Chapter VIII — On divination that is carried out by the use of lots

I. This is described by St. Thomas (II-II, q. 95, art. 8), who asserts it to be threefold. The first is divisory, which occurs so that, by an action of some kind, the outcome of the lot may reveal something hidden — namely, when it is determined, by the outcome, what is to be assigned to whom — an office, an honor, a rank, and the like. The second is consultative, when the divine will is consulted, that we may know what to avoid, what to undertake, what to do in this or that affair. The third is divinatory, when it is sought that some hidden future thing be revealed by a demon, tacitly or expressly. "A lot," says the Angelic Doctor, "is said to be divisory when it consists in some action, such that, from its outcome, something hidden is made known to the one to whom it pertains. And likewise if the inquiry regards a possession, or an office, or something of this sort, it takes the character of a divisory lot. If, however, the inquiry regards what ought to be done, it takes the character of a consultative lot. But if it is inquired what will be the case — as though such an act of human inquiry were vain and false, unless the lots are used according to the disposition of the stars to produce the effect (which is a fantastical opinion), and consequently not without a demon insinuating himself — then such divination is superstitious, or unlawful."

II. Divisory lots are lawful, since they are nothing other than a certain agreement of wills whereby men come together, so that it may be decided, by the outcome of the lot, to whom a thing, an honor, a rank, and the like ought to be assigned. There is here no pact whatsoever, express or tacit, with a demon. Very many examples of this kind of lot occur in Sacred Scripture, both Old and New Testament. In the Old: "And Samuel brought the tribe of Benjamin by lot" (1 Kings 10). Likewise Deuteronomy: "He himself shall divide the land by lot." From the New Testament: "They cast lots, and the lot fell upon Matthias" (Acts 1); "Upon my vesture they cast lots" (Matthew 27).

III. Question I. Is it lawful to use divisory lots in the election to secular offices? Response: The affirmative opinion is common with respect to the election to lay offices — since such a casting of lots is forbidden by no law, and is otherwise, by its very nature, entirely free from any taint of superstition. In order, however, for it to be lawful, the lot must be cast among candidates who are equally suitable and equally deserving. For if, through the use of the lot, rewards should fall to unsuitable candidates while suitable ones are passed over, this would then be a sin against distributive justice. It is lawful to cast lots, then, when several suitable candidates present themselves, and no distinction of merit among them can be discerned, so that it cannot be known which of them ought to be preferred.

IV. Question II. Is it lawful to use lots in the election to ecclesiastical benefices? Response: The negative opinion is common, since ecclesiastical law forbids this, in the chapter Ecclesia, on lot-casting, where the following is stated: "We condemn the use of lots in elections by a perpetual prohibition." No elections, then, whether to dignities, benefices, or ecclesiastical offices, can lawfully be carried out by the use of lots — and this holds true even for the election of compromise-electors chosen to carry out such elections. The Angelic Doctor expressly teaches this view; for although he admits the use of lots to be lawful for settling disputes, he denies that this is lawful for elections to ecclesiastical benefices. "One can sin in this matter in four ways," he says (loc. cit.). "First, if one has recourse to lots without any necessity at all: for this seems to pertain to tempting God. Whence Ambrose says, commenting on Luke: 'He who is chosen by lot is not subject to human judgment.' Second, if even in a case of necessity one uses lots without due reverence for God."

V. Question III. Is an election to an ecclesiastical benefice carried out by lot altogether void? Response: The election to ecclesiastical offices and benefices, although unlawful, is not for that reason void, since it is prohibited only by law, but not declared invalid. The election of a Prelate of the Church who holds jurisdiction, however, is [treated otherwise, per the chapter Quia propter, on elections]. And this is the common and true opinion, since in matters of prohibition one must always look to whether the prohibition adds, beyond an absolute prohibition, an express declaration of nullity as well — since a mere prohibition alone does not entail nullity, unless this is expressly stated. And since it is only in the election of a Prelate of the Church holding both jurisdictions that an election carried out by lot is declared void — while in elections to benefices and offices merely [the election] is void only in that specific sense — it follows that other cases, which are merely prohibited, are not void.

VI. Question IV. Is the use of lots lawful for settling disputes over ecclesiastical property or benefices? Response: If ecclesiastics dispute over temporal goods, there is no doubt that they may settle the dispute by the use of lots, with the due conditions observed, just as laypeople may — since, in this hypothesis, their goods are not distinguished from those of the laity. The question proposed, then, concerns disputes arising over elections to ecclesiastical benefices and offices; and on this difficulty two opinions are found. The first holds that a penal law ought not to be extended beyond the cases expressly stated. Now ecclesiastical law forbids the use of lots only in elections to benefices and offices, not in settling disputes. The other opinion denies this, on the grounds that if disputes were settled by lot, elections would in effect be made, or at least completed, by the use of lots.

VII. This second opinion is the more probable one, if the discussion concerns a casting of lots done on private authority. If, however, it is done on public authority — namely, that of a judge — so that lots may be cast in disputes so difficult and so entangled, and their legal merits so obscure, that no judgment can be reached by discerning them, then the use of lots becomes more respectable: for an absolute casting of lots is not forbidden. For Solomon says (Prov. 18): "The lot suppresseth contentions, and determineth even between the mighty." Whenever, then, the best possible outcome — namely, the settling of the dispute — is achieved, the casting of lots will not be unlawful. The law, in the chapter Ecclesia, on lot-casting, forbids elections to benefices and ecclesiastical offices to be made by lot; it also forbids disputes to be settled by lot when the legal merits are not so entangled that they cannot be discerned, and the case decided by the sentence of a judge. But when disputes are so obscure that the judges themselves cannot tell which party's rights are favored, who would say that ecclesiastical law forbids an end to be put to such disputes by the use of lots? Otherwise one would have to say that the law wills such disputes to remain endless forever — something no one can suspect. In order to avoid the difficulties that might be raised against it, such a casting of lots ought to be done on the authority of an ecclesiastical judge. For then there will be no danger of anyone obtaining a benefice without just title — since the authority of the judge competent to confer the benefice, in prescribing the casting of lots, itself pronounces the judgment; and whoever obtains the benefice does so, not so much through the effect of the lot, as through the sentence of the judge who prescribed such a casting of lots. There is likewise no suspicion of simony, which is removed by the judge's authority. This is the more common opinion, and the more probable one in my own view. It is defended by the Gloss (on the chapter Licet Causam, on the proposition "Uti possidetis"), Suárez (On Religion, Vol. I, tract. 3, Bk. 2, ch. 12, n. 33), Sánchez (Bk. II, ch. 38, n. 79), Castropalao (tract. 17, disp. 1, punct. 6, n. 7), Leander (tract. 9, disp. 12, q. 13), and the theologians of Salamanca (tract. 22, ch. 11, punct. 3, n. 88), among others. From these it is recorded that, once, when a dispute was raging as to which of two men had been lawfully elected Pope, it was decided, by the agreement of the Cardinals, to settle the discordant claim by lot. But would it not have been better, in such a case, to elect a third candidate, setting aside both rival claimants? This, we know from ecclesiastical history, is indeed what was done; and we believe the Cardinals would do the same, should such a case arise again. Nor do we know of any instance where a dispute over the Papacy was ever actually settled by lot. This, however, we submit to the judgment of the wise.

VIII. Question V. Is a consultative casting of lots lawful? Response: A twofold cause of consultative lot-casting exists, both spiritual — namely, God, or a demon. If the outcome is expected from a demon, it is called a divinatory lot, which is superstitious, and was forbidden by Pope Sixtus V in his own bull. We have already given the reason for this several times: namely, that such lots have no connection with future events, whether as causes or as signs of them. Since, then, this knowledge is not obtained from God, it remains that it is obtained from a demon; wherefore, in such lot-castings, there is always present a pact with a demon, either explicit or implicit.

IX. It is called consultative, when the knowledge of a future event is sought from God. That this is lawful is proved by many examples from Sacred Scripture, already indicated above. For Joshua made use of a lot to detect the hidden culprit, as is related in ch. 7. Saul discovered, by lot, that his son Jonathan had tasted [the forbidden honey], as is gathered from 1 Kings 14. The Apostles, having first cast lots, enrolled Matthias in the number of the Apostles. Other examples have already been indicated. For the lawful use of consultative lots, St. Thomas prescribes four conditions, which we have already described, and will briefly recall here. The first is a pressing necessity, whether spiritual or temporal; absent such necessity, God is tempted. The second is that the utmost reverence and deference toward God be preserved in such a casting of lots — namely, that it be preceded by mature deliberation, and that prayers be offered to God, as the Apostles did before the election of Matthias. The third is that sacred things not be mixed with profane ones — as if one were to make use of the pages of the Gospel, or the relics of the Saints, for temporal affairs. The last is that this casting of lots not be employed in elections to ecclesiastical benefices. Theologians note that these conditions are scarcely ever observed in practice. For this reason, such castings of lots are altogether to be rejected; and in doubtful matters, the laws, prudent rules, and wise men are to be consulted, lots being set aside.

X. Theologians commonly also note that, when lots are used — even with God's aid invoked — if no necessity is present, the sin will not be one of superstition, but of tempting God. When the other conditions are lacking, beyond the sin of superstition, other crimes can also occur — as when lots are used to detect a hidden thief, murderer, or other culprit, in which case, beyond superstition, the crime of injustice is also committed.

XI. Regarding the superstition involved in the use of duels, and of trial by red-hot iron or boiling water, St. Thomas teaches (II-II, q. 95, art. 8, ad 3): "The trial by red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is indeed ordered toward the investigation of some hidden sin, through something done by man; and insofar as some miraculous effect is expected from God, it agrees in this respect with the casting of lots — but it exceeds the common character of lots. Whence such a judgment is rendered unlawful: both because it is directed toward the discernment of hidden things, which are reserved to divine judgment alone, and also because such a judgment has not been sanctioned by divine authority." See II-II, q. 5 [i.e., other relevant passages]. In the Decree of Pope Stephen V it is said: "The extortion of a confession from anyone by the trial of red-hot iron, or of boiling water, is not sanctioned by the sacred canons; nor is it to be presumed, since it has not been sanctioned by the teaching of the holy Fathers, being a superstitious invention. Public crimes, once a spontaneous confession or the testimony of witnesses has established them, having the fear of God before our eyes, are granted to our own governance to judge. But hidden and unknown things are to be left to him alone who knows the hearts of the sons of men." The same reasoning seems to apply to the practice of dueling — except that it approaches more closely to the common character of the casting of lots, insofar as no miraculous effect is expected there, except perhaps when the combatants are very unequal in strength or skill.

XII. Question VI. Why do sleepers divine more than those who are awake? Response: A fitting reason for this can scarcely be assigned. Many contend that sleepers, being more withdrawn from the external senses and from things presented from without, are thereby more inwardly recollected. The soul, then, gathered within itself, and undistracted by external things, contemplates its own images more vividly. Hence it is that God sometimes reveals certain future things to those who are asleep — not because sleep of itself has any power for prophecy, but because the soul in sleep, being more tranquil and free from external hindrances, is more receptive. There is also a further, natural cause, arising from the food by which men are nourished. Let us hear Marcus Tullius (Bk. I, On Divination): "Plato accordingly wishes that men go to sleep with their bodies so disposed that nothing may bring error or disturbance to their minds. For this reason it is thought that the Pythagoreans were forbidden to eat beans, since this food produces great flatulence, quite contrary to the tranquility of mind that seeks the truth. When, then, the soul is withdrawn from the senses in sleep, and from contact with the body, it remembers the past, discerns the present, and foresees the future. For the body of one asleep lies as if dead, while the soul is vigorous and alive — a thing it will do far more fully after death, when it has departed wholly from the body." Cicero has much more to say on this subject.

XIII. Question VII. Why do fools and simpletons divine more easily than those endowed with sound reason? Response: It is a common proverb that fools, children, and simpletons divine — a view held by Plato and Aristotle. This divination, however, which is attributed to fools and the mad, is neither prophecy nor divination properly so called, but a certain prediction resting on natural causes. For fools and simpletons, being devoid of prudence and sharpness of mind, are led by a kind of instinct, like brute animals, which excel men at indicating future things that arise from natural and necessary causes. Certain fish portend storms to sailors; birds foretell rain to farmers; herds to shepherds; mice fleeing a house in a body foreshow its collapse. This arises from the fact that brute animals have a greater affinity with bodily causes, and perceive their impressions and influences more vividly; and so they sense future effects better and more surely. Similarly, fools and simpletons, being devoid of prudence, are closer to brute animals, and are more strongly affected by the impressions of natural causes; and so they tend to foresee natural future events better than prudent men. Contemplation withdraws much from the senses; and conversely, the application of the external senses weakens the power of contemplation, while the privation of one sense sharpens another. Thus the blind hear more acutely, and recall things more easily. In fools and simpletons, then, natural divination is sometimes more frequent than in the prudent, on account of their greater kinship with brute creatures. It should be added that fools and simpletons are talkative, and chatter continuously, blurting out whatever comes into their mouths; hence it is that, amid such a flood of words, they sometimes by chance foretell something true — just as street peddlers, who, narrating all the events to which men are commonly subject, and which occur most frequently, often reveal things that do in fact come to pass; a revelation which the unlearned take for prophecy, though it is entirely a matter of chance.

XIV. Question VIII. Why do men close to death often divine the future? Response: Plato, and other philosophers, observed that those closer to death foretell future things. Marcus Tullius relates this (Bk. I, On Divination). That the dying can divine, Posidonius confirms even by the example he cites, of a certain Rhodian, who, while dying, named six of his contemporaries, and said which of them would die first, which second, and so on in order. St. Gregory, as Azor relates (Bk. IX, ch. 24; Dialogues, Bk. IV, ch. 26 and 27), adduces many examples proving that the dying have foretold future events. He relates that a lawyer, near death, called his servant boy to prepare his clothes, since he wished to go out. The boy refused to obey, thinking his master delirious. But the man, rising from his bed, dressed himself, and declared that he would proceed by the Appian Way to the Church of St. Sixtus. But as his illness worsened, he met his death. It had been arranged that his body should be carried for burial along the Praenestine Way, to the Blessed Martyr Januarius; but because this route seemed too long to those who had charge of his funeral, they suddenly changed their plan and carried him instead to the very church the deceased had named — being wholly unaware of his prediction. He adds (ch. 27) that Count Theophanius foretold to his wife that there would be fair weather after his death, even though, while he was still alive and near death, the weather was extremely stormy, so that his body could not be carried out for burial. If these things are true, it must be said that, when the dying foretell things that cannot be known by natural power, God reveals these things to them, illuminating their minds to foresee the future. St. Gregory proves this also by the examples of Jacob and his sons, and of Moses, who, drawing near to death, foretold many future things — the latter to the people of Israel. When, however, the dying foretell future things that depend on natural causes, this occurs because their minds, the senses being dulled, contemplate things more exactly, and their bodies are more strongly affected by the influences of natural causes; and so they perceive better than others the changes of season and weather.

XV. St. Augustine (Bk. XII, On Genesis, Literally Interpreted, ch. 17) proposes many examples... in which he notes that those raving with a burning fever divine future things. Their prophesying, however, is nothing but chance: for since the delirious are talkative, blurting out everything that comes to their mouths, they sometimes hit upon what is to come. They are guided by no prudence, restrained by no fear; they conceal nothing hidden, but blurt out everything. It is no wonder, then, if they sometimes predict some future event — just as those who often throw javelins sometimes hit the mark even with their eyes closed. Those seized by black bile divine more frequently, since their minds are more easily drawn away from the senses, and thus withdrawn, they contemplate things with a more intense effort. They also more readily perceive the influences and changes of the air and the celestial bodies. I pass over many other examples, since they are of scarcely any use. For even Marcus Tullius himself, though he defends many superstitious things, writes as follows (Bk. I, On Divination, near the end): "If anyone's soul could perceive the entire connection of all causes, nothing at all, surely, would escape it — for he who grasped the causes of things to come would necessarily grasp all things that are to be. But no one can do this except God; it must therefore be left to man to foresee future things by certain signs that indicate their consequences." In this, however, Cicero errs — setting aside his other errors — in that he attributes too much weight to these signs.