Dreams and casting lots

We know from Holy Scripture that almighty God has sometimes made known his will to men by means of dreams, and the devil, too, is able to fill the mind with his suggestions during sleep. If God in some rare instance uses dreams to make known his will, he should of course be lovingly obeyed. The suggestions of the devil, on the contrary, should be repelled and despised. We can distinguish between the two sources by observing whether the impulse received is towards good or evil, whether what is suggested is worthy of God, whether it tends to disturb our peace or leaves us tranquil and disposed to the service of God. Dreams have ordinarily a natural cause, but they are no indication of what the future will bring. We may not, then, guide our conduct by dreams; God has given us our reason and the Church to teach us what we should do; we must follow these and not dreams if we would act aright. Constantly to guide ourselves by dreams would be mortally sinful, to allow them to influence us occasionally and in matters of little moment would not be more than a venial sin.

There is no harm in casting lots to decide a doubtful claim; the parties merely agree to stand by what turns up by chance. It is superstitious and sinful to cast lots in order to discover some secret, or with a view to shaping one’s life according to the issue. Sometimes this method of deciding doubts has been adopted by holy men in consequence of an intimation received from God, or sometimes because no better way out of the difficulty appeared.

The use of the divining-rod under the belief that a stick of a special shape cut from a particular kind of tree or bush will point out hidden treasure, or mines, or springs of water, is superstitious and sinful. For it is certain that there is no natural force which acts in the arbitrary manner in which the divining-rod is said to act under the circumstances. It is not impossible but that particular individuals may be very sensitive to the presence of water or minerals even when hidden under the surface of the earth, and perhaps the frequent finding of springs by dowsers is partially to be explained in this way. Then by practice and experience a power of detecting the presence of underground water from the vegetation or other signs on the surface may be developed. There is also without doubt a great deal of fraud in such matters. Finally, the devil may sometimes intervene.

782. Divination of dreams. - "Dreams are signs of certain future events, insofar as they are reduced to some cause common to dreams and future events... Therefore it is to be considered what is the cause of dreams, and whether it can be the cause of future events, or can know them" (a. 6). Now dreams are sometimes caused divinely: to which certainly faith is to be given insofar as their origin is established; sometimes diabolically: therefore if someone seeks to be instructed by a demon in such a mode, he is guilty of express divination through dreams; generally, however, naturally, from the habit of soul and body, the influence of the air, etc., and these dreams are certain natural signs of health, complexion, passions, occupations of the dreamer, but not of future events or free acts: whence he who gives faith to these common dreams, through which certainly God does not speak, interpretatively has recourse to the demon, who sometimes inserts himself into the phantasies and dreams of men.

783. Use of lots. - Divisory lots, which are employed for dividing or attributing goods, of themselves contain no superstition or other malice, but by positive law they are prohibited in elections to ecclesiastical offices and benefices. - Consultory lots, which are employed for knowing what one ought to do, if counsel is expected explicitly or implicitly from a demon, are superstitious. If the providence of God alone is implored, they are sometimes licit: when they are done either from divine command or instinct, or at least from urgent necessity and every defect of counsel, with due reverence; but regularly they are illicit because they contain a tempting of God. - Divinatory lots are generally illicit: for lots do not receive this power of laying open hidden truth divinely, outside most special circumstances, nor indeed do they have it from their own nature; whence he who inquires into truth through lots either tempts the Lord, or expects the intervention of a demon (a. 8).

I. There are various kinds of dreams, commonly divided into the oracular, the dream proper, the "insomnium," and the phantasm. An oracle occurs when God, through the ministry of the Saints or Angels, reveals to someone in sleep a vision of some future thing; such was the dream of Abimelech (Gen. 20), of Abraham (Gen. 28), of Samuel (1 Kings 3), and of St. Joseph and the Magi (Matt. 2). A vision occurs when what one sees in a dream comes to pass in the very manner in which it was seen; such was the ancient dream of Joseph (Gen. 37), of Jacob (Gen. 46), and of Gideon (Judg. 7). An insomnium, properly so called, is that which appears in figures, and requires interpretation in order to be understood — such was the dream of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. 2), and of the butler and the baker (Gen. 40), which, having occupied their waking thoughts, then presented itself to them again while sleeping. Hence Ecclesiasticus (ch. 5) says that many are led astray by dreams. A phantasm occurs when someone, scarcely having fallen asleep, and thinking themselves still awake, seems to see various and discordant figures. These kinds of dreams, apart from the oracular, nonetheless amount to nearly the same thing.

II. Four causes are commonly assigned to dreams, two of which are intrinsic, two extrinsic. The intrinsic cause of dreams is called animal, arising from internal passions — for this reason animals too are accustomed to dream, from this same cause; the other is bodily, since dreams arise from the body's varying condition, as the Angelic Doctor explains (II-II, q. 95, art. 6): "The intrinsic cause of dreams is twofold. One is animal — namely, insofar as those things which a man's imagination was occupied with, and had an affection for while awake, recur in sleep... The other intrinsic cause of dreams is bodily. For according to the interior disposition of the body, some movement arises in the imagination corresponding to that disposition; just as in a man in whom cold humors abound, there occur in dreams things pertaining to water or cold. And for this reason physicians say that dreams are to be attended to, in order to discern interior bodily dispositions." Experience confirms this: for those who abound in blood dream of things that bring joy — treasures, banquets, gardens; those troubled by bile dream of slaughter, quarrels, assaults, and warlike encounters; those full of viscous humors sense themselves being crushed and suffocated in their dreams; those prone to melancholy see darkness and drowning in theirs. And whenever the bodily humors are disturbed, dreams tend to be grave and mournful — signs of the body's ill health.

III. The extrinsic cause of dreams is likewise twofold. One is bodily, as the Angelic Doctor says, "when the sleeper's imagination is altered either by the surrounding air, or by some celestial influence, so that certain images appear to the sleeper corresponding to celestial impressions." The other is spiritual, which, as St. Thomas adds, comes from God, who, through the ministry of Angels, reveals certain things to men in dreams, according to that text (Num. 12): "If there be a prophet of the Lord among you, I will appear to him in a vision, or I will speak to him in a dream." Sometimes too, as the Angelic Doctor continues, by the operation of demons certain images appear to the sleeper, from which they sometimes reveal certain future things to those who have an explicit or tacit pact with them.

IV. Question I. Is it lawful to divine the future by dreams? Response: To this question St. Thomas responds as follows (loc. cit.): "It must be said that if someone observes dreams in order to foreknow future things, insofar as dreams proceed from divine revelation, or from an intrinsic or extrinsic natural cause, to the extent that the power of such a cause can extend, this will not be an unlawful divination. But if such divination is extended beyond the point to which such a cause, or revelation, can extend — as, for instance, if one were to seek to foreknow future contingents or hidden matters of the human heart through dreams that do not proceed from divine revelation — this will be an unlawful and superstitious divination, since such divination is extended to matters where an explicit or tacit pact with demons is present, insofar as they would be invoked for this." It is therefore lawful to observe dreams sent by God, and through them to divine the future. But one must first determine whether the dreams are sent by God or by a demon — and this is the difficult task. No infallible rule can be given for this; several probable conjectures, however, are available. The chief of these is this: if the dreams are honorable, and incline the mind toward spiritual good, they are to be believed sent by God, as St. James says (ch. 3): "The wisdom that is from above, first indeed is chaste, then peaceable, modest, persuadable, consenting to the good, full of mercy and good fruits, without judging, without dissimulation." If, on the other hand, they disturb the mind, or incline it toward evil, they must be believed to be suggested by a demon. If, after sufficient diligence, they remain doubtful, they are to be disregarded — this being the safer course. The character and integrity of life of the one who experiences the dreams also contribute greatly to discerning whether they are sent by God or by a demon. Those who experience such dreams ought to reveal them to a prudent confessor, and, pouring out prayers to God, ask of him the true understanding of them — for God does not allow those who do not wish to be deceived to be deceived.

V. Question II. Is the observation of natural dreams lawful? Response: Theologians commonly affirm this, since such dreams proceed from natural causes — namely, from an abundance of humors, or from the quality of one's temperament. It is, moreover, lawful to seek out, from natural causes, the effects that flow from them. Physicians, accordingly, lawfully observe dreams, in order to discern the causes of illnesses, and to remove them.

VI. Question III. Is it lawful to divine free future things from dreams? Response: All teach that this is a grave crime, since free future events depend solely on the will... — future contingents — and dreams have no connection whatsoever with them; nor can dreams attain to any certain or determinate knowledge of such effects by their own nature, but only offer some conjecture. Nothing, then, that is free is to be divined from dreams. Superstitious, accordingly, are those who observe dreams, or who place themselves in bed in a certain manner so that future events may be revealed to them in dreams; likewise those who place the horns of animals under the pillows of the sick, so that they may obtain a calm and restful sleep — for there is no connection whatsoever between dreams and such instruments.

VII. Question IV. Does one who, on the occasion of a dream, conducts his affairs and business in a certain way, sin? Response: Extremes are to be avoided here, as in other matters. Whoever makes a habit of observing dreams, and constantly uses them as a kind of rule for conducting his affairs, undoubtedly commits superstition. If, however, someone occasionally omits or undertakes something on the occasion of a dream — not out of a firm belief in the dream's predictive power, but taking the occasion from it to reflect more seriously upon some matter, and to reform his ways — he is not tainted with any superstition. Suppose a sinner sees in a dream that he will die suddenly unless he corrects his ways and repents at once; he would not be superstitious in the least — rather he would act prudently if he immediately went to confession and reformed his ways. For it can be prudently believed that such dreams are infused by God, and that one is thereby admonished through the ministry of dreams, as we have already noted, to turn to a better way of life — provided the dream is simple, and inclines toward the good. Prudence is nevertheless required, to discern whether this apparent good is indeed a certain, necessary good, bringing with it no evil at all. For an evil angel sometimes proposes a good, in order to lead one thereby to a greater evil. This, however, is easy to discern. In the example given, no evil at all can be feared, since it is, by its very nature, good for a sinner to give up his sins, to wash them away by penance, and to turn to God — so that nothing insidious lies concealed in it.

VIII. Question V. When outcomes correspond to dreams, is it permissible to observe this correspondence? Response: It not infrequently happens that someone observes that events correspond to dreams he has had. He may then be tempted to pay attention to such things, and place faith in them. Is he to be said, in that case, to be tainted with the stain of superstition? St. Thomas answers (II-II, q. 96, art. 8, ad 2): "Although at first men experienced something true from such observations by chance, afterward, once men began to apply their minds to such observances, it happens that many things come to pass according to such observances, through the deception of demons — so that men entangled in such observances may be more firmly bound by manifold errors." Vain dreams, then, are to be avoided; and in matters of faith, morals, and worldly affairs we ought to be guided by those other principles which are well established for us — namely, Scripture, and other sure and reliable sources. We have no need of dreams to correct our morals, or to undertake worthy deeds and good works. This must always be kept before our eyes: that Scripture forbids putting faith in dreams. "Unless it be a vision sent by the Most High, set not thy heart upon dreams" (Ecclesiasticus 34). It must also be observed that, when God sends a dream, he provides some sign by which it may be recognized as truly sent from him. Unless, therefore, certain or highly probable signs occur that the dream descends from above, it is to be disregarded.

I. This is described by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 8), who asserts it to be threefold. The first is divisory, which occurs so that, by an action of some kind, the outcome of the lot may reveal something hidden — namely, when it is determined, by the outcome, what is to be assigned to whom — an office, an honor, a rank, and the like. The second is consultative, when the divine will is consulted, that we may know what to avoid, what to undertake, what to do in this or that affair. The third is divinatory, when it is sought that some hidden future thing be revealed by a demon, tacitly or expressly. "A lot," says the Angelic Doctor, "is said to be divisory when it consists in some action, such that, from its outcome, something hidden is made known to the one to whom it pertains. And likewise if the inquiry regards a possession, or an office, or something of this sort, it takes the character of a divisory lot. If, however, the inquiry regards what ought to be done, it takes the character of a consultative lot. But if it is inquired what will be the case — as though such an act of human inquiry were vain and false, unless the lots are used according to the disposition of the stars to produce the effect (which is a fantastical opinion), and consequently not without a demon insinuating himself — then such divination is superstitious, or unlawful."

II. Divisory lots are lawful, since they are nothing other than a certain agreement of wills whereby men come together, so that it may be decided, by the outcome of the lot, to whom a thing, an honor, a rank, and the like ought to be assigned. There is here no pact whatsoever, express or tacit, with a demon. Very many examples of this kind of lot occur in Sacred Scripture, both Old and New Testament. In the Old: "And Samuel brought the tribe of Benjamin by lot" (1 Kings 10). Likewise Deuteronomy: "He himself shall divide the land by lot." From the New Testament: "They cast lots, and the lot fell upon Matthias" (Acts 1); "Upon my vesture they cast lots" (Matthew 27).

III. Question I. Is it lawful to use divisory lots in the election to secular offices? Response: The affirmative opinion is common with respect to the election to lay offices — since such a casting of lots is forbidden by no law, and is otherwise, by its very nature, entirely free from any taint of superstition. In order, however, for it to be lawful, the lot must be cast among candidates who are equally suitable and equally deserving. For if, through the use of the lot, rewards should fall to unsuitable candidates while suitable ones are passed over, this would then be a sin against distributive justice. It is lawful to cast lots, then, when several suitable candidates present themselves, and no distinction of merit among them can be discerned, so that it cannot be known which of them ought to be preferred.

IV. Question II. Is it lawful to use lots in the election to ecclesiastical benefices? Response: The negative opinion is common, since ecclesiastical law forbids this, in the chapter Ecclesia, on lot-casting, where the following is stated: "We condemn the use of lots in elections by a perpetual prohibition." No elections, then, whether to dignities, benefices, or ecclesiastical offices, can lawfully be carried out by the use of lots — and this holds true even for the election of compromise-electors chosen to carry out such elections. The Angelic Doctor expressly teaches this view; for although he admits the use of lots to be lawful for settling disputes, he denies that this is lawful for elections to ecclesiastical benefices. "One can sin in this matter in four ways," he says (loc. cit.). "First, if one has recourse to lots without any necessity at all: for this seems to pertain to tempting God. Whence Ambrose says, commenting on Luke: 'He who is chosen by lot is not subject to human judgment.' Second, if even in a case of necessity one uses lots without due reverence for God."

V. Question III. Is an election to an ecclesiastical benefice carried out by lot altogether void? Response: The election to ecclesiastical offices and benefices, although unlawful, is not for that reason void, since it is prohibited only by law, but not declared invalid. The election of a Prelate of the Church who holds jurisdiction, however, is [treated otherwise, per the chapter Quia propter, on elections]. And this is the common and true opinion, since in matters of prohibition one must always look to whether the prohibition adds, beyond an absolute prohibition, an express declaration of nullity as well — since a mere prohibition alone does not entail nullity, unless this is expressly stated. And since it is only in the election of a Prelate of the Church holding both jurisdictions that an election carried out by lot is declared void — while in elections to benefices and offices merely [the election] is void only in that specific sense — it follows that other cases, which are merely prohibited, are not void.

VI. Question IV. Is the use of lots lawful for settling disputes over ecclesiastical property or benefices? Response: If ecclesiastics dispute over temporal goods, there is no doubt that they may settle the dispute by the use of lots, with the due conditions observed, just as laypeople may — since, in this hypothesis, their goods are not distinguished from those of the laity. The question proposed, then, concerns disputes arising over elections to ecclesiastical benefices and offices; and on this difficulty two opinions are found. The first holds that a penal law ought not to be extended beyond the cases expressly stated. Now ecclesiastical law forbids the use of lots only in elections to benefices and offices, not in settling disputes. The other opinion denies this, on the grounds that if disputes were settled by lot, elections would in effect be made, or at least completed, by the use of lots.

VII. This second opinion is the more probable one, if the discussion concerns a casting of lots done on private authority. If, however, it is done on public authority — namely, that of a judge — so that lots may be cast in disputes so difficult and so entangled, and their legal merits so obscure, that no judgment can be reached by discerning them, then the use of lots becomes more respectable: for an absolute casting of lots is not forbidden. For Solomon says (Prov. 18): "The lot suppresseth contentions, and determineth even between the mighty." Whenever, then, the best possible outcome — namely, the settling of the dispute — is achieved, the casting of lots will not be unlawful. The law, in the chapter Ecclesia, on lot-casting, forbids elections to benefices and ecclesiastical offices to be made by lot; it also forbids disputes to be settled by lot when the legal merits are not so entangled that they cannot be discerned, and the case decided by the sentence of a judge. But when disputes are so obscure that the judges themselves cannot tell which party's rights are favored, who would say that ecclesiastical law forbids an end to be put to such disputes by the use of lots? Otherwise one would have to say that the law wills such disputes to remain endless forever — something no one can suspect. In order to avoid the difficulties that might be raised against it, such a casting of lots ought to be done on the authority of an ecclesiastical judge. For then there will be no danger of anyone obtaining a benefice without just title — since the authority of the judge competent to confer the benefice, in prescribing the casting of lots, itself pronounces the judgment; and whoever obtains the benefice does so, not so much through the effect of the lot, as through the sentence of the judge who prescribed such a casting of lots. There is likewise no suspicion of simony, which is removed by the judge's authority. This is the more common opinion, and the more probable one in my own view. It is defended by the Gloss (on the chapter Licet Causam, on the proposition "Uti possidetis"), Suárez (On Religion, Vol. I, tract. 3, Bk. 2, ch. 12, n. 33), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 38, n. 79), Castropalao (tract. 17, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 7), Leander (tract. 9, disp. 12, q. 13), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 22, ch. 11, punct. 3, n. 88), among others. From these it is recorded that, once, when a dispute was raging as to which of two men had been lawfully elected Pope, it was decided, by the agreement of the Cardinals, to settle the discordant claim by lot. But would it not have been better, in such a case, to elect a third candidate, setting aside both rival claimants? This, we know from ecclesiastical history, is indeed what was done; and we believe the Cardinals would do the same, should such a case arise again. Nor do we know of any instance where a dispute over the Papacy was ever actually settled by lot. This, however, we submit to the judgment of the wise.

VIII. Question V. Is a consultative casting of lots lawful? Response: A twofold cause of consultative lot-casting exists, both spiritual — namely, God, or a demon. If the outcome is expected from a demon, it is called a divinatory lot, which is superstitious, and was forbidden by Pope Sixtus V in his own bull. We have already given the reason for this several times: namely, that such lots have no connection with future events, whether as causes or as signs of them. Since, then, this knowledge is not obtained from God, it remains that it is obtained from a demon; wherefore, in such lot-castings, there is always present a pact with a demon, either explicit or implicit.

IX. It is called consultative, when the knowledge of a future event is sought from God. That this is lawful is proved by many examples from Sacred Scripture, already indicated above. For Joshua made use of a lot to detect the hidden culprit, as is related in ch. 7. Saul discovered, by lot, that his son Jonathan had tasted [the forbidden honey], as is gathered from 1 Kings 14. The Apostles, having first cast lots, enrolled Matthias in the number of the Apostles. Other examples have already been indicated. For the lawful use of consultative lots, St. Thomas prescribes four conditions, which we have already described, and will briefly recall here. The first is a pressing necessity, whether spiritual or temporal; absent such necessity, God is tempted. The second is that the utmost reverence and deference toward God be preserved in such a casting of lots — namely, that it be preceded by mature deliberation, and that prayers be offered to God, as the Apostles did before the election of Matthias. The third is that sacred things not be mixed with profane ones — as if one were to make use of the pages of the Gospel, or the relics of the Saints, for temporal affairs. The last is that this casting of lots not be employed in elections to ecclesiastical benefices. Theologians note that these conditions are scarcely ever observed in practice. For this reason, such castings of lots are altogether to be rejected; and in doubtful matters, the laws, prudent rules, and wise men are to be consulted, lots being set aside.

X. Theologians commonly also note that, when lots are used — even with God's aid invoked — if no necessity is present, the sin will not be one of superstition, but of tempting God. When the other conditions are lacking, beyond the sin of superstition, other crimes can also occur — as when lots are used to detect a hidden thief, murderer, or other culprit, in which case, beyond superstition, the crime of injustice is also committed.

XI. Regarding the superstition involved in the use of duels, and of trial by red-hot iron or boiling water, St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3): "The trial by red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is indeed ordered toward the investigation of some hidden sin, through something done by man; and insofar as some miraculous effect is expected from God, it agrees in this respect with the casting of lots — but it exceeds the common character of lots. Whence such a judgment is rendered unlawful: both because it is directed toward the discernment of hidden things, which are reserved to divine judgment alone, and also because such a judgment has not been sanctioned by divine authority." See II-II, q. 5 [i.e., other relevant passages]. In the Decree of Pope Stephen V it is said: "The extortion of a confession from anyone by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is not sanctioned by the sacred canons; nor is it to be presumed, since it has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy Fathers, being a superstitious invention. Public crimes, once a spontaneous confession or the testimony of witnesses has established them, having the fear of God before our eyes, are granted to our own governance to judge. But hidden and unknown things are to be left to him alone who knows the hearts of the sons of men." The same reasoning seems to apply to the practice of dueling — except that it approaches more closely to the common character of the casting of lots, insofar as no miraculous effect is expected there, except perhaps when the combatants are very unequal in strength or skill.

XII. Question VI. Why do sleepers divine more than those who are awake? Response: A fitting reason for this can scarcely be assigned. Many contend that sleepers, being more withdrawn from the external senses and from things presented from without, are thereby more inwardly recollected. The soul, then, gathered within itself, and undistracted by external things, contemplates its own images more vividly. Hence it is that God sometimes reveals certain future things to those who are asleep — not because sleep of itself has any power for prophecy, but because the soul in sleep, being more tranquil and free from external hindrances, is more receptive. There is also a further, natural cause, arising from the food by which men are nourished. Let us hear Marcus Tullius (Bk. I, On Divination): "Plato accordingly wishes that men go to sleep with their bodies so disposed that nothing may bring error or disturbance to their minds. For this reason it is thought that the Pythagoreans were forbidden to eat beans, since this food produces great flatulence, quite contrary to the tranquility of mind that seeks the truth. When, then, the soul is withdrawn from the senses in sleep, and from contact with the body, it remembers the past, discerns the present, and foresees the future. For the body of one asleep lies as if dead, while the soul is vigorous and alive — a thing it will do far more fully after death, when it has departed wholly from the body." Cicero has much more to say on this subject.

XIII. Question VII. Why do fools and simpletons divine more easily than those endowed with sound reason? Response: It is a common proverb that fools, children, and simpletons divine — a view held by Plato and Aristotle. This divination, however, which is attributed to fools and the mad, is neither prophecy nor divination properly so called, but a certain prediction resting on natural causes. For fools and simpletons, being devoid of prudence and sharpness of mind, are led by a kind of instinct, like brute animals, which excel men at indicating future things that arise from natural and necessary causes. Certain fish portend storms to sailors; birds foretell rain to farmers; herds to shepherds; mice fleeing a house in a body foreshow its collapse. This arises from the fact that brute animals have a greater affinity with bodily causes, and perceive their impressions and influences more vividly; and so they sense future effects better and more surely. Similarly, fools and simpletons, being devoid of prudence, are closer to brute animals, and are more strongly affected by the impressions of natural causes; and so they tend to foresee natural future events better than prudent men. Contemplation withdraws much from the senses; and conversely, the application of the external senses weakens the power of contemplation, while the privation of one sense sharpens another. Thus the blind hear more acutely, and recall things more easily. In fools and simpletons, then, natural divination is sometimes more frequent than in the prudent, on account of their greater kinship with brute creatures. It should be added that fools and simpletons are talkative, and chatter continuously, blurting out whatever comes into their mouths; hence it is that, amid such a flood of words, they sometimes by chance foretell something true — just as street peddlers, who, narrating all the events to which men are commonly subject, and which occur most frequently, often reveal things that do in fact come to pass; a revelation which the unlearned take for prophecy, though it is entirely a matter of chance.

XIV. Question VIII. Why do men close to death often divine the future? Response: Plato, and other philosophers, observed that those closer to death foretell future things. Marcus Tullius relates this (Bk. I, On Divination). That the dying can divine, Posidonius confirms even by the example he cites, of a certain Rhodian, who, while dying, named six of his contemporaries, and said which of them would die first, which second, and so on in order. St. Gregory, as Azor relates (Bk. IX, ch. 24; Dialogues, Bk. IV, ch. 26 and 27), adduces many examples proving that the dying have foretold future events. He relates that a lawyer, near death, called his servant boy to prepare his clothes, since he wished to go out. The boy refused to obey, thinking his master delirious. But the man, rising from his bed, dressed himself, and declared that he would proceed by the Appian Way to the Church of St. Sixtus. But as his illness worsened, he met his death. It had been arranged that his body should be carried for burial along the Praenestine Way, to the Blessed Martyr Januarius; but because this route seemed too long to those who had charge of his funeral, they suddenly changed their plan and carried him instead to the very church the deceased had named — being wholly unaware of his prediction. He adds (ch. 27) that Count Theophanius foretold to his wife that there would be fair weather after his death, even though, while he was still alive and near death, the weather was extremely stormy, so that his body could not be carried out for burial. If these things are true, it must be said that, when the dying foretell things that cannot be known by natural power, God reveals these things to them, illuminating their minds to foresee the future. St. Gregory proves this also by the examples of Jacob and his sons, and of Moses, who, drawing near to death, foretold many future things — the latter to the people of Israel. When, however, the dying foretell future things that depend on natural causes, this occurs because their minds, the senses being dulled, contemplate things more exactly, and their bodies are more strongly affected by the influences of natural causes; and so they perceive better than others the changes of season and weather.

XV. St. Augustine (Bk. XII, On Genesis, Literally Interpreted, ch. 17) proposes many examples... in which he notes that those raving with a burning fever divine future things. Their prophesying, however, is nothing but chance: for since the delirious are talkative, blurting out everything that comes to their mouths, they sometimes hit upon what is to come. They are guided by no prudence, restrained by no fear; they conceal nothing hidden, but blurt out everything. It is no wonder, then, if they sometimes predict some future event — just as those who often throw javelins sometimes hit the mark even with their eyes closed. Those seized by black bile divine more frequently, since their minds are more easily drawn away from the senses, and thus withdrawn, they contemplate things with a more intense effort. They also more readily perceive the influences and changes of the air and the celestial bodies. I pass over many other examples, since they are of scarcely any use. For even Marcus Tullius himself, though he defends many superstitious things, writes as follows (Bk. I, On Divination, near the end): "If anyone's soul could perceive the entire connection of all causes, nothing at all, surely, would escape it — for he who grasped the causes of things to come would necessarily grasp all things that are to be. But no one can do this except God; it must therefore be left to man to foresee future things by certain signs that indicate their consequences." In this, however, Cicero errs — setting aside his other errors — in that he attributes too much weight to these signs.

CONCERNING dreams it should be noted, from D. Bonaventure, 3. part. Centil. sect. 23., and the little work, Declaratio terminorum Theologiae, and in 2. d. 7. part. 2. quaest. 3. ad argumenta, and d. 23. art. 2. quaest. 2. ad argumenta, that they come about from many causes. First, from the singular Providence of God, such were the dreams of Joseph. Second, from the constellation of the sky and the impression of the air. Third, from the affection and disposition of the human body. Fourth, from prior anxieties. Fifth, from the act of demons.

From God indeed come dreams for unfolding the Divine will: Such was the dream of Joseph about the Virgin not to be abandoned, about the flight into Egypt, about the return; more even about the way to be turned aside, Matth. 1. and 2.; and these are good, since they come from God.

About these you have Numbers 12, Job 33, Genesis 40 and 41, Daniel 2, 4 and 7, Judges 7, 3 Kings 3, Esther 10, and also 2 Machab. 15, and elsewhere monitions and examples. Yet if there is not probability that those dreams are from God, it will not be permitted to give faith to them, for knowledge of future contingents cannot be had from elsewhere. Therefore they are prohibited in Deuteronomy 13, where he decrees that they are to be punished with death; and Ecclesiasticus 34, where it is said: Dreams lift up fools: Unless the visitation be from the Most High, give not thy heart upon them: For dreams have led many into error, and they have fallen who hoped in them. So it is proved by the Saintly Doctor in 2. d. 7. loc. cit. Yet it can be a venial fault if they are believed out of levity, or not firmly.

It is MORTAL also to place any vain things under the bed of the sick, e.g. horns, letters, that they may catch sleep: For these have effects from an implicit at least pact with the devil.

It is discerned, moreover, whether dreams are from God or from the devil by those signs by which also revelations are, as Delrius notes, lib. 4. disq. mag. cap. 3. quaest. 6. Pererius lib. 1. in Danielem, quaest. 3., and lib. 2. de magia quaest. 3. Suarez Tom. 1. de Relig. lib. 2. de superstit. cap. 13. Fagundez lib. 1. in primum praeceptum, cap. 39.

But two signs are chief. The first is from the effect toward which they move: for if they excite to a good work, they are good. Second, from the affections which they cause, namely if they cause alacrity, or the devotion of fasting, it is a sign that they are good. Yet in these one must walk cautiously and humbly, with the judgment also of a prudent confessor.

IF dreams are from some impression and influx of secondary causes, for instance heat, or a very humid, turbid air, they avail nothing; for they are accustomed to stir the humors violently, whence dreams mostly arise indicating the humors predominant in us. For thus the bilious seem to gaze upon conflagrations, the sanguine upon wounds, the melancholic upon dark things, for instance smoking globes, or dense fog, funerals, and the dead. But the phlegmatic see white things, for instance snows: if one thinks himself flying through the air, it is a sign of a tempered symmetry; if he thinks he finds treasures, it is a sign of possessing a deficit. Finally the Saintly Doctor concludes that these are signs of infirmity from some humor predominating. But it belongs to physicians to observe these, as Ciruelo teaches, de superstit. 2. p. cap. 6. Perer. supra de magia, quaest. 7. Azor. tom. 1. lib. 9. cap. 17. Less. lib. 2. cap. 43. d. 8. Suarez tom. 1. de Relig. lib. 2. de superstit. cap. 13. Fagundez num. 20. Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 7. d. 1.

TO these dreams from the abundance of the dominating humor belongs that dream in which one sees and feels at night a specter rushing upon him and oppressing him, which physicians call the Incubus, and it is called Ephialtes, as the Saintly Doctor says, loc. cit. Centil. For it arises from a thick and foul humor rushing into the brain and intercepting the passages of the animal spirits, as the Saintly Doctor teaches with Galen, lib. 3. de locis male affectis, cap. 4.; and this is a sign of thick and melancholic blood, and there is danger of epilepsy if one suffers it frequently; and this is also called phantasma, from Cicero Visum: Marobius treats of these at length, lib. 1. in somnium Scipionis.

Dreams are also accustomed to break in from cares and anxieties, which indicate only past causes, and propose nothing of the future to be divined.

SORTILEGE is divination by lots, which the ancients used, and indeed some Saints, as the Apostles, Acts 1, when they gave the lot for the election of the successor of Judas in the Apostolate, before they received the fullness of the Holy Spirit, as the Saintly Doctor observes, p. p. Centiloquii, sect. 29. And because some lots are just, others condemned as superstitious, therefore the diversity of these must be explained, that we may unmask superstitious sortileges, which the Saintly Doctor reviews in the speculum animae, cap. 1.

There are THREE genera of lots: Divisoria, Consultoria, and Divinatoria. Lots are divisory when by a cast of lots what is to be divided among each party is expected, for instance of two brothers, to whom this estate may fall, etc. They are consultorial, when by a cast of lots in doubtful matters the divine counsel is inquired into, what is to be done. They are divinatory, when from lots things to come are inquired into; and indeed these can be expected either from God, or from the Demon, or from chance.

DIVISORY lots are in some cases lawful, and are conceded in l. si duob. C. si communia de legatis, when equal power of choosing is given to two heirs or legatees, and they contend among themselves; the faculty is given of deciding the whole matter by lots.

They are LAWFUL indeed in secular matters which cannot otherwise conveniently be divided, for instance in the division of an inheritance between two brothers, or other co-heirs, for settling disputes. So teaches the Abbas in c. Ecclesiae extra de sortilegiis. Fagund. lib. 1. t. 40, Less. tom. 1. de Iustitia, lib. 2. c. 43. d. 9. Suarez Tom. 1. de Relig. lib. 2. de superstit. c. 12. Tanner. d. 5. quaest. 7. dub. 1. They are lawful also in honors or dangers, as if between two nations there is a dispute which town should first be attacked. So D. August. Ep. 180, and Lessius. They are also employed in another danger, when there are many Clerics in time of pestilence, and it is disputed who ought to remain to minister the Sacraments. So Fagund. Sanchez tom. 1. Decal. lib. 2. cap. 38. n. 59. Suarez n. 17., with D. Thom. 2. 2. quaest. 95 art. 8. Yet guard against injustices, losses, and profanations. See Bass. V. Divinatio.

Divisory lots are PERMITTED also in punishments, as if many are condemned to death for the same crime, and the Prince, to show clemency, wants to grant some pardon, but, to keep discipline, to punish some; by the lot of dice those to be saved and those to be condemned are chosen. So, with the authorities alleged, Delrius lib. 4. disq. cap. 4. quaest. 1. Finally, when in a storm some are to be cast into the sea, as Less. loc. cit., Fagundez num. 4., Delrius num. 60., Sanchez num. 62. note.

There is a QUESTION, however: whether lots are lawful for settling ecclesiastical disputes. First indeed, as regards election to ecclesiastical benefices, they are prohibited in cap. Ecclesia, extra, de sortilegiis. As to the rest: The first opinion asserts that it is lawful; another denies. A third concedes that it is lawful, provided it be done by public ecclesiastical authority. So Suarez, cap. 12. num. 12. Sanchez num. 79. Fagundez num. 7. The reason is, because it is nowhere prohibited in the law; which however is not proved privately, because there is a danger of invading a benefice under an unjust title. It is confirmed by the general rule in the matter of benefices, where it is decreed that a private pact over a benefice that is being litigated is not lawful, and that such a pact is Simony. That it can be done by the authority of a judge, the Gloss holds, in cap. licet causam, de probat. Hostiensis there num. 20. Abbas num. 37.

CONCERNING election indeed to benefices, all agree that it is not lawful, as is shown in cap. Ecclesia, and it is extended to the universal ecclesiastical election, in which jurisdiction, or the right of electing or renouncing, or an ecclesiastical dignity, benefice, or administration is given. So Suarez num. 5. Fagundez n. 10. And such an election will also be invalid, because it is against the form of elections given in cap. Quia propter, de elect., as Panormitanus notes, in cap. Ecclesia; see Bassaeus num. 3.

You will say: Matthias was elected to the episcopate by lot, Acts 1.

Fagundez answers that there lots are called suffragia. So in the Greek text we have: they gave them suffragia. But afterwards, thus he was elected to remove the scandal of the people, because Joseph seemed rather to be the one to be elected, since noble, and celebrated for justice and holiness, they asked of God a confirmation, which took place with a light sent down from God, which they call the lot. So also Lorinus on that passage, alleging Chrysostom. And D. Dionysius, de Ecclesiast. Hierar. part. 3. cap. 5., says that this lot was a Gift showing to that most noble assembly that Matthias had been elected. The same the Saintly Doctor teaches in the sermons on that Saint.

¶ Yet for civil offices election by lot is not evil; it can, however, be against distributive justice, if the less worthy is set in the lot with the more worthy. So Suarez cap. 12. num. 15. Less. cap. 43. d. 9. num. 58. Sanchez cap. 38. num. 58. D. Thom. quaest. 95. art. 8. Azor. tom. 1. lib. 9. cap. 21. quaesito un. Tolet. lib. 4. sum. cap. 15. Sylvest. superstitio, quaestio 9. Sayrus lib. 4. cap. 5. num. 20. Deltius lib. 40. cap. 4. quaest. 1., and all commonly, cited by Fagundez num. 15. See also Sigisin. dub. 26., with Basszo ut supra.

But the Canon law does not regulate except in the properly ecclesiastical matter.

C O N S U L T O R I AE lots are regularly illicit; they can, however, be lawful under these conditions. The first is necessity: Second, if they are done with God inspiring: Third, due reverence: Fourth, that they be not done about an undue matter, of which I treated just above. So Sanchez num. 83. Less. num. 60. Suarez num. 18. Fagundez n. 16. Bass. num. 3. Portel. de dub. reg. V. Venef. num. 21.

But without necessity, etc., to want God to show His will is to tempt Him who has not promised this, and the way is opened to the Demon, to insinuate himself by frauds.

That they can nevertheless be done prudently, the usage of the Holy Fathers shows, Iosue 7. Primo Reg. 10. Act. 1. So Prov. 16.: Lots are cast into the lap, but they are tempered by the Lord. So also S. P. Francis consulted God by thrice opening the Book of the Gospels, and again by turning over a companion, and also in other ways, as S. Bonaventure relates in his life.

I assert therefore, that divinatory lots are illicit and prohibited, cap. 1. de sortil. et 26. quaest. 1. cap. sortes. cap. Pervenit. cap. Si quis clericus. cap. Contra. cap. Episc. eadem 26. quaest. 1., and the Saintly Doctor relates it in the confessionali, cap. 3. particula 37. et 38. They are prohibited also by Sixtus V in his motu proprio.

It is proved, because knowledge of things to come is to be expected from God alone; but he himself never promised to announce the future by lots. So Fagundez n. 19. Suarez num. 27. Sanchez num. 88. Less. num. 61., and others.