The duties of the husband

The duties of parents extend to illegitimate as well as to legitimate children. The duty of caring for an illegitimate child falls primarily on the mother, who, before a year has elapsed from its birth, may obtain from the magistrates a maintenance order against the reputed father, providing for the child’s support and education at his expense.

A husband is bound by our law to support the children of his wife by a former husband as well as his own.

BESIDES the obligations which are treated of under Marriage, and the rights and obligations arising out of property belonging to married people, which are discussed under the Seventh Commandment, there are certain obligations arising from marriage inasmuch as it places the husband in a position of authority and the wife in one of subjection. A word must here be said concerning their mutual obligations in this respect.

The husband is bound to support his wife and family according to English law, who therefore have a claim in justice upon him as well as in piety. The husband sins grievously by treating his wife with habitual harshness and neglect, and by not providing for her necessities and those of her children. In this latter case the wife would not be guilty of sin if she took from her husband without his knowledge what was necessary for the decent support of the family.

VII. The effect of irritation is that the vow is entirely extinguished, so that in no case does the obligation afterward revive (can. 1312, § 1).

Corollary. The following can irritate vows:

1. A father can irritate vows emitted by prepubescent children, provided that when they become pubescent they have not confirmed them while aware of the infirmity of the prior vow. If, unaware of the infirmity, they confirm them, strictly speaking they only renew the vow as it was; but it was infirm or irritatable. The aforesaid power also belongs to him who, either by law (as a tutor), or by the father's disposition, is substituted in his place. The reason is that, because of the weakness of prepubescents, power over their will, that is, dominative power, must be judged to belong to the father and to the others enumerated. But dominative power, by can. 1312, § 1, has annexed to it the power of irritating vows (St. Alphonsus, III, 229, 238; cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 9).

It is disputed whether a father can irritate vows emitted by pubescent minors. Now the matter seems wholly doubtful, because the father's dominative power over pubescent minors is not proved. Nor is can. 89, which declares: "A minor person remains subject to the power of parents or guardians in the exercise of his rights, except in those things in which the law holds minors exempt from power"; nor is the cited canon, I say, judged to settle the question or theoretical controversy whether or not the father enjoys dominative power over pubescent minors.

Corollary. In doubt whether a vow was emitted before or after puberty, the power of irritating is doubtful, because it is doubtful whether the vow was emitted at a time when it was certainly subject to irritation.

2. The mother seems able to do the same as the father, provided he does not contradict, or with dependence on the father. The reason is that dominative power seems to belong to the mother as much as to the father, because she is the principle of the child no less than the father. Once dominative power is admitted, the power of irritating vows also must be admitted (St. Thomas, opusc. 17, cap. 13, vers. Decimo; St. Alphonsus, Homo Apostolicus, tr. 5, n. 36).

3. The husband seems to have the power of irritating the vows of the wife, because he seems to enjoy dominative power over her; for such power of itself is very expedient for the good of conjugal society, that is, for fostering dependence and intense love, for restraining the wife's impulses of mind, and for favoring the peace of the family. But dominative power carries with it the power of irritating vows (cf. St. Thomas, II-II, q. 88, a. 8, ad 3; St. Alphonsus, III, 324).¹

4. Superiors of religious, both exempt and non-exempt, both solemnly and simply professed, and likewise Superioresses, can directly irritate vows emitted by subjects during the time in which they were subject to themselves or to other Superiors, for example to a predecessor (can. 501, § 1). The power does not extend: 1. to substantial religious vows, for since these are constitutive of subjection, they are emitted independently of this subjection, and therefore cannot be called infirm or irritatable; 2. to vows annexed to the substantial vows, because since they are emitted together with the substantial vows, they likewise are judged to have been made independently of subjection. They also except the vow of passing to a stricter Religion² (St. Alphonsus, III, 233; IV, 53, 54).

What has been said about Superiors of religious should also be applied: 1. to the Pope with respect to professed male and female religious (cf. can. 499, § 1); 2. to Chapters of religious according to the norm of the constitutions and common law (cf. can. 501, § 1); 3. to the Bishop, if it is a question of a religion of diocesan right.

A Superior cannot irritate the vows of novices unless, according to the things said under I, he truly supplies the place of a parent, and it is a question of a vow which a parent could irritate (St. Alphonsus, IV, 55). Nor does the faculty of irritating the vows of novices or other faithful belong to the Supreme Pontiff, because he lacks dominative power over them.

Question. Whether the Church supplies probable power of irritating vows.

Response. We judge that it must be denied. For the power of irritating vows supposes dominative power; if this is present, the Church certainly completes it; if it is not present, it cannot be completed.

Corollary. Those who enjoy the power of irritating vows can also in advance render subjects incapable of vowing, either in some matter or universally, so that vows from that time are null from the beginning (St. Alphonsus, III, 228).

¹ Cf. Num. 30:7-13; Eph. 5:24.

² Cap. 18, de Reg.

V. The effect of suspension is relaxation for a time of the obligation of the vow; namely, when the right of the one suspending ceases, it revives, unless in the meantime it has ceased from another cause (can. 1312, § 2).

Corollary. The following can suspend vows - besides those who can irritate them:

1. A father or the one acting in his place in administering the goods of children can suspend the real vows of pubescent children as long as they lack the right of administering their own goods; likewise their personal vows, insofar as they prejudice domestic governance. The same power belongs to the mother as to personal vows; likewise as to real vows, if she herself is tutor or curatrix (St. Alphonsus, III, 229, 230).

2. A husband can suspend the vows of the wife insofar as they prejudice the use of marriage, the education of offspring, or domestic governance; likewise the wife can suspend the vows of the husband which prejudice her rights (St. Alphonsus, III, 234, 235).

Corollary. If spouses by mutual consent have emitted a vow of chastity, and in such a way that each has ceded his or her own right, the husband can directly irritate the vow of the wife; but the wife, once freed from the vow, can indirectly irritate the vow of the husband (cf. St. Alphonsus, III, 239).

4. The Pope can suspend the vows of all the faithful, and the Bishop the vows of diocesan subjects, insofar as they are adverse to the ecclesiastical governance belonging to him.

5. Religious Superiors and Superioresses can suspend the vows of novices which prejudice probation and religious discipline (St. Alphonsus, IV, 55).

Note. Vows emitted before religious profession are suspended for as long as the one vowing remains in religion (can. 1315).

V. Cessation. From can. 1319, a promissory oath, or the obligation induced by an oath of this kind, ceases:

1. If it is remitted by him for whose advantage the oath had been emitted (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 89, a. 9, ad 2; St. Alphonsus, III, 193). And that remission quite probably is made validly and licitly even when the oath was emitted principally in honor of God. "The reason is that, although the promise was made to God, it was nevertheless always made dependently on the will of the man to whom it was sworn, namely: if he does not remit the execution" (St. Alphonsus, cited place).

2. If the thing sworn is changed substantially; or, when the circumstances have changed, becomes either evil or altogether indifferent; or finally impedes a greater good. The former is drawn from the fact that the intention of the one swearing is not judged to have extended itself to matter substantially or notably changed, as was said concerning the intention of the one vowing (n. 653). The other things follow from this: that the thing sworn, if it becomes evil, or indifferent, or an impediment to a greater good, ceases to be matter apt for an oath (n. 688). Notice, however, that honorable matter promised and accepted in favor of a third party, even if perhaps less perfect in itself, nevertheless here and now remains more perfect, indeed is commanded, on account of the right acquired by the third party (n. 688).

3. If the final cause or the condition under which perhaps the oath was given is lacking. See what was said about a vow, n. 655.

4. By irritation, dispensation, or commutation, according to the norm of can. 1320. Moreover, from the cited canon:

a) The same persons who can irritate vows can irritate promissory oaths, and for the same reason (n. 662). They can irritate them - equally as vows - even if the irritation tends to the prejudice of others, even though these refuse to remit the obligation.

b) Likewise the same persons who can dispense or commute vows can dispense or commute promissory oaths, and for the same reason (n. 671); but if the dispensation of the oath tends to the prejudice of others, the Apostolic See alone can dispense or commute the oath on account of the necessity or utility of the Church (St. Alphonsus, III, 189, 192).

II. Duties of spouses. 1. Spouses owe one another love, affective and effective,¹ conjugal fidelity,² and living together.³

2. The husband is bound: 1. diligently to administer family affairs; 2. rightly to govern the wife and the whole family. Yet let the husband be mindful of the condition of the wife, who is a companion, not a handmaid. Hence let him treat her honorably; if there is need, let him correct her, but it scarcely happens that it is lawful to strike her (St. Alphonsus, III, 351).

3. The wife is bound: 1. to reverence her husband;⁴ 2. to obey her husband;⁵ 3. together with the husband to govern the family; 4. to perform domestic duties. As to obedience, however, note that of herself she is not held to those things which the husband would irrationally impose, for example if he required from a woman of more honorable condition that she sweep the house, unless poverty excused it (St. Alphonsus, III, 351, 352, question 2). Besides, disobedience as such is not easily gravely evil, because she ought to obey as a companion, not as a handmaid.

Spouses sin gravely by provoking one another with hatreds, grave curses, or quarrels.

The husband sins gravely: 1. "if he hinders [his wife] concerning the precepts of God or of the Church... but if he hinders her, even without cause, concerning those good things which are only of counsel, as confession, communion, etc., he commonly sins only venially; 2. if he beats her gravely; yet sometimes he can moderately chastise by words, or even from a grave cause by moderate blows, with account taken of condition and state;... 3. if he neglects the governance of the house and the family property; 4. if he does not cohabit with his wife or is absent for a long time without just cause; 5. if, when he can, he does not procure food, unless however the wife has departed from the company of the husband by her own fault, or unless she has committed adultery" (St. Alphonsus, III, 356).

The wife sins gravely: 1. "if she provokes her husband by quarrels or otherwise by words to grave anger or blasphemy;... 2. if, despising her husband, she claims authority for herself; 3.... if she inserts herself into the administration of the house without just cause; such as if, for example, the husband, being prodigal, squanders the goods of the family" (St. Alphonsus, III, 351).

¹ Cf. Eph. 5:25, 28, 29; Titus 2:4.

² Cf. our little work De virtute castitatis, n. 34.

³ Cf. cited work, n. 103.

⁴ Eph. 5:33.

⁵ Eph. 5:22, 23.

I. Public authority, just as it can kill a criminal, so a fortiori can mutilate, imprison, and beat him. But it is another question whether public authority lawfully imposes certain mutilations, namely vasectomy, oophorectomy, and so forth, as a punishment. Now, speaking theoretically, a punishment of this kind, although it can be defended from the fact that it deprives criminals of a great good, that is, of the faculty of procreating, seems less congruent with the common sense of morality. I said theoretically, because in practice it will impose the said punishment for this end, that the procreation of offspring to be procured by the criminal may be impeded. But that is illicit, because it is not lawful even for public authority directly to impede the good of the species (n. 740).

II. Superiors lacking supreme power, for example parents and those taking their place, cannot mutilate or strictly imprison their delinquent subjects; nevertheless they can beat them moderately. It is said:

1. They cannot mutilate them, because "man himself and all his parts" belong to society (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 1); but it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to subtract from the community what pertains to the community (n. 741).

2. They cannot strictly imprison them, because not only man and all his parts belong to the community, but also his activity; hence again it belongs only to the supreme governor of society to impede the activity of man by strict imprisonment (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 3). Nevertheless inferior Superiors can keep their subjects at home for just causes.

3. They can beat them moderately. For they enjoy the power of coercing subjects insofar as by acting thus they do not inflict injury on the community. But beating a subject inflicts no injury on the community, because it removes neither life, nor the integrity of members, nor activity (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2). Yet it is not lawful for a man to beat his wife, unless a most grave necessity urges, since the wife is not his servant but his companion (St. Alphonsus, VI, 972).

III. Equals, for example brothers and sisters, even if older by birth, cannot even beat delinquents, unless by consent of a superior. The reason is that by beating some harm is inflicted on the body of him who is beaten; moreover, it is not lawful to inflict harm on someone except by way of punishment, on account of justice. But no one can punish someone unless he is subject to his power. Therefore an equal cannot beat an equal (St. Thomas, II-II, q. 65, a. 2).

What are the rights and obligations of spouses as to persons? - The head of the wife is the husband, and therefore the wife is under the power of the husband in those things which pertain to marriage, that is, which pertain to the undivided sharing of life. Eph. 5:22 seqq.; C. A. 91. Therefore the wife, without the consent of the husband, cannot be obligated by vow, S. Th. 2. 2, q. 88, a. 8 ad 3; L. l. 3, n. 234; regularly she cannot be obligated by contract; she cannot make a pilgrimage without the consent of the husband, and regularly must follow the domicile of the husband. C. I. 131, 134, 135; C. G. 214, 217, 220, 221, 222; C. H. 58, 61; C. A. 91, 92; C. B. 1354; C. He. 160, 170; C. L. 1193, even if the husband changes domicile without cause, provided the wife can follow him without grave detriment either of soul or of body, and, from C. H. 58 and C. L. 1186, not into a foreign nation. By the same C. L. 1189, a wife can publish a writing without the consent of the husband. C. Pervenit 1, de Coni. lepr.; Sanch., de Matr., l. 1, d. 41, nn. 2, 4; L. 351, l. 6, n. 977; S. Th. S., q. 64, a. 6 ad 1; Quodl. 4, a. 11. Cf. v. 2, n. 1052.

Without the consent of the husband, and except for cases excepted by law, the wife cannot act in judgment. C. I. 134; C. H. 60; C. L. 1192. From C. He. 168, whatever the regime of goods has been, a wife can stand in judgment. But in cases with third parties, as to goods brought in, she is represented by the husband.

The wife indeed must furnish reverence, obedience, and compliance to the husband in those things which regard the governance of the house and good morals; but she is his companion, not his maidservant. Therefore if she is rich or noble she is not compelled to furnish to the husband things which are not of her dignity, for example, to cook foods, sweep the house, etc. Yet if she does not obey the husband in a grave matter, she sins gravely, and a certain moderate coercion is permitted to the husband. 1 Pet. 3:5 seqq.; L. 351, 352, 356; l. 6, n. 972; Sanch., de Matr., l. 6, d. 6, n. 14; C. I. 131; C. G. 313; C. H. 57; C. B. 1354, 1356, 1357; C. L. 1185, 1189; Leo XIII, Enc. Arcanum, 10 Feb. 1886.

The husband in turn must love and protect the wife, Eph. 5:25; C. I. 132; C. H. 57; C. G. 213; C. L. 185; feed her, and dwell with her; and therefore it is not licit for him to be absent from her for a long time unless from a grave cause. Gen. 2:24; C. I, de Coni. lepr.; C. I. 130, 132; C. G. 212, 214; nor even to undertake a long pilgrimage with the woman unwilling. C. 8, de Voto. Yet the husband is not usually bound to take the wife with him at great inconvenience and expense, when it happens that he must travel around because of business. C. 9, § In tanta, de Voto. But the husband sins gravely if he affects the wife with contumelious or defamatory words; if he impedes her concerning the precepts of God or of the Church without just cause; if he gravely beats the wife; if he neglects the governance of the house and the family estate. Col. 3:18, 19; L. 356; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 5, n. 17; S. Th. 2. 2, q. 26, a. 11.

In those things which pertain to mutual help of life, man and wife are of equal right, since marriage is entered for the sake of mutual help. Hence they mutually owe each other love, fidelity, assistance, and support. Eph. 5:25; Matt. 19:5; 1 Cor. 7:3 seqq.; C. I. 130; C. G. 212; C. H. 56; C. A. 90; C. L. 1184; and if anything adverse happens to one, the other must be a participant. Therefore a woman must follow a husband migrating elsewhere for the sake of health or as a punishment, and a man must follow a woman. L. 353, l. 6, nn. 957, 977. And one must furnish support to the other in need, even if driven into exile by his or her own fault, or shut in prison, indeed even when separated from the other, provided it is not by his or her own fault, if he or she has resources; and the husband must feed the wife even if he married her without dowry, or the dowry perished by chance. C. I. 132, 133, 142; C. G. 214; C. B. 1360, 1361; C. He. 159, 160, 161; Sanch., de Matr., l. 9, d. 4, n. 20; d. 5, nn. 8, 14.

It is lawful for neither, with the other unwilling, to enter religion, C. un., Extr., de Voto; and he who passes to religion with the spouse unwilling can be recalled. C. 3, 12, de Conv. coni. Nor is it lawful for a man, with the wife unwilling, to receive orders, indeed not even tonsure, C. 4, de Temp. ord., in 6, except if he has justly and by law separated from her as to habitation. L. l. 1, n. 969. Cf. 1 Tim. 2:8-15; 5:9-14; Eph. 5:22-33.

What about ownership of children under paternal power and of wives? - A child under paternal power is one who is still subject to paternal power. But although "the woman is equal to the man in the act of marriage, nevertheless in those things which pertain to the disposition of the house, the husband is the head of the woman, according to the Apostle, 1 Cor. 11." S. Th. 2. 2. q. 32. a. 8 ad 2. Moreover, "he who is constituted under the power of another, insofar as he is such, ought to be regulated according to the power of the superior. For this is the natural order, that lower things be regulated according to higher. And therefore it is necessary that in those things in which an inferior is subject to a superior, he dispense no otherwise than has been permitted to him by the superior." S. Th. ibid. c.

Hence it is clear that although children under paternal power and wives can well have ownership of things, nevertheless this ownership is not independent, speaking per se, from the power of the father of the family and of the husband; but it is subject to their power as regards administration, and also as regards usufruct, for sustaining the expenses of education and the burdens of marriage. Cf. 667 ff., 677 ff.

The ownership of children under paternal power regards things given to them by any title transferring ownership, or acquired by their own industry. For as regards paternal goods, children have no strict right to paternal goods while the father lives. Hence, if children under paternal power take anything from these goods, they are per se bound to restitution. Per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of less importance, and it is prudently presumed that the father remits that obligation.

Likewise ownership of wives is understood in their own goods, not in the goods of the husband. Hence a wife also, if she takes something from the husband from his goods, is per se bound to restitution. Again per se, namely unless there is question of a thing of less importance, and it is prudently presumed that the husband consents. Likewise a wife would be excused if, not having paraphernal goods, she took something from the common goods, or from the fruits of her dowry, to relieve the necessity of parents or children who had been received from a first marriage. For she is bound to this by the law of nature, and the husband ought to consent to it. But since the husband does not have direct ownership of the goods of the wife, if he dissipates them, he is bound to restitution. Cf. 667 ff., 677 ff.; 1 Kings 25; S. Th. 2. 2. q. 57. a. 4; L. 539, 542-544; H. A. 33.

The question is raised here only concerning common goods, whether the husband is bound to restitution if he dissipates them; and it must be affirmed if there is question of the capital and common goods themselves, since if these goods are common and consequently belong to the husband and wife in common, it is clear that the right of the wife is injured in this matter, and therefore is to be repaired. If there is question of the revenues of the same goods, when these are assigned to the husband by the laws, he is excused from restitution as regards those badly spent; but when they enter the common goods and constitute goods of the community, he is bound to restitution, as when the profits themselves enter the community and constitute common goods. And this is had indeed in C. G. 401, 1421, 1422; C. I. 1433, 1435, 1436; C. H. 1392 ff. For although the husband alone has administration of the goods of the community, nevertheless he does not have usufruct except only for the good of the family, C. G. 1409, and of the community itself, C. I. 1436; C. H. 1401, 1408, 1409, 1413, 1415.

From C. He., in the regime of union of goods, the revenues of the wife and the natural fruits of the goods brought by her are the property of the husband, 195. In the regime of communion of goods, all goods and all revenues belong undividedly to each spouse, 215. From C. B., in the regime of universal community of goods, the goods of the husband and wife are the common goods of each, and among these are also reckoned those things which the husband and wife acquire during the community, 1438. The husband administers them; but he cannot freely dispose of them, 1443 ff., especially to the detriment of the wife, 1456. From them, however, the expenses of marriage are to be made, 1458. And almost the same holds in the regime of community of acquisitions, 1519 ff., and in the regime of community of movables and acquisitions, 1549 ff. Cf. here 677, 1237; L. 539, 542; Lessius 1. 2. c. 25. d. 4. n. 37.

592. 2. The obligations and rights of the husband. Since the husband is the head of the family, there belongs to him the power of governing: a) the wife; b) the children; c) the family property.

Hence he must take care that the wife faithfully fulfills all her duties; but he is also bound to provide her with sufficient food, clothing, and housing, even if the wife brought no dowry goods. In the case of divorce as to bed and habitation, the husband is bound to provide suitable support for the wife, unless the divorce was made on account of the grave fault of the wife. Therefore a husband sins if he treats his wife harshly and roughly; or if he compels her to labors which dishonor her condition and dignity. For the wife is the companion, and not the handmaid, of the husband. A husband can, and indeed must, correct a wife who is at fault; this correction ordinarily ought to consist in words uttered without anger and hatred. Graver corrections consisting in deeds or blows are commonly evil or at least to be dissuaded, inasmuch as they are more harmful than useful. A husband can sin gravely if he pursues his wife with abusive words, for example, by calling her an adulteress, harlot, witch, etc.; likewise he sins gravely if he greatly afflicts his wife by his drunken excesses and other disordered passions.

By reason of paternal power over the children, the direction of their education is incumbent upon the husband according to what was said above concerning the education of children.

The husband must diligently administer the family goods entrusted to him. As regards the administration of the wife's goods, the civil laws or legitimate agreements must be observed, as was said above, n. 16ff., in the tract on justice.

830. Mutual offices of spouses. - Besides the offices of justice, which regard either the administration of goods, concerning which it was already spoken in n. 181-182, or the conjugal debt itself of intercourse to be rendered (I Cor. VII, 3) and conjugal fidelity to be preserved, concerning which it must be spoken in the treatise on matrimony, there are three things which spouses owe each other by natural and divine law from piety: mutual love, mutual help and consolation, and cohabitation.

1. Sincere and intense mutual love. For since they are as one flesh (Mt. XIX, 5), they ought also to be as one heart; for this reason St. Paul commands husbands to love their wives as Christ loved the Church (Eph. V, 25), and wives to love their husbands (Tit. II, 4; Col. III, 18; I Tim. II, 15). This love must be not only affective but also effective, so that spouses furnish help to each other, especially in necessities, and, says Prummer, Th. M. II, n. 590, "avoid disordered egoism, contumelious words, harshness, and especially jealousy, which is wont to be the sepulcher of conjugal love."

2. Mutual help and consolation: for in this they complete each other, because the gifts of one are the complement of the other. Whence God says: It is not good for man to be alone; let us make him a help like unto himself (Gen. II, 18). Hence matrimony is not only a union of bodies but also a union of souls, and a special friendly society by which spouses promise service and assistance to each other.

3. Cohabitation at one table and bed (can. 1128; C. C., a. 214); this is a corollary of the others, altogether required for attaining the ends of matrimony: the education of offspring and mutual help. Whence it is said: For this cause a man shall leave father and mother, and shall cleave to his wife, and they shall be two in one flesh (Gen. II, 24; Mt. XIX, 5).

831. Special offices of the husband. - The husband is the head of the wife and family; and therefore there belongs to him the power of governing not only the children and the family property, but also the wife, who nevertheless is not his handmaid but a worthy partner. Hence he is bound:

1. to furnish to the wife suitable sustenance according to his state, and support and protection;

2. to take care that the wife faithfully fulfill her duties;

3. also to correct her when delinquent; but correction ordinarily ought to consist in words brought forth without anger and hatred: for graver correction consisting in deeds or in moderate blows is rarely opportune or even legitimate.

Hence per se he sins gravely a) if he denies food to the wife, or, although he can, does not procure it, unless she has departed by her own fault;

b) if he treats his wife very harshly and roughly, or compels her to labors which altogether disgrace her condition;

c) if he affects his wife with contumelious or defamatory words;

d) if without cause he impedes her as to the practice of religion;

e) if he gravely beats her;

f) if he greatly afflicts her by his drunken excesses and other disordered passions;

g) if he is very negligent in the governance of family property.

832. Special offices of the wife. - The wife ought to reverence her husband as head and ruler, and furnish him due obedience; whence the Apostle warns: Women, be subject to husbands, as it behooves in the Lord (Col. III, 18; Eph. V, 33). For this reason she ought to expend diligent care in domestic affairs, as her condition demands; and to obey the husband in the governance of the house and in good morals.

Hence per se the wife sins gravely: a) if by quarrels or words she provokes her husband to grave anger or blasphemy;

b) if, despising her husband, she herself wishes to govern, or is notably disobedient, unless the husband commands irrationally;

c) if she gravely neglects domestic affairs, indulging idleness or amusements; or if, given to luxury, she exasperates her husband;

d) if she habitually injects herself into the administration of the house, not in the manner of one helping but of one dominating; unless there is a just cause, such as if the husband, as a spendthrift, squanders the goods of the family or is unfit for management: yet let her not think this last too easily.

971. Mutual love and help is a necessary condition and foundation of conjugal life. So intimate and individual a custom of life, which is perfected in rendering the conjugal debt to one another and is completed by the partnership of roof and bed, so that spouses adhere to each other to the exclusion of another person, is not understood, we said, nor can it firmly stand, without an intimate union of souls strengthened by constant love, and without mutual help to be furnished to each other in the various necessities of domestic life. And indeed:

1° Nature inclines to this love, which moves to matrimony and to mutual love of man and woman, so that under its influence they may be a support and help to each other; marital copula fosters and nourishes this love, and common offspring promotes and strengthens it.

2° Christian doctrine commands love: "Husbands," says the Apostle, Eph. V, 25, 28, "love your wives, as Christ also loved the Church, and delivered himself up for her... So also husbands ought to love their wives as their own bodies. He who loves his own wife loves himself"; and similarly he wills that women "love their husbands, love their children; be prudent, chaste, sober, having care of the house, kind, subject to their husbands," Tit. II, 4-5.

3° Reason also confirms it: for where there is a special conjunction, there ought to be a special love. Between husband and wife there is an altogether special and most intimate conjunction in conjugal life, so that they are even one flesh. Therefore between them there ought to be an altogether special and intimate love; from which mutual support and help is naturally born to follow, because true love is naturally operative.

To true and intimate conjugal love there is opposed:

a) love, as it is called, platonic, nourished toward an unmarried person of the different sex; by which the spouse withdraws his heart from the other spouse so as to give it to an outside person, while nevertheless leaving the body to the spouse for conjugal acts;

b) a fortiori adulterous friendship, which would admit a lustful affection or act with outside persons; to which they say indulgence must be given in our days, since they judge affection restricted to the spouse to be "a certain obsolete weakness of mind and soul, or an abject and vile jealousy," and "this the more because not a few have an innate sexual disposition to which they cannot give satisfaction within the narrow limits of monogamous marriage," as Pius XI denounces;

c) likewise blind agreement of character and mere sympathy of disposition, which certain moderns intend to substitute as the foundation of marriage for genuine conjugal love, or for the deliberate and constant conjunction of souls and mutual charity, and "when this ceases, they teach that the bond by which alone souls are united is relaxed and fully dissolved";

d) finally conjugal jealousy, which can arise not only from the imprudence or fault of the other spouse, but also from the mere suspicion of the jealous one, and consists in this, that everywhere and in all actions of the other party he perceives signs of diminished love toward himself and undue love toward another person. For this defect the best remedy, says Prummer, Th. M. III, n. 688, "is the candid and open manner of speaking and acting always employed between spouses, without all ambiguities and secrets. As a rule to be recommended: Each spouse in his private life should hide nothing from the other party." This indeed, the praised author warns, is not to be extended to one's professional life and to secrets committed to one.

972. Respective offices of husband and wife. - Every love ought to be ordered; but in conjugal love there ought to be an order of subordination, because the husband is loved by the woman as her head, and the woman by the husband not as a slave or handmaid but as a companion and friend. Hence the Apostle says, Eph. V, 22-23: Let women be subject to their husbands as to the Lord; because the husband is the head of the woman, as Christ is the head of the Church (likewise I Pet. III, 1; I Cor. XI; Col. III, 18; I Tim. II, 12; Tit. II, 5); as he also adds: Husbands, love your wives as Christ also loved the Church, which he chose for himself, namely as a companion. Hence, although husband and wife are equal in right as to those things which are proper to the human person in order, namely, to his ultimate end, and as to the primary object itself of the matrimonial contract, or the conjugal debt, nevertheless they are by no means equal, but unequal, as to those things which concern domestic life.

And therefore the offices of the husband are one thing, those of the woman another.

A. The husband is the head of the woman and of the family, and therefore he ought

1° to protect the woman,

2° to provide suitable support to her according to his state,

3° to direct and govern her, not however as a slave, but as a companion and friend, and therefore to see to it that she fulfills her duties and to correct her when she fails, moderately, however, and according to her dignity,

4° diligently to administer the temporal goods of the family.

B. The woman is the companion of the husband, but subject to him as to the head, and therefore she ought

1° to show reverence to him as to head and ruler,

2° to furnish obedience in the governance of the house and in good morals,

3° diligently to care for the domestic matter.