Point II. On Doubtful Sins

Doubt here can chiefly concern: 1. the act of sin, or a sin committed; 2. the gravity of the sin, both on the part of the matter and on the part of consent; 3. the confession of a sin certainly committed.

477. Questions. - QUESTION 1. Must mortal sins doubtfully committed necessarily be accused?

Reply. More probably, negative, if the doubt persists after a diligent examination has first been made; and this holds even if the doubt is truly positive, or there is a true probability that the sin was committed. The reason is that a doubtful law is at issue here, which consequently does not bind. And indeed, according to Trent, mortal sins of which one has consciousness must be accused; but one does not have consciousness of doubtful sins; for to have consciousness implies certain knowledge of the sin, since conscience is nothing other than knowledge of the heart and a judgment concerning a sin committed. Therefore. - St. Lig., no. 473; Sporer, no. 389; Roncaglia, ch. 2, De Integritate Confessionis, q. 7; Reuter, no. 305; and many others. - See St. Lig., no. 473.

Others nevertheless contradict this; because, as they say, it is gathered from the words of the Council of Trent that all mortal sins must be accused as they are in the conscience; and consequently, if they are doubtful in the conscience, they are also to be confessed as doubtful. - But it must be replied that the Council of Trent does not say that sins are to be accused as they are in the conscience, but those of which we have consciousness. In practice, however, an accusation of this kind is to be counseled, says St. Lig., no. 476.

Certain Theologians teach that negatively doubtful sins must be accused; but this is false; for no obligation can be given of confessing negatively doubtful sins, since a doubt of this kind rests upon no solid foundation and arises only from an empty suspicion or fear that a sin was committed, as frequently happens to the scrupulous or to timorous consciences.

478. QUESTION 2. Must sins of doubtful gravity be accused?

Reply. More probably, negative of itself, at least speculatively, even given a true probability of the gravity of the sin. The reason is the same as for the preceding question: for it is not established that a grave sin was committed, and consequently the obligation of confession cannot be established. - Thus the same authors against the same authors.

In practice, however, a twofold rule is to be followed: First Rule. In doubt whether the matter of the sin is grave, uneducated penitents ordinarily ought to accuse doubtful sins: 1. because they generally cannot form their conscience by themselves;

2. because they generally do not know how to distinguish venial sins from mortal sins. Nevertheless, except the scrupulous, who are not accustomed to commit mortal sins frequently. But instructed penitents are not bound to accuse sins of doubtful gravity, because they can form their conscience by themselves; nevertheless, they are ordinarily to be gently exhorted to accuse these also ¹.

¹ It is useful to have explained these things, so that the Confessor, observing the dangers in which the penitent is placed, may both admonish him and be able to remove them.

Second Rule. In doubt concerning full consent or perfect advertence: 1. if penitents are of a timorous conscience and are not accustomed to sin gravely, they are in no way bound to confess doubtful sins, because the presumption derived from things ordinarily occurring favors them; indeed, they are often to be prevented from making this accusation if they seem prone to scruples ²; 2. if penitents hold the middle way between a timorous and a lax conscience, they are indeed not to be obliged, but certainly are to be induced to declare the doubtful consent, because this profits the tranquility of conscience, etc.; 3. if penitents are of a lax conscience, they generally ought to declare doubtful sins, because the presumption is against them. - See St. Lig., no. 476.

² This observation seems to pertain to the doubt whether any fault was present rather than to the doubt whether the fault which intervened was mortal or only venial. For otherwise the scrupulous are not to be prevented from confessing venial sins when they are certainly established.

479. QUESTION 3. Must grave sins certainly committed, concerning which you nevertheless doubt whether you confessed them, necessarily be accused?

Reply 1. Affirmative, if the doubt is negative, namely, when no prudent reason is at hand for thinking that you have already confessed them. The reason is that the law of confessing is certain, nor does any reason suggest that this law has been satisfied, according to what was said concerning Conscience, vol. I, no. 41.

Reply 2. It is controverted, however, if the doubt is positive, that is, if a positive and grave reason suggests that the sin has already been declared. Some say that a sin of this kind must be declared, because the obligation of confession is certain but its fulfillment is doubtful. - Thus St. Lig., no. 477 ³. - Others, however, very commonly deny it with Suarez, Lugo,

³ The VV. object this passage of the holy Doctor (p. 936, no. 113), and add that in the Note placed thereunder St. Alphonsus wrote these things in Quaestiones Recentiores Reformatae, no. 16: Whether the penitent is bound to confess a mortal sin certainly committed if he only probably thinks that he has confessed it, Suarez, Lugo, the Salmanticenses, and others deny. But I say with Concina and others that he is bound to subject that sin to the keys, since the confession is doubtful and the obligation of Confession is certain.

Reply. Let it suffice to have summoned here also those things which Lugo writes (De Poenitentia, disp. 16, no. 58): ALL COMMONLY TEACH that someone is not bound to confess that sin which he probably judges that he... has already confessed. And again (ibid., no. 59): Nothing is more frequent among theologians than to excuse from repeating a confession one who has confessed... according to some probable opinion concerning its validity. Who, therefore, would be angry with him who prefers to follow the common doctrine of the Theologians?

Indeed, since St. Alphonsus also (bk. 6, no. 477), in the Roman edition of the year 1757 dedicated to Benedict XIV, released a penitent of this kind from repeating confession, as Suarez, Sanchez, Navarrus, Bonacina, Filliuccius, Roncaglia, Viva, Tamburini, Croix, Lugo, Escobar, Granadus, Fagundez, the Salmanticenses with Sylvester, Henriquez, etc., also COMMONLY say, who indeed would not adhere to St. Alphonsus when he follows those lights of theology, rather than adhere to St. Alphonsus when he follows Concina? For did Concina bring forward anything new? Indeed, since the matter concerns a certain general principle, shall we set aside the common sense of so many theologians in order to attribute to the judgment of the most rigorous Concina the privilege of a clearer understanding?

Lacroix, Bonacina, etc. - Recall what was said in the Treatise on Conscience, vol. I, no. 80, where the reason for the former opinion is shown to be both weak and also productive of grave inconveniences ⁴.

⁴ Thus indeed as regards the obligation; for as regards practice no one will deny that it contributes very greatly to peace of conscience if the anxiety consequent upon doubts of this kind is laid aside through confession; unless, however, the contrary occurs, so that in this way anxiety is added to anxiety. This indeed sometimes happens to those who, after a general confession diligently made according to their capacity, begin to doubt whether they declared this or that sin. For after the Confessor has patiently heard them twice, three times, or four times, it is fitting that he forbid them to think back in any way upon their past life or add anything unless they are most certain that they never rightly confessed some grave sin. - See St. Alphonsus, bk. 6, no. 477.

480. QUESTION 4. Must one who has confessed some sin as doubtful repeat it if he afterward knows it as certain?

Reply. It is controverted. The FIRST OPINION, more probable and common ⁵, affirms. The reason is: 1. because we must accuse all certain sins of which we have consciousness; 2. because that sin was not accused as to its substance, for a certain accusation is not included in a doubtful one. - St. Lig., no. 478.

⁵ This opinion could once have been called common, when, as Lugo writes (De Poenitentia, disp. 16, no. 92), certain learned men judged it probable that the penitent was not bound afterward to confess as certain what he had previously confessed as doubtful.... Among these was the Most Reverend Father Nicholas Ricchardius, Master of the Sacred Palace, with whom I discussed this matter privately; and he himself also replied privately that it seemed very probable to him that such an obligation was not present; which others also judged.

But it must be said otherwise concerning the following age, so much so that St. Alphonsus (bk. 6, no. 478) alleges more Doctors for the opposite opinion than for his own, which he calls common. And indeed, as Cardenas, a man perhaps more attached than was fair to his own tenets, says sorrowfully and almost indignantly (disp. 51, no. 4): Scarcely had our Lugo opened this little crevice when the more recent authors, advancing in a body, regarded it as a most ample door through which they might safely enter into that opinion. And he immediately adds a catalogue of these Doctors, in which seven appear who were omitted by St. Alphonsus, who otherwise names ten others.

Moreover, to solve the arguments of Cardinal De Lugo, Cardenas was compelled, against the opinion of St. Alphonsus and indeed the common opinion, to affirm that even he who, uncertain about the number, had said that he sinned about ten times, more or less, is bound afterward to confess the certain number if it is discovered. Moreover, the reason brought forward by him for his opinion, namely that according to Trent that gravity of guilt must be expressed from which the punishment to be imposed according to equity may be judged, would already overthrow the doctrine which St. Alphonsus (in the same no. 478, at the end) calls most probable and most common, namely, that someone is not bound to confess again a sin which he now knows to be grave when nevertheless neither did the Confessor himself know it as grave when the confession was made.

** The VV. detain the reader for fourteen columns and more concerning this Note (pp. 472-479), and contend for two things: 1. that the affirmative opinion of the holy Doctor Alphonsus must truly be called common (p. 479); 2. that the strongest reasons militate for it (p. 478).

As regards the first, I reply that a twofold question must be distinguished here: one, namely, of law, and the other of fact. And as regards the question of law, it must be diligently noted that the validity of the Sacrament is not at issue here, but only material integrity. Therefore let the words of St. Alphonsus be recalled here (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 29): No one is bound to doubtful laws.... Nor does it stand in the way to say here that in the matter of the Sacraments we cannot follow opinions which are only probable; because this proceeds when the validity of the Sacrament is at issue; it is otherwise concerning integrity. Hence the conclusion: since probability suffices to exempt from the obligation of confession in the case, but even a greater probability than the opposite does not suffice for imposing this obligation (see the opinion of St. Alphonsus in the Note to nos. 71-73, vol. 1), therefore in reality there stand against the affirmative opinion of St. Alphonsus not only all who depart from it, but also all who concede that the opinion which denies the aforesaid obligation is at least probable; and, on the contrary, those who call the affirmative opinion merely more probable do not sufficiently support it; indeed, these also will have to be said to stand for the negative if the argument which the VV. employ elsewhere, as we have seen, has any force, namely, that whoever admits some opinion to be merely more probable thereby concedes that the opposite is probable; which, nevertheless, we have said is not always true.

With these things premised, let us now approach the question of fact. Having counted the Authors both whom the holy Doctor Alphonsus alleges for his affirmative opinion and whom the VV. afterward added (pp. 474-478), we have thirty-seven. Having counted again those who are related for the opposite negative opinion by St. Alphonsus, Cardenas, Mendo, Giribaldi, etc., we have thirty-eight, and indeed with those omitted whom Lugo (disp. 16, no. 92) affirms that he consulted. Moreover, even if no account is taken of those whom the VV. produce for themselves, since nevertheless they judge that opinion only as more probable and thus rather stand against themselves, it may now be asked: Can an opinion be called common which has thirty-seven for itself but thirty-eight against itself? Is it not better to say with Wagemann (pt. 3, tr. 2, ch. 5, no. 58): It is debated with equal probability on each side? Nevertheless, an immense distinction (which must never be consigned to oblivion) stands out between the two opinions; namely, according even to the certain suffrage of St. Alphonsus, the probability of the negative opinion suffices for denying absolutely the obligation of Confession in the case; but St. Alphonsus also absolutely denies that the probability of the affirmative suffices for asserting the obligation. Therefore, if we judge this controversy by employing the extrinsic argument of authority, we must conclude, according to the certain principles of the holy Doctor Alphonsus, A doubtful law does not bind, etc., that the opinion of the same holy Doctor which says that the obligation of Confession is to be imposed in the case is no otherwise safe than it is safe to oblige the faithful to observe doubtful laws. It will be safe to offer counsel; it will not be safe to impose a precept. But, you will say, how then do so many call the affirmative opinion common, and indeed most common, as, for example, Voit, Scavini, and Frassinetti have it?

Reply. This phenomenon can be explained without difficulty. For although Lugo (disp. 16, no. 52) wrote that few had touched upon this question, Cardenas (disp. 51, no. 3) was nevertheless able to call these few all theologians; and from this Illsung, for example (De Sacramento Poenitentiae, q. 4, art. 5, no. 116), was able to call that opinion common. Several afterward copied this, paying less attention to what Cardenas (loc. cit., no. 4) had warned, namely that the more recent authors, as though advancing in a body, entered the little crevice opened by Lugo as if it were a most ample door. Nor, again, is it surprising that others, after Cardenas had said that all theologians thought thus, judged the same opinion even most common; which we then see copied by others also.

But let us come to the intrinsic reasons. The VV., as we have already premised, prefix this title to the second article (p. 478): The strongest reasons militating for the affirmative opinion are weighed.

Reply. Where are those strongest reasons if you omit that title? You will finally find this single one: Just as Cardenas, Billuart, and Cuniliati urge the obligation of repeating the confession, because by the precept of the Council we are bound to confess all sins of which we have consciousness, so also does St. Alphonsus. In the proposed case, the penitent now has consciousness of the sin which he formerly held as doubtful. Therefore he is bound to confess the same sin as certain. But Lugo had already replied to this reason (loc. cit., no. 87): We have seen that this argument proves that even a twenty-first sin afterward known as certain must be confessed by the penitent who confessed twenty, more or less, because that sin is now certain in the conscience of the penitent.

And in fact this is the rock upon which all the reasons customarily adduced for the same matter finally strike. Hence Dicastillo (tr. 8, disp. 9, no. 141), after weighing at great length the arguments on each side, concludes: Because of the efficacious argument by which it is proved that the same reasoning applies to a doubtful sin and to an uncertain number, I judge it more consonant with reason that such a number also must be explained if it is afterward known with certainty how great it determinately was, etc. But, says Lugo (loc. cit., no. 78), when a penitent unable to determine the certain number of sins confesses the likely number, for example, I committed perjury ten times, more or less: if he afterward remembers that he committed perjury twelve times, several and weighty Authors commonly teach that he need not confess it...; and St. Alphonsus also approves this doctrine (Homo Apostolicus, tr. 16, no. 34). And nevertheless, behold, Gobat (tr. 6, no. 443) protests that he could not find a difference between the two cases: Neither do I, he says, although I wearied myself long and greatly in investigating the difference, find any. Therefore, this reason, as they say, the strongest, proves either too much or nothing.

The VV. assume further (loc. cit.) that, according to St. Alphonsus, the reasoning is different because in the one case the error is not concerning the substance (but concerning the number), whereas in the other it is concerning the substance. - Lugo replies that, when you say, I committed perjury ten times, more or less, concerning the ninth, tenth, and eleventh perjury the error concerns the substance in precisely the same manner, namely, the fact.

The VV. object, moreover (loc. cit.), that the reason adduced by Cardenas is firm, because a greater number of sins increases liability and requires a greater punishment. - Reply. Against the doctrine of St. Alphonsus, this would prove that the number also which someone previously confessed as likely and afterward discovered as certain must be expressed in a repeated confession. But Illsung (tr. 6, disp. 6, q. 4, no. 116) adds against this reason of Cardenas: This reason seems to me to suppose something false, namely, that for this reason alone a negatively doubtful sin of a different species, or more than one or two of the same species, stated under negative doubt and afterward known, would have to be repeated, because a greater penance would have been enjoined for them. Notwithstanding this reason, many deny, and I

with them (as also the holy Doctor Alphonsus), that merely aggravating circumstances are to be explained.

Finally, to what some object, that the negative opinion has against it both the doctrine of the ancients and the practice of the faithful, Wagemann replies (loc. cit.): The ancients did not examine the opinion expressly; they did not have before them the instruction of Trent; they relied upon the false principle: in doubt the safer part is to be chosen. The practice generally concerns a doubt improperly so called, or what is better, since in this way scruples also are disclosed; and a universal practice can scarcely be discovered.

The SECOND OPINION, sufficiently probable, denies it. The reason is deduced from what was said in no. 472: for just as, once a doubtful number of sins has been set forth with the word about, you are no longer bound to declare in confession the certain number which you afterward discovered, provided the excess is not notable; so neither are you bound to repeat in confession a sin which you accused as doubtful and afterward learned to be certain: for there is no difference between the two cases, since even in a doubtful number certain sins are declared as doubtful; nor must the species be disclosed more than the number of sins. Moreover, the doubtful sin was directly remitted, since it was remitted by virtue of the absolution to which, as it existed in the conscience, it was subjected. Therefore, it is not necessary to subject it again to the keys. - Thus Lugo, disp. 16, no. 78; Sporer, no. 397; Elbel, no. 274; Reuter, no. 332, etc.

481. • QUESTION 5. Can anyone, without confession first being made, approach Holy Communion with a doubtful or probable mortal sin?

Reply. Affirmative, rigorously speaking. The reason is that the Council of Trent requires confession before Communion only for those who are conscious of mortal sin. Hence a Priest who doubts whether he consented to an evil thought, or who judges probably that he did not consent to it, can celebrate, after first making an act of contrition, but without confession, even though he has access to a Confessor. - St. Lig., no. 475. - In practice, however, confession is to be counseled.