which I am led by this one efficacious argument, that the sacrament of Penance COULD have been instituted with this obligation. But that he did institute it, the more common sense of Catholics persuades, and a tradition continued from the time of the Apostles down to our times, by reason of which the Doctors have not so much proved as PRESUPPOSED, as an UNSHAKEN DOGMA, the precept of confessing doubtful sins equally with certain ones. For, as Augustine says, Book 4 Against the Donatists, that which the universal Church holds," and so forth. Thus far Fr. Moya. To these add Leander and Tamburini himself, although patrons of the kindlier opinions.”

XIV. Fr. Viva therefore of his own accord confesses that the doctrine obliging Christians to confess negatively doubtful sins is most common. But here he subjoins: “These things notwithstanding, I think the contrary opinion is PROBABLE and SAFE, asserting that negatively doubtful sins are not necessary matter of the sacrament of Penance, which very many authors follow in Mendo and Diana and others … whom Caramuel numbers up to twenty-two. … To whom add Lessius, Sá, Layman, Praepositus, Amicus, Leander, Hounihl, and also Ferrandinus On Scandal, question 77, where he cites the Revisers of the Society of Jesus as holding that this opinion can now be permitted in our schools; which openly and of set purpose Marchant, Joseph de Januario, Martinon, and many other writers judge probable — although FORMERLY, according to our rules, it could not be permitted, since scarcely one writer could be found who openly maintained it, as the same men testify in Tamburini. But now, as Diana notes, IT DAILY STRIKES DEEPER ROOTS.”

XV. The axe is to be applied to these poisonous roots, which attempt to infect the common doctrine of the Church, lest, as Diana prophesies, they daily grow more. Formerly in the illustrious Society of Jesus it was forbidden that a lax opinion be taught in the schools; is it now struck in public print by Fr. Viva, that it may daily strike deeper roots? If I wrote such things, our adversaries would cry out that I detract from the Jesuits, impose upon them, and calumniate them. And indeed what Fr. Viva writes of his own Society — that an opinion is now defended with approval against the common doctrine of the Church which formerly it had forbidden — I should not dare to publish; nor would I have transcribed it, unless the necessity of unteaching the unskilled urged. Fr. Viva confesses that the doctrine which teaches the obligation of confessing negatively doubtful sins is that of almost all the ancients. He confesses that the kindlier probabilists themselves — Sánchez, Leander, Tamburini — defend it as certain. What more? Even Fr. Matthew de Moya himself, in his work condemned for the heaping up of lax opinions, says that this doctrine the more common sense of Catholics persuades, and a tradition continued from the time of the Apostles down to our times, by reason of which the Doctors have not so much proved as presupposed, as an UNSHAKEN DOGMA, the precept of confessing doubtful sins equally with certain ones. This same thing almost all theologians testify, and the probabilists themselves, nay Fr. Viva himself.

XVI. And against the tradition of the Apostles, against the doctrine of all sacred antiquity, against the common opinion of all the more learned theologians and of almost all the probabilists, and against the long-established rules of his own Society, does Fr. Dominic Viva dare to propose to the Christian people as probable, nay as SAFE, an opinion false, improbable, and — to speak most mildly — full of laxity? This was brought in by Caramuel, Ferentinus, Martinon, Verde, and Januarius, patrons of a laxer Ethics. All theologians commonly detest it, and the most illustrious Society did not formerly permit it to be dictated in the schools. But now, says Fr. Viva, it daily strikes deeper roots. In what soil, in what schools, with what husbandmen and cultivators does this lax opinion daily strike roots?

XVII. Falsely does Fr. Viva cite for this opinion St. Antoninus, Tabiena, and Palude, whom after his manner he reads in Diana, or in Mendo. Whether he truly cites Layman and Lessius let others see: the Salmanticenses in the place cited, no. 195, vindicate Layman from this laxity. But Fr. Viva studies to multiply patrons, that the roots of his opinion may creep more widely.

XVIII. Fr. Claude La Croix, Book 6, part 1, no. 598, after his manner gathers all the opinions, true and false, upon this controversy; and for the opinion denying the duty of confessing negatively doubtful sins, against the common doctrine of the Church, whom does he allege? Toldet, Stoz, Caramuel, Conmarch. Then at no. 609 he thus concludes: “The opinion affirming an obligation of confessing negatively doubtful mortal sins is, authority being regarded, MORE PROBABLE, as is plain from what is said at no. 607. But intrinsic reasons being precisely regarded, the negative seems MORE PROBABLE, as will be plain to one comparing the intrinsic reasons adduced at nos. 607 and 608.”

XIX. Good heavens! Attend your mind. Toldet, Stoz, Conmarch, and Caramuel devised reasons more valid, more robust, and clearer for denying the duty of confessing negatively doubtful sins than the wiser Jesuit theologians of two centuries, who forbade this doctrine in the schools. Did Toldet and Stoz with a few others penetrate the matter more deeply than the holy Doctors of the Church, than St. Thomas, than the Fathers of the Tridentine Catechism, than all the rest of the theologians, both antiprobabilist and probabilist? Fr. La Croix indeed confesses at no. 610 that our opinion is absolutely more probable. But what thence? For by the benefit of Probabilism it is enough for him that the contrary be probable. The most certain doctrines of the Church they clothe with the mask of Probabilism, and thus render ambiguous truths which formerly reigned beyond controversy. Whither Christian affairs tend, unless this manner of opining be eliminated, let Christian readers judge. The sophisms which are wont to be obtruded, since they all rest upon Probabilism already shattered by me, I pass over. Consult Vol. IX, dissertation 4, chapter 7.