Gravity of the Sin of Hatred

Gravity of the Sin of Hatred of Neighbor.—(a) Hatred, whether of dislike or of enmity, is from its nature a mortal sin, since it is directly opposed to the virtue of charity, which is the life of the soul.

(b) Dislike, if enmity is not joined to it, is rarely in fact a mortal sin. Aversions and antipathies for others usually are either indeliberate, or have to do with what are real or fancied defects in others. Dislike is a mortal sin only when one despises another so much that one deliberately loathes even that which is of divine provenance in the other, or dislikes a real imperfection so immoderately as to inflict serious injury (e.g., by refusing pardon or the common signs of charity, by giving grave scandal, etc.)

(c) Enmity in fact is often only a venial sin, either because one wishes only a small harm (e.g., the loss of a small sum of money), or because one wishes harm, even a great harm (e.g., the commission of mortal sin), without full deliberation. Enmity is a mortal sin, however, when one deliberately wishes a grave evil (e.g., mortal sin or the loss of reputation) to one’s neighbor.

Hatred Compared with Other Sins Against the Neighbor.—(a) Hatred is a graver sin than other internal sins against the neighbor, such as envy, anger; for, while each of these latter attacks some particular kind of good of the neighbor or only to a limited degree, hatred may be directed against any good and knows no measure. Thus, covetousness is directed against the external goods or possessions of a neighbor, while hate may extend to either internal or external goods. Envy is opposed to the neighbor’s good relatively, in so far as it is considered an obstacle to one’s own glory, but hate detests another’s good absolutely. The hater finds his satisfaction, not in any profit derived for self, but in his aversion for another’s good, and the harm that is wished his neighbor. This comparison here made should be understood, other things being equal, so that hatred of another’s life is contrasted with envy of his life, etc.; for, if the goods are not the same, hatred may be a lesser sin, as when hatred of a neighbor’s temporal good is compared with envy of his spiritual good. (b) Hatred of a neighbor is a more serious sin than external offenses done against him, for hatred sets the will wrong, and it is in the will that sin takes root: “He who hates his brother is a murderer” (I John, iii. 15). The external act, on the contrary (e.g., killing an innocent man), is not a formal sin when the will is guiltless. (c) Hatred is a less harmful sin to the neighbor than external offenses; for example, internal dislike and malevolence will not break any bones, as may happen from a severe blow.

Why is hatred not numbered among the capital vices? As was said above (see 269), a capital vice is one from which naturally and usually other species of sin take their origin. Now, hatred of God or the neighbor, in the natural and usual course of sin, does not precede, but rather follows other sins. Hence, hatred is not a capital sin. This will appear more clearly if we distinguish two kinds of hatred:

(a) Hate of that which is truly evil and opposed to the true good of man (e.g., hate of vice), is naturally prior to other disinclinations, since rational nature first inclines one to love its good and hate its evil (see 1106).

(b) Hate of that which is not evil (as hate of God or of the neighbor), is naturally subsequent to other sins, for it is only a nature already corrupt that detests true goodness. This does not mean, however, that the whole catalogue of lesser sins must have been committed before hatred is arrived at, nor that in individual cases a sinner has not the freedom to hate before he has committed less grave sins.

In a certain wide sense, however, it may be said that hatred of the neighbor goes before all other sins against the neighbor, just as was remarked above (1299) concerning sins against God.

(a) Hence, interpretative hate—i.e., a feeling against another that makes one act in effect as if there were hatred—does precede the other sins. Thus, if Titus, who bore no ill-will to Balbus, becomes enraged against him and inflicts death, the murder is traced back to anger, but this anger may be called hate, inasmuch as dislike of the life of Balbus is included in the desire of revenge.

(b) Formal hate—i.e., dislike of another that is absolute, and not modified by such considerations as desire of revenge or sorrow over one’s own inferiority—does not precede, but rather follows the other sins, as was explained in the previous paragraph. It is only this sin of formal hate that is a special sin. Titus in the example murdered Balbus, not because he had an absolute dislike for him, but because the thirst for revenge made Balbus displeasing to him.

The causes of the sin of hatred are as follows: (a) causes that dispose one to hate are anger and envy, for to desire evil to another, for revenge or on account of one’s own glory, prepares the way to desire evil to him absolutely, which is hatred. Envy, however, disposes to hate more than anger, since it is more akin to hatred: anger wishes evil to another as something owed to justice, but both envy and hatred look upon the neighbor’s good as a thing distasteful. (b) The cause that induces sinful hatred of the neighbor is envy; for one cannot hate that which is good unless one regards it as in some way disagreeable, and it is the vice of envy that makes one regard one’s neighbor’s good as one’s own evil. Hatred of God also indirectly results from envy, for, while the creature does not envy God, his envy of his neighbor breeds hatred of his fellow-man, and this in turn may produce hatred of God.

S. Th. I-II, q. 29; II-II, q. 34.

944. Hatred is a motion of the appetite by which we are ill-affected toward something. For just as love is a consonance of the appetite with that which is fitting to it, so hatred is a dissonance toward that which is repugnant, or evil. Now hatred is twofold:

1. hatred of abomination or aversion, by which we turn away from something (a thing or a person) as evil or harmful to us; when there is question of a person it is called hatred of a quality;

2. hatred of enmity or malevolence, or hatred of the person himself according to himself, by which, from displeasure at some person, we will evil to him, because it is evil to him, that is, stopping in his evil, so that, namely, it may go ill with him.

Hatred of abomination is opposed to love of concupiscence; hatred of enmity is opposed to love of benevolence. But as love of concupiscence disposes to love of benevolence, so the former hatred disposes to this latter hatred: for from the fact that we turn away from someone as displeasing and troublesome to us, it often happens that we will evil to him, and regard his evil as our good.

945. Hatred of God. - According to his essence, God cannot be had in hatred, because by essence he is goodness itself; and therefore he who sees this essence does not have God in hatred. But insofar as from him there comes to us an effect which we regard as evil, he can be had in hatred by us (cf. Num. X, 35; Deut. XXXII, 41; Ps. LXXIII, 23; Jn. XV, 24), for example, insofar as he prohibits sins or punishes sinners.

This is a sin, and always mortal, unless it is done from indeliberation: for it is always a grave disorder to turn away from the highest Good, in whom there is nothing to be turned away from; or to will evil to him who is supremely lovable. Indeed it is the greatest of all sins: 1. because it is directly opposed to the dilection of God, which is the principal act of the more worthy virtue, charity, and therefore it is also directly opposed to the infinite goodness of God; 2. because precisely that by which something is mortal sin is the aversion of the will from God; but this is had in itself, essentially, and explicitly in hatred of God, while in other sins it is found only implicitly, participatively, and according to another; therefore hatred of God is the gravest sin of all. - But hatred of enmity toward God is graver than hatred of abomination: the former is opposed to the infinite intrinsic goodness of God, the latter to his external manifestation and glory.

He sins by hatred of enmity a) who wills God not to be, or not to be omnipotent, omniscient, just, etc.; - b) who is saddened concerning his perfections or rejoices concerning offense against him, concerning the violation of God's precepts; - c) who persecutes the works of God and intends to lessen his external glory, because it is displeasing to God. Thus the devil desires and procures evil to God because it is God's evil.

946. Hatred of neighbor. - Hatred of abomination of neighbor is good, if he is had in hatred according to that which is evil in him (Wis. XIV, 9; Ps. CXVIII, 113; CXXXVIII, 21), for example, insofar as he is a sinner, enemy, persecutor, harmful to us, etc., unless the hatred is greater than the cause deserves. On the contrary, it is a sin if he is had in hatred according to something which is good in him, for example, insofar as he is pious, just, prudent, etc.¹ - Hatred of enmity toward neighbor, by which we will evil to him as evil, so that it may go ill with him, is always a sin. Thus he sins who 1. desires the inconvenience of neighbor as such and taken absolutely; 2. rejoices concerning his evil as it is evil to him; or 3. is saddened concerning good as it is good to him.

¹ Some say that hatred of abomination, not of a quality but of a person, insofar as this person is held as unworthy of all dilection, is always a sin and most grave, because it is to exclude from beatitude. But this is already hatred of enmity, as being hatred of the person according to himself: already to will that he have no good.

The sin of hatred toward neighbor is mortal from its genus because it is against charity (I Jn. II, 9; III, 14-15; IV, 20). Nevertheless it can be venial, not only from indeliberation, as if it is done from a sudden motion of anger, but also from lightness of matter, for example, if we wish a slight evil to neighbor, or if the aversion is slight, as ordinarily simple displeasure is without imprecation of evil. Nevertheless this is dangerous, especially if it lasts long, because it will easily happen that the evils which here and there befall neighbor are pleasing.

Hatred of neighbor, if it is considered on the part of the disorder of the one sinning, is the gravest of sins against neighbor, because thus our will is most greatly disordered toward him.² Nevertheless it is not the greatest on the part of the effect, namely, of the harm inflicted on neighbor: thus theft, homicide, detraction, etc., are greater.

² Namely, other sins against neighbor participate in the character of hatred, Cajetan notes.

947. Hatred of neighbor is multiple in species. - Hatreds of a quality of neighbor differ in species according to specifically diverse motives, for example, to hate neighbor because he is pious or because he has brought about a just damage.

Hatreds of neighbor by which we wish (with inefficacious desire) that diverse evils befall him are probably of the same species, because these evils are sought for him only under the general character of evil; whence the evils are not to be specified in confession. On the contrary, hatreds by which we desire (with true efficacious desire) to inflict diverse evils on neighbor are certainly of diverse species, because the desire of committing a sin has the malice of the work with all the circumstances; whence the evils desired are to be declared in confession. Thus the will of taking away reputation and the will of killing differ.

948. Observations. - 1. Formal hatred of oneself is not given, as being repugnant to nature.

2. To will evil to someone insofar as it is a good for him or for others is not hatred; indeed, it is licit, if the order of charity is preserved (cf. n. 889). Nevertheless it would be a sin to will the evil of another against the order of charity, that is, on account of a good which does not equal it: thus a son cannot will the death of his father on account of the inheritance (cf. props. 13, 14, 15 condemned by Innocent XI).

3. Hatred of abomination concerning only the evil of neighbor is not simply hatred, but hatred in a certain respect and mixed with love: "This very thing, that in a brother we hate fault and defect of good, pertains to love of the brother: for it is of the same character that we will the good of someone and that we hate his evil. Whence, taking hatred of a brother simply (by not willing good), it is always with sin" (a. 3).

4. True hatred is cured with difficulty; nevertheless penitents often confess as hatreds things which are not such, or at least are not grave. Thus when they affirm that they cannot forget an injury, or cannot look at, speak to, or salute someone, or cannot do so without vehement emotion, it must be investigated whether these things are not mere natural aversion from a true or apparent offense, - or a pure affection of the sensitive appetite from diversity of disposition without sufficient deliberation, - or a desire of evil from an honorable end. But if they do not wish a grave evil to neighbor, nor refuse the ordinary signs of dilection, nor is another grave inconvenience feared from that affection (for example, contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge), they are to be absolved.

5. St. Alphonsus observes, Th. M., l. II, n. 30, ad 3: "A private person who, being averse from another, flees him, if he does this so that he may deprive him of his conversation and consolation, and thus sadden him, and it may go ill with him, it is hatred of enmity and a sin. - But if, wishing no evil, you only flee because he is contrary to your nature, or is accustomed to be troublesome to you, it is hatred of aversion and a sin, if it is without reason: such it will not be if he is a very harsh person, provided contempt, scandal, and desire for revenge are absent."

6. Hatred of neighbor formally, according to the character of the object, and therefore more directly, arises from envy, through which the very good of neighbor is rendered saddening and consequently hateful. But dispositively it arises from anger: for first, through anger, man apprehends the evil of neighbor according to a certain measure, as it has the character of revenge; but, anger persevering, man comes to considering and seeking the evil of neighbor absolutely and according to itself, which pertains to the character of hatred (a. 6, ad 3).

To no one is it doubtful that hatred is a sin against Charity, as the S. Doct. shows at length on 15. Ioannis. Therefore he rebukes there the haters of God: They have hated me, and my Father. And the haters of the neighbor: But because you are not of the world, therefore the world hateth you. Levit. 19. Thou shalt not hate thy brother in thy heart. Prima Ioan. 3. He who hateth his brother, is a murderer. Therefore the haters of the neighbor are rebuked, Amos 5. Proverb. 9. as S. Bonaventure reports there on 15. Ioan. Whence D. August. tract. 5. in primam Ioan.: He has not moved his hand to kill a man, and already he is held a murderer by the Lord. That one shall live; and this one is already judged an assassin. I said, however, that hatred whose material object is God, or man, is a sin; for if hatred be borne toward the sinner, as such, it is not evil, as D. Bonaventure notes on 15. Ioan., which that Psalm 138 proves: With perfect hatred I hated them, where D. Gregory in the Pastorali, p. 3. cap. 1. admon. 23.: Perfect hatred, whereby vice is hated and nature loved.

Or, if even our dear ones stand in the way of the divine service, they are to be hated, Lucae 14. If anyone come to me, and hate not Father, and Mother, as S. Bonaventure observes on that passage. But hatred against God, who is Light, Truth, and the Highest Good, is most grave and monstrous, as the S. Doct. expounds at length on 15. Ioan., ruminating those words: If I had not done among them the works which no other hath done, they would not have sin. But now both they have seen, and have hated me, and my father.

I assert first, that hatred of God is the gravest sin.

It is proved by D. Bonav. loc. cit. first with the reasoning of D. August. tract. 92. in Ioan. and Chrysost. homil. 72. in Ioan., taken from that cited Ioan. 15.: They have hated me without cause. For where is the highest good, outside of which there is no good, and in which nothing evil is to be found, it would necessarily, as to specification, be to be loved; and it is most monstrous to hate it. It is confirmed from Aristotle 8. Eth. cap. 10.: That is worst which is contrary to the best. But hatred of God is contrary to Charity, which is the highest virtue, since it is borne toward the Highest Good insofar as it is the Highest Good: Therefore.

It is proved secondly by D. Bonav. in the Incendio amoris, and Stimulo amoris, because, as it is the greatest duty to love the Highest Goodness, from which there come to us Being, Life, and all good things; so it is the greatest abomination and iniquity, to be carried in hatred against that goodness, and to will its destruction.

It is proved thirdly by D. Bonav. in the places cited, and elsewhere everywhere, with the reasoning which D. Thom. also uses, art. 2.: because as Charity is best, because the whole adheres wholly to God, as God is; so hatred of him is worst, because it turns the whole away from God, and in every way. With these and similar arguments all the works of the Seraphic Doctor are filled.

S. Bonaventure notes, however, that wayfaring men ordinarily do not hate God explicitly, but only implicitly, insofar as they are turned away from him, that they may be converted to a changeable good; and therefore all sins virtually contain hatred of God, as Valentia also notes, disp. 3. quaest. 11. puncto 2.

I assert secondly, that to hate the neighbor is a most grave sin.

It is proved by the S. Doct. ad cap. 15. Ioan. and collat. 70. homi. de enim., where those are called haters of the neighbor, as I said. There he brings forward many Fathers asserting hatred to be detestable: Gregory homil. 27. in Evang. and D. August. saying: To hold hatred against a brother is to stop up the fountain of Charity.

Hence the S. Doct. lib. 1. de profectu religiosi, cap. 29., among the remedies of hatred, puts first to consider seriously that God does not spare him who does not spare, as is said Matth. 18. Whence he who wishes to be saved must lay aside hatred, and it is better to do this with certainty; now it is always of its genus a mortal sin; but per accidens it can be venial, first from imperfection of deliberation. Secondly, when he wishes the neighbor the greatest evil. So Suarez de Charitate, tract. 3. disp. 6. sect. 1. Azorius Tom. 3. lib. 2. cap. 20. Sylvester v. odium. Fagundez in 10. praecept. Decalogi, lib. 10. cap. 2. num. 22.

Nay, of its genus it is the greatest sin, among those things which are done against the neighbor. So D. Thom. quaest. 34. art. 4. and Suarez. For although the harms inflicted on the neighbor aggravate other sins above hatred; yet this is worse by the disordination of the will, because it turns one altogether from the Neighbor, the object of Charity, by the natural and Divine law of loving.

It is not placed, however, among the capital vices, because other sins do not proceed first from it, but it is rather the dregs of other sins — Envy, Anger, etc. — from which dregs others then crawl. So D. Thom. art. 5. Fagundez num. 24.

From what has been said you have that hatreds against God and against the neighbor are diverse in species, because the objects are diverse; nor have they of themselves that one should be for the sake of the other, as we said in Charity with D. Bonavent. 3. dist. 27. quaest. 2.

Nay, each hatred seems to be doubled, insofar as they turn away from the natural and supernatural Divine good; likewise also that of the neighbor, as Bannes said, art. 6.; but Valentia puncto 2. assents to the opposite.