The Effects of Sin

Dogmatic theologians treat of the effects of original sin; hence our discussion is chiefly of the effects of personal sin. Three are assigned, namely the corruption of natural good, the guilt of fault or stain of sin, and liability to punishment.

I. Corruption of natural good consists in this, that personal sin causes the wounds inflicted by original sin to become worse. These are:

1. Ignorance, insofar as reason is so deprived of its order to the true that it is prone to assenting to the false, and finds assenting to the true difficult, and is deprived of knowledge of necessary things.

2. Malice, insofar as the will is so deprived of its order to the good that it is prone to evil and finds choosing the good difficult.

3. Weakness, insofar as the irascible appetite is so deprived of its order to the arduous that it is weak for tolerating adversities.

4. Concupiscence, insofar as the concupiscible appetite is so deprived of its order to sensible good that it is prone to desiring it against the order of reason.

Now "these four are wounds inflicted upon the whole of human nature from the sin of the first parent. But because the inclination to the good of virtue in each person is diminished by actual sin, as is clear from what has been said, articles 1 and 2 of this question, these also are the four wounds resulting from other sins; namely, insofar as through sin reason is dulled especially in practical matters, and the will is hardened toward the good, and greater difficulty of acting well increases, and concupiscence burns more intensely" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85, a. 3).

II. Guilt of fault or stain. 1. Notion. The stain of sin is the privation of the beauty of the soul, connoting the sin from which it was contracted. It is said "connoting the sin from which it was contracted," because the stain has the character of fault; hence it is moral and voluntary, or it connotes the act of the will by which it was produced. The stain does not differ from fault and habitual sin. It is called fault insofar as it is conceived as the privation of the order due to God; habitual sin, insofar as it is considered as the state of the soul remaining from actual sin not remitted.¹

2. Existence. The stain remains in the soul after the act of sin. This is clear: 1. from Sacred Scripture: "Is it a small thing to you that you sinned in Beelphegor, and unto the present day the stain of this crime remains in us?"² 2. By reason. "Stain, as was said, imports a certain defect of brightness on account of departure from the light of reason or of the divine law; and therefore, as long as man remains outside light of this kind, the stain of sin remains in him. But after he returns to the light of reason and to the divine light, which happens through grace, then the stain ceases. Although the act of sin ceases, by which man departed from the light of reason or of divine law, nevertheless man does not immediately return to that in which he had been; rather, some motion of the will contrary to the first motion is required. Just as if someone is distant from another through some motion, when the motion ceases he does not immediately become near to him, but it is necessary that he approach by returning through a contrary motion" (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86, a. 2). Hence proposition 56 among the Baian propositions was deservedly condemned: "In sin there are two things, the act and the guilt; but when the act has passed, nothing remains except the guilt or obligation to punishment."³

3. Division. The brightness of the soul, in the privation of which the stain consists, is twofold according to these words of St. Thomas: "The soul of man has a twofold brightness: one from the shining of the rational light of reason, by which it is directed in its acts; the other from the shining of the divine light, namely of wisdom and grace, by which also man is perfected for acting well and fittingly" (I-II, q. 86, a. 1). Therefore:

a) The stain of mortal sin consists in the privation of rectitude both natural and supernatural, i.e., of sanctifying grace, charity, the supernatural virtues, except faith and hope, the gifts of the Holy Spirit, and merits.

b) The stain of venial sin is situated in the privation of the fervor of charity. "It must be said that stain can be in two ways: in one way through the privation of beauty, and thus in venial sin no stain remains, because it does not take away grace, which is the beauty of the soul. In another way through this, that the beauty which belongs to grace is impeded from appearing outwardly, just as the beauty of a face is spoiled by dust; and such a stain is in venial sin, because the beauty of grace is impeded from being shown outwardly in acts" (St. Thomas, In IV Sent., dist. 16, q. 2, a. 2, ad 1). From these things it is clear why St. Thomas does not call the stain of venial sin a stain simply, but in a certain respect (I-II, q. 89, a. 1), namely because it does not deprive of grace, through which beauty is present in the soul.

Corollary I. The stains of diverse sins differ, since a stain is a privation connoting the sin from which it was contracted; hence it is diverse insofar as the sin which it connotes is diverse (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86, a. 1, ad 3).

Corollary II. A new sin is said to cause a new stain insofar as of itself it is privative of grace, and therefore constitutes a new cause of privation.

¹ Billuart, De peccatis, diss. 7, art. 1.

² Josh. 22:17.

³ Denzinger-Bannwart, n. 1056.

III. Liability to punishment. 1. Notion. Liability to punishment is the condignity of undergoing punishment because of sin committed. Now punishment is some evil to be inflicted, or inflicted, by legitimate authority upon an agent for a morally evil action.

2. Existence. Sacred Scripture teaches that liability to punishment is induced by sin: "Many are the scourges of the sinner."¹ "Tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man working evil."² Then reason requires that he who has violated order be cast down by the prince of order, namely so that the violated order may in some way be restored through a certain repayment of punishment (St. Thomas, I-II, q. 87, a. 2).

3. Quality of the punishment to which sins induce liability.

a) Mortal sin induces liability to a twofold punishment, namely of loss and of sense, each eternal; this the dogmatic theologians prove at length.

b) Venial sin of itself induces liability to temporal punishment. But by accident it induces eternal punishment when the sinner dies with venial sin not remitted as to fault. Thus St. Thomas (I-II, q. 87, a. 5, ad 3) against Scotus. And indeed, while fault remains, liability to punishment remains. But in the damned there remains the fault of venial sin not remitted in this life, since the damned are simply at the terminus, and therefore incapable of acts of charity or repentance.

Note. Mortal or venial sin remitted in this life as to fault, more probably, is not punished in hell by eternal punishment; rather, once satisfaction has been made, the punishment comes to an end.

¹ Ps. 31:10.

² Rom. 2:9.

468. (A) After the sinful act has passed, man remains habitually turned away from God, until he is freed from sin through penance: but he cannot be exempted from this unless through an act of the will he retracts the evil act placed by himself, and obtains pardon from God.³ But that state of turning away from God is called habitual sin, or the state of sin; it is not indeed a vicious habit properly so called, for this supposes repeated acts of the same species; but it is a certain inordinate disposition, by force of which the will, which ought to tend toward God, remains turned away from the ultimate end, and therefore is less apt for resisting temptations and for acting well.

³ St. Thomas declares this thus, I-II, q. 86, a. 2: "Although the act of sin ceases, by which man withdrew from the light of reason or of the divine law, nevertheless man does not immediately return to that in which he had been; but some motion of the will contrary to the first motion is required; just as if someone is distant from another by some motion, when the motion ceases he does not immediately become near to him, but he must approach by returning through a contrary motion."

This disposition is called guilt of fault, because the sinner, as long as he has not retracted nor repaired the injury inflicted upon God, remains guilty of that offense; therefore he ought to do penance as soon as possible, if he wishes to recover grace.

469. (B) For man constituted in the supernatural order, the state of sin includes also the privation of habitual grace and charity; for in the present order, man is not ordered to his supernatural end except through habitual grace, as was said above, n. 8; therefore he is not turned away from the same end except by privation of habitual grace and charity.

(C) But this privation of grace is nothing other than the stain of sin, which the Scriptures often commemorate; for sins are called stain, filth, uncleanness, defilements; from which God washes us with clean water, and Christ washes us in His blood.¹ But this stain is not something positive or a depraved quality, but only the privation of sanctifying grace. St. Thomas declares this by comparison:² just as a stain in corporeal things consists in this, that a shining body loses its brightness from contact with another body, so in spiritual things the soul is metaphorically said to be stained when it loses its brightness by clinging to created things through inordinate love.³

¹ Josh. 22:17; Isa. 4:4; Ezek. 36:25; Zech. 13:1; 1 Cor. 6:11; Eph. 5:27.

² St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86, a. 1.

³ In the natural order, the state of sin would consist in the privation of the rectitude by which man is naturally ordered to God.

Usefulness. It is not for us to treat expressly either of the punishment or of the remission of sin, since those parts are taken up in the dogmatic treatise on Penance and on the Last Things. Yet because, that we may be more averse in soul from sin, it is of no small profit to know the harms and deadly consequences which are brought on by sin; and because the knowledge of the reason by which sins are extinguished illumines the ways of salutary penance: therefore, not only for possessing more adequately the doctrine concerning sins, but also for suggesting opportune admonitions to the Confessor and spiritual Father, it will be worth while here summarily to embrace the golden judgments of St. Thomas concerning each argument, that of the punishments and that of the remission of sins. And concerning the punishments of sins we shall adhere more closely to the exposition of Card. Billot in the little work De Peccato personali.

390. Preliminary note. 1. After St. Thomas in the Summa Theologica treated of the causes of sin, he treats of its effects. Following in the footsteps of the Angelic Doctor, we also treat of the effects of sin, yet omitting those things which are had concerning the effects of original sin, since these are now customarily treated rather in Dogmatics. Indeed several deadly effects of original sin are produced, more or less, also by personal sin; for example, those four wounds which original sin inflicted on human nature are renewed and aggravated through personal sin, namely ignorance in the intellect, malice in the will, weakness in the irascible power, and disordered concupiscence in the concupiscible power. For mournful experience manifestly shows that by personal sins often repeated the human intellect is gradually blinded concerning the truths of faith and morals. Indeed this frequency of sins can blind the intellect to such an extent that it scarcely, or not even scarcely, sees the ways of salvation, but as if headlong in darkness rushes from one sin into another. Moreover malice in the will is caused and increased by repeated vices, so that at last, at some time, obstinacy is effected. That weakness in resisting and a greater disordered propensity in desiring arise from repeated sins is especially clear in disordered passions, for example in sins of drunkenness, lust, etc. The Angelic Doctor⁴⁴ briefly gathers all these things, saying: "Those four wounds were inflicted on the whole of human nature from the sin of the first parent. But because the inclination to the good of virtue in each one is diminished through actual sin, those also are the four wounds consequent upon other sins, insofar namely as through sin reason is dulled chiefly in things to be done, and the will is hardened toward good, and a greater difficulty of acting well increases, and concupiscence burns more intensely."

⁴⁴ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 85, a. 3.

391. 2. The effect of sin is called by more modern authors habitual sin; this name does not seem to be a happy innovation, since habitual sin can easily be confused with a habit of sinning, which nevertheless is altogether something else. Habitual sin is understood as the culpable disorder remaining from any sin, or the state of sin. The ancient theologians of the Middle Ages called this a stain.⁴⁵ But under the name of stain they properly understood voluntary privation of sanctifying grace;⁴⁶ and therefore stain, properly speaking, is not caused except by mortal sin: "Venial sin indeed impedes actual brightness, but not habitual brightness, because it neither excludes nor diminishes the habit of charity and of the other virtues, but only impedes their act. But stain imports something remaining in the stained thing; hence it seems more to pertain to the detriment of habitual brightness than of actual. Hence properly speaking venial sin does not cause stain in the soul. And if somewhere it is said to introduce stain, this is in a certain respect, insofar as it impedes brightness, which is from acts of the virtues."⁴⁷

Since the chief division of actual sin is into mortal and venial, the effects of mortal and venial sin must be seen separately.

⁴⁵ Concerning the diverse opinions about the stain of sin, see Billuart, De pecc. diss. 7, a. 2, § 2.

⁴⁶ St. Thomas teaches: "Stain is not something positive in the soul, nor does it signify privation alone, but it signifies a certain privation of the brightness of the soul in order to its cause, which is sin; and therefore diverse sins introduce diverse stains" (S. theol. 1, 2, q. 86, a. 1, ad 3).

⁴⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 89, a. 1.

392. Several effects of mortal sin are indeed enumerated, but all are founded as in a root in the loss of sanctifying grace. That sanctifying grace is truly lost through mortal sin is of faith; for the Council of Trent defines:⁴⁸ "It must be asserted that the grace of justification received is lost not only by infidelity, through which faith itself is lost, but also by any other mortal sin, although faith is not lost." Just as sanctifying grace was the cause of original justice and of the whole felicity of the first parents, so the loss of that grace through sin was the cause of all evils. With proportion preserved, sanctifying grace in the same way causes the nobility and happiness of any man, while on the contrary the loss of it brings a great misfortune upon any man. For sanctifying grace is a participation of the divine nature in the soul of the just man; through it man becomes a sharer of the divine nature,⁴⁹ becomes the temple of God,⁵⁰ becomes a co-heir of Christ,⁵¹ and receives all the infused virtues and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. All these things indeed are destroyed in the blink of an eye by one mortal sin. Hence, by enumerating individually, the following effects of mortal sin appear:

1. Loss of sanctifying grace.

2. Loss of the infused virtues, and also of the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

The reason is that the infused virtues receive their form, that is, direction, from charity. But sin is directly opposed to charity, since sin is essentially a grave offense against God. Charity and mortal sin destroy one another. Where charity is, there is no sin; but where mortal sin is, there is no charity. Faith and theological hope are not utterly destroyed by mortal sin; nevertheless they become, as theologians are accustomed to say, unformed, that is, their acts lack direction to the ultimate end.⁵² This loss of virtues and gifts is most grave, and to it can be applied those things which Jeremiah utters lamenting over Jerusalem, which is a type of the soul, destroyed: "How does the city sit alone, full of people!"⁵³ Before sin is committed the soul is filled with most sweet inhabitants, namely the three divine persons dwelling in it, the three theological virtues, the four cardinal virtues, and the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit; but after sin is committed these inhabitants are violently cast out, and the soul remains alone and deserted.

3. Loss of all merits.

The soul by sinning mortally loses the merits which it acquired in its whole life, since "all his justices which he had done shall not be remembered."⁵⁴ Jeremiah expresses this fittingly: "The enemy has put his hand to all her desirable things."⁵⁵ From divine mercy these merits, mortified through sin, after grace has been recovered, live again.⁵⁶ But all good works done in the state of mortal sin merit no eternal reward, because, charity being absent, the works of man are not accepted before God.

4. Most foul defilement of the soul.

Through sanctifying grace the soul obtains a most beautiful brightness and incomparable beauty. Therefore in the Canticle of Canticles the beauty of the bride, which is a figure of the just soul, is extolled with such great praises. But when grace is lost through sin, in place of that beauty the soul receives a foul stain; St. Thomas⁵⁷ explains this in this way: "Stain is properly said in bodily things, when some bright body loses its brightness from contact with another body, as a garment and gold and silver. But in spiritual things, according to the likeness of this, stain must be spoken of. Now the soul of man has a twofold brightness: one indeed from the refulgence of the natural light of reason; ... but another from the refulgence of divine light, namely of wisdom and grace.... But there is, as it were, a certain touch of the soul, when it adheres to certain things through love. But when it sins, it adheres to certain things against the light of reason and of the divine law. Hence the very detriment of brightness arising from such contact is metaphorically called the stain of the soul." Jeremiah very forcefully describes this defilement of sin: "And from the daughter of Sion all her beauty has gone out";⁵⁸ "He has killed everything that was beautiful to sight in the tabernacle of the daughter of Sion";⁵⁹ "Their face has become blacker than coals, and they have not been known in the streets; their skin has adhered to their bones, it has dried up and has become like wood."⁶⁰ With how great a foulness the soul is contaminated by mortal sin can in some way be understood from the following deduction. The common adage is: the corruption of the best is the worst; that is, the nobler a thing is, the worse is its corruption. Now the human soul, ennobled by sanctifying grace and as it were deified, obtains the first place among all sublunary creatures. Therefore its corruption caused by mortal sin will be worse and fouler than any other corruption. A corrupted stone is foul; a corrupted plant is fouler; the putrefying corpse of a dog is still fouler; the putrefying corpse of a man is still fouler; but the soul, and that one elevated to the supernatural order, if it is dead and putrefying through mortal sin, is the foulest of all. Therefore it is no wonder if St. Philip Neri, who by a special grace saw a soul in the state of mortal sin, exclaims that nothing is fouler in the whole world than a soul defiled by mortal sin. Briefly but forcefully Peter Chrysologus⁶¹ expresses this doctrine in these words: "When the soul departs, at once stench, corruption, putrefaction, worm, ashes, horror, and all things detestable to sight succeed to the body. When God departs, immediately there comes into the soul the stench of sins, the corruption of crimes, the putrefaction of vices, the worm of conscience, the ashes of vanities, the horror of infidelity, and there comes to be in the living sepulcher of the body the funeral of the soul already buried."

5. Remorse of conscience.

Because a) the natural law is indelibly inscribed in the heart of man; b) synderesis always dictates that good is to be done and evil is to be omitted; c) conscience is as it were the herald of God, crying out with a loud voice against the offender of God, hence in the soul of the sinner there arises a most painful struggle. Wherefore the words of Sacred Scripture are most true: "There is no peace for the impious,"⁶² and "We were threatened at our necks; to the weary no rest was given."⁶³ - These remorses of conscience were represented by the ancient pagans under the likeness of the Furies, that is, of women whose hair was snakes or serpents.

6. The guilt of eternal punishment.

This guilt is the debt of punishment to be paid on account of the sin committed. For mortal sin is essentially an offense against God and the greatest disorder. But God, who established the best order in the whole universe, cannot permit that this order be wounded with impunity. Hence St. Thomas⁶⁴ rightly teaches: "Whatever rises up against some order, it is consequent that it be depressed by that order itself or by the prince of the order, ... and this depression indeed is punishment." This punishment must in some way correspond to the disorder or fault committed. Moreover, sin brings in a quasi-infinite fault or malice, as was said above in n. 356. Therefore the punishment which is inflicted on sin must be infinite in some way. In fact that punishment is twofoldly infinite in some way, namely a) because an infinite good is lost, that is, the beatific vision; this punishment is graver and is called the punishment of loss; b) because the damned are punished in gehenna through a quasi-infinite duration, that is, through all eternity, both with the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense. Briefly but adequately this twofold punishment is expressed in the terrible words of Christ to come: "Depart from me [punishment of loss], accursed, into eternal fire [punishment of sense]."⁶⁵ For fuller treatment of the punishments of gehenna, see the treatise on the other world or on the last things.

Not rarely mortal sins already committed are punished in this life by diverse grave punishments, for example diseases, loss of reputation, goods, peace, etc.; just as also sometimes God as a punishment withdraws assisting grace from the sinner, who thence from day to day perpetrates greater and more numerous sins.

From all things said thus far and very briefly indicated, it evidently follows that mortal sin is rightly and deservedly called a mystery of iniquity, and that too most fruitful, namely producing the most deadly effects.

⁴⁸ Sess. 6, c. 15 de iustif. (Denz. n. 808).

⁴⁹ Cf. 1 Petr. 1, 4.

⁵⁰ Cf. 2 Cor. 6, 16; 1 Cor. 3, 16 and 17.

⁵¹ Cf. Rom. 8, 17.

⁵² Whether unformed faith is a true virtue will be said below in the treatise on faith. Theological hope also remains in some way after mortal sin (cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 65, a. 4).

⁵³ Thren. 1, 1.

⁵⁴ Ez. 18, 24.

⁵⁵ Thren. 1, 10.

⁵⁶ S. theol. 3, q. 89, a. 5.

⁵⁷ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 86, a. 1.

⁵⁸ Thren. 1, 6.

⁵⁹ Thren. 2, 4.

⁶⁰ Thren. 4, 8.

⁶¹ Sermo 19 (Migne, Patr. lat. 52, 252).

⁶² Is. 48, 22; 57, 21.

⁶³ Thren. 5, 5.

⁶⁴ S. theol. 1, 2, q. 87, a. 1 (ed. Leon.).

⁶⁵ Matth. 25, 41.

393. It has already been said above, n. 367, that it is very difficult to determine in what precisely the essence of venial sin is situated. But as to the effects which venial sin produces, the Doctors agree sufficiently. The principal effects are:

1. Privation of the actual brightness of the soul.

The soul in the state of sanctifying grace shines like a star. When venial sin comes upon it, this brightness is darkened, although it is not properly stained. St. Thomas deservedly does not admit that a stain properly so called comes from venial sin, as was said above in n. 391. Elsewhere,⁶⁶ however, the Angelic Doctor admits a certain quasi-stain of venial sin, which brings with it "an inclination of affection disordered toward some temporal thing." The stain which is produced in the soul through mortal sin is not unfittingly compared to spiritual leprosy, which disfigures the face of a man and which cannot be removed unless the man's health has been restored, namely through a new infusion of sanctifying grace. But the quasi-stain caused by venial sin is filth adhering externally to the face, which can be washed away by the man himself, namely through the removal of disordered adherence to temporal things.

2. Difficulty in the exercise of charity and the other virtues.

St. Thomas constantly teaches that the infused habit of charity cannot be diminished, neither effectively nor meritoriously.⁶⁷ Certainly charity can be destroyed through mortal sin, as was said above in n. 392; it can also be increased through meritorious works, but it cannot be diminished. Hence if someone having charity, for example of 100 degrees, commits a thousand venial sins, he will not obtain less glory in heaven than one who has equal charity without any venial sin. The first indeed will expiate punishments for the thousand venial sins committed through a long duration in purgatory, but when the washing has been completed he will have equal glory with the other. The reason why the habit of infused charity cannot be diminished is this: charity, as existing about the last end, that is, God himself, is not touched by venial sin, which is only a disorder about means to the end. For love of the end can exist whole, even if the means, not necessary, to the end are lightly esteemed. But although venial sin is not able directly to diminish charity, nevertheless it renders the acts of charity and of the other virtues more difficult, because little by little it causes evil passions and contrary habits.

3. Subtraction of many graces.

Venial sin leads to tepidity, and a tepid man is not so disposed to receive divine grace as a fervent man. A darkened crystal does not receive the rays of the sun so purely and abundantly as a transparent glass. Wherefore the words of Sacred Scripture,⁶⁸ "Because thou art lukewarm, and neither cold nor hot, I will begin to vomit thee out of my mouth," can be applied to a soul given over to venial sins. God gradually withdraws grace from such a soul, and from this withdrawal the exercise of virtues becomes more burdensome, while a fall into mortal sin becomes more imminent. Hence as another effect of venial sin there is assigned:

4. Disposition toward mortal sin.

Although ten times a hundred thousand venial sins do not equal one mortal sin, yet venial sins often repeated, fully deliberate, proximately dispose to mortal sin. For, as is clear from what has been said, through venial sin the fervor of charity is diminished, disordered passion is increased, divine grace is gradually withdrawn, and as an almost inevitable consequence there is a fall into mortal sin. Hence it is said: "He that contemneth small things shall fall by little and little."⁶⁹

5. Guilt of temporal punishment.

Since venial sin is a true fault, to it there is owed a punishment, which indeed is not eternal, but temporal or transitory. Many punishments of venial sin are indeed sometimes inflicted on this earth; but in the other life there is inflicted the punishment of purgatory, concerning which St. Thomas⁷⁰ teaches with the other Doctors that the least punishment of purgatory exceeds the greatest punishment of this life. That purgatory really exists has been defined many times by the Church, for example by the Second Council of Lyons,⁷¹ by the Council of Florence,⁷² and by the Council of Trent.⁷³

⁶⁶ S. theol. 3, q. 87, a. 3 ad 3.

⁶⁷ S. theol. 2, 2, q. 24, a. 10. Of the scholastics, almost Dionysius the Carthusian alone taught that venial sins directly diminish sanctifying grace and charity.

⁶⁸ Apoc. 3, 16.

⁶⁹ Eccli. 19, 1. Cf. S. theol. 1, 2, q. 88, a. 3.

⁷⁰ 4, dist. 21, q. 1, a. 1.

⁷¹ Denz. n. 464.

⁷² Denz. n. 693.

⁷³ Denz. n. 777, 840, 983.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 85; 109, a. 7; De Malo q. 2, a. 11 and 12.

515. The first effect of sin is the diminution or corruption of the good of nature, not indeed of the principles by which human nature is constituted and of the properties which flow from it (for example, intellect and will), but of the natural inclination to virtue.¹ For:

¹ It is natural because according to its beginning it is from nature, insofar as the intellect and will tend to good (I-II, q. 63, a. 1), and because it perfects nature in its own order.

1. On the part of privation: by mortal sin (and therefore by original sin) man is turned away from the ultimate end, whence the powers of the soul are deprived of due subordination to one another and to God, and thus are deprived of due order to the good of virtue and negatively do not attain their end. This subordination in the state of pure nature would be had imperfectly from the fact that, reason ordering, the will would convert itself to the ultimate end, God, and thus by one act would habitually subject all the powers of man to itself and refer them to God; but in the state of innocence it was perfect through the supernatural gifts of original justice. Hence through original sin, which takes away original justice, man is also said to be wounded in his natural goods, because in him all the powers of the soul remain deprived of their proper order by which they were naturally ordered to virtue. Insofar as reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of ignorance; insofar as the will is deprived of order to the good, there is the wound of malice; insofar as the irascible appetite is deprived of its order to the arduous, there is the wound of infirmity; insofar as the concupiscible appetite is deprived of its order to the delectable moderated by reason, there is the wound of concupiscence.

2. On the part of conversion: by actual sin, as by every human act, there comes about an inclination to similar acts; this disposition is an obstacle by which man is impeded from being easily borne toward the contrary good of virtue. Therefore the very inclination to virtue is diminished, not indeed in itself (and consequently it cannot be totally corrupted), but insofar as a positive impediment of attaining the end is set against it. Hence from actual sin the four wounds inflicted by original sin are increased and aggravated.

516. Remark. - From this is understood the doctrine of the Scholastics, according to whom sin has as its effect the privation of mode, species, and order:

"Mode, species, and order follow every created good, insofar as it is such, and also every being. For every being and good is considered through some form, according to which the species is taken. But the form of each thing ... is according to some measure ... and from this it has a certain mode, which regards measure. From its form, moreover, each thing is ordered to another. Thus, therefore, according to diverse grades of goods there are diverse grades of mode, species, and order.

a) Therefore there is a certain good pertaining to the very substance of nature, which has its mode, species, and order; and this is neither taken away nor diminished by sin.

b) There is also a certain good of natural inclination, and this also has its mode, species, and order; and this is diminished by sin ... but is not totally taken away.

c) There is also a certain good of virtue and grace, which also has its mode, species, and order; and this is totally taken away by mortal sin.

d) There is also a certain good which is the ordered act itself, which also has its mode, species, and order; and the privation of this is essentially sin itself (as to the formal element).

And thus it is clear how sin is the privation of mode, species, and order; and takes away or diminishes mode, species, and order" q. 85, a. 4.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 86; q. 89, a. 1.

517. The second effect of sin is the debt of guilt, that is, the debt of repairing the offense brought upon God through sin. For after actual sin has been committed, man remains guilty of it; for when the voluntary act by which man recedes from the light of reason and the law of God ceases, man does not for this reason immediately return to it, but for this there is required a motion of the will contrary to the first motion, "just as if someone is distant from another by some motion, he does not immediately become near to him when the motion ceases, but it is necessary that he approach by returning through a contrary motion" (q. 86, a. 2). Hence guilt is imputed to man until he has retracted it and obtained its pardon.

518. In mortal sin, the debt of guilt imports a state of habitual aversion from the ultimate end, which is habitual sin: for it is impossible that man be guilty of aversion from the end and at the same time be converted to the end. Hence man remains turned away from God until by conversion he returns to God (Is. XVII; Matt. IX, 1-7; 12-13; Luke VIII, 37-50; I John III, 5; Ps. L, 4). Habitual sin, in the natural order, would be only the privation of the habitual ordering of reason (and will) to God; but in the supernatural order, since conversion and ordering to God is made through grace, the privation of habitual conversion to God is also the privation of habitual grace making one pleasing (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 15, can. 27; sess. 7, can. 6). It is not a mere punishment or effect, but true habitual sin, because it is a voluntary and culpable inordination: voluntary, as foreseen by him who sins mortally and therefore willed at least in its cause or indirectly; culpable, because he is bound to forestall and remove such inordination.

519. Mortal sin leaves a stain in the soul. - For our habitual ordering to God, whether through reason or through grace, is the beauty of the soul: "the soul of man," says St. Thomas, a. 1, "has a twofold brightness, one indeed from the shining of the light of natural reason through which it is directed in its acts, another from the shining of the divine light, namely, of wisdom and grace." Hence the privation of habitual ordering to God is at the same time the loss of due brightness and therefore a stain of the soul. Hence habitual sin and stain are not distinguished really but only by reason: insofar as it takes away order to God as ultimate end, it is considered as habitual guilt and separation from God; insofar, however, as it takes away the due beauty of the soul, it is considered as stain¹ (Jer. II, 22; Zach. XIII, 1; Ps. XIV; Ps. CXVIII; Ecclus. XXXI; Is. IV, 4; Ezek. XIV; XXXVI, 23; Josh. XXII, 17; John XIII, 10; Eph. V, 27; Tit. I, 15; I Cor. VI, 11; Council of Trent, sess. 5, can. 2; prop. 56 of Baius).

¹ "Stain is properly said in corporeal things when some bright body loses its brightness from contact with another body ... But there is as it were a certain touch of the soul, when it adheres to certain things through love. But when it sins, it adheres to certain things against the light of reason and of divine law ... Hence the very detriment of brightness arising from such contact is metaphorically called a stain of the soul ... Therefore it must be said that the soul is not defiled by lower things by the power of those things, as though they acted upon the soul; but rather conversely the soul defiles itself by its own action, by adhering to them inordinately against the light of reason and of divine law" (q. 87, a. 1 and ad 1).

Nevertheless it does not follow that the stains of diverse sins do not differ among themselves, or that a second mortal sin does not cause a new stain, since habitual grace has already been removed by the first. For, as St. Thomas says, a. 1, ad 3, stain signifies the privation of the brightness of the soul in order to the cause, which is the act of sin, and therefore stains are many, diverse, and unequal according as the sins which induced them are many, diverse, and unequal, just as shadows are diverse according to the diverse bodies impeding the light. Moreover a second sin of itself is privative of grace and would take it away if it found it; and therefore it is a new cause of privation and thus a new stain.

520. What venial sin leaves behind. - Venial sin, which is contrary to fervor, that is, the exercise of charity, is imputed unto guilt until man, charity influencing, through an act of contrition or another equivalent act which contains virtual displeasure for sin, retracts it and thus compensates its inordination. But since it does not take away nor diminish the habitual or permanent order to God and the habitual beauty of the soul (Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 11; sess. 14, c. 5), it follows that it does not induce a stain properly so called and remaining; but insofar as here and now it impedes actual brightness arising from acts of the virtues, it is sometimes said improperly, for one moment, to stain the soul.²

² The greatest charity is compatible with venial sin; therefore the fervor which venial sin impedes is not habitual.

St. Thomas, I-II, q. 87; q. 72, a. 5; Suppl., q. 99, a. 1; De Malo q. 1, a. 4 and 5; q. 7, a. 1 and 8; C. Gent. III, 140-146; II Sent. d. 24, a. 2, ad 5.

521. The third effect of sin is the debt of punishment, that is, the debt of punishment to be paid on account of sin, or the obligation of undergoing punishment. For:

a) In order that law be observed by men, it must have coercive force through fear of punishment; in other words, it is required that law be sanctioned by a proportionate punishment (n. 237). But sin is against the eternal law of God. Therefore before God it induces the debt of a punishment proportionate to it.

b) Justice requires that the equality of order which has been injured be repaired. But the sinner violates the equality of order, while he prefers his own will to the divine will and satisfies it against the order of God. Therefore justice requires that equality be repaired, and that man be compelled to suffer something against his own will according to the ordination of the will of God, "namely, that he who has indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the commandment of God, according to the order of divine justice should suffer something against that which he would will, whether spontaneously or unwillingly" (q. 87, a. 6); and this is punishment.

c) He who rises up against some order ought to be repressed by the prince of the order. But by sin man acts not only against the order of reason, and sometimes against the order of a human legislator, but also against the order of God. Therefore he incurs a threefold punishment: one from himself, which is remorse of conscience; another sometimes from man; but the third from God (q. 87, a. 1; - Exod. XVIII; Ps. XXXI; Matt. XII, 36; XXV; Rom. II, 9).

522. Punishment is an afflictive evil inflicted in vengeance of sin against the will of the one suffering, or the privation of a delectable good which the will unwillingly suffers against the natural appetite.¹

¹ It is, namely, against the habitual tendency of nature, and not always against the actual and elicited appetite of the will, since someone can be ignorant of it, indeed can voluntarily undergo it, in which case nevertheless it remains involuntary in a certain respect.

One punishment is 1. concomitant, which guilt itself, as efficient cause, brings with itself intrinsically (Wis. V, 7; 2-13; Luke XV, 18), for example, privation of health, shame, remorse of conscience, privation of grace as a stain; - 2. another is inflicted, which is brought from without by God or man as efficient cause and of which guilt is the meritorious cause, for example, privation of grace as the physical destitution of a supernatural principle by God. This regards either only past sin, and then it is a) either punishment simply and strictly so called, or merely vindicative, if evil is inflicted from justice alone, solely in vengeance of the violated order, namely, in punishment of one's own sin (Ezek. XVIII, 20) and for restoring the injured order of justice, for example, the punishment of the future life; or b) satisfactoria, if the evil inflicted either by the judge or by the sinner upon himself is voluntarily sustained, for one's own sins or even for the sins of others, for compensating the injury brought upon God, for example, sacramental penance, fasting, an evil sent by God: this, involuntary in a certain respect, is voluntary simply, which diminishes the account of punishment; - or c) it also regards future sin, and then it is medicinal, if evil is inflicted or tolerated also from mercy, as a remedy of salvation, as censure is: namely, for correction and healing against future sins, whether of him who is punished or of others, for example, a punishment of the present life inflicted by God.

523. Thesis I. Mortal sin per se induces the debt or obligation of eternal punishment, as inducing an inordination of itself irreparable. It is of faith.

It is proved 1. from the Scriptures: Matt. XXV, 41, 46; Mark IX, 42; Is. LXVI, 24; Apoc. XIV, 11; XX-XXII; II Thess. I, 9;

2. from Tradition, namely, from the Athanasian Symbol, and from the definition of the Fourth Lateran Council (cap. Firmiter), and Trent, sess. 6, can. 24 and 25; sess. 14, can. 5;

3. by reason: Mortal sin induces an inordination of itself irreparable; therefore eternal punishment is owed to it. Proof: Mortal sin takes away the principle of moral life by which it could be repaired, namely, ordering to the ultimate end (in the present order: grace and charity), by which man adheres to God and by which he can obtain pardon from God by satisfying. But no one can recover the principle of life, in the case, ordering to the ultimate end (or charity), by his own powers. Therefore mortal sin of itself is irreparable, so that from its nature its disorder remains forever. But while the cause remains, the effect remains. Therefore, while the disorder of sin remains, the debt of punishment remains, and therefore mortal sin from its nature can be punished forever² (q. 87, a. 2).

² It is no objection that the inordination perpetually remaining after death is no longer voluntary, because the time of meriting and demeriting has passed; whence it ought not to be punished perpetually. For the perpetual disorder is voluntary in its cause, because one sinning voluntarily cast away ordering to the end, and indeed irreparably.

It is confirmed: a) The first principle of moral life is ordering to the ultimate end, just as the soul is the principle of animal life, and truths evident of themselves are the first principles of intellectual life. But sickness can be repaired because something of the vital principle remains, but death, which removes the principle of life, cannot be repaired by nature; similarly error in conclusions can be repaired from reduction to principles, but error in first principles is irreparable. Therefore similarly sin which turns away from the ultimate end, or inordination concerning the ultimate end, is irreparable for man; although it can be repaired by the power of God.

b) The sinner voluntarily places himself in a state from which, unless divinely aided, he cannot be rescued. Hence from the very fact that he wills to sin, as much as is in him, he binds himself to remain always in sin, and consequently implicitly wills to remain in sin perpetually. Just as he who would take away his own eyes would deserve to lack sight forever, so he who voluntarily turns himself away from God deserves to be deprived of God forever.

c) The sinner constitutes his ultimate end and perfect happiness in a creature against God, and consequently wills to order his whole life to it and always to adhere to it; he prefers the fruition of created good to the eternal fruition of the ultimate end, and consequently much more would have willed to enjoy that created good forever. And therefore he implicitly has the will of sinning forever, and deserves to be punished in his own eternal thing, since he has sinned against the eternal good.³ - For he totally turns himself away from God, the ultimate end, and renounces him. But he who renounces the end because he adheres to another, deserves never to obtain it, because the ultimate end from its nature is perpetual. Hence he who renounces it, renounces it forever.

³ It is no objection that the one sinning sometimes has a contrary will of not always adhering to the created good, or even of converting himself. For when there are several opposed wills, the predominant intention elides the others; but the will of sinning is efficacious and has effect, whence it is predominant; and therefore the opposed intention is only conditioned, or even a mere velleity. For knowing that these things cannot be composed, the sinner simply prefers and chooses created good as the ultimate end. "Just as if someone were to throw himself into a pit, from which he could not get out unless extraordinarily aided, it could be said that he would will to remain there forever, however much he might think otherwise" (St. Thomas, IV Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3).

d) The sinner contemns eternal life and rejects charity, which is the bond by which he is united to the heavenly society; therefore he deserves to be excluded from that society in perpetuity.

We have proposed the argument for the present order, in which ordering to the ultimate end is made by grace and charity; but it is valid also in the natural order, because no creature can offer condign satisfaction for sin, nor therefore by itself recover the due ordering to the end, as is usually shown in the treatise on the Incarnate Word (n. 536).

524. Thesis II. The punishment of mortal sin is twofold: the punishment of loss and the punishment of sense. - For sin consists in aversion from God and undue conversion to created good. Insofar as it is aversion from God, the infinite good, it justly deserves to be deprived of the infinite good (punishment of loss: I Cor. VI, 9; Matt. XXV, 41; Apoc. XXI-XXII); insofar as it is undue conversion to a creature, a finite good, it justly deserves the punishment of affliction from creatures (punishment of sense; Is. LXVI; Mark IX, 42; Apoc. XIV, 11; Matt. XXV, 41). But since sin is not of infinite gravity on the part of conversion, punishment of infinite bitterness is not required (a. 4).

525. Thesis III. Venial sin of itself does not merit anything except temporal punishment. - For since it does not take away order to the ultimate end and charity from which it can be repaired, of itself it is reparable and therefore of itself does not merit eternal punishment, but temporal. Per accidens, however, according to St. Thomas, it is punished by eternal punishment, if it becomes irremissible because it is joined to mortal sin (a. 5).

526. Thesis IV. When guilt has been remitted, not always is every punishment remitted, as is proved in the treatise on Penance, and is clear from the definition of the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 14, can. 30, and sess. 14, can. 22; but satisfactoria can remain, because the sinner cannot be converted to God unless his will accepts the order of divine justice, according to which "he who has indulged his own will more than he ought, acting against the commandment of God, should suffer something against that which he would will, whether spontaneously or unwillingly" (a. 6). Hence it is required "that he himself spontaneously assume punishment for himself in recompense for past guilt, or also patiently sustain what is brought upon him by God" (Wis. X; Gen. III; II Kings XII, 13).

Hence, although "the stain being removed, the wound of sin has been healed as to the will, punishment is still required 1. for the healing of the other powers of the soul, which through preceding sin were disordered, namely, that by contraries they may be cured; 2. it is required for restoring the equality of justice; and 3. for removing the scandal of others, so that those who have been scandalized by guilt may be edified by punishment" (ad 3).

527. Remark. - Let it be noted that punishment does not correspond to guilt according to the dignity of him against whom one sins (because thus to any sin whatever there would be owed a punishment infinite in intensity), but according to the disposition and inordination of the sinner, - and indeed a) the quantity of punishment or bitterness corresponds to the quantity of guilt, which is not infinite simply but greater or lesser in various degree according to diverse gravity; b) the duration of punishment corresponds not to the quantity but to the duration of guilt, not on the part of the act which passes away, but on the part of perpetual inordination (a. 4, ad 3, coll. a. 3, ad 1; IV Sent. d. 46, q. 1, a. 3, ad 6).

528. The evil of guilt and the evil of punishment differ:⁴ a) guilt is prior to punishment, because it induces punishment; b) guilt is according to the will (to operate evil), punishment against the will (to suffer evil); c) guilt is evil in action or a deficient act, punishment is evil in the agent according as he is deprived of permanent perfection; d) guilt is opposed to the honorable good, punishment to the delectable good. Hence:

⁴ Cf. De Malo, q. 1, a. 4 and 5.

1. The evil of guilt is greater than the evil of punishment; whence it is never licit to commit sin, even venial sin, to avert any punishments whatever, even those of hell.

DISSERTATION VII

ON THE EFFECTS OF SIN

St. Thomas, Ia IIae, qq. 85, 86 and 87.

V. Question IV. What are the effects of original sin? Answer: The first effect, or penalty, of original sin is the privation of original justice, adorned with which the soul obeyed God and held dominion over all the inferior faculties. This harmony being disturbed and the yoke shaken off, the soul remained besieged by an intestine tumult of appetites.